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The following project is intended as a contribution to the inter-disciplinary enterprise of 
cognitive film theory. Employing a cognitive approach, the project examines our capacity 
to respond emotionally to audiovisual fictions in general and cinematic fictions in 
particular. In order to structure and focus the investigation, the project centres on the 
paradox of fiction: namely, the question of why and how we respond emotionally to 
fictional characters and events, especially when we are consciously aware of their fictional 
- i.e., non-existent - status. (It also considers the related paradoxes of representation and 
empathy.) The main strategy for solving the paradox is to challenge the proposition that 
(cinematic) emotions require 'existence beliefs'; in tum, this strategy can be divided into 
'direct' and 'indirect approaches', as exemplified by the 'seeing' and 'thought theories' 
respectively. An additional strategy is to revise the Cartesian framework which underlies 
the paradox as a whole. 
The first three main chapters explicitly address the direct approach. The process of 
direct engagement can be divided roughly into a 'seeing stage' and a 'reacting stage'. In 
light of this, Chapter 2 outlines a modular and computational view of the mindlbrain, 
considering some of the ways in which we 'see' the world and the cinema. In a 
corresponding fashion, Chapter 3 outlines a multi-level model of the emotion system from 
a neurobiological perspective, considering some of the ways in which we 'react' to what 
we see. The function of Chapter 4 is to develop the multi-level model in question by 
adopting a connectionist and cognitive perspective, thereby tracing both an associative 
network and a cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion. The final main chapter -
Chapter 5 - explicitly addresses the indirect approach. Given that appeals to 'thought' and 
'imagination' are potentially problematic, it re-traces the simulative route to (cinematic) 
emotion, demonstrating how the multi-level model acts as both a constraint on, and an 
alternative to, emotional simulation. 
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NOTE ON I}RESENTATION 
Throughout this thesis, I have employed two malO strategies which, when considered 
together, provide an overview of the central arguments. First, a detailed contents page is 
included at the beginning of each chapter. Each contents page is broken down into sections 
and sub-sections; each of these breakdowns is intended to reflect the basic structure of the 
psychological processes being described. Second, substantial use has been made of certain 
types of visual aid. Regarding the figures, boxological diagrams provide the best way of 
illustrating certain psychological processes, whilst graphs provide the best way of 
illustrating either functional or inverse relationships between two or more factors. Tables 
are used to summarise key points and frame stills to illustrate key moments from the films 
under discussion. A different numbering system has been employed for each type of visual 
aid: for example, Figure 1.1 , Table 1.1, and Frame 1.1. 
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Given the significant role emotion plays in both our everyday lives and our experience of 
art, historically the subject of emotion has been strangely neglected in both the sciences 
and the humanities. In the last twenty or so years, however, emotion has become 
something of a hot topic of research in both philosophy and psychology. And in the last ten 
or so years, this development has been reflected in film studies by the interdisciplinary 
enterprise known as cognitive film theory. 1 Although the origin of the cognitive approach 
to film can be traced back to Hugo Miinsterberg writing as early as 1916, the cognitive 
approach was only significantly revived by David Bordwell as recently as 1985. Since 
then, a small group of theorists have offered cognitivist accounts of cinematic emotions: 
for instance, Noel Carroll (1990) focuses on our reactions of fear and disgust to the 
proverbial monster in horror films; Ed Tan (1996) argues that our primary emotion when 
viewing a film is one of 'interest'; whilst Torben Grodal (1997) describes the way in which 
we emotionally process a film's 'narrative flow' . Most recently, Greg M. Smith (2003) has 
proposed an 'associative network model' of the film viewer's emotion system. 
The following project is intended as a contribution to this particular field of 
enquiry. Considering the obviously broad nature of the field, I will necessarily narrow my 
focus to an investigation of a number of inter-related paradoxes which seem to arise when 
we consider our capacity to respond emotionally to both fictions in general, and cinematic 
fictions in particular. My hope is that by addressing the problematic assumptions which 
underlie such paradoxes, we may begin to grasp the dynamics of the film viewer's 
perceptual and emotional relationship to the big screen. The task of this opening chapter, 
then, is to revisit the paradoxes in question and the solutions which have been proposed 
I For a recent review of cogni tive film theory, see Carl Plantinga (2001). 
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thus far, before sketching an overview of the type of solution which will be described in 
the subsequent chapters. 
1.1 THE PARADOX OF FICTION 
(a) Fiction or non-fiction? 
Implicit in the question of how we respond emotionally to fictional characters and events is 
the conundrum of why it is that we do so, especially when we are consciously aware of 
their fictional (i.e., non-existent) status. The conundrum that has come to be known as the 
paradox of fiction is best illustrated by considering the type of thought experiment 
proposed by Colin Radford (1975) in a much-cited article entitled 'How Can We Be 
Moved By the Fate of Anna Karenina?': 
Suppose that you have a drink with a man who proceeds to tell you a harrowing story about 
his sister and you are harrowed. After enjoying your reaction he tells you that he doesn't 
have a sister, that he has invented the story. In this case ... we might say that the 'heroine' 
of the account is fictitious. Nonetheless .,. once you have been told this you can no longer 
feel harrowed. (p.68) 
Radford's thought experiment has been used to demonstrate that belief in the 
'existence' of a person or event is necessary for an emotional response to that person or 
event; or, to put it another way round, it has been used to demonstrate that emotions 
require existence beliefs. An existence belief is an example of an epistemic mental state or 
propositional attitude; that is, it consists of a proposition - "the man's sister exists." - and 
an attitude towards that proposition - "I believe that", which is to be distinguished from "I 
desire that", "I hope that", and so forth. The problem arises when we engage with the 
characters and events either described or presented by fictions - say, Leo Tolstoy'S 1877 
novel Anna Karenina, or Clarence Brown's 1935 film adaptation staring Greta Garbo (see 
Frame 1.1). In such cases, we seem to lack the relevant existence beliefs but nevertheless 
retain the ability to respond emotionally. 
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Frame 1.1: The paradox of fiction: Anna Karellina (1935) 
The paradox of fiction can be spelt out more precisely in terms of three apparently 
sound propositions which when considered together produce a contradiction (see Table 
1.1). Radford himself offers what could be described as an irrationality theory of 
emotional responses to fiction. Significantly, he dismisses 'brute facts' and ' biological 
reasons' from the very outset, claiming that the issue under discussion is ' conceptual' in 
nature (ibid., p.67). (As we will see, the distinction between empirical investigation and 
conceptual analysis is not as clear-cut as it appears.) In total, Radford outlines six possible 
solutions to the paradox but rejects each of them, concluding that our capacity to respond 
emotionally to fiction 'involves us in inconsistency and so incoherence' (p.78). 
Table 1.1: The paradox of fiction 
No. Proposition 
1 We do not believe in the 'existence' of fictional characters and events 
2 We are able to respond emotionally to fictional character and events 
3 We must believe in the ' existence' ofa person or event in order to 
respond emotionally to that person or event 
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(b) Challenging the first and second propositions 
Having outlined a non-solution to the paradox of fiction, how have theorists attempted to 
find a positive solution (see Table 1.2)? To date, the main strategy has been to argue that at 
least one of the three propositions is either false or in need of revision. Different theorists 
have attempted to challenge different propositions; let us give a brief overview of their 
intellectual endeavour in logical, as opposed to chronological, order. 2 
(i) The illusion theory 
The first option is to challenge the first proposition of the paradox of fiction. The strong 
version of the illusion theory proposes that we mistakenly believe in the existence of 
fictional characters and events - that is, we are the subjects of some sort of deception -
whilst the weak version proposes that we somehow minimise the effect of our correct 
belief in their non-existence. Dismissing the strong version on the grounds of 
implausibility, Carroll (1990) and others attribute the weak version to the poet Samuel 
Coleridge who, in his 1817 work Biographia Literaria, introduced the notion of the 
'willing suspension of disbelief. (From this point onwards, let us refer to 'existence 
disbeliefs' as non-existence beliefs.) Coleridge's phrase has entered our everyday 
vocabulary; indeed, one could argue that it is the phrase that most readers and viewers 
offer when asked to explain their apparently contradictory responses to fiction. More 
surprisingly, perhaps, the phrase continues to be posited as a serious explanation by both 
psychologists and communications researchers. 
(iiJ The pretend theory 
The second option is to challenge the second proposition by replacing real emotions with 
'pretend' or 'quasi emotions'. Carroll (ibid.) and others attribute the pretend theory to the 
philosopher Kendall Walton (1978). Walton considers it to be 'a principle of common 
2 Part of this discussion will inevitably follow Noel Carroll (1990), pp.60-88. For a more recent discussion, 
see Mette Hjort and Sue Laver (1997), Part 1. 
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sense' that emotions (for example, fear) require existence beliefs (p.6). In light of this 
principle, he suggests that when we consume fictions, we engage in a game of make-
believe: for instance, we pretend to believe that the monster presented by a horror film is 
real and a genuine threat to ourselves, using the corresponding images and sounds as 
'props'. Subsequently, we experience 'pretend fear' or 'quasi-fear sensations' (with 
physiological and behavioural components). 
Is either of these two theories plausible? To begin with Coleridge's illusion theory, the 
notion of 'suspending our disbelief merely replaces one type of contradiction, or 
psychological mystery, with another. As Carroll (ibid., p.67) observes, the notion merely 
'relocates the contradiction by moving it back a step'. In the following chapters, I will 
argue that, if anything, Coleridge got it the wrong way round; our capacity to respond 
emotionally to fictions involves the 'unwilling application of disbelief. The pretend theory 
- whether or not it is attributed to Walton - is equally problematic. As Carroll (p.73) 
argues, the notion of a 'pretend' or 'quasi' emotion 'relegates our emotional responses to 
fiction to the realm of make-believe'. In the following chapters, I will argue that a 
straightforward 'either-or' distinction between 'real' and 'quasi emotions' is untenable, our 
emotional responses to both the real world and the cinema involving many of the same 
pathways and systems. 
(c) Challenging the third proposition 
Contrary to both the illusion and the pretend theories, we want to retain the first and 
second propositions of the paradox of fiction if at all possible: it seems reasonable to say 
that we do not believe in the existence of fictional characters and events on the one hand, 
but that our emotional responses to those characters and events are genuine in significant 
respects on the other. In light of this, one of the most promising lines of enquiry may lie in 
challenging the third proposition: that is, emotions, real or otherwise, do not require 
existence beliefs after all. For pragmatic purposes, it will be helpful to divide the proposed 
solutions into what I will classify as direct and indirect approaches. 
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(i) The direct approach: the seeing theory 
According to the direct approach, we are capable of responding emotionally to the fictional 
character and events presented by film in a 'direct' fashion; that is, in the absence of 
( conscious) mental activity. The main example of the direct approach is provided by 
Malcolm Turvey's (1997) seeing theory of emotional responses to fiction. Turvey bases 
this theory on Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1958) discussion of the verb 'to see' - especially, 
the notion of 'regarding-as'. Another possible example is provided by Joseph Anderson's 
(1996) ecological approach to cognitive film theory. Although Anderson does not focus on 
the paradox of fiction, he bases a large part of his approach on Gibson's (1979) ecological 
theory - especially, the notions of 'direct perception' and 'affordances'. 
(ii) The indirect approach: the thought theory 
In contrast, the indirect approach allows for the role of (conscious) mental activity. 
According to Carroll's (1990) thought theory, we do not respond emotionally to the 
mistaken belief that, say, the monster presented by the horror film actually exists; rather, 
we respond emotionally to the thought of the monster, where the act of thinking is defined 
as the capacity to 'entertain a proposition non-assertively' - that is, without existential 
commitment. Murray Smith (l995b) has advanced a similar theory, arguing that we 
'imaginatively entertain' the scenarios presented by fiction film, using the perceptual data 
in question as a 'prompt'. The thought theory also relates to Gregory Currie's (1995) 
imagination theory which spells out the imagination in terms of offline simulation. 
Both the seeing and thought theories and are on the right lines in attempting to challenge 
the third proposition: emotions, real or otherwise, do not require existence beliefs. Both 
theories, though, are in need of development and clarification. As a follower of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Turvey does not attempt to outline any of the causal 
processes underlying our perceptual and emotional relationship to film; because of this, he 
does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomena in question. Similarly, although it 
is plausible that both thought and imagination play a significant role in our experience of 
film, we should treat explanatory appeals to such capacities with caution, endeavouring 
whenever possible to offer explanations in more concrete and literal terms. 
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Table 1.2: Proposed solutions to the paradox of fiction 
target proposition type of theory status of theory 
1 illusion theory to be rejected 
2 pretend theory to be rejected 
3 direct seeing theory to be developed 
indirect thought theory to be developed 
1.2 THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION 
(a) Referent or representation? 
The paradox of fiction will be the main focus of the subsequent chapters; it will provide the 
basic framework for our investigation into (cinematic) emotions. It is important to note, 
however, that the paradox of fiction is closely related to two other paradoxes; significantly, 
the solutions to the latter may lead us to the solution to the former. The first of these 
paradoxes exists within the perceptual realm. In Francis Ford Coppola's The Conversation 
(1974), a surveillance expert called Harry Caul (played by Gene Hackman) attempts to 
decipher a conversation he has secretly recorded between a young couple walking in San 
Francisco's Union Square (see Frame 1.2). 
In an interview about the film, Coppola acknowledges the strangeness of the ritual 
of film viewing, describing an occasional moment of clarity when one reflects upon the 
absurdity of sitting in a darkened room and being presented with 'patterns of light and 
sound,.3 In a strict sense, a pattern of light and sound which resembles either a middle-
aged man listening or a young couple talking has the same ontological status as a pattern of 
light and sound which resembles absolutely nothing whatsoever. In this respect, 
responding emotionally to such a pattern turns out to be, in Coppola's words, 'a crazy 
situation' . 
3 Coppola is interviewed in the featurette 'Close-up on The Conversation': directed by Robert Davia and 
available on the Special Edition DVD of the film. 
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Frame 1.2: The paradox of representation: The Conversation (1974) 
In the way that Radford's thought experiment suggests that emotions require 
existence beliefs, is there an equivalent argument to made for perception (see Table 1.3)? 
According to Richard Allen (1997), the causal theory of perception suggests that we must 
be in the 'presence' of a person or event in order to perceive that person or event; in other 
words, perception is subject to some sort of 'presence condition' (as opposed to a 
'presence belief). This is where the paradox of representation arises. In the case of 
viewing The Conversation, we are not in the 'presence' of either Caul/Hackman or the 
event of his eavesdropping, and yet we seem to perceive both Caul/Hackman and his 
eavesdropping efforts in some meaningful sense. In order to allow for direct comparisons 
with the paradox of fiction, the paradox of representation can be spelt out, once again, in 
terms of three apparently sound propositions which when considered together produce a 
contradiction. 
Table 1.3: The paradox of representation 
No. Proposition 
I We are not in the 'presence' of represented characters and events 
2 We are able to perceive represented characters and events 
3 We must be in the 'presence' ofa person or event in order to 
perceive that person or event 
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(b) Challenging the third proposition 
How have theorists attempted to solve the paradox of representation (see Table 1.4)? 
Kendall Walton's (1984) transparency theory can be regarded as an attempt to challenge 
the first proposition of the paradox. With respect to those scenes from The Conversation 
which feature Caul/Hackman, Walton would propose that we see 'through' the 
corresponding representations to the man himself; that is, we are, in some sense, in the 
'presence' of an actual person. To my knowledge, no one has attempted to challenge the 
second proposition: to reiterate, it seems reasonable to say that we perceive Caul / 
Hackman in some meaningful, if unspecified, sense. Once again, then, the most promising 
line of enquiry seems to lie in challenging the third proposition; similarly, the proposed 
solutions can be divided into direct and indirect approaches. 
(i) The direct approach: the seeing and recognition theories 
As before, the main examples of the direct approach are provided by Turvey's (1997) 
seeing theory and Anderson's (1996) ecological approach. Before we could react 'directly' 
to the characters and events of The Conversation, we would have to see them in a 'direct' 
fashion; indeed, both Turvey and Anderson argue from this sort of logical standpoint. 
Another example is provided by the recognition theory - attributed by Allen (ibid.) to 
Currie (1995). Like Anderson (and unlike Turvey), Currie refers to the underlying causes 
of perception: if asked about the case in question, he would argue that the image of Caul / 
Hackman triggers a corresponding 'object-recognition capacity'. 
(ii) The indirect approach: the imagination and illusion theories 
The indirect approach has two potential candidates. The first candidate is the imagination 
theory - attributed by Allen (ibid.) to Wittgenstein's (1958) notion of 'seeing-as' and 
Richard Wollheim's (1980) notion of 'seeing-in'. According to this theory, we imagine 
'seeing' the image of Caul/Hackman 'as' if were actually in his presence, or, to put it 
another way, we imagine 'seeing' the actual man 'in' the image. The second candidate is 
the illusion theory - one example being Allen's own (1995) theory of 'projective illusion'. 
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Illusion theories in general stipulate that when we perceive Caul/Hackman, we are 
deceived in either a sensory or an epistemic fashion. (My reason for including the illusion 
theory at this point is that illusions may involve top-down processes of an indirect nature.) 
In the following project, both the seeing and recognition theories will be developed by 
adopting a cognitive approach to be defined below. As Coppola recognizes, the key point 
is that the patterns of light and sound presented by film are capable of interfacing with the 
viewer's mind. In contrast, both the imagination and illusion theories will be rejected. 
Although it is plausible that imagination is involved in the case of emotion, it will be 
argued that it is not required in the case of perception. Likewise, we are not the unwitting 
subjects of an illusion: at the sensory level of the mind, talk of deception is inappropriate, 
whilst at the epistemic level, it is inaccurate. 
Table 1.4: Propoled solutions to the paradox of representation 
target proposition typeoftbeory status of theory 
I transparency theory (1) to be rejected 
2 N/A N/A 
3 direct seeing theory to be developed 
recognition theory 
indirect imagination theory to be rejected 
illusion theory (1) 
1.3 THE PARADOX OF EMPATHY 
<a> Self or other? 
The second relative of the paradox of fiction occupies the emotional realm. Radford takes 
it for granted that being moved by the fate of a real-life version of the man's sister is not 
problematic. Even if we imagine that the man's sister really does exist, however, we could 
still ask the following question: why do we respond emotionally to the situation of another 
person at all, especially a person we have never met? According to Alex Neill (1996, 
p.175), empathy is the capacity to feel with another person. (Sympathy, on the other hand, 
is the capacity to feel for that person.) 
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To widen the scope of the discussion, some of the philosophical and psychological 
literature on empathy cites the real-world example of standing at the foot of a mountain 
whilst observing a rock climber struggling desperately with an overhang. A filmic 
counterpart would be viewing Kevin Macdonald's Touching the Void (2003), a recent 
documentary about two British men who successfully climbed a mountain in the Peruvian 
Andes in 1985, before facing a series of equivalent ordeals on their descent (see Frame 
1.3). Why is it plausible that we would respond emotionally to the fate of the anonymous 
climber in the first instance, or the fate of either Joe Simpson or Simon Yates in the 
second, as people who exist separately - in physical, kindred, and platonic terms - from 
ourselves? 
Frame 1.3: The paradox of empathy: Touching the Void (2003) 
The latter questions lead us to the paradox of empathy. Here, the paradoxical aspect 
stems from the somewhat disheartening and misanthropic assumption that only concern for 
oneself is straightforwardly rational and understandable. This extension of Radford' s 
thought experiment can be used to suggest that belief in the ' self-relevance' of a situation 
is necessary for an emotional response to that situation; or, to put it another way, emotional 
responses require relevance beliefs (see Table 1.5). Each of the three propositions of the 
paradox of fiction can be adapted with respect to the paradox of empathy: 'reality-status' 
can be replaced with ' self-relevance' , and ' audiovisual representation' (of another person' s 
situation) can be replaced by 'another person' s situation' (period). 
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Table 1.5: The paradox of empathy 
No. Proposition 
1 We do not believe in the 'self-relevance' of other people's situations 
2 We are able to respond emotionally to other people's situations 
3 We must believe in the 'self-relevance' of a situation in order to 
respond emotionally to that situation 
(b) Challenging the third proposition 
How have theorists attempted to solve the paradox of empathy (see Table 1.6)? Certain 
theories of altruism might attempt to challenge the first proposition of the paradox by 
proposing that we do believe in the 'self-relevance' of the rock climber's situation; such a 
proposal, however, would beg the very question we are asking. To my knowledge, no one 
has attempted to challenge the second proposition: to reiterate, it seems reasonable to say 
that we would be able to respond emotionally to the climber's plight. As before, then, the 
most promising line of enquiry seems to lie in challenging the third proposition; what is 
more, theorists tend to propose two basic routes to empathy, the first route operating 
'directly' and the second 'indirectly'. 
(i) The direct approach: the associative route 
The direct route to empathy can be described as the associative route. In the case of the 
struggling rock climber, the first possible target for our empathetic response would be the 
climber himself. The most obvious examples of personal cues would be provided by the 
climber's facial, bodily, and vocal expressions of emotion (fear, pain, distress, and the 
like). As we will see, these cues would operate either as external stimuli, via classical 
conditioning, or internal stimuli via affective mimicry and facial feedback. The second 
possible target for our empathetic response would be the climber's situation: in other 
words, we might look past the climber to the world around him. The situational cues 
would include the causes of the climber's emotion - namely, the overhang and the 
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stomach-churning drop itself - as well as certain contextual elements. These cues would 
operate either as external stimuli or by the triggering of associated memories. 
(ii) The indirect approach: the simulative route 
The indirect route to empathy can be described as the simulative route. Traditionally, 
theorists appeal to the notion of either perspective-taking or role-taking: according to this 
notion, we 'imaginatively project' ourselves into the climber's situation as if we were 
actually struggling with the overhang ourselves. Following the recent discussions of 
simulation theory in the philosophy of mind, this imaginative activity can be spelt out in 
terms of 'mental simulation': viz., we simulate the climber's perceptions, beliefs, and 
desires, and feed them into the relevant psychological mechanisms, operating in an 
'offline' fashion. 
In the case of empathy - as in the case of fiction - both the direct and indirect approaches 
are plausible. In the following chapters, I will attempt to trace the associative route to 
empathy in greater detail, whilst introducing an appraisive route not described above. 
Having done this, I will attempt to re-trace the simulative route in terms of the other two. 
Table 1.6: Proposed solutions to the paradox of empathy 
target proposition type of theory status of theory 
1 altruism (?) to be developed 
2 N/A N/A 
3 direct associationism to be developed 
indirect simulation theory to be developed 
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1.4 TOWARDS A NEW SOLUTION 
(a) Methodology 
In order to find a solution to the paradox of fiction - and the related paradoxes of 
representation and empathy - we must begin by considering the issue of methodology. Let 
us start with general considerations, before moving onto specific ones. 
(i) Philosophy and/or science? 
Both Colin Radford and the Wittgensteinian theorists seem to make a sharp distinction 
between two kinds of reality and two kinds of epistemological enterprise. According to this 
distinction, the spectator's relationship to fiction is an aspect of the human world and the 
study of this world is the domain of philosophy, where the principal method of 
investigation is defined as 'conceptual clarification'. In this light, philosophers are 
typically concerned with necessary truths which are expressible as analytic statements, a 
well-known example being the sentence, 'A bachelor is an unmarried man.' In the case of 
psychology, philosophers are taken as being concerned with the prescriptive (normative) 
project of ascertaining whether or not the 'reasons' for our actions are rational and 
justifiable. Significantly, Radford and colleagues dismiss both the natural world and the 
domain of science, where the principal method of investigation is defined as 'empiricism' 
(in the form of observation and experiment). In this light, scientists are typically concerned 
with contingent truths which are expressible as synthetic statements, non-specific examples 
being Radford's notions of 'brute facts' and 'biological reasons'. In the case of 
psychology, scientists are taken as being concerned with the descriptive (non-normative) 
project of ascertaining the 'causes' of our actions. 
In contrast, the following project will start from the Realist assumption that there is 
one 'real world' which exists independently of both our experience and our use of 
language, and that behind the observable domain of objects and events lies the 
unobservable domain of causal mechanisms (see Roy Bhaskar, 1975).4 Following a 
4 Outlined by Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery (1985, Ch. I) in relation to film history. Realism (upper-
case R) is not to be confused with the type of realism (lower-case r) espoused by the French film theorist 
Andre Bazin. 
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'naturalized epistemology', the difference between philosophy and sCience will be 
regarded as one of degree, the two enterprises existing in 'continuity' with one another 
(see W. V. Quine, 1969). On the one hand, philosophy should be informed by, and 
consistent with, the empirical discoveries of science, in order to break free from the vicious 
circle of conceptual clarification and to make new progress on old problems. On the other 
hand, science should be informed by, and consistent with, the conceptual (or 'theoretical') 
insights of philosophy, for reality cannot be understood through observation and 
experiment alone. In the case of psychology, it will be argued that the normative project of 
justifying the spectator's emotional responses to fiction can be achieved by the non-
normative project of describing the underlying causes of those responses. 
(ii) Conceptual integration and piecemeal theorizing 
The Realist assumption implies that the academic disciplines of philosophy and film 
studies can have only limited control over the boundaries of their subject-matter. 
Practitioners can be selective about the types of questions which they address: for instance, 
it seems entirely reasonable for philosophers to ask "Why do spectators respond 
emotionally to that which is fictional?", and for film theorists to ask "Why do spectators 
respond emotionally to film?" Once these questions have been decided and approved, 
however, the answers are determined by the world itself. Given that the ritual of film 
viewing comprises both 'humanistic' and 'naturalistic' factors, the segregation of these 
factors according to academic discipline is arbitrary and not conducive to achieving a 
complete and deep understanding. 
This point leads us to the enterprise of conceptual integration. The evolutionary 
psychologists Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, and Jerome Barkow (1992) argue that the 
mysteries of one academic discipline can be solved by referring to the theoretical insights 
and empirical discoveries of another, whilst observing that the communication between 
disciplines is hindered by institutional barriers. With respect to film studies, conceptual 
integration is akin to what David Bordwell (1996) and Noel Carroll (1996c) advocate as 
piecemeal theorizing. In opposition to the Grand Theorist's attempts to describe and 
explain broad aspects of the world - notable examples being (psychoanalytic) subject-
position theory and culturalism - Bordwell and Carroll argue that researchers should 
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concentrate on 'middle-level' problems which have both theoretical and empirical 
dimensions and which require an interdisciplinary approach of the nature described. 
(b) Approaches 
Having argued the general case for naturalized epistemology and so forth, which specific 
disciplines should we attempt to 'integrate' and 'piece' together? For pragmatic purposes, 
the disciplines of relevance to us can be divided into two basic approaches. 
(i) A cognitive approach 
The main approach can be regarded as an extension of cognitive film theory, where the 
term 'cognitive' is used in a broad sense to refer to any aspect of the spectator's 
psychology. How, though, should we specifically understand the role of the spectator's 
mind and brain, and the relationship between the two? 
In the beginning, there was substance dualism - the Cartesian view that the mind 
(as a supposedly immaterial substance) and the brain (as a decidedly material one) are 
distinct entities. The contemporary solution to the problem of how the two are capable of 
interacting is thefunctionalist view that the mind is 'what the brain does', the 'software' of 
the mind being implemented on the 'hardware' of the brain. Significantly, however, the 
mindibrain, softwarelhardware dichotomy leads to two contrasting positions. The first 
position is described as the autonomy of psychology thesis. Some philosophers (e.g., Jerry 
Fodor, 1974) argue that our understanding of the mind cannot be illuminated by our 
understanding of the brain, typically pointing out that the same piece of computer software 
can be implemented on different kinds of computer hardware. Ironically, this position leads 
to a type of dualism, albeit 'theory dualism'. The second position comes under the rubric 
of neurophilosophy. Other philosophers (e.g., Patricia Smith Churchland, 1986) propose a 
'unified account' of the mindibrain, arguing that the questions of psychology can be 
informed in significant ways by the findings of neuroscience, and vice versa. At its most 
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radical, this position leads to 'eliminative materialism' - the view that 'folk psychological' 
mental states such as beliefs and desires do not exist. 5 
In this thesis, I propose to steer a middle course between these two extremes; that 
is, I wish to acknowledge that some, but not all, aspects of our psychology can be informed 
by neuroscience, whilst retaining our folk psychological notions of 'belief and 'desire' 
when appropriate, especially our notion of a 'non-existence belief. In total, I will 
distinguish two basic perspectives on the mindlbrain (neurobiological and functional) and 
four related levels of explanation (corresponding to the disciplines of neurobiology, 
associationism, cognitivism, and intentionalism).6 
(1) A neurobiological perspective. In light of the above arguments, a 
neurobiological approach is required to describe the 'hardware' of the spectator's brain. 
For the time being, we should note two basic points. First, contrary to popular belief, the 
brain can be understood in terms of at least two different levels of organization (see Table 
1.7). At the microscopic scale, the brain is composed of neurons and circuits. Although 
current brain imagining techniques are capable of detecting the operations of individual 
neurons, they are not yet capable of disentangling one circuit, or network of neurons, from 
another. Many sceptics tend to assume that neurobiological explanations refer to 
microscopic brain structures alone. At the macroscopic scale, however, the brain is 
composed of systems and subsystems. Significantly, brain imaging techniques are capable 
of detecting, say, the visual system as a whole, and, increasingly, the visual subsystems of 
which it is composed. Unless stated otherwise, the neurobiological explanations cited in 
this thesis will refer to macroscopic brain structures. 
Table 1.7: Levels of brain organization (for future reference) 
levela of brain organization 
(1) microacopic acale (a) neurons 
(not detectable *) (b) circuits (i.e. , networks of neurons) . 
(2) macroacopic acale (c) subsystems 
(detectable) (d) systems 
5 Also see P. M. Churchland (1981) and Stephen Stich (1983). 
6 In a guide to cognitive science intended for a humanities audience, Patrick Hogan (2003, pp.31-34) outlines 
variants of these four levels of explanation in reverse order. 
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Second, the brain can be understood in terms of basic neuroanatomy (see Table 
1.8). To begin with, we can make a simple two-fold distinction between the 'neocortex' 
(the six layers which envelope the cerebral hemispheres) and the 'subcortex' (everything 
which lies beneath) - a distinction which will relate informatively to the 'dual nature' of 
both real world and filmic experience. Following Paul MacLean's (1990) 'triune', or 
'three-in-one', brain theory, the neocortex can be regarded as a brain in its own right - one 
which is extraordinarily developed in the case of humans - whilst the subcortex can be 
divided into brains of mammalian and reptilian origin. Each of these brains is associated 
with a number of key structures which will be referred to at various stages of the thesis. 
Table 1.8: Basic neuroanatomy (for future reference) 
triune brain theory key structure. 
forebrain 'new cortex' (neocortex) [ frontal - parietal - occipital 
(1) neocortex ('human' ) l - temporal -
limbic system ['old cortex' ( limbic cortex) 
forebrain l hippocampus, amygdala 
('mammalian' ) BF, BG 
diencephalon r thalamuB 
(2) subcortex l hypothalamus 
forebrain 
( , rept iHan' ) 
-------- ----------- - - - - - - - - bra£n -stem r te~tW; - - - - - - - - - - - - -midbrain 
hindbrain l pons, medulla; cerebellum 
BF = basal forebrain; BG = basal ganglia 
(2) A functional perspective. In order to understand how a functional approach 
describes the 'software' of the spectator's mind, we must identify at least three levels of 
explanation (see Table 1.9). For pragmatic purposes, we can think of the mind as 
functioning in two basic ways. (a) Associationism (connectionism). The associationist 
proposes that the mind is made up of either chains or networks of associative connections. 
Although this view dates back to the seventeenth century and the British Empiricists, it has 
been recently resurrected in a different guise. Connectionists attempt to model mental 
processes by building networks which approximate the structures and pathways of the 
brain; a node in a connectionist network is analogous to a neuron, or a group of neurons, 
whilst the connection between one node and another is analogous to a synapse. In this 
respect, functional explanations move towards neurobiological ones, connectionists 
effectively attempting to make the mind more 'brain-like'. 
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(b) Cognitivism (computationalism). In contrast, the cognitivist - 'cognitive' in a 
narrower sense - proposes that the mind is made up of computational systems, the function 
of which is described as 'information-processing'. Significantly, the information in 
question comes in the form of mental representations which are 'about' the world in some 
particular way; the processing occurs by transforming one mental representation into 
another through the application of some sort of algorithm.7 For specific arguments, the 
term 'cognitive' will be used to refer to cognitive processes of this functional nature, whilst 
the term 'computational' will be used to describe both these and perceptual processes. 
Psychologists attempt to investigate the mind's computational systems by conducting 
empirical experiments, whereas philosophers do so through thought experiments and 
logical argument. In both cases, functional explanations move away from neurobiological 
ones, those concerned effectively attempting to make the mind even more 'mind-like'. 
(c) lntentionalism. The third and final level of explanation is somewhat 
miscellaneous. Whereas associations and computations are capable of operating in a 
subpersonal and non-conscious fashion, the intentionalist attempts to understand the 
spectator's mind in terms of personal and conscious mental states - notably, their thoughts 
and feelings 'about' the world which surrounds them. Here, the main method of 
investigation is introspection and verbal report; that is, the investigator can actually ask the 
spectator questions along the lines of, "What did you think?" and "What did you feel?" 
Intentionalist explanations are functional to the extent that thoughts (as cognitive states) 
perform a causal role in the mental life of the spectator, and non-functional to the extent 
that feelings (as qualitative or phenomenological states) do not. 
Table 1.9: A cognitive approach 
levels of explanation 
(1) neuro- (brain, 'hardware') (a) neurobiology 
(b) associationism (connectionism) 
(2) functional (mind, 'software') (c) cognitivism (computationalism) 
.. -------------------------------------(d) intentionalism (?) 
7 Cognitivism / computationalism is related to Continental Rationalism to the extent that mental 
representations are said to be 'innate' or 'nativist'. 
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(ii) An evolutionary-ecological approach 
The second approach can be regarded as a 'way of thinking' about the first approach as a 
whole and each of the levels of explanation with which it is associated. 8 The theory of 
evolution by natural selection was originally proposed by the British naturalist Charles 
Darwin in his 1859 book On the Origin of Species. Since then, it has been developed and 
popularised by the biologists George Williams (1966) and Richard Dawkins (1976) among 
others. Evolutionary theory begins with an ecological premise. Every organism has an 
environment with which it interacts. At any given time, that environment presents a 
number of 'adaptive problems' which must be solved in order to ensure survival and 
reproduction; obvious examples include obtaining food, finding mates, and avoiding 
predators. The evolutionary process itself operates by the mechanisms of 'blind variation' 
and 'selective retention' (BYSR).9 Occasionally, errors in the genetic copying process 
result in new 'adaptations' (or slight improvements to existing ones), where an adaptation 
is defined as a mechanism which is capable of solving a problem of the nature described 
(BY). Those organisms which are thus advantaged stand a better chance (almost by 
definition) of surviving, reproducing, and passing their advantageous genes onto the next 
generation, the members of which also stand a better chance of surviving, reproducing, and 
so on (SR). Gradually, over a large number of generations, complex adaptations emerge. 
In the case of the spectator's brain, evolutionary theory can be applied to the 
neurobiological approach to form evolutionary neurobiology. Returning to MacLean's 
triune brain theory, the subcortical regions of the brain can be roughly divided into 
reptilian adaptations to environments from the Mesozaic Era (248 to 65 million years ago) 
and mammalian adaptations to environments from the so-called Tertiary Period of the 
subsequent Cenozoic Era (65 to 1.8 mya.). The neocortical regions of the brain, on the 
other hand, can be roughly regarded as human adaptations to environments from the same 
era's Quaternary Period (beginning 1.8 mya). At this advanced stage, considerations of the 
brain inevitably tum into considerations of the (human) mind, necessitating a shift in 
approach. In the case of the mind, evolutionary theory can be applied to the functional 
approach, and computational ism especially, to form evolutionary psychology (see 
Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow, 1992). Evolutionary psychologists describe the set of 
selection pressures which shaped the mind as the 'environment of evolutionary 
8 Hogan (2003) refers to evolutionary theory as a 'meta-level' of explanation. 
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adaptiveness' (EEA). Regarding the Quaternary Period, the EEA is equated with the 
Pleistocene Epoch - 1.8 million to 10,000 years ago - in particular. (The Holocene Epoch -
10,000 years ago to the present day - is regarded as being too short a period of time for 
complex psychological adaptations to have evolved.) 
In terms of a research strategy, the evolutionary-ecological story can be told in 
reverse order, functional considerations preceding neurobiological ones (see Figure 1.1). 
Several theorists have argued that understanding an adaptive problem is crucial to 
understanding the computational mechanism which is 'designed' to solve that problem, 
whilst understanding a computational mechanism is crucial to understanding that 
mechanism's hardware implementation (see Cosmides et aI., ibid.; Marr, 1982). This 
strategy will be explicitly employed in the early stages of the thesis. 









When it comes to the domains of art and fiction, evolutionary theory yields the 
following question: why does the modem day spectator have the capacity to respond 
emotionally to fictional (i.e., non-existent) characters and events? Is this capacity: (l) an 
adaptation; (2) the byproduct of an adaptation; or (3) simply genetic noise? Given that the 
capacity is too elaborate and robust for genetic noise, the answer seems to lie in either the 
adaptationist or byproduct hypotheses. 
(1) The adaptationist hypothesis. In order to understand the adaptationist 
hypothesis, let us focus on two fundamental dimensions of the EEA. (a) Reality. The 
Pleistocene saw the birth of the first type of human society: namely, the 'hunter-gatherers' 
(see Lenski, 1970). It is thought that our ancestors lived on the African savannah in tribes 
of between fifty to eighty people. Wandering from plain to plain, they obtained their food 
9 Terms originally coined by Donald T. Campbell (1960). 
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by hunting animals and gathering plants, the two labours being divided between men and 
women respectively. Technology was basic, extending to the making of tools, clothes, and 
shelter. The main social institution was the nuclear family (parents and children), 
marriages usually taking place between tribes. Other social institutions - politics, law, 
education, and science - were minimal. (In contrast, the Holocene has seen the birth of 
horticultural, agrarian, industrial, and post-industrial societies.) 
(b) Representation. In addition to the physical entities of objects and events, the 
Pleistocene would have contained two basic categories of representation (see Sperber, 
2000). Examples of 'mental representations' would have included the beliefs and desires of 
individual people, whilst examples of 'public representations' would have included 
language and pictures. Significantly, these two basic categories would have given rise to 
four categories of 'metarepresentation': for instance, mental representations of mental 
representations (say, the thought, "The man believes that X.") would have formed the basis 
of the capacity to read other people's minds, whilst public representations of mental 
representations (say, the utterance, "The woman desires that Y.") would have played an 
important role in both conversation and story-telling. 
(2) The byproduct hypothesis. In order to understand the byproduct hypothesis, we 
must highlight two fundamental properties of the evolutionary process. According to the 
property of non-teleology, the process is entirely devoid of goals and intentions. Although 
it effectively designed the psychological adaptations for manipulating representations in 
general, it could not have anticipated the recent, (post-)industrial invention of cinematic 
representations - qua disembodied 'patterns of light and sound' - in particular. Meanwhile, 
the property of conservation (or co-optation) means that the process does not discard older 
adaptations when new challenges and innovations come along. Instead, it conserves and 
co-opts those adaptations by building both on top of them and with them. The net-result of 
these two properties is that the modern day spectator must process cinematic 
representations using adaptations designed in a different time and for a different purpose. 
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(c) Overview of thesis 
My mam strategy for solving the paradox of fiction - and the related paradoxes of 
representation and empathy - will be to revise the third proposition by removing existence 
beliefs (presence beliefs, relevance beliefs) from the psychological equation: as we have 
seen, this strategy can be divided into direct and indirect approaches. In turn, the process of 
'direct engagement' can be divided roughly into a seeing stage and a reacting stage: it 
seems reasonable to say that we must 'see' an object or event in some way, before we can 
'react' to that object or event. An additional strategy will be to revise the Cartesian 
framework which underlies the paradox as a whole. Both of these tasks will be achieved by 
referring to modular and multi-level theories of the mindlbrain and the emotion system. 
Each of the four main chapters of the thesis will make a number of fundamental 
distinctions, and adopt two or more of the four principal levels of explanation, whilst 
arguing from a broadly evolutionary perspective (see Table 1.10). In contrast to Grand 
Theory, the project should be thought of as providing a framework for integrating various 
piecemeal or middle-level theories. 
(i) Chapter 2 
Psychological beginnings: 
Ways o/seeing the world and the cinema 
My aim in Chapter 2 is to offer a preliminary solution to the paradox of fiction by 
outlining a modular and computational view of the mindlbrain - a view which comes under 
the rubric of 'psychological beginnings'. In particular, the chapter will address the first half 
of our 'direct' relationship to the world and the cinema by considering the 'seeing stage' of 
the reception process: in total, four different ways of 'seeing' the world and the cinema 
will be described. These four ways will be related to Wittgenstein's notions of 'regarding-
as' and 'seeing-as', and Gibson's notions of 'direct perception' and 'affordances'. 
Throughout, the discussion will appeal to both functional and neurobiological levels of 
explanation, whilst adopting a broadly evolutionary perspective. 
The first part of the chapter will consider the role of Fodorian modularity. The 
philosopher Jerry Fodor's (1983) proposal that our perceptual systems are modular in 
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nature will provide us with a possible solution to the paradox of representation. 
Considering that our visual and auditory systems are 'encapsulated' from, and 
'impenetrable' to, our all-important existence beliefs, it is plausible that they produce 
'shallow outputs' which inform the rest of the mind that we are in the 'presence' of actual 
people and events. In addition, this line of reasoning will be combined with the 'threshold 
model of social influence' from the field of virtual reality to produce an explanation for our 
feeling of being 'immersed' in the filmic world (the so-called 'diegetic effect'). The second 
part will consider the role of Darwinian modularity. Evolutionary psychologists propose 
that central capacities are also modular in nature: significantly, although these capacities 
are not encapsulated in a Fodorian sense, they may be equally blind to our existence 
beliefs. In particular, the discussion will focus on how the 'mind-reading system' may 
mistakenly treat film characters as (actual) intentional agents and how 'emotional 
autoappraisers' may mistakenly treat filmic events as being of (actual) significance to our 
own goals and concerns. 
The third part of the chapter will consider the role of central processing. Fodor's 
(1983) proposal that the central systems of the mind are non-modular will provide us with 
a possible insight into why, contrary to the implications of both the paradoxes of 
representation and fiction, we are not the unwitting subjects of certain types of epistemic 
illusion. Considering, for instance, that our central systems are 'sensitive' to non-existence 
beliefs and so forth, it is plausible that they produce 'deep outputs' which succeed in 
distinguishing a cinematic representation from the actual referent on the one hand, and a 
fiction film from a non-fiction film on the other. The fourth and final part will consider the 
role of conscious (attentive) processing. The related phenomena of consciousness and 
attention 'emerge' from a hierarchy of processors operating in parallel. In particular, the 
discussion will focus on how we consciously attend to the perceptual and narrational 
information presented by a film, and how we may deliberately employ various detachment 
and engagement strategies. 
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(ii) Chapter 3 
Outlining a multi-level model of the emotion system: 
Ways of reacting to the world and the cinema 
My aim in Chapter 3 is to offer a primary solution to the paradox of fiction by outlining a 
multi-level model of the emotion system at a coarse-grain level of analysis. In particular, 
the chapter will address the second half of our 'direct' relationship to the world and the 
cinema by considering the 'reacting stage' of the reception process: some of the basic ways 
of 'reacting' to the world and the cinema will be described in turn. This time, the 
discussion will use the neurobiological level of explanation as a guide to the functional 
level, whilst continuing to adopt a broadly evolutionary perspective. 
The first part of the chapter will focus on our emotional relationship to the world. 
Centring on the emotions of fear and disgust, it will consider the impact of emotional 
stimuli by asking the question of what happens when, say, we encountering a threatening 
creature such as a snake. In general, the discussion will provide an overview of the input, 
induction, and response stages of the emotional process. More particularly, the 
neurobiological accounts of the neuroscientists Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio will 
allow us to gain an understanding of the basic relationship between our perceptual, 
cognitive, and emotional systems on the one hand, and the role of the body on the other. 
The functional account of Fodor, on the other hand, will allow us to clarify the precise 
nature of the information which is processed by, and passes between, each of these 
systems. 
The second part of the chapter will focus on our emotional relationship to the 
cinema. Staying with the emotions of fear and disgust, it will consider the impact of films 
from both the horror and war genres by asking the question of what happens when a film 
presents us with, say, an image of a snake. With respect to the input and induction stages of 
the emotional process, a combination of the neurobiological and functional accounts will 
yield the following hypothesis. On the one hand, it is plausible that our perceptual 
(cortical) systems - in virtue of being 'informationally encapsulated' - produce the basic 
categorization, "A snake of such-and-such a description" as a shallow input. On the other 
hand, our central (prefrontal) systems - in virtue of being 'sensitive' to non-existence 
beliefs - produce the abstract categorization, "Cinematic representation of a snake of such-
and-such a description" as a deep input. Considering that our emotion system (amygdala) 
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is blind to the true nature of stimuli and receives both types of input simultaneously, we 
have a possible case of the blind being led by the foolish as well as the (apparently) wise. 
An examination of the response stage will be used to address the question of whether 
cinematic emotions should be classified as 'real' or 'quasi', and to tackle a fourth paradox 
not mentioned so far. It is plausible that the paradox of horror - which is concerned with 
the conundrum of why viewers choose to subject themselves to aversive experiences - can 
be partly solved by acknowledging that our fear and disgust responses to horror films may 
play an important role in 'organising' the internal structure of our fear and disgust systems. 
(iii) Chapter 4 
Developing a multi-level model of the emotion system: 
Tracing the associative network and cognitive appraisal routes to (cinematic) emotion 
Considering the limitations of the neurobiological approach, my aim in Chapter 4 is to 
develop a multi-level model of the emotion system at a fine-grain level of analysis, thereby 
offering what could be described as a secondary solution to the paradox of fiction. The 
SP AARS approach advanced by the psychologists Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish (1997) 
will provide us with a framework for our investigation. In total, two different routes to 
(cinematic) emotion will be traced. This time, the discussion will appeal to both 
connectionist and cognitive levels of explanation. 
The first part of the chapter will trace an associative network route to (cinematic) 
emotion, thereby enabling us to account for the impact of the (multiple) emotion cues 
presented by film. In order to allow for continuity, the discussion will stay with the 
emotion of fear and the horror genre. Following a consideration of associative and 
connectionist networks, we will be in a position to understand the impact of three types of 
emotion cue: namely, diegetic cues presented from within the world of the fiction film (the 
most obvious sources being the character and their situation), non-diegetic cues presented 
from outside the world of the film (the most obvious example being music), and somato-
visceral cues originating in the 'theatre' of the viewer's brain and body. (The discussion 
will conclude by suggesting that all of these emotion cues act as affective prompts for 
emotional imagery.) 
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The second part of the chapter will trace a cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) 
emotion, thereby enabling us to account for the meaning of the situations encountered by 
(goal-oriented) characters. Following a consideration of appraisal theory, three types of 
appraisal will be distinguished. The notion of 'primary appraisal' will be related to the 
second way of seeing cited above: it will refer to the automatic, indiscriminate process 
which appraises the situations presented by film as if they were real and of personal 
significance, thereby producing 'appropriate' emotional responses. (In this instance, the 
absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the presence of the diegetic effect.) The 
notion of 'secondary appraisal', on the other hand, will be related to the third way of 
'seeing': it will refer to the 'globally sensitive' process which appraises the 
representational and fictional status of the situations in question, thereby minimising the 
potential 'intensity range' of our emotional responses. Finally, the notion of 'reappraisal' 
will be related to the fourth and final way of 'seeing': it will refer to the reflective process 
which appraises the depicted situation from the perspective of the characters, thereby 
maximising our emotional responses within the reduced intensity range. (In this instance, 
the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the presence of motivational prompts.) 
(iv) Chapter 5 
Re-tracing the simulative route to (cinematic) emotion: 
Emotional constraints and emotional alternatives 
Having outlined and developed a multi-level model of the emotion system, my aim in 
chapter 5 is to address our 'indirect' relationship to the world and the cinema, thereby 
offering what could be described as a tertiary solution to the paradox of fiction. In 
particular, the chapter will attempt to (re-)trace the simulative route to (cinematic) 
emotion: given that appeals to 'thought' and 'imagination' are potentially problematic, we 
should ascertain to what extent the multi-level model in question acts as both a 'constraint' 
on, and an 'alternative' to, emotional simulation. (In addition, the whole discussion will be 
related to the emotional phenomenon of empathy, thereby bringing the paradox of empathy 
into the equation. All four levels of explanation will be appealed to.) 
The first part of the chapter will investigate the extent to which association acts as 
a 'constraint' on simulation. In order to do this, the discussion will reconsider some of the 
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fear examples from previous chapters. A reconsideration of associative networks from both 
a neurobiological and a connectionist perspective will yield the following two points. First, 
it is plausible that both 'direct' perception and 'indirect' simulation utilise the same nodes 
in the mindlbrain, the external perceptual information presented by fiction films making 
the internal activity of perceptual imagining largely superfluous. Second, the direct 
activation of nodes may serve as an affective prompt for emotional imagery, whilst our 
capacity to respond emotionally to this imagery may be dependent on a 'critical number' of 
associated nodes being (directly) activated. 
The second part of the chapter will investigate the extent to which appraisal acts as 
an 'alternative' to simulation (and theory). In order to do this, the discussion will turn 
from the emotion of fear to the related emotions of anxiety and concern, and focus on 
filmic examples of surprise and suspense. If emotional simulation operates in an 
unintentional, non-conscious fashion, begins with either the world or the film, and 
successfully bridges the gap between theory and experience, then it can be spelt out in the 
more literal terms of automatic appraisal. Likewise, if emotional simulation proceeds in a 
conscious, intentional fashion, then it can be spelt out in terms of reflective appraisal. (The 
emotional responses generated by automatic appraisal may serve as motivational prompts 
for its reflective counterpart.) The chapter will conclude by proposing that the term 
'simulation' should be reserved for those instances in which we deliberately attempt to 
imaginatively entertain the thoughts and feelings of a character. 
Table 1.10: Overview of thesis 
fundamental distinctions principal levels of explanation 
(1) Fodorian modularity functional ~ neurobiological 
Chapter 2 (2) Darwinian modularity ibid. 
(3) central processing ibid. 
(4) conscious (attentive) processing ibid. (plus intentional) 
Chapter 3 (I) real world emotions neurobiological ~ functional 
(2) cinematic emotions ibid. 
Chapter 4 (I) associative network route to (cinematic) emotion connectionist (plus intentiona\) 
(2) cognitive appraisal route cognitive (plus intentional) 
Chapter S (1) simulative route to (cinematic) emotion, constraints on all 
(2) simulative route, alternatives to all 
N.B. The evolutionary-ecological approach can be regarded as a complementary perspective. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION I 
(a) Revising the third proposition 
How should we understand our capacity to engage with the world and the cinema? How 
should we understand our psychological relationship to actual objects and events, and to 
cinematic representations of those objects and events? The paradox of fiction provides us 
with a potential framework for answering such questions. As we have seen, the paradox 
consists of three propositions which, though seemingly sound when considered 
individually, produce a contradiction when considered collectively; the main strategy for 
solving the paradox is to revise the third proposition which states that we must believe in 
the existence of a given scenario in order to engage with that scenario. 
In light of this, the first objective of our investigation is to eliminate so-called 
'existence beliefs' from the psychological equation. The most obvious way of undertaking 
this task is to consider direct theories of psychological engagement: that is, theories which 
propose that we engage with the world - and the cinema - in the absence of (conscious) 
mental activity. In turn, the process of 'direct engagement' can be divided roughly into a 
seeing stage and a reacting stage: it seems reasonable to say that we must 'see' an object 
or event in some way, before we can 'react' to that object or event. In this chapter, then, we 
will consider the first half of our 'direct relationship ' to the world and the cinema by 
focusing on the seeing stage of the reception process. 
I The tenn 'seeing' in the chapter title is inspired by Wittgenstein's (1958) di cuss ion of the verb ' to see' . 
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(i) A Wittgensteinian / Gibson ian approach to 'seeing' 
How should we understand the notion of 'seeing'? The first example of a direct approach 
is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1958) discussion of the verb 'to see' in the 
Philosophical Investigations. In this discussion, Wittgenstein is concerned with the concept 
of 'seeing', rather than the causes underlying seeing. According to his notion of regarding-
as, we are capable of perceiving the world in a 'direct' fashion; that is, in the absence of 
mental interpretation - where mental interpretation is presumed to be a conscious activity. 
This conceptual approach forms the basis of Malcolm Turvey's (1997) seeing theory of 
emotional responses to fiction. Turvey applies the notion of 'regarding-as' to the case of 
cinematic perception, and, by equation, to the case of cinematic emotion: viz. if we are 
capable of perceiving the objects and events depicted by cinema in a direct fashion, then 
we are also capable of reacting to them in the same way. (Wittgenstein also introduces the 
notion of seeing-as: a type of perception which does involve an element of mental 
interpretation. As we will see, this notion also plays an important role in understanding our 
discriminatory and attentive relationship to cinematic representations.) 
The second example of a direct approach is provided by J. J. Gibson's (1979) 
ecological approach to visual perception. In the standard laboratory experiment on visual 
perception, the observer is presented with discrete 'snapshots', whilst being kept stationary 
(cf. the cases of painting and photography). Gibson recognised, however, that a real world 
observer samples the light reflected from the surfaces of (mobile) objects in their 
environment, whilst moving through that environment: the function of visual perception is 
the detection of 'invariants' specified by the 'ambient optic array'. The ecological 
approach forms the basis of Joseph Anderson's (1996) contribution to cognitive film 
theory. Although Anderson is not primarily concerned with the paradox of fiction - and the 
index to his book only contains two references to the subject of emotion - he singles out 
two aspects of Gibson's ecological approach which are a 'priceless gift for film theory'. 
The first is the theory of direct perception: the perception of the objects and events in our 
environment is direct; that is, it is not mediated by either mental representations or 
inferential processes. The second is the theory of affordances: not only are we capable of 
directly perceiving what an object or event is; we are also capable of directly perceiving 
what that object or events 'offers' us (either for good or ill). 
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(iO A computational approach 
Having eliminated (conscious) mental interpretation from the equation, how should we 
deal with causal processes which fall outside the mental realm? Wittgenstein does not 
make reference to the causes of visual perception because his project is a conceptual one; 
he pointedly remarks that the causes 'are of interest to psychologists' (p.193). Gibson, on 
the other hand, refused to make reference to inferential processes and mental 
representations because he assumed that such a move would lead to the notion of a little 
man - or 'homunculus' - residing in the mind, which, in tum, would lead to an infinite 
regress. 
As a follower of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Turvey chooses to dismiss causal 
processes; indeed, in a later article with Richard Allen (2001), he argues that making 
reference to processes of which we are not aware is fundamentally mistaken. (This 
argument will be addressed in Chapter 6, as part of my conclusion.) In contrast, I will 
follow Anderson's example by making reference to what has been described as the 
computational theory of mind. Although the computational theory can be traced back to 
Alan Turing (1950) - one of the inventors of the computer - we should not take the theory 
as proposing that the computer and the mind operate in exactly the same way. Rather, 
computations can be defined in relatively neutral terms as formal operations on 
(syntactically structured) mental representations. 
(b) Revising the underlying framework 
Is attempting to revise the third proposition of the paradox of fiction the only way forward? 
One could argue that the incentive to remove one type of mental state (namely, existence 
beliefs) from the psychological equation stems from the assumption that contradictory 
mental states are problematic. The second objective of this chapter, then, will be to 
challenge the framework which underlies the paradox as a whole. 
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(i) A Cartesian view of the mind/brain 
How should we understand the framework in question? Gregory Currie (1995, p.83) 
describes the Cartesian view of the mindlbrain as follows: 'the mind is a unified and 
indivisible organ, transparent to itself, and identical with the person whose mind it is.' If 
we adhere to this view, our emotional responses to fiction are indeed problematic: we seem 
to be faced with the case of a single ego engaging in what George Orwell would describe 
as 'doublethink' by holding contradictory beliefs simultaneously. 
Although the Cartesian view of the mindlbrain is officially attributed to the 
seventeenth century rationalist philosopher Rene Descartes, what could be described as the 
'Cartesian instinct' has its roots in at least two aspects of our everyday lives. The first 
aspect is our use of language. The mindlbrain seems to be a unified and invisible organ 
partly because it speaks in the first-person singular - '1', 'me', 'mine', and so forth -
through our mouths.2 The second aspect is our reliance on phenomenology. The mind 
seems to be a unified and indivisible organ partly because we are conscious of a unified 
and indivisible experience, and unconscious of the causal mechanisms and processes which 
bring this experience about. 3 
(ii) A modular view 
How should we go about Challenging the Cartesian view of the mindlbrain? From both a 
functional and a neurobiological perspective, the mindlbrain is believed to be modular in 
nature. The basic idea is that the mindlbrain is composed of a number of computational 
systems or levels, each system or level responsible for a different type of information 
processing; crucially, different types of information either pass or fail to pass from one 
system or level to another. 
2 Phrasing inspired by Nagel (1989, p.89): '[The mind/brain] speaks in the first person singular through our 
mouths, and that makes it understandable that we should think of its unity as in some sense numerically 
absolute, rather than relative and a function of the integration of its contents.' 
3 Phrasing inspired by Spinoza (1955): 'Men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are 
conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined.' Cited by 
LeDouX (1998), p.267. 
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The notion of 'modularity' was resurrected by the philosopher Jerry Fodor (1983) 
in an essay entitled The Modularity of Mind. In short, Fodor proposes that the mindlbrain is 
composed of three types of system. To begin with, transducers at the body's 'surfaces' -
for example, the retina of the eye or the cochlea of the ear - convert physical stimulus 
energy into electrical (neural) signals. Subsequently, these signals are sent to (modular) 
input systems - for example, one of the five perceptual systems or a preliminary language-
processing system - for a procedure described as 'input analysis'. In tum, the results of 
input analysis are sent to (non-modular) central systems for what could be described as 
cognitive processing. 
Other theorists have described similar views of the mindlbrain. The evolutionary 
psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1992) describe the mindlbrain as a 
coalition of specialists; in contrast to Fodor, they propose that many cognitive (i.e., central) 
capacities are also modular in nature. The philosopher Daniel Dennett (1978, 1991) 
describes the mindlbrain as a hierarchy of homunculi operating in parallel; in particular, he 
proposes that consciousness is equivalent to a 'serial virtual machine' which emerges from 
this hierarchy. The neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga (1978, 1992) proposes that the two 
hemispheres of the brain are responsible for different aspects of the mind, the left 
hemisphere acting as an 'interpreter' for the activities of the right; in particular, he argues 
that '98 percent' of the brain's activities operate below consciousness, the upshot being 
that we are only aware of the end-results. 
If the mindlbrain is not a single agent but what Marvin Minsky (1986) describes as 
a 'society' of mental agents, then the problem of contradictory mental states co-existing, 
begins to disappear. Here, it should be acknowledged that the logic in operation is 
extremely basic - from a logician's point of view, perhaps embarrassingly so. The real 
battle, however, lies with accepting a more mechanical view of the mindlbrain which, in 
addition to being counter-intuitive, threatens to undermine our cherished notions of 
personal identity and free will.4 
... ... ... 
4 Eddy Zemach (1996) has proposed a similar solution to the paradox of fiction. Zemach refers to the 
modularity of the mind, and the existence of multiple belief 'processors' or 'dossiers'. 
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In brief, my aim in this chapter is to offer a preliminary solution to the paradox of fiction 
by outlining a modular and computational view of the mindlbrain - a view which comes 
under the rubric of 'psychological beginnings'. In total, I will discuss four different ways 
of seeing the world and the cinema: namely, (1) Fodorian modularity; (2) Darwinian 
modularity; (3) central processing; and (4) conscious (attentive) processing. Where 
appropriate, I will relate these four ways to Wittgenstein's notions of 'regarding-as' and 
'seeing-as', and Gibson's notions of 'direct perception' and 'affordances'. Although the 
chapter will cover some old ground along the way, I feel that there is a need to place the 
theories proposed by various philosophers and cognitive film theorists into a larger 
framework - and to make a distinction between different levels of explanation - whilst 
acknowledging the scope and limits of such an enterprise. In addition, many of the theories 
in question have been only concerned with perception and cognition thus far; I wish to 
specify potential relations to the emotion system whenever possible. 
2.2 MODULAR PERCEPTUAL SYSTEMS: 
PRODUCERS OF 'SHALLOW OUTPUTS' 
(a) Perceiving the world: Fodorian modularity 5 
"If called by a panther / Don't anther." 
From 'The Panther' by Odgen Nash (quoted by Fodor, 1983, p.70) 
"He who attempts to tease a cobra / Is soon a sadder he, and sobra." 
From 'The Cobra' by Odgen Nash 
How should we understand our perceptual relationship to the world? This question brings 
us to a consideration of Fodor's (1983) arguments in The Modularity of Mind for the 
'modularity' of our perceptual systems. Whereas Fodor focuses on constructing a modular 
(and computational) account for the case of 'psycholinguistics' or 'language-processing', 
we will focus on constructing an equivalent account for the sense of vision. Considering 
that we are ultimately concerned with the hi-modal medium of cinema, we will also make 
5 With respect to film theory, Fodorian modularity is briefly discussed by Currie (1995, p.85). Currie 
effectively combines Fodor's modular view of the mind with Dennett's homuncular view (to be discussed in 
section 2.5). As evidence for the modular / homuncular view, Currie cites 'object' and 'face-blindness' (cf. 
Fodorian modularity) and the findings of split-brain studies (cf. the experiments by Gazzaniga - to be 
discussed in section 3.2). 
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some brief remarks about the sense of audition. (Fodor's own views will be directly 
acknowledged in the text.) 
In order to understand the fundamentals of both senses, it will be helpful to 
envisage the simpler environment of our hunter-gather ancestors in the Pleistocene, and 
our non-human ancestors in the many ages before that; an environment containing 
potential food and mates for the organism's good, and more saliently perhaps, potential 
predators - in the form of wild cats and snakes - for the organism's ill. 
(i) The visual system 
Vision has been described as 'the distance sense par excellence': no other sense provides 
us with such an instant overview of our immediate environment. Starting from an 
ecological (and thereby evolutionary) perspective, the domain of the visual system is 
solving the adaptive problem of visual scene analysis, whilst the default mode of the visual 
system is effectively naIve realism (that is, the world is how it appears). In order to achieve 
solve this problem, the visual system must effectively answer two key questions: first, 
What are the objects and events in the immediate environment?; and second, Where are 
those objects and events? Both of these questions can be broken down into a series of sub-
questions; in this respect, one can think of the visual system as a 'collection' of modules, 
each module specialising in the analysis of a certain type of visual input. With respect to 
the 'what' question, possible examples of modules include edge detectors, shape detectors, 
and mechanisms for colour perception; in addition, there may be mechanisms for such 
'higher-level' functions as object perception and face perception. With respect to the 
'where' question, on the other hand, possible examples of modules include motion 
detectors and mechanisms for spatial perception. The modularity of the visual system can 
be addressed from two basic perspectives (see Table 2.1). 
(1) A functional perspective. For Fodor, the essence of modularity lies in the 
property of informational encapsulation. Although the modules within the visual system 
can communicate with each other, the visual system as a whole only has access to the 
outputs of transducers, a 'proprietary database', and a 'form-concept dictionary'; it is 
encapsulated with respect to information from outside its particular domain. The precise 
nature of this encapsulation can be clarified by making reference to Zenon Pylyshyn's 
(1980) notion of cognitive impenetrability. According to this notion, the visual system 
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cannot be 'penetrated' by the epistemic mental states which are the domain of the central 
systems of the mind: for instance, our beliefs, desires, and expectations regarding the true 
nature of our environment. In particular, it cannot be penetrated by what we have described 
as our existence beliefs: namely, our beliefs in the existence of either the panther or the 
snake. Closely related to the properties of 'informational encapsulation' and 'cognitive 
impenetrability' are the properties of mandatory and fast operation; visual perception is 
like a reflex, albeit more complex. An explanation for all of these related properties can be 
couched in ecological terms: if visual perception is to be adaptive in a competitive 
environment, then it must be both accurate and instantaneous; and if it is to be accurate and 
instantaneous, then it cannot afford either to search through the entire contents of our 
minds or to be influenced by our potentially fickle and unreliable beliefs, desires, and 
expectations. 
Given the informational encapsulation and so forth of the visual system, how does 
it go about the process of scene analysis? This question can be answered by way of a re-
consideration of Gibson's (1979) theory of direct perception. Gibson's theory entails two 
levels of explanation. At the ecological level, 'invariances' in the ambient optic array 
would 'specify' the presence of either the panther or the snake. At the physiological level, 
on the other hand, the nervous system would be structured in such a way as to 'resonate' to 
the invariances in question. Following David Marr's (1982) computational theory, a 
computational level of explanation is required to redefine the 'specification-resonation' 
relationship by explaining how invariances are actively processed - rather than passively 
picked up - by the nervous system (see Bruce, Green, and Georgeson, 1996, Ch. 17). From 
our perspective, the important point about computational theory is that it replaces the 
inferential processes and mental representations - rejected by Gibson for the reasons cited 
above - with computational operations performed on a series of 'sketches,.6 In order to 
facilitate such computations, the proprietary database of the visual system contains various 
'assumptions' about the nature of the world.7 As physical and mobile objects, both the 
panther and the snake would have a number of basic properties: they would be solid, 
6 Anderson (1996, pp.30-3l) also argues that Gibson's ecological approach should be combined with Marr's 
computational approach. 
7 These assumptions are described by Anderson (1996), p.33-35; and Pinker (1997), pp.28-29. 
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bounded, and evenly lit; they would tend to move in a single direction; and whilst moving, 
they would continually cover and uncover parts of the background.8 
The final stage of visual scene analysis is of particular significance. According to 
Fodor, the visual system produces shallow outputs. In order to understand what is meant by 
the term 'shallow', we should envisage a kind of halfway point between two extremes. On 
the one hand, the outputs of the visual system are not as 'shallow' as what Marr would 
describe as an incomplete 'primal' or '2.5-D sketch' of, say, the panther or the snake. On 
the other hand, they are not as 'deep' as the scientific classification that the panther or the 
snake is, say, a member of a rare and endangered species. Instead, the outputs of the visual 
system should be thought of simply in terms of the basic categorizations "panther" and 
"snake": these categorizations are 'reliably predicted' by the visual properties of the 
respective stimuli and 'phenomenologically given'. Following Marr and Nishihara (1978), 
Fodor suggests that 'the final stage of visual input analysis involves accessing a 'form-
concept' dictionary which, in effect, pairs 3-D sketches with basic categories.' 
(Presumably, the visual system also produces what could be described as basic 
localizations. )9 
In short, what we want to say is that the visual system produces representations of 
recognizable (and localizable) objects and events - no more and no less - and that these 
representations are passed onto the other systems of the mind in an informational sense, 
whilst being made available to us as conscious percepts in a phenomenological sense. It 
should be stressed that although shallow outputs have both perceptual and 
phenomenological content, they are not equivalent to perceptual beliefs. As we will see, 
the fixation of perceptual belief is the domain of central processing. In a related fashion, 
we need not describe shallow outputs as having existential import: for instance, they do not 
assert that, "The panther exists" or, "This is an actual snake". Given that the default mode 
of the visual system is naive realism, the assumption of existence is implicit in the very 
process of scene analysis. 
(2) A neurobiological perspective. Although Fodor is mainly concerned with 
functional properties, he implies that the visual system is 'associated' with fIXed neural 
8 In contrast, Bordwell (1985, pp.30-33) proposes a constructivist theory of perception inspired by 
Helmholtz: because sensory data is impoverished, percepts are 'constructed' by means of unconscious 
inferences; this theory stresses the role of ('top-down') knowledge, expectations, and hypotheses. 
9 Marr and Nishihara (1978) forms the basis of Marr (1982), Ch. 5. For more recent theories of object 
recognition, see Biederman's (1995) geon theory. 
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architecture. Significantly, this architecture exists at a macroscopic scale and can be 
detected psychophysically. Given that we are ultimately concerned with the connection 
between the visual system and the emotion system, it is necessary to give a rough sketch of 
the neuroanatomical structures involved (see Figure 2.1). 
To begin with, photoreceptors in the retina of each eye send relatively processed 
information to the visual thalamus (or lateral geniculate nucleus) - a subcortical structure 
which has been described as a 'gateway' to the neocortex. More specifically, the thalamus 
'relays' information to the occipital lobe and the striate region of the visual cortex 
(otherwise known as area VI) which is primarily concerned with the analysis of edges. 
After VI, the visual system divides into ventral ('what') and dorsal ('where') pathways -
revealing that the 'what' and 'where questions' are dealt with separately. With respect to 
the 'what' pathway, area V3 of the extrastriate visual cortex is thought to be involved in 
the analysis of form and area V 4 in the analysis of colour, whilst areas TEO and TE of the 
inferotemporal cortex possibly playa role in object and face perception respectively (see 
Zeki, 1993). Specific 'breakdown syndromes' of the latter two areas may result in 'object-
blindness' (visual agnosia) and 'face-blindness' (prosopagnosia) respectively. With respect 
to the where 'pathway', on the other hand, area MT is thought to be involved in the 
analysis of motion. Each visual area contains at least one 'retinotopic map', and although 
processing does not happen in strict sequence - as the numbering of the areas suggests -
one can think of representations as being built up in complexity as they 'ascend' the visual 
hierarchy. 
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Adapted from Figure 4.10, Gazzaniga et al. (1998), p.133. Despite the necessary roughness 
of such a sketch - there are over thirty visual areas in total and each area is further 
subdivided both functionally and anatomically - it gives us some idea of how Fodorian 
modules may be realised in the brain. 
(ii) The auditory system 
Audition is another example of a 'distance sense'. The domain of the auditory system is 
solving the adaptive problem of auditory scene analysis. In order to achieve this, the 
auditory system must effectively answer the same key questions as the visual system: 
namely, What and where are the objects and events in the immediate environment? 
Although much less is known about how these questions are answered, it is plausible that a 
modular (and computational) account can be given. Starting from a functional perspective 
once again, it is reasonable to assume that the auditory system possesses the properties of 
informational encapsulation and cognitive impenetrability; that it operates in a mandatory 
and instantaneous fashion, by means of computational processes performed on a series of 
sketches, whilst having access to a 'proprietary database' which contains various 
'assumptions' about the nature of the world; and that it produces shallow outputs in terms 
of 'basic categorizations' and 'basic localizations'. 
Moving to a neurobiological perspective, the auditory system is also associated 
with fixed neural architecture (see Gazzaniga et aI., 1998, pp.156-161). Auditory receptors 
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in the cochlea of each ear send information to the auditory thalamus (or medial geniculate 
nucleus). In tum, the thalamus 'relays' information to the primary auditory cortex (area 
AI) and auditory association cortex (area All), where the processing of auditory 
representations IS dependent on a number of 'tonotopic maps'. In particular, the 
neurobiological account gives us clues as to how the auditory system would go about 
answering the 'what' and 'where' questions. With respect to the 'what pathway', our 
auditory system would use frequency variation to identify either the panther or the snake: 
the corresponding data would be sufficient to distinguish the sound of one from the other, 
even if the two sounds were 'operating' at the same pitch. The 'where pathway' can be 
sub-divided into a 'time pathway' and an 'intensity pathway'. Unlike photoreceptors in the 
eyes, auditory receptors in the ears do not encode spatial information. In order to localise 
the panther or snake in three-dimensional space, therefore, the auditory system would 
make reference to two cues: namely, the time difference between the corresponding sound 
reaching each ear and the intensity difference between the corresponding sound at each ear. 
Table 2.1: Fodorian modularity (see Fodor, 1983) 
property description 
questions ... perceptual scene analysis: 
(domain) (i) what?; (ii) where? 
(1) functional computational character / complete encapsulation / 
default mode real objects and events 
answers shallow: 
(outputs) (i) basic cat.; (ii) basic loco 
(2) neurobiological neural architecture fixed: 
macro-scale; detectable 
... The evolutionary-ecological approach can be regarded as a complementary perspective. 
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(b) Perceiving the cinema: regarding-as (type I) 
Having outlined our perceptual relationship to the world, how should we understand our 
perceptual relationship to the cinema? In order to answer this question, we must address 
two related conundrums. 
(i) Solving the paradox oj representation 
The paradox oj representation - and its problematic third proposition - is based on two 
related theories of perception (see Figure 2.2). The main theory is described by Allen 
(1997). According to the causal theory of perception, there is a 'causal relationship' 
between an object in the external world and our perception of that object. Here, the key 
question is: how can we perceive the object depicted by a representation when the object in 
question is not physically present? The additional theory is described by Turvey (1997). 
According to the mental interpretation theory of perception, perception involves the 
'mental interpretation' of the 'material properties' of an object - presumably made known 
to us by means of 'impoverished' sensory data. Here, a key question might be: why do we 
mentally interpret the material properties of a represented object as if the object in question 
was physically present, when we know that this is not the case? 
Figure 2.2: The causal and mental interpretation theories of perception 
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The key to revising the third proposition lies in adopting a direct approach. One of 
the main examples is provided by Turvey's seeing theory, based, in tum, on Wittgenstein's 
(1958) discussion of the verb 'to see' .10 Wittgenstein refers to our 'standard visual 
experience' of objects as regarding-as or 'the "continuous seeing" of an aspect' (p.194, 
p.205). Take a look, for instance, at Wittgenstein's example of the 'picture-face' (see 
10 The following discussion will take Turvey's interpretation of Wittgenstein - as opposed to Wittgenstein 
himself - as its starting point. 
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Figure 2.3). In a strict sense, we do not perceive the 'material properties' of a circle 
surrounding four random lines and a couple of dots; rather, we continuously see the 
'aspect' of a face. Significantly, Wittgenstein states: 'In some respects I stand towards [a 
picture-face] as I do towards a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to 
the expression of the human face.' (The picture-face will reappear in many guises 
throughout this thesis.) 
Figure 2.3: First example of regarding-as: Wittgenstein's 'picture-face' 
Reproduced from Wittgenstein (1958), p.204. 
In contrast, our 'exceptional visual experience' involves seeing-as, an example of 
which is 'the "dawning" of an aspect' (p.194, p.205). Take a look, for instance, at the 
Jastrow 'duck-rabbit' - an example of an ambiguous figure (see Figure 2.4). In this case, 
the aspect of either the duck or the rabbit may 'dawn' on us, thus taking us by surprise - a 
type of perceptual 'pop-out effect'. According to Turvey, however, the real value of the 
Jastrow duck-rabbit lies in the following. First, by presenting competing aspects, the figure 
makes us explicitly aware of the distinction between the 'aspect' of an object and its 
'material properties'. Second, the phenomenon of aspect-dawning demonstrates that our 
perception of an aspect is not the result of (consciously-mediated) mental activity -
evidence against the mental interpretation theory of vision. Contrary to first appearances, 
therefore, the duck-rabbit figure has greater implications for our understanding of standard, 
as opposed to exceptional, visual experience - regarding-as rather than seeing-as. 
(Wittgenstein cites our perception of the schematic triangle as a more straightforward 
instance of seeing-as - this example will be discussed in section 2.4.) 
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Figure 2.4: Second example of regarding-as: Jastrow 'duck-rabbit' 
Reproduced from Pinker (1997), p.293. The Jastrow duck-rabbit has been discussed by a 
number of theorists, including Gombrich (1960). p.29. 
At this point, we should introduce the notion of regarding-as (type J) - the 
bracketed qualification will serve to distinguish it from another type of regarding-as to be 
discussed below. When Turvey identifies 'necessity and temporal instantaneity' as 
'criteria' ofWittgenstein's notion of 'regarding-as' (ibid., p.447), he is effectively pointing 
to two properties of Fodorian modularity: namely, mandatory and fast operation 
respectively. In light of this, Wittgenstein's claim that our perception of the duck-rabbit 
figure does not require mental interpretation is another way of saying that our perception of 
the figure is mediated by a modular (and computational) visual system; a system which, 
crucially, is encapsulated from, and impenetrable to, non-existence beliefs (see Figure 2.5). 
Presumably, the first and second stages of the process involve the analysis of 
primal and 2.5-D sketches respectively. A consideration of the third and final stage, on the 
other hand, leads us to the recognition theory of pictorial perception. Currie (1995, p.82) 
would claim that a picture of an animal and an actual animal trigger the same 'object 
recognition capacity'. In reply, Allen (1997, pp.88-91) argues that such an account 
personifies 'parts of the brain as homunculi'. Saying that a recognition capacity is being 
triggered, however, does not imply that any recognition is going on in the everyday sense 
of the word: the process in question can be spelt out in terms of the brute matching of a 3-
D model with a 'basic category' stored in memory. (Object recognition is, to use 
Wittgenstein's phrase, 'forced from us' (p.197). All that is required of us is that we are 
'already conversant with the shapes of those two animals'; that is, our memories must 
contain the relevant categories (p.207).) 
Anderson (1996, pp.43-49) notes that the visual system 'cannot tolerate ambiguity'. 
In the case in question, then, the visual system will alternate between the 'duck-aspect' and 
the 'rabbit-aspect', producing either the basic categorization "duck" or the basic 
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categorization "rabbit" as a shallow output and (conscious) visual percept. It should be 
noted, however, that Jastrow specifically designed the duck-rabbit figure in order to 
prevent the 'resolution of ambiguity'. Considering that the duck-rabbit figure does not 
have an obvious equivalent in the real world, one could argue that the term 'exceptional' 
should be reserved for the figure itself, as opposed to the modular (and computational) 
processes involved in perceiving it. Indeed, this observation reveals that the processes 
underlying our instantaneous perception of the picture of the duck-rabbit are more or less 
the same as those underlying our instantaneous perception of the picture-face - the main 
difference between the two being that the former involves two object recognition 
capacities, whereas the latter involves a single 'face recognition capacity'. In conclusion, 
Wittgenstein's example of the duck-rabbit enables us to explicitly experience Fodorian 
modules 'in action' as it were. Conversely, Fodor's modularity thesis enables us to 
understand the similarity between Wittgenstein's examples of the duck-rabbit and the 
picture-face. 
Figure 2.S: The mandatory nature of pictorial perception qua object recognition 
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The advantage of the duck-rabbit figure is that it demonstrates the mandatory 
nature of visual perception qua object recognition. We could also experience Fodorian 
modules 'in action' by considering any number of illusions (see Figure 2.6): for instance, 
the Miiller-Lyer illusion (cited by Fodor, 1983, p.66) and the Ponzo illusion (discussed by 
Searle, 1992, pp.231-234).11 
II For an example of modular language-processing, see Wittgenstein's (1958, p.198) discussion of our 
instantaneous perception of the word 'Pleasure'. 
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Figure 2.6: The Miiller-Lyer illusion (left) and the Ponzo illusion (right) 
A consideration of the Ponzo illusion brings us to the illusion theory of pictorial 
perception (see Figure 2.7). Allen argues that the illusion theory should be rejected because 
it assumes a causal theory of perception. In contrast, I would argue that the theory should 
be rejected for the following reasons. Consider the following thought experiment: If the 
visual system had been designed from scratch to cope with modem conditions - a world 
containing representations - then would it operate any differently? I would argue that the 
answer must be 'no'. Our visual system either makes specific 'assumptions' about the 
general nature of the world - for instance, 'converging lines indicate distance' - and 
inevitably makes the occasional error; or it make no 'assumptions' whatsoever and is 
completely incapable of solving the adaptive problem of scene analysis; a plausible 
compromise between these two positions is inconceivable. (This is not to say, however, 
that evolution always comes up with the best, or only, solution to a problem.) In the 
Meditations, Descartes claimed that the fact that we succumb to illusions is a reason to 
distrust our senses (and to doubt the existence of the external world, a precursor to the 'evil 
demon hypothesis'). On the contrary, we should regard such occurrences as indirect 
indications of an adaptive visual system. In conclusion, then, the notion of an 'illusion' 
should be discarded for its misleadingly negative connotations. 
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Figure 2.7: The mandatory nature of pictorial perception qua depth perception 
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So far, I have described the activity of being in front of, and detached from, a still picture. 
But the activity of film viewing may go several steps beyond this, culminating in a 
phenomenological experience which the film theorist Noel Burch (1979) describes as the 
diegetic effect. From our perspective, a film's diegetic effect can be understood in two 
senses: first, we may have the feeling of being in the presence of actual people and events; 
and, second, we may have the feeling of being immersed in the environment behind what 
Gibson (1979, p.301) describes as the 'magic window'. (According to this definition, 
presence and immersion can be thought of as opposite sides of the same coin.) 
Significantly, Ed Tan (1994; 1996, Ch. 3) claims that the diegetic effect influences our 
appraisal of a situation's emotional meaning; in other words, it has implications for solving 
the paradox of emotional responses to fiction. Tan implies, however, that the diegetic 
effect is based on some sort of illusion; in contrast, I will attempt to explain the effect in 




At the Research Center for Virtual Environments and Behavior (ReCVEB) at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara, Jim Blascovich and Jack Loomis have been using 
immersive virtual environments (IVEs) as a 'research tool' in perceptual, cognitive, and 
social psychology (see Loomis, Blascovich, and Beall, 1999).12 An example of the type of 
research question which concerns them is as follows. Social psychologists assume that we 
must have the feeling of being in the 'presence' of an actual person, in order for that person 
to have an influence on our 'thought, feeling, and behaviour' (Allport, 1954). In light of 
this of this, imagine donning a 'head-mounted display' (HMD) and being confronted by a 
computer-generated landscape which stretches out to the horizon. In the distance, you 
catch sight of a human-like figure. This 'virtual other' is either a computer agent (akin to a 
character in a computer game) or a human avatar (controlled by an actual person outside 
the IVE). 
In order to describe your relationship to this virtual other, Blascovich (2002a, 
2002b) proposes the threshold model oj social influence (see Figure 2.8). The vertical axis 
of the graph is concerned with the sensory realm: the factor of behavioural realism is the 
extent to which you perceive the virtual other as behaving in a realistic fashion - a 
continuum marked by the terms 'low' and 'high'. The horizontal axis, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the epistemic realm: the factor of agency is the extent to which you believe 
that the virtual other represents an actual person standing outside the IVE - a continuum 
with 'agent' at the low end and 'avatar' at the high end. Significantly, Blascovich describes 
a functional, or compensatory, relationship between these two factors - a relationship 
which is indicated by the diagonal dashed line. If the level of agency on the horizontal axis 
is relatively low (i.e., you believe that the virtual other is only an agent), then the level of 
behavioural realism on the vertical axis must be relatively high for the 'threshold' of social 
presence to be reached and for social influence to occur. (Interestingly, Blascovich claims 
that behavioural realism is of greater importance than photographic realism, citing the folk 
wisdom of cartoonists in support.) Conversely, if the level of agency is relatively high (i.e., 
you believe that the virtual other is really an avatar), then an equivalent result can be 
achieved with a relatively low level of behavioural realism. 
12 Thanks to Jim Blascovich and Jack Loomis for several illuminating discussions about the relationship 
between virtual reality and film, for introducing me to the 'threshold model of social influence', and for 
al\owing me to try out a number of' immersive virtual environments' . 
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N.B. Two basic types of graph will be used in this thesis. This graph is an example of the 
first type: it illustrates a functional, or compensatory, relationship between two factors. 
Adapted from Blascovich (2002a, 2002b). 
In the case of film, we are concerned with the diegetic influence, social and 
otherwise, of both characters and events; therefore, we must alter the scope of the threshold 
model's applicability (see Figure 2.9). To begin with, let us replace the factor of social 
presence with the factor of diegetic presence. Similarly, considering that Burch (1979, 
p.247) refers to a 'threshold of emergence' with respect to the diegetic effect, let us replace 
the 'threshold of social influence' with the threshold of diegetic influence. What about the 
other factors? The threshold model makes a crucial distinction between a representation's 
appearance on the one hand, and its referential relationship to the world on the other. First, 
the factor of 'behavioural realism' can be replaced with realism period; a continuum 
marked by the neutral terms 'low' and 'high'. Blascovich (personal communication) notes 
that realism should be thought of as a 'latent variable' in the sense that it defies 
straightforward measurement; it is possible, however, to gain an approximate idea of the 
level of realism by considering certain 'manifest variables'. From the perspective of film 
theory, Andre Bazin's (1967, 1971) view of realism was both descriptive and prescriptive: 
for instance, he recognized that the introduction of sound (1927), colour (1930s), and 
widescreen (1950s) reflected a 'general trend' towards realism, whilst arguing that film 
should attempt to preserve the spatial and temporal continuity of reality. In contrast, our 
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view of realism will be purely descriptive: i.e., it will be concerned with what filmic 
information - including the viewing conditions - happens to 'interface' with our (modular) 
perceptual systems. 
Second, the factor of 'agency' can be replaced with the more general factor of 
reality-status: a continuum with, say, fiction at the 'low end' and non-fiction at the 'high 
end' (see Grodal, 1997, pp.32-35). Once again, our view of reality-status will be purely 
descriptive: i.e., it will be concerned with the way in which referential relationships happen 
to be processed by the (non-modular) central systems. (This factor will be discussed in the 
section 2.4.) Despite the various revisions to the model, however, the crucial point is that 
the functional, or compensatory, relationship between the factors in question still holds. If 
a film's reality-status is relatively low (i.e., you believe that the film is fictional), then the 
level of realism must be relatively high for the threshold of diegetic presence / influence to 
be reached and for the diegetic effect to occur. Conversely, if the film's reality-status is 
high (i.e., you believe that the film is, say, a documentary), then an equivalent result can be 
achieved with a relatively low level of realism. 





reallty .. tatul 
(p1'OCllllCl by centralsyltlms) 
Although Burch acknowledges that any type of film may be capable of inducing the 
diegetic effect, let us illustrate the threshold model by briefly considering the extreme 
example of 'Realist' cinema. Bazin praised the Italian Neorealist movement from the 
1940s and early 1950s. More recent examples, however, are provided by the Dogma 95 
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movement established in Denmark. The first three rules of 'The Vow of Chastity' , for 
instance, specify that all shooting should be done on location, all sound should be diegetic 
(i.e., no non-diegetic music), and the camera should be handheld. Lars Von Trier' s The 
Idiots (1998) is a controversial film about a group of young people - led by Stoffer (Jens 
A1binus) - who periodically pretend to be mentally retarded (an activity described as 
'spassing'). In the opening scene of the film, the group is joined by a naIve young woman 
called Karen (Bodil J0rgensen) who has run away from home (see Frame 2.1). In the 
concluding scene, Karen must prove her commitment to the group's cause by returning to 
her home and 'spassing' in front of her estranged and unsuspecting husband and family 
(see Frame 2.2). Given that we are fully aware that the characters are played by actors and 
the events have been staged for the camera, why is it probable that we experience an acute 
sense of embarrassment on both Karen and her family ' s behalf? 
Frames 2.1 and 2.2: Presence: The Idiots (1998) 
In a discussion of the film, Murray Smith (2003 , p.114) refers to a ' fundamental 
epistemological difference' between the ' literal reality of the events represented, a feature 
of documentary or historical representations' and ' realism, a feature of fictional 
representations' . How should we understand the nature of such realism (see Table 2.2)? In 
the case of IVEs, the photographic realism of ' virtual others' is constrained by the 
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processing power of the rendering computer, although Blascovich would argue that this 
constraint is only significant in as much as it affects behavioural realism. Whether or not 
this is correct, a film such as The Idiots need not make a compromise between the two 
options. 
(1) Photographic realism. The film's image track combines two important factors. 
The first factor is indexicality. Following Bazin's observations on the 'ontology' of the 
photographic image, the mechanical nature of the photographic process means that there is 
an indexical relationship between, say, the character of Karen and the actress Bodil 
J0rgensen. This relationship has significant implications for Walton's (1984) transparemy 
theory: viz., we see 'through' the images in question to Karen / Jergensen herself; that is, 
we are, in some sense, in the 'presence' of an actual person. The second factor is motion. 
Because 'flicker fusion' occurs at approximately fifty flashes per second and a sequence of 
twenty-four photographs per second is an 'evolutionarily unanticipated' phenomenon, the 
(modular) visual system perceives a continuous stream of light whilst failing to detect the 
difference between the 'discrete changes' of apparent motion and the 'continuous changes' 
of real motion. I3 (The importance of motion is also acknowledged by Burch.) The end-
result of this 'indexicality-motion' combination is the film's capacity to capture 'the 
subtleties and nuances' of Karen / J0rgensen's facial and bodily expressions. 14 
(2) Behavioural realism. In a discussion of the differences between theatrical 
(exaggerated) and filmic (naturalistic) acting, the actor Michael Caine (1990, p.6) states: 
'Iftoday's actor emulates film, he'd be better off watching a documentary.' An example of 
a documentary tradition is direct cinema which aims to film its subjects in a relatively 
unobtrusive fashion. Strangely, however, given the possibility that the subjects in question 
may be influenced by the camera's presence, the highest level of behavioural realism may 
actually occur in fiction films such as The Idiots which are made in the style of direct 
cinema. How should we understand the impact of such behavioural realism? Following 
Gibson's notion of 'perceptual invariances', Peter Wuss (2002) attempts to explain the 
'reality effect' of the Dogma films by proposing that films such as The Idiots present 
'behavioural invariances' which can be 'extracted' by the viewer. From the perspective of 
optics, the notion of 'behavioural invariances' is potentially problematic. From the 
13 Anderson (1996, p.61) argues that the perception of motion is not due to the much-cited phenomenon of 
the 'persistence of vision'. 
14 Phrasing inspired by Prince (1993, p.24): 'a major source of the appeal and power of the movies lies ... in 
film's ability to capture the subtleties and nuances of socially resonant streams of kinesic expressions'. 
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perspective of the threshold model, however, the key point is that the behaviour of, say, the 
character of Karen can be separated in some way from her reality-status, and this 
behaviour must be specified (ultimately) by the film's 'ambient optic array'. According to 
the Fodorian account outlined above, the (modular) visual system will analyse this optic 
array through computational processing and produce the basic categorization, "A woman 
of such-and-such a description" as a shallow output, thereby telling the rest of the mind 
that we are in the presence of an actual person. (The description in question will only 
contain information that is 'phenomenologically given'.) 
Having considered the factors of photographic and behavioural realism, we are in a 
position to challenge Walton's transparency theory. This challenge can be regarded as an 
application (or wielding) of Ockham's razor: the philosophical maxim which states that, 
'Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.' Once we have acknowledged that - (I) 
the image of Karen / Jergensen was produced by the mechanical process of photography 
(indexicality); (2) the image is processed in a certain way by the visual system 
(computational theory); and (3) the end-result of this processing is the phenomenological 
experience of being in the company of an actual person (presence) - then there is nothing to 
be gained by postulating the entity of 'transparency' .15 
Table 2.2: Presence: the factors of photographic and behavioural realism 
IVE film 
(1) photographic realism? no yes 
(2) behavioural realism? yes yes 
(3) Sonic realism. What role does the auditory system play? With respect to sonic 
realism, the film's soundtrack entails 'sonic indexicality'. Because sound recording is also 
a mechanical (causal) process, there is an 'indexical' relationship between Karen's voice 
and Jorgensen's voice; such indexicality necessarily entails motion or 'flow'. The end-
result of this 'indexicality-flow' combination is the film's capacity to capture 'the 
subtleties and nuances' of Karen / Jorgensen's vocal expressions; the auditory system will 
analyse the corresponding 'sonic array' through computational processing and produce the 
IS Carroll (1996e) notes that the transparency theory does not account for either the distinction between 
character and actress or the physical 'detachment' between the image and its referent (cf. binoculars and 
microscopes) . 
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basic categorization "A voice of such-and-such a description" as another shallow output, 
thereby telling the rest of the mind that an actual person is speaking. Beyond the uni-modal 
realm, the perceptual system as a whole will 'actively search' for correlations between the 
sensory modalities of vision and audition, especially concerning the phenomenon of lip-
sync (see Anderson, 1996, pp. 81-84). According to the 'processing rule' for synchrony, for 
instance, if Karen / j0rgensen's lip-movements (a visual event) and vocalisations (an 
auditory event) occur at the same time, then the two will be perceived as a single (cross-
modal) event - the 'synchresis effect'. Because of the 'spatial magnetization' of sound by 
image, furthermore, the sound of Karen's voice will seem to come from her mouth, even 
though the projection and sound systems in a multiplex theatre are functionally distinct 
(see below). In summary, the relationship between the visual and auditory representations 
of Karen will produce a whole which is greater than the sum of its two parts, thereby 
heightening our sense of presence. (The importance of lip-sync is also acknowledged by 
Burch.) 
How do photographic, sonic, and behavioural realism influence our response to the 
final scene cited above? Although the reality-status of Karen and the members of her 
family is low, the net-result of the factors described is that the overall level of realism with 
regard to both ordinary and 'spassing' behaviour is extraordinarily high (if not maximal). It 
is plausible, therefore, that all of the characters have sufficient diegetic presence for the 
threshold of diegetic influence to be reached and for the diegetic effect to occur; a possible 
result of the diegetic effect is the sense of embarrassment described. 
o Immersion 
Given that presence and immersion are opposite sides of the same coin, it should be 
stressed that all of the factors described above will be of relevance to what follows, and 
vice versa. With respect to the threshold model, for instance, the line marked 'presence' 
can be replaced with one marked 'immersion'. The following discussion will be used, 
therefore, to bring another set of factors into the realism 'equation'. In light of this, 
imagine donning the 'head-mounted display' (HMD) once again. In essence, you have two 
types of access to the computer-generated landscape which lies before you (see Table 
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2.3).16 The first type of access is perceptual. With regard to the visual system, the human 
field of view samples 180 degrees of the ambient optic array; although the display does not 
'fill' your FOV, the apparatus excludes conflicting visual information relating to the room 
in which you are actually situated. In addition, the field of view comprises 140 degrees 
binocular overlap; the disparity between the left and right displays creates stereoscopic 
(binocular) vision, enabling you to see objects and events in three-dimensions. With regard 
to the auditory system, on the other hand, the ear-phones are capable of reproducing a 
section of the dynamic range (soft to loud) and frequency range (bass to treble) of human 
hearing, whilst the disparity between the left and right ear-phones creates stereophonic 
sound, enabling you to 'hear' objects and events in three-dimensions. 
The second type of access is enactive. As you tum to survey the landscape and take 
a step forward, both your head and body movements are registered by tracking devices and 
translated into visual and auditory changes by a rendering computer: thus, there is a system 
in place which permits you to interact (in 'real time') with your surroundings, whilst 
allowing for feedback from both tactile cues (for example, the floor on which you are 
standing) and vestibularlkinesthetic cues (concerning your head and body movements 
respectively). Loomis (personal communication) describes this type of virtual experience 
as the 'ultimate equivalent configuration': i.e., there is sensory equivalence between the 
information presented to us and the information that would be presented if we were 
actually situated in the depicted environment. (The notion of epistemic equivalence will be 
discussed in section 2.4.) 
16 Grodal (1997, pp.45-48) makes a distinction between 'perceptual access' and 'enactive access'. In order to 
illustrate this distinction, however, he cites video games as opposed to IVEs. 
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Table 2.3: Immersion: perceptual and en active access 
perceptual! motor system perceptual data! motor action 
(i) visual stereoscopic vision 
(ii) auditory stereophonic sound 
external (iii) haptic (touch) tactile cues (e.g., floor, ladder. gun) 
(1) perceptual (iv) olfactory (smell) X 
access (v) gustatory (taste) X 
internal (i) vestibular (head) vestibular cues 
(ii) kinesthetic (body) kinesthetic cues 
(2) enactive (i) head head movements 
access (ii) body body movements 
To what extent are filmic environments immersive in the way described? In a 
consideration of film as a type of 'virtual display', Loomis (1992, p.592) argues that the 
observer is more likely to experience 'distal attribution'; that is, the feeling of being in 
front of, but detached from, a non-immersive virtual environment (VE) (see Figure 2.10). 
Loomis states: 'even when an observer views a movie from the proper viewing point in the 
theater, residual cues (e.g., binocular disparity signalling screen flatness, visible features of 
the theater that surround the screen) and the lack of contingency upon the observer's head 
movements provide sensory information that a movie is being viewed.' From the 
perspective of Fodorian modularity, however, to what extent are these 'residual cues' 
significant: do any 'visual properties' of the viewing situation 'reliably predict' a film's 
virtual status? According to Goumerie' s paradox, for instance, sitting anywhere other than 
the 'optimum' viewing position will not significantly distort the projected image 
(Anderson, 1996, p.68). In a related fashion, binocular disparity is only effective for 
objects at a distance of less than fifteen feet from the observer; therefore, the distance 
between the viewer and the screen will minimise any 'flattening' of the image, whilst the 
viewer's head-movements will not make any discernible difference (ibid., p.66). Beyond 
the screen, the visibility of the theatre will be minimised by the lack of illumination; in any 
case, the (modular) visual system is effectively 'blinkered', processing different elements 
of the environment in isolation from the others. All of these points will be developed 
below. 
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Figure 2.10: Immersion versus distal attribution: the viewing situation 17 



















Given the possible insignificance of the residual cues cited by Loomis, might filmic 
environments be immersive after all? Let us answer this question by considering a film 
example which may create an extraordinary sense of visual immersion. In a sequence from 
Terrence Malick's World War II / action film The Thin Red Line (1998), American soldiers 
ascend a hill in Guadalcanal in an attempt to overcome a Japanese post at the hill's 
summit: Private Bell (Ben Chaplin) informs three of his fellow Privates that he will go on a 
lone reconnaissance mission to ascertain the state of play (see Frames 2.3 and 2.4). The 
camera follows him as he crawls through the long grass. Given that we are fully aware that 
we are viewing a film, why might we feel that we are actually accompanying Bell on his 
mission? 
17 The infonnation about the standard layout of a theatre is available from the Dolby website. The calculation 
for visual angle is cited by Lombard (1995), p.319. 
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Frames 2.3 and 2.4: Visual immenion: The Thin Red Line (1998) 
Considering that our visual access to the environment in question is partially 
detennined by the nature of the viewing conditions, let us consider some of the differences 
between viewing the sequence in a modern multiplex theatre and viewing a hypothetical 
3D-IMAX version of the sequence on the one hand, and a standard televisual version on the 
other. Although televisual technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated - for 
example, see the recent experiments in 'immersive television' - for the sake of argument, 
let us assume that the televisual viewing experience involves a standard television set 
positioned in the comer of an illuminated room in the home. 
(1) Visual access: viewing conditions. In the case of vision, the everyday notions of 
'quantity' and 'quality' correspond to the factors of salience and definition respectively 
(see Table 2.4). First, the most obvious feature which would distinguish both the !MAX 
and filmic viewing experiences from their televisual counterpart concerns the process of 
projection. All other things being equal, the 3D-IMAX image would occupy a larger 
proportion of our field of view than the filmic image, and the filmic image would occupy a 
larger proportion of our field of view than the televisual image (as determined by the 
measure of 'visual angle'). Conversely, the widescreen aspect ratio of 2.35: 1 would 
approximate the shape of our field of view more closely than either the IMAX ratio of 
1.435:1 or the standard televisual aspect ratio of 1.33 :1 (see Wollen, 1993). In light of 
these two inter-related properties, both the IMAX and filmic images would maximise the 
salience of the hillside environment to a greater extent than the televisual image, producing 
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salience of the hillside environment to a greater extent than the televisual image, producing 
a higher level of what Loomis would describe as equivalent visual information. 
Conversely, the lack of illumination would incidentally play a significant role in 
minimising the salience of the theatrical environment in which we are actually situated, 
thereby producing a lower level of non-equivalent visual information. (This inverse 
relationship will be discussed again in section 2.5.) 
Second, both IMAX and filmic projection would produce images of higher 
brightness, colour, and resolution, thereby maximising the definition of Private Bell's body 
as he crawls through the long grass in the foreground, and the texture elements of the hill's 
summit (the Japanese post) in the background. (In a strict sense, of course, both salience 
and definition would be dependent on all of the elements described.) Considering these 
basic differences, it is probable that both the 3D-IMAX and filmic images would activate 
the various modules comprising our visual system to a greater extent than their televisual 
counterparts, resulting in the production of 'equivalent' shallow outputs of a greater 
'weight' on the one hand, and 'non-equivalent' shallow outputs of a lesser 'weight' on the 
other; the net-result being that the periphery of the mind would tell the central workspace 
that we are actually present ('immersed') in the hillside environment behind the 'magic 
window'. 
Table 2.4: Visual immersion: the factors of salience and definition 
measure 3D-IMAX film television 
(1) salience image size (visual angle) 60-120° 45° 16.6° 
('quantity') * image shape (aspect ratio) 1.435:1 2.35:1 1.33.1 
(2) definition brightness range (contrast ratio) full full limited 
('quality') colour range (colour number) full full limited 
resolution (pixel number) high high low 
* Also see the exclusion of 'non-equivalent' visual information. 
At this point, however, it should be pointed out that Malick's film must balance 
visual immersion with narrative control (see Figure 2.11). The sequence in question, for 
instance, is intercut with 'mental images', or 'memories', of Private Bell's 'girl back 
home'. Although the lMAX version might have the upper hand on its filmic counterpart in 
terms of overall salience and definition, the size and shape of the image would not lend 
60 
itself to the telling of the film's narrative: the close-ups of Bell and co. would be 
impossible, and we would have to look up, down, and to the sides of the screen in order to 
gather all of the visual information presented, necessitating a lower editing rate (see 
Wollen, 1993). Many of the criticisms originally aimed at widescreen and challenged by 
Barr (1963), therefore, can be used to argue the case for (widescreen) film over IMAX. 
(Aspects of film narrative will be discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.5.) 






N.B. As stated previously, two basic types of graph will be used in this thesis. This graph is 
an example of the second type: it illustrates an inverse relationship between two factors. A 
similar graph could be drawn for the relationship between visual immersion and image 
quality. 
Beyond the natural partnership of salience and definition lies the miscellaneous 
factor of dimensionality. In this particular case, one might assume that the filmic and 
televisual versions of the sequence would be on equal terms as both would employ a two-
dimensional screen (see Table 2.5). In actual fact, however, the filmic version might have 
the upper hand on its televisual counterpart once again: for instance, the brightness, colour, 
and resolution of the projected image would 'maximally conserve' the Gibsonian depth 
cues of motion parallax, texture gradients, and occlusion, thereby heightening the contrast 
between the foreground and background elements described above. According to Marr's 
(1982) account of depth perception, the absence of stereoscopic vision (cf. IVEs) would be 
compensated by modules which process the depth cues in question (see Messaris, 1994, 
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p.52). Even more strangely, perhaps, the filmic version might have the upperhand on the 
hypothetical 3D-IMAX version. If the module for processing stereopsis was activated, for 
example, it would 'override' and 'suppress' all other depth processing, resulting in the 
curious 'flattening' of the hillside environment (see Anderson, 1996, pp.65-75). This leads 
us to the paradoxical conclusion that the 'two-dimensional' filmic version might have 
greater dimensionality than the allegedly 'three-dimensional' IMAX one. 
Table 2.S: Visual immersion: the factor of dimensionality (psychological versus simulated depth) 
measure 3-DIMAX film television 
(3) dimensionality conservation of depth cues maximal maximal minimal 
override of other depth processing? yes no no 
(2) Visual access: method of filming. Having considered the role of the viewing 
conditions, let us tum to the way in which our visual access to the filmic environment is 
manipulated by Malick himself. Bazin argues that the film-maker should use the deep 
focus / long take, thereby preserving the spatial and temporal continuity of reality, whilst 
allowing for ambiguity of meaning and freedom of interpretation. As stated previously, 
however, we are concerned with what information happens to 'interface' with the human 
visual system. First, Gibson claims that the human visual perspective is based on the 
'earth-air interface'. In this light, the sequence presents the environment from a position 
which could be occupied by an American soldier: the camera is positioned at eye-level and 
in proximity to the action, the lens frequently pushing against the blades of grass. The 
closer the camera, the greater the salience of the environment's 'affordances' and the 
greater the 'motion parallax' between foreground and background elements. Second, 
because human vision is not panoramic, our perception of the real world is dependent on a 
'succession of partial views' (see Anderson, 1993, p.61). In this light, the sequence 
presents various establishing shots which enable us to form what Julian Hochberg (1978) 
would describe as a 'cognitive map' of the environment. ls Given that we have been 
successfully oriented to the hill's summit (the goal of the action), the sequence is free to 
present us with an array of front, reverse, and side views: in the Ptolemaic universe of The 
18 The notion of a 'cognitive map' is rejected by Gibson (1979, pp.l98-200). Presumably, this map is held in 
what Baddeley (1995) describes as the visuo-spatial sketchpad of working memory: the storage of object 
representations and spatial relations may be dependent on the ventral ('what') and dorsal ('where') pathways 
respectively. 
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Thin Red Line, then, we remain stationary whilst the hillside environment revolves around 
us. In conclusion, one could argue that contrary to Bazinian realism, the method of film-
making employed by Malick provides a greater approximation of the soldier's (visual) 
experience. 
(3) Enactive access. Although we cannot interact with the filmic environment in a 
strict sense, the sequence is capable of simulating interaction in various ways. Gibson's 
(1979) ecological approach places considerable emphasis on a moving observer: for 
instance, ambient vision is a consequence of the movement of the head in relation to the 
body, whilst ambulatory vision is a consequence of the movement of the body in relation to 
the environment. In the sequence, the camera 'specifies' head movements through the 
panning shot: Gibson notes that such shots may result in 'panoramic' vision. Similarly, the 
camera 'specifies' body movements through the tracking shot: Gibson argues that the 
tracking shot is preferable to the zoom shot because the latter cannot 'display the deletion 
or accretion that occurs at occluding edges' (p.298). Indeed, in certain circumstances we 
may actually feel as if we are moving through the filmic environment. 
In addition to camera position and movement, interaction can be simulated through 
editing. The most obvious example is provided by deictic gaze behaviour (see Carroll, 
1996d, and Persson, 2003). Our natural tendency to follow the gaze of another person to its 
'target object' can be duplicated by point-of view editing: in the sequence, for instance, a 
close-up of an American soldier's face (the point/glance shot) may be followed by a long 
shot of what that soldier is looking at - say a Japanese soldier in the distance (the 
point/object shot) To use Loomis's terms, there is 'sensory equivalence' between the 
optical information presented to us and the information that would be presented if we were 
actually interacting with the depicted environment. Intriguingly, IVE researchers at UCSB 
have been effectively concerned with the opposite problem: viz., how realistic does a 
'virtual other' have to be for the subject to actually follow its gaze to a target object?19 In 
this case, the possibility of genuine interaction may be ruled out by an insufficient level of 
photographic and behavioural realism. 
(4) The role of the kinesthetic system. Despite film's reputation as a bi-modal 
medium - see, for example, the journal title Sight and Sound - the above observations 
suggest that the kinesthetic system often plays a role in film viewing, bringing kinesthetic 
cues into the realism equation. Gibson describes several experiments in visual kinesthesis -
19 See experiment by Tim German and Jeff Niehaus, Department of Psychology, UCSB. 
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for example, the 'gliding room' and the 'haunted swing' - in which the 
'pseudoenvironment', rather than the subject, undergoes locomotion; significantly, the real 
'surface of support' must be hidden from view in order for the effect to occur. With respect 
to Malick's film, a particularly salient example of visual kinesthesis is provided by one of 
the opening sequences: a boat transports the American soldiers to the island, moving up 
and down through the waves; as the camera travels alongside the boat (presumably 
positioned in an adjacent craft?), we may experience a sensation akin to sea-sickness. The 
larger the projected image and the lower the visibility of the theatrical environment, the 
more powerful the sensation; the hypothetical IMAX version cited above, for instance, 
might be 'uncomfortably' compelling. How should we explain visual kinesthesis in 
Fodorian tenns? Because the visual system is dominant, it will analyse the film's optic 
array and deliver shallow outputs to the rest of the mind which state, incorrectly, that we 
are actually moving; in the event of a disagreement, these outputs will over-ride the 
conclusions of the kinesthetic system, whose outputs state, correctly, that we are actually 
stationary . 
* * * 
So far, we have been concentrating on visual immersion. To what extent, though, are filmic 
environments sonically immersive? To begin with, its seems unlikely that any 'auditory 
properties' of the viewing (or 'listening') situation 'reliably predict' the soundtrack's 
virtual status. As Michel Chi on (1994, p.67) observes, there is no auditory equivalent to the 
screen: for sound 'there is neither frame nor preexisting container' . (Indeed, our 
relationship to sound does not seem prone to the same degree of scepticism with respect to 
either the paradox of representation or the paradox of fiction.) In light of this, let us turn 
immediately to a film example which may create an extraordinary sense of auditory 
immersion. In the concluding sequence of Michael Mann's Heat (1995), policeman 
Vincent Hanna (AI Pacino) and bank robber Neil McCauley (Robert De Niro) shoot it out 
on the outskirts of a busy airfield (see Frames 2.5 and 2.6). Given that we are fully aware 
that we are viewing a film, why might we feel as if aeroplanes are actually taking off and 
landing all around us? 
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Frames 2.5 and 2.6: Auditory immersion: Heat (1995) 
Our auditory access to the airfield environment would be heavily influenced by the 
' listening' conditions; given that a consideration of 3D-IMAX will not allow for any 
illuminating (favourable) comparisons in this particular instance, let us tum to the 
differences between film and television alone, once again assuming certain extremes for 
the sake of argument. 
(1) Auditory access. In the case of sound, the everyday notions of 'quantity' and 
'quality' also correspond to the factors of salience and definition - or 'volume' and ' tone'-
respectively (see Table 2.6). Whereas a standard television set only transmits a single 
channel of sound, the standard sound system in a multiplex theatre transmits '5 .1' 
channels. The five main speakers would produce sounds of a greater dynamic range (soft 
to loud), thereby maximising the salience of the aeroplanes and producing a higher level of 
what Loomis might describe as equivalent auditory information. In a related fashion, the 
speakers would produce sounds of a full frequency range (bass to treble), thereby 
maximising the definition of auditory ' details'; as each aeroplane either took off or landed, 
our auditory system would use frequency variation - relating to the roar of the aeroplane's 
engine - in order to produce the basic categorization "aeroplane" as a shallow output. (In a 
strict sense, however, both factors would be a function of the dynamic and frequency 
ranges.) Considering Chion' s remark, there would be no permanent example of non-
equivalent auditory information. A temporary example would be the sound of another 
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viewer talking or crackling their sweet wrappers; here, the constraint in operation is social 
as opposed to technological. 
Table 2.6: Auditory immersion: the factors of salience and definition 
measure film television 
(1) salience dynamic range loud: 110 dB loud: 70dB 
('quantity') (soft to loud) 
(2) definition frequency range full: 20 Hz - 20,000 Hz limited: 100 Hz - 7,000 Hz 
('quality') (bass to treble) 
What about the miscellaneous factor of dimensionality? Although the standard 
television set transmits mono sound, televisual sound would benefit from the process of 
psychological localization (see Figure 2.12). Given the viewing differences described 
above, however, this process would be exploited more effectively by the standard sound 
system in a multiplex cinema. The first type of psychological localization would be 
dependent on the synchresis effect and the phenomenon of spatial magnetization described 
above. In the well-known diner scene from earlier in the film - widely publicised as the 
first time that Pacino and De Niro appear on screen together - the sound of Hanna's and 
McCauley'S voices would seem to come from their mouths, even though the projection and 
sound systems are functionally distinct. Similarly, the sounds of the aeroplanes in the final 
scene would seem to follow their trajectories across the screen. The second type of 
psychological localization would be produced by sound perspective: manipUlations of 
volume would give the impression that the aeroplanes were either approaching or receding, 
a loud sound indicating proximity and a soft sound indicating distance.2o 
20 Both spatial magnetization and sound perspective may be dependent on the laws of gestalt psychology, 
providing us with possible examples of 'top-down processing'. 
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In contrast to television, however, the standard sound system in a multiplex theatre 
IS also capable of exploiting real localization; in this respect, moreover, filmic 
environments may have the upper hand on IVEs (see Figure 2.13). Three of the main 
speakers are positioned behind the screen: a central speaker transmits the main sounds 
(major dialogue, sound effects, and music), whilst left and right speakers transmit 
stereophonic sound (all of the aforementioned sounds, along with minor dialogue). At the 
sides and rear of the theatre, on the other hand, left and right speakers transmit surround 
sound (ambient and atmospheric sound effects). Presumably, this setup obeys what 
Williams (1985) describes as the 'hierarchy of sonic importance'. In light of this, a 
consideration of the auditory system provides us with a vivid example of how the mind 
may actually calculate immersion. Say one of the aeroplanes in the sequence flies from the 
left speaker at the back of the theatre to the right speaker at the front. Using the processing 
rule that an object will continue to move in the same direction, our auditory system will 
compare the time difference between the roar of the aeroplane's engine reaching each ear 
and the intensity difference between the roar at each ear, in order to produce the basic 
localization "moving from back left to front right" as a shallow output. In a related fashion, 
a consideration of the auditory system demonstrates that an aeroplane can be 
'acousmatized' at the back of the theatre, before it becomes 'visualized' at the front of the 
theatre, thereby contributing to the impression of 'magic-window reality'. 
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Figure 2.13: Auditory immersion: the factor of dimensionality (real localization) 
visualized zone 
L c R 
acousmatic zone 
N.B. The bold line marks what Chion describes as the 'visualized zone' (i.e., the screen) 
although the front three speakers are also capable of transmitting both offscreen and non-
diegetic sound; the remaining area comprises the 'acousmatic zone' (primarily offscreen 
sound). The lines between the five speakers - including the bold line - illustrate the various 
panning options which can be employed by the film-maker. 
(2) The role of the haptic system. The discussion of visual immersion was used to 
suggest that the kinesthetic and vestibular systems occasionally playa role in film viewing; 
similarly, a discussion of auditory immersion can be used to suggest that the haptic system 
also plays some sort of role, bringing tactile cues into the realism equation. Although the 
sense of 'touch' actually comprises pressure, temperature, and pain, in this particular 
instance we are concerned with pressure alone; indeed, hearing - which is ultimately based 
on pressure - has been described as 'feeling at a distance' (see Gleitman et al. 1991, p.170). 
In the sound system described above, a sixth speaker positioned behind the screen (the '.1 ' 
channel) specialises in bass sounds: because the frequency will be sufficiently low (say, 20 
to 120 Hz) and the volume sufficiently high (say, 120dB?), we may actually feel the 
vibrations of the 'aeroplanes' through the floor and seats of the theatre, a phenomenon 
which recalls the 1970s experiments in Sensurround.21 
21 The first Sensurround film was Earthquake (1974). 
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o Conclusion 
A film's diegetic effect can be (partly) explained In tenns of the phenomenological 
experiences of presence and immersion; in tum, these experiences can be (partly) 
explained in tenns of the impact of the shallow outputs produced by F odorian modules on 
the rest of the mind. In the case of presence, film may have the upper hand on immersive 
virtual environments (IVEs) in tenns of utilising both photographic and behavioural 
realism. Immersion, on the other hand, is not a case of all or nothing: if IVEs are at the 
high end of the 'immersion spectrum' and televisual environments are at the low end, then 
filmic environments may be situated somewhere in the middle, providing a greater 
approximation of our perceptual and enactive access to an IVE than might be expected, 
whilst actually exceeding IVEs in tenns of auditory dimensionality. The impact of a drama 
film such as The Idiots may be primarily dependent on presence, whereas the impact of a 
war / action film such as The Thin Red Line may be primarily dependent on immersion. 
Either way, a similar set of factors will be involved in both cases: for instance, the level of 
Karen's presence in The Idiots will vary according to the size of the screen and the 
darkness of the theatre,22 whilst the level of our immersion in the hillside environment of 
The Thin Red Line will be partly dependent on the degree of photographic and behavioural 
realism. 
It seems fitting to conclude this discussion with a question: namely, will the future 
see any advance in tenns of a film's diegetic effect? With respect to presence, for instance, 
fiction films may be already capable of capturing more naturalistic performances than even 
the direct cinema tradition of documentary film-making. With respect to immersion, on the 
other hand, we must consider the following factors. Fiction films must balance (interactive) 
spectacle with (non-interactive) narrative; more visually immersive media such as 3D-
IMAX have a number of limitations; the standard sound system in a multiplex theatre has 
already reached a high level of sophistication; the impact of adding the two remaining 
senses - namely, smell and taste - is likely to be negligible;23 and, finally, genuine 
interaction might be neither possible nor desirable. On top of all this, there is the 
possibility that the human perceptual system has stopped evolving: in other words, once a 
22 Lombard (1995) claims that viewers respond more positively to televisual images of people when those 
images are presented on larger screens, or when the viewer is positioned closer to the screen. 
23 For example, Burch (1979, p.246) cites the failure of the 1960s experiments in Smell-O-Vision. The first 
Smell-O-Vision film was Scent of Mystery (1960). 
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successful 'interface' has been achieved, there may be nowhere left to go. At only one 
hundred years old, then, film may be the ultimate virtual experience after all. 
2.3 ANOTHER TYPE OF MODULARITY 
(a) Cognizing the world: Darwinian modularity 24 
How should we understand our cognitive relationship to the world? The title of Fodor's 
1983 work The Modularity of Mind is misleading for it implies that, on his view, the mind 
is largely, or even entirely, modular. An excursion beyond the front cover, however, 
reveals that the term 'modularity' is only applicable to the perceptual systems of the mind; 
the systems which comprise the central workspace are emphatically non-modular. 
Unfortunately, the problems do not end with the confusion surrounding the title: Fodor's 
account of the central systems is dangerously close to the view of the mind as a 'blank 
slate' or 'general-purpose processor' (tabula rasa) - originally proposed by the seventeenth 
century British empiricists John Locke and David Hume, and standardly adopted by the 
social sciences. 
In recent years, this view of the mind has been challenged by the approach of 
evolutionary psychology advanced by Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby 
(1992) in The Adapted Mind, and endorsed by writers such as Steven Pinker (1997) in How 
the Mind Works and Henry Plotkin (1997) in Evolution in Mind. The approach of 
evolutionary psychology can be regarded as a 'New Synthesis' of computational 
psychology and evolutionary theory: first, the mind is composed of a large number of 
'special-purpose' computational modules (tabula cognitiva); and second, these modules 
evolved by natural selection to solve the adaptive problems encountered by our hunter-
gatherer ancestors in the Pleistocene.25 
24 With respect to film theory, Darwinian modularity is discussed by Anderson (1996, pp.37-43) under the 
rubric of 'capacities'. 
2S Thanks to Leda Cosmides and John Tooby at the Center for Evolutionary Psychology, UCSB, for 
generously giving me their time to answer my questions, for allowing me to participate in a graduate course 
on evolutionary psychology, and for inviting me to present a paper at their weekly graduate seminar on the 
same subject. 
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(i) Specific examples 
In order to illustrate the nature of 'psychological adaptations', Tooby and Cosmides (1992, 
pp.55-61) describe the adaptations which comprise the vertebrate eye and visual system; 
considering the above discussion, these adaptations are instances of Fodorian modules. 
Significantly, however, Cosmides and Tooby (1992, p.165) also propose that many central 
capacities are modular in nature. 26 Their main research field is the domain of social 
reasoning; in particular, they propose that there is a cheater detection module (CDM) for 
detecting cheaters in social exchanges. Much of Cosmides and Tooby's research (e.g., 
1997) is based on the Wason-selection task (see Figure 2.14). In this task, subjects must 
tum over certain cards in order to test a certain rule. In a standard task, only 25 per cent of 
subjects give the correct answer. When the task is concerned with social exchanges where 
one person accepts a benefit without satisfying a requirement, however, 75 per cent of 
subjects give the correct answer. In this case, the subject should experience a cognitive 
'pop-out effect'. (The failure of the remaining 25 per cent is attributed to experimental 
error as opposed to a faulty CDM.) 
Beyond the perceptual realm of recognizable and localizable objects and events, we 
can think of the world as comprising a number of different levels which, from the bottom 
upwards, are reflected by the academic disciplines of physics, biology, psychology, 
sociology, and so forth; each of these levels raises a key question which must be answered. 
Correspondingly, many theorists believe that we come into the world equipped with a 'folk 
understanding' of the physical, biological, psychological, and social reality in which we 
live; to use Dennett's (1987) term, this understanding enables us to take a variety of 
appropriate 'stances' to the different aspects of our immediate environment. 27 
(1) Physical reality: What is the nature of physical objects? It is plausible that there 
is a module for 'folk physics' which enables us to take a 'physical stance' to moving 
objects. This capacity involves the attribution of certain physical laws according to a 
'theory of bodies'. (2) Biological reality: What is the nature of biological objects? A 
module for 'folk biology' enables us to take a 'biological stance' to plants and animals. 
26 My distinction between Fodorian modularity and Darwinian modularity was informed by Steen (1997) 
who claims that there are 'two quite convincing levels of functional specialization'. 
27 With respect to the following list, Dennett (1987) specifically proposes the physical stance and the 
intentional stance. In addition, he proposes that we can take a design stance to human-made tools and a 
contingency stance to contingent relationships in the world. 
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This capacity involves the attribution of some hidden 'essence' according to a 'theory of 
nature'. (3) Psychological reality: What are the intentions of psychological agents? A 
module for 'folk psychology' enables us to take the 'intentional stance' to fellow human 
beings. This capacity involves the attribution of epistemic mental states according to a 
'theory of mind'. (4) Social reality: What are the implications of social exchanges between 
psychological agents? A variety of modules - including the CDM - enable us to take a 
'social stance' to certain types of exchange with fellow human beings. (5) Emotional 
reality: What is the emotional significance of objects and events? It is plausible that there 
is an array of modules for the appraisal of the emotional significance - or the 'direct 
perception' of Gibsonian 'affordances' - which enable us to take an 'emotional stance' to 
all of the above: namely, objects, plants and animals, individual agents, and groups of 
agents. 
Figure 2.14: Wason-selection task: standard (top); social exchange (bottom) 
EJ EJ 
~ EJ 
From Cosmides and Tooby (1997). 
(iiJ General properties 
How should we understand the general properties of the central capacities in question? To 
begin with, there is a distinction to be made between mental representations on the one 
hand, and the computational mechanisms which process those representations on the other. 
In light of this, Richard Samuels (2000) describes two possible scenarios. According to the 
notion of Chomskian modularity, the mind comes equipped with 'systems of mental 
representations' alone: in the case of language, the relevant system is described as a 
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'universal grammar' (see Chomsky, 1975).28 According to the notion of Danvinian 
modularity, on the other hand, the mind comes equipped with both systems of mental 
representations and 'special-purpose' computational mechanisms for processing those 
representations. Samuels argues that many evolutionary psychologists - including 
Cosmides and Tooby - fail to distinguish between the view that the mind is a general-
purpose processor which has access to Chomskian modules and the view that the mind is a 
collection of Darwinian modules. In order to set up a marked contrast with Fodor's account 
of the central systems, let us assume that the latter view is correct. 
Apart from operating outside the realms of perceptual and language-processing 
systems, how are Darwinian modules similar to, and different from, F odorian modules? 
Once again, this question can be answered by considering two basic perspectives (see 
Table 2.7). (1) A functional perspective. Starting with the key similarities, Darwinian 
modules seem to be encapsulated from - and impenetrable to - our existence beliefs: the 
COM, for instance, is apparently oblivious to the artificial nature of the Wason-selection 
task. In a related fashion, Darwinian modules operate in a fast and mandatory fashion: 
hence, the cognitive 'pop-out effect' described above. The key difference is that Darwinian 
modules are not encapsulated from - and impenetrable to - all epistemic mental states: it is 
plausible that the CDM has access to information from both the perceptual systems and 
memory, and that it is influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by our background 
knowledge. (2) A neurobiological perspective. Although it is reasonable to assume that 
Darwinian modules are 'associated' with fixed neural architecture, it is probable that this 
architecture is physiologically distributed and exists at a microscopic scale; i.e., above the 
level of the individual cell but below the level psychophysically detectable by current brain 
imaging techniques - Dennett (1991, p.21O) suggests that neural circuits will be forever 
invisible to neuroscientists. Despite some evidence of 'dissociations', therefore, the CDM 
must be analysed primarily at a functional, as opposed to a neurobiological, level of 
explanation. 
28 Chomsky (1975) proposes that that there is a language-acquisition device (LAD); more recently, Pinker 
(1994) has described the capacity in question as the language instinct. 
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Table 2.7: Darwinian modularity (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992) 
property description 
questions * mind-reading / emotional appraisal: 
(domain) (i) intentions?; (ii) significance? 
(I) functional computational character / partial encapsulation / 
default mode real intentions and real significance 
answers shallow: 
(outputs) (i) intentional / (ii) emotional stances 
(2) neurobiological neural architecture circuits: 
micro-scale; not detectable 
* The evolutionary-ecological approach can be regarded as a complementary perspective. 
(b) Cognizing the cinema: regarding-as (type II) 
Having outlined our cognitive relationship to the world, how should we understand our 
cognitive relationship to the cinema? In order to answer this question, let us tum our 
attention to two possible examples of Darwinian modules which are of obvious relevance 
to film viewing: namely, those modules which underlie, and give rise to, the intentional 
and emotional stances. Although this project is primarily concerned with the emotional 
stance, let us begin by considering the intentional stance, regarded by many - including 
Fodor (1992) - as the best example ofa central capacity which is modular in nature. 
(i) Taking the intentional stance 
Taking the intentional stance to the people in our environment can be understood in terms 
of mind-reading. Simon Baron-Cohen (1995) describes four mechanisms which comprise 
our 'mind-reading system'. Let us briefly describe each of these mechanisms in tum, 
before turning to a particular film example. The first mechanism is the Intentionality 
Detector (ID) (see Figure 2.15). The ID is concerned with volitional mental states and 
processes dyadic representations of the form "agent-wants-object". In particular, the ID is 
sensitive to movement, especially self-propelled movement (see Premack, 1990). In order 
to illustrate this fact, Baron-Cohen cites a well-known film by Heider and Simmel (1944) 
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which features geometrical shapes moving in and out of a container. 29 The two found that 
viewers tended to describe the shapes in intentional terms: for example, "The triangle 
wants to escape from the container." As stated previously, the importance of movement is 
acknowledged by Burch (1979) in his discussion of the diegetic effect. Presumably, the 
property of movement is sufficient to give the shapes both presence and influence. 
(Considering that the 10 is closely related to our visual system, it is a potential candidate 
for a Fodorian module.) 
Figure 2.15: The Intentionality Detector (10) 
o 
The second mechanism is the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) (see Figure 2.16). The 
EDD is concerned with perceptual mental states and processes dyadic representations of 
the form, "agent-sees-object". In particular, it is sensitive to eye-like stimuli, detects the 
direction of eye-movements, and treats a sustained gaze as a sign of interest. Significantly. 
our capacity to detect the direction of eye-movements provides us with a further example 
of regarding-as (type I). Considering that the EDD is contained within the visual system -
and is presumably 'inforrnationally encapsulated'. and so forth - it is an obvious candidate 
for a Fodorian module. In order to observe the 'necessity and temporal instantaneity' of 
this module, we can simply take another look at Wittgenstein's example of the 'picture-
face'; all we need to add is a pair of clearly defined eyes and a target for the gaze. 
29 Heider and Simmel's film has been used in recent experiments by Blascovich et al. 
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Figure 2.16: The Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) 
The third mechanism is the Shared-Attention Mechanism (SAM) (see Figure 2.l7). 
SAM is concerned with shared mental states and processes triadic representations of the 
fonn "agent l-sees-(agent 2-sees-object}" or, if the two agents are looking at each other, 
"agent l-sees-(agent 2-sees-agent I}". Although Baron-Cohen assumes that one of these 
agents is oneself, presumably the same mechanism is employed when we observe two 
people paying attention to and discussing an object of interest. (Considering that SAM is 
located 'outside' the perceptual systems - in the central workspace of the mind - it is a 
possible candidate for a Darwinian module.) 






The fourth and final part of the mind-reading system is the Theory-ol-Mind 
Mechanism (ToMM) - inspired by Alan Leslie (1994) (see Figure 2.18). ToMM is 
concerned with epistemic mental states and processes mental representations of the fonn 
"agent-attitude-proposition". Many theorists argue that a theory of mind - otherwise 
known as folk psychology - provides us with the best way of making sense of another 
person's behaviour. A man walks into a bar. Why? Because he believes that the bar sells 
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alcohol, he desires some liquid refreshment, and he intends to buy a drink. Of course, we 
could be wrong - the man may intend to use the public telephone - but having some idea 
about a person's mental states is usually better than having none at all. Considering that 
ToMM lies in the central workspace of the mind, receives information from all of the three 
mechanisms described (possibly via SAM), and deals with epistemic mental states, it is an 
obvious candidate for a Darwinian module. The key question is: how does ToMM - and the 
mind-reading system as a whole - operate in the case of watching film characters on the 
screen and how does this operation relate to the Wittgensteinian notion of 'seeing' 
described previously? 
Figure 2.18: The mind-reading system 
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Intriguingly, Dennett (1987, pA8) illustrates the intentional stance by appealing to 
the ritual of film viewing: 'watching a film with a highly original and unstereotypical plot, 
we see the hero smile at the villain and we all swiftly and effortlessly arrive at the same 
complex theoretical diagnosis.' Following Dennett's example, let us illustrate the final 
three mechanisms of Baron-Cohen's mind-reading system by considering a short sequence 
from Alfred Hitchcock's The 39 Steps (1935). By way of introduction, the sequence in 
question brings together two narrative scenarios (for a discussion of narrative film, see 
Bordwell, 1985). Narrative scenario 1 is based loosely on the original novel by John 
Buchan. Richard Hannay (played by Robert Donat) is a young Canadian renting a flat in 
Portland Place, London. He is befriended by, and offers shelter to, a beautiful female spy 
who is murdered by an unknown assailant in the middle of the night. Following a tentative 
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lead, Hannay flees to the Scottish Highlands, effectively on the run for a crime he did not 
commit. 
According to Hitchcock, narrative scenario 2 was 'inspired by an old story about a 
South African Boer, a black-bearded man, very austere, with a very young, sex-starved 
wife' (Truffaut, 1986, p.l22). After narrowly escaping from the police, Hannay seeks 
shelter at a cottage owned by an old crofter and his young wife. To begin with, Hannay 
meets the crofter John (played by John Laurie); their introductory conversation reveals 
John to be both hostile and mercenary. When the crofter's wife Margaret (Peggy Ashcroft) 
enters the scene, the schema of the possessive and jealous husband is brought into playas 
Hannay's innocent enquiry "Your daughter?" is met with the stem, abrupt reply "My 
wife." Conversely, when John temporarily exits the scene, the schema of the lonely wife 
trapped in a loveless marriage is evoked by Margaret's friendly attitude towards Hannay 
(which hints at romantic interest) and her nostalgic comments about Glasgow (which hint 
at a dissatisfaction with her present situation). John suddenly re-enters the scene and after 
an uncomfortable moment, Hannay asks John if he can look at his newspaper: a shot from 
Hannay's point-of-view reveals that the headline on the front page reads 'PORTLAND 
PLACE MURDER TRACED TO SCOTLAND'. As Margaret serves the supper, John tells 
Hannay that "if you'll pit doon that paper, I'll say a blessing." 
When the three characters sit down at the kitchen table, four key elements are in 
place: namely, a hero, a potential villain, a potential love interest, and an incriminating 
object in an enclosed space (see Frame 2.7). The following sequence is one minute in 
duration and consists of nine shots; it is filmed according to the classical 180-degree 'axis 
of action' system, with the camera as an invisible and ideally placed witness. Although the 
sequence contains some dialogue (John saying grace), it can be regarded as an example of 
what Hitchcock described as 'pure cinema': that is, it relies on purely visual terms - in 
particular, a series of nine eyeline-matches - to tell the main story. 
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Frame 2.7: Mind-reading: The 39 Steps (1935) 
The first shot of the sequence establishes the relative positions of the four key 
elements, allowing the viewer to fonn a cognitive map of the scenic space: John sits at the 
head of the table with Hannay to his left and Margaret to his right; the newspaper lies in 
the centre of the table. In the second shot, the camera cuts in to show a head-on view of 
John saying grace; crucially, his eyes are closed. At this point, the sequence cuts to a shot 
of Hannay in three-quarters profile, the closer framing allowing us to distinguish the 
movements of his eyes (shot 3). Hannay looks to his left, in the direction of John (ELM 1), 
then downwards to his right, in the direction of the newspaper, eyes scanning left to right 
(ELM 2). How do we, the viewer, comprehend this particular shot? According to Baron-
Cohen's account of the mind-reading system, the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) will be 
capable of detecting the direction of the two eyelines in question and 'match' them to the 
relevant objects, thereby producing dyadic representations of the fonn "Hannay sees John" 
and "Hannay sees the newspaper". EDD will also take Hannay's sustained gaze at the 
newspaper as a sign of interest.) (As both John and the newspaper are situated off-screen, 
EDD must have access to our cognitive map of the scenic space.) Meanwhile, the Theory-
of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM) will consider the dyadic representations from the EDD in 
conjunction with infonnation from memory relating to narrative scenario 1 (man-on-the-
run) in order to produce corresponding mental representations along the lines of "Hannay 
is checking that John is not watching him" and "Hannay wants to know what the 
newspaper says about him". (How much do the police know about him and his 
whereabouts? Will the newspaper incriminate him?) 
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Eyeline-match 1 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Hannay-sees-John 
ToMM: Mental representation: Hannay-cheeks-that John is not watching him 
Eyeline-match 2 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Hannay-sees-newspaper 
ToMM: Mental representation: Hannay-wants-to know what newspaper says about him 
While Hannay is busy reading the newspaper, the sequence cuts to a reverse shot of 
Margaret, also in three-quarters profile (shot 4). To begin with, Margaret looks upwards in 
the direction of Hannay, with an expression of apparent affection (ELM 3). According to 
Baron-Cohen's account, EDD will conclude that Margaret is looking at Hannay, whilst 
ToMM will consider this conclusion in conjunction with narrative scenario 2 (lonely wife-
jealous husband), thereby inferring that the gaze is motivated by romantic interest. 
Subsequently, Margaret looks downwards to her left in the direction of the newspaper 
(ELM 4). Here, the situation becomes even more complex. In addition to EDD processing 
a dyadic representation of the form "Margaret sees newspaper", the Shared Attention 
Mechanism (SAM) will process a triadic representation of the form "Margaret observes 
that Hannay is looking at the newspaper". ToMM will consider both the dyadic 
representation from the EDD and the triadic representation from SAM, in order to produce 
a mental representation along the lines of "Margaret wants to know why Hannay is looking 
at the newpaper". (Notice that this particular inference will depend on general folk 
psychology - people tend to be curious about the objects of other people's attention - rather 
than specific narrative information relating to either scenarios I or 2.) 
Eyeline-match 3 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Margaret-sees-Hannay 
ToMM: Mental representation: Margaret-desires-Hannay 
Eyeline-match 4 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Margaret-sees-newspaper 
SAM: Triadic representation: Margaret-sees-(Hannay-sees-newspaper) 
ToMM: Mental representation: Margaret-wants-to know why Hannay is looking at newpaper 
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The middle shot of the sequence (shot 5) presents a semi-subjective view of the 
newspaper from the point-of-view of Margaret. In turn, we see Margaret's reaction (shot 6) 
as she looks back upwards in the direction of Hannay with an expression of horror and 
confusion (ELM 5). The latter exchange gives rise to the second example of a triadic 
representation to be processed by SAM: i.e., Margaret and Hannay are now looking at 
each other. At this point, the mind-reading system switches back to narrative scenario I -
especially our knowledge of the newspaper's contents - to infer that Margaret suspects 
Hannay of the Portland Place murder described on the front page. 
Eyeline-match 5 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Margaret-sees-Hannay 
SAM: Triadic representation: Margaret-sees-(Hannay-sees-Margaret) 
ToMM: Mental representation: Margaret-suspects-Hannay of murder 
The sequence cuts to a reverse reaction shot of Hannay (shot 6). Hannay looks in 
the direction of John (ELM 6), in order to check that John still has his eyes closed, and 
then back to Margaret (ELM 7), at which point his eyes, as Truffaut says, 'voice an 
eloquent appeal' (ibid.). (The latter exchange gives rise to the third and final example of a 
triadic representation.) Here, Donat's performance is notably restrained - there is no need 
for the exaggerated kinesic expressions typical of the silent films made just a few years 
earlier - demonstrating the importance of narrative context. 
Eyeline-match 6 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Hannay-sees-John 
ToMM: Mental representation: Hannay-cheeks-that John is not watching him 
Eyeline-match 7 
EDD: Dyadic representation: Hannay-sees-Margaret 
SAM: Triadic representation: Hannay-sees-(Margaret-sees-Hannay) 
ToMM: Mental representation: Hannay-pleas-his innocence to Margaret 
At this stage, the sequence returns to the head-on view of John who, unbeknownst 
to Hannay and Margaret, has now opened his eyes (shot 8). John looks to his left in the 
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direction of Margaret (ELM 8) and then to his right in the direction of Hannay (ELM 9). 
The mind-reading system switches back to narrative scenario 2 for a final time, thereby 
inferring that John suspects Hannay and Margaret of, in Truffaut's words, a 'romantic 
understanding' (ibid.). 
Eyeline-match 8 
EDD: Dyadic representation: lohn-sees-Margaret 
ToMM: Mental representation: lohn-suspects-Margaret of desiring Hannay 
Eyeline-match 9 
EDD: Dyadic representation: lohn-sees-Hannay 
ToMM: Mental representation: lohn-suspects-Hannay of desiring Margaret 
The sequence concludes with a re-establishing shot (shot 9). The three characters 
now fill the frame, emphasising the claustrophobic tension of the scene. Hannay and 
Margaret realise that John has finished saying grace and look downwards uncomfortably. 
John makes an excuse and exits the cottage in order to spy on the two from the outside 
. d 30 WIn ow. 
In conclusion, our capacity to read the minds of the three characters provides us 
with an example of regarding-as (type 1/). Why is the notion of 'regarding-as' relevant? 
Although the sequence requires us to arrive at a series of 'complex theoretical diagnoses', 
we arrive at these diagnoses 'swiftly and effortlessly', seeing each of the character's 
(changing) mental states in a direct and intuitive fashion. When we are presented with, say, 
a shot of Richard Hannay, not only is our perception of "A man of such-and-such a 
description." forced from us, but our tendency to attribute Hannay with beliefs, desires, 
intentions, emotions, and the like, is largely beyond our conscious control. What about the 
'type II' qualification? Whereas regarding Hannay's 'picture-face' as a face is the end-
result of a Fodorian module (read: perceptual, local, psychophysically detectable), 
regarding Hannay's 'picture-face' as the face of an intentional agent is the end-result of 
what has been described as a Darwinian module (read: central, distributed, possibly 
'forever invisible' to the neuroscientist). In particular, ToMM is not informationally 
30 For a discussion of how the space is constructed in this subsequent sequence, see Edward Branigan (1994), 
pp.56-62. 
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encapsulated in the Fodorian sense described above; for instance, it is extremely sensitive 
to relatively complex narrative information (namely, scenarios 1 and 2). Similarly, ToMM 
is cognitively penetrable in the sense that this information is freely available to 
consciousness, and if we have not been concentrating on the film's earlier scenes - or we 
are shown the sequence in isolation from the rest of the narrative - then the mechanism 
might arrive at erroneous diagnoses. 
The argument can be developed in the following terms. To the extent that a person 
is defined by their intentional mental states, it is more 'natural' for us to regard a 'virtual 
person' as the corresponding character than as the actor who embodies that character: for 
instance, we are more likely to attribute the person 'Hannay / Donat' with the mental states 
of a man on the run in the Scottish Highlands than with the mental states of a man 
performing for the camera in a studio at Shepherd's Bush in London. (If we think of 
'Hannay' and 'Donat' as being two 'aspects' of the same person, then the former has 
greater salience than the latter. I somehow doubt that we can 'flip' between the two with 
equal ease; in this respect, any analogy with the Jastrow duck-rabbit or the Rubin face-vase 
breaks down.) Why is this so? Crucially, there does not seem to be an inhibitory 
mechanism which 'switches off ToMM when we encounter virtual people; indeed, 
psychologists take this fact for granted as they tend to test this capacity precisely by using 
representations. There are at least two possible reasons for the lack of such a mechanism. 
First, film characters are what Barkow (1992) describes as 'evolutionarily unanticipated' 
phenomena. At no time in our evolutionary history, therefore, has there existed an 
appropriate selection pressure. Second, mind-reading, as an essentially cognitive process, 
is not particularly draining on our resources and is usually private. Contrast reading the 
mind of a film character with responding in a full-blown emotional fashion to a scene from 
a film, either by running away from the proverbial monster or by attempting to save the 
character in danger: both activities would be expensive in a physiological and a 
behavioural sense (not to mention embarrassing in a social one). 
Of course, if we are asked "In a strict sense, are you watching Hannay the character 
or Donat the actor?", we would reply "I am watching Donat the actor." This disparity, 
however, may reflect the contributions of different systems or levels of processing: self-
report is mediated by the articulatory (vocal) system which is within our conscious control; 
and may be more intimately connected to the central processing which makes the correct 
distinction (see Figure 2.19). Similarly, we will refrain from physically coming to 
HannaylDonat's aid at various stages of the film: behaviour is mediated by the somatic 
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nervous system. Indeed, the latter scenario suggests that although an inhibitory mechanism 
may not exist for ToMM, a safety-valve of sorts is already in place; albeit, a valve which 
evolved for different reasons. It does not matter if we perceive and cognize the characters 
and events on the screen as if they were real as long as both our emotion and action 
systems are appropriately inhibited and/or disengaged. To put it another way, inaccurate (or 
'non-veridical ') perceptions and cognitions are tolerable as long as they occur within the 
confines of a mind, brain, and body which, overall, are wise to the bigger picture. 
Figure 2.19: The relationship between mind-reading and articulation 
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N.B. The dashed line illustrates the 'cognitive penetrability' of the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM). 
(iiJ Taking the emotional stance 
Taking the emotional stance to an object or event in our environment can be understood in 
terms of the 'direct perception' of what Gibson describes as 'affordances'. To recap, the 
affordance of an object or event is what it 'offers' the observer (either for good or ill). 
Whereas a more realistic version of either Jastrow's duck or rabbit might 'afford' eating 
for the observer's 'good', a realistic version of a rattlesnake may 'afford' poisoning for the 
observer's 'ill'. 
For a cinematic example, consider a scene from Steven Spielberg's Raiders of the 
Lost Ark (1981) (see Frame 2.8). In search of the Lost Ark of the film's title, the 
archaeologist Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) climbs down a rope into the Well of Souls, a 
deep pit whose floor is crawling with dangerous snakes. Falling the last few feet, Jones 
lands in front of a venomous rattlesnake which rises up in readiness for attack. (Jones 
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glances off-screen; the image of the snake is presented as a POV shot and accompanied by 
the sound of hissing and a musical stinger.) 
Frame 2.8: Automatic appraisal: Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) 
Although Gibson refuses to make reference to inferential processes and mental 
representations, an explanation couched in computational terms suggests that the direct 
perception of affordances is another instance of regarding-as (type II) . To set the scene, the 
evolutionary psychologist's proposal that humans possess multiple faculties whilst facing 
multiple demands may lead to the following objection: What prevents incompatible 
faculties from being activated simultaneously? This is where emotions come into play. 
Cosmides and Tooby (2000) describe emotions as superordinate programs which - to 
adopt the simple trichotomy of inputs, processing, and outputs - co-ordinate the 
' subprograms' running within perceptual systems, cognitive-motivational systems, and 
physiological and behavioural systems respectively. The authors suggest that each emotion 
corresponds to a certain type of situation / ' adaptive problem' encountered by our hunter-
gatherer ancestors in the Pleistocene: for instance, the situation of being confronted by a 
rattlesnake entails the adaptive problem of self-preservation. 
Both the real-world and filmic situations present specific cues; namely, 'snake 
features' . (Indeed, the human visual system may contain 'snake detectors' in the way that a 
frog' s visual system may contain 'bug detectors' .) Cosmides and Tooby propose that there 
are monitoring algorithms (or 'demons') which are closely related to the perceptual 
systems and receive situational cues as input; situation-detecting algorithms, on the other 
hand, consider the outputs of monitoring algorithms along with the contents of memory 
and so forth. Significantly, the authors note that the employment of a situation-detecting 
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algorithm is approximately equivalent to the process of cognitive appraisal. (In this 
respect, they cite Lazarus and Lazarus (1994).) In a related fashion, perhaps we should 
think of the appraisal of emotional significance as being performed by an array of what 
Paul Ekman (2003, p.21) describes as 'automatic-appraising mechanisms' , or 
autoappraisers for short (see Figure 2.20). Autoappraisers exhibit some of the properties of 
Darwinian modules; with respect to film viewing, for example, they are relatively 
'sensitive' to the personal and environmental variables cited by Lazarus on the one hand, 
but relatively 'insensitive' to those variables (beliefs, concepts, and memories) which 
pertain to the true nature of the viewer's environment on the other. In addition, 
auto appraisers are not detectable psychophysically. (Both the Raiders snake example and 
the notion of 'cognitive appraisal' will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.) 
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Figure 2.20: Automatic appraisal (I) 
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Having considered the prototypical example of being confronted by a snake, it 
should be noted that autoappraisers may be capable of dealing with emotional situations of 
considerably greater subtlety and complexity. To go to the opposite extreme, then, let us 
return briefly to the sequence from The 39 Steps. Given that we have been aligned with 
Hannay, it is plausible that 'goal structures' which correspond to his situation will be 
activated. (The issues of 'alignment' and 'goals' will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5.) Following the fourth eyeline-match, one could argue that the mental 
representation "Margaret suspects Hannay of murder" has emotional implications with 
respect to Hannay's freedom; to use Gibsonian language, the glance and corresponding 
facial expression 'afford' the possibility that Hannay's 'freedom goal' will be threatened (a 
possible instance of empathy). Similarly, following the eighth eyeline-match, the mental 
representation "John suspects Margaret of desiring Hannay" also has emotional 
implications, albeit for a different set of reasons (a possible instance of sympathy). It is 
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plausible, therefore, that the corresponding auto appraisers will be sensitive to the outputs 
of ToMM. 
~SUALSCENEANAlY~S 




Figure 2.21: Automatic appraisal (II) 
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2.4 NON-MODULAR CENTRAL SYSTEMS: 
PRODUCERS OF 'DEEP OUTPUTS' 
(a) Discriminating the world: central processing 
So far, we have discussed our perceptual and cognitive relationship to both the world and 
the cinema: for instance, we have looked at how we directly perceive both a human face 
and a picture-face, and how we directly cognize the minds 'behind' such faces. Ifwe were 
concerned with the world alone, then it is feasible that we could stay with the type of 
perceptual and cognitive capacity described. Given, however, that we are concerned with 
both the world and the cinema - and especially the latter - we must address the esoteric 
question of how we discriminate the one from the other. 
This question requires us to take seriously Fodor's arguments for the non-
modularity of central processing. Although these arguments date back to at least 1983 and 
the confusingly entitled The Modularity of Mind, the discussion can be framed in terms of 
a more recent debate. If taken to its logical extreme, the 'New Synthesis' of computational 
psychology and evolutionary theory - advanced by Cosmides and Tooby, and endorsed by 
both Pinker (1997) and Plotkin (1997) - leads to a sharply contrasting position: according 
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to the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH), the mind is largely, or even entirely, 
modular in nature. In a 2000 book entitled The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor 
challenges the New Synthesis I MMH by presenting two main arguments; these arguments 
can be described under the rubric of the input problem and the frame problem. 
(i) The input problem 
The input problem concerns the question of how perceptual information is filtered from the 
periphery of the mind to the central workspace. In order to illustrate the input problem, 
Fodor discusses Cosmides and Tooby's (1992) notion of the cheater detection module 
(CDM) - introduced in section 2.3. 
(1) Argument. The gist of Fodor's argument can be summarised as follows. Imagine 
being confronted by a social situation in which an acquaintance is attempting to accept a 
benefit from you without satisfying the relevant requirement: some information presented 
by the situation would be of relevance to cheater detection, whilst other information would 
not be. The inputs to the visual system would be selected by transducers at the retina. 
Considering, however, that the CDM operates 'outside' the perceptual systems, the notion 
of a 'CDM transducer' is implausible. How, then, are the inputs to the CDM selected? By 
definition, the computational mechanisms which select the one from the other must be less 
domain specific (and so on) than the CDM itself. Therefore, the mind cannot be 'massively 
modular'. 
(2) Counter-argument. How convincing is this argument? First, it should be 
acknowledged that it is not clear that any evolutionary psychologist actually subscribes to 
MMH. Although Cosmides and Tooby (2000, p.56) describe the mind as 'a network of 
special-purpose computational mechanisms', they also concede that some general-purpose 
mechanisms must be 'embedded' in this network. Second, Cosmides (personal 
communication) argues that Dan Sperber (1996) effectively offers a solution to the input 
problem. In short, Sperber proposes that the mind is composed of 'three tiers' of modules: 
namely, perceptual modules (consistent with Fodor's account); first-order conceptual 
modules; and second-order metarepresentational modules. Significantly, Sperber suggests 
that the output of a perceptual module is capable of satisfying the input conditions of a 
conceptual module, whose output, in tum, is capable of satisfying the input conditions of a 
metarepresentational module, and so on. 
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In spite of these two objections, a consideration of the input problem is of relevance 
to understanding the impact of the shallow outputs described previously. It is plausible, for 
instance, that the basic categorizations "moving object" and "moving eyes" are capable of 
satisfying the input conditions of the Intentionality Detector (ID) and the Eye-Direction 
Detector (EDD) respectively, whose outputs, in turn, are capable of satisfying the input 
conditions of the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM); hence, our inclination to attribute 
the characters in The 39 Steps with intentional mental states which, in a strict sense, do not 
exist. Similarly, the basic categorization "snake" may be capable of activating both 
monitoring and situation-detecting algorithms (otherwise known as autoappraisers), which, 
in turn, may lead to the activation of the 'appropriate' emotion program. 
(ii) The frame problem 
According to Fodor (1983), the results of perceptual processing are sent to (non-modular) 
central systems for cognitive processing. Starting from an evolutionary-ecological 
perspective, the domain of the central systems is solving the adaptive problem of the 
fixation oj perceptual belief (although the default mode of the central systems is still likely 
to be naive realism). In order to solve this problem, the central systems must effectively 
answer the following key question: What is the true nature of the immediate environment? 
Once again, the non-modularity of the central systems can be addressed from two basic 
perspectives (see Table 2.8). 
(1) A Junctional perspective. If the essence of modularity lies in the property of 
informational encapsulation, then the essence of non-modularity lies in the property of 
global sensitivity. The 'global sensitivity requirement' is best illustrated by considering 
what artificial intelligence researchers call the frame problem: viz., how can one place a 
'frame' around the body of information which might be of relevance to arriving at a 'best 
explanation' about one's environment, or the body of information which, even if it is not 
directly relevant, may have an indirect influence on the explanation in question? In light of 
the frame problem, central systems may need to access information held by any other 
'system' at any given time: for instance, they may need to 'look' at the conclusions of the 
perceptual systems along with the contents of memory. In relation to the New Synthesis, 
Fodor (2000, p.28) proposes that many cognitive processes appear to be 'globally 
sensitive' or abductive in nature. He argues, however, that the only types of computations 
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we currently understand are the Classical computations proposed by Alan Turing, which, 
to recap, are defined as 'formal operations on syntactically structured mental 
representations' (p.ll). Unfortunately, these computations are 'intrinsically local and thus 
badly equipped to account for the abductive aspects of cognition' (p.79). (Fodor also 
rejects the connectionist way of explaining abduction - the role of connectionism will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.) 
Even if 'abductive' cognition is beyond the scope of our understanding, how should 
we think of the operations and end-products of the central systems? Although in a strict 
sense the operations of the central systems are neither 'mandatory' nor 'fast', Fodor (1983, 
p.104) assumes that central processing proceeds in a 'largely nonconscious' fashion; that 
is, usually we do not have to consciously consider the type of question cited above. It is up 
to us to coin a suitable term to describe the nature of the end-products. For Fodor, central 
processing is effectively the end of the line. Given, however, that we are ultimately 
concerned with the relationship between the central systems and the emotion system - and 
given that the perceptual systems produce 'shallow outputs' in the form of 'basic 
categorizations' - let us assume that the central systems produce deep outputs in the form 
of abstract categorizations (to be described in greater detail below). 
(2) A neurobiological perspective. Given that central systems may need to access 
information held by any other 'system' at any given time, it is plausible that they are 
associated with equipotential, as opposed to 'fixed', neural architecture. As a possible 
candidate, Fodor (ibid., p.1l8) cites the so-called 'association cortex', the part of the 
neocortex which is neither sensory nor motor (and which includes the prefrontal cortex). 
(Contrast this particular scenario with the case of the visual system, where a circumscribed 
number of modules - or 'areas' - are linked to each other by what could be described as 
'hardwired' neural connections.) In addition, the lack of a clear correlation between 
'neuroanatomical form' and 'psychological function' explains why there are no specific 
'breakdown syndromes' for central processes - cf. the cases of object and face-blindness 
cited previously - and why there is no 'neuropsychology of thought'. As we will see, the 
fact that central processing is distributed in a neuroanatomical sense has significant 
implications when it comes to understanding its relationship to the emotion system. 
(3) Objections. Inspired by the ideas of Cosmides and Tooby, Sperber (1996) 
attempts to challenge Fodor's notion of non-modular central systems by taking an 
explicitly evolutionary approach. First, Sperber notes that Fodor ignores 'evolutionary 
considerations', only making one argument which could be regarded as evolutionary: 
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namely, the proposal that perceptual systems are phylogenetically older than central ones. 
(p.43) Second, Sperber tells an evolutionary 'just so' story about a species of imaginary 
organisms called protorgs and a small group of their descendents called orgs (p.125). 
Protorgs were in constant danger of being crushed by approaching elephants, an event 
which always presented a conjunction of two cues; namely, 'noises N' and 'soil vibrations 
Y'. Accordingly, protorgs were equipped with an 'acoustic perception module' and a 
'vibration perception module', both of which were directly connected to an output (flight) 
module. The fact that the flight response could be elicited by either N or Y, however, 
resulted in many 'false positives' and wasted resources. In the case of the orgs, on the other 
hand, evolution inserted a conceptual module between the perceptual modules and the 
output module; this module effectively operated as an 'AND-gate', thereby allowing for 
more accurate responses to the environment. As a result, the orgs were able to compete 
more effectively for limited resources and eventually succeeded the protorgs. Sperber 
concludes that evolution by natural selection, as a slow and blind process, is more likely to 
result in the 'emergence' of new modules - for example, conceptual modules of the type 
described - as opposed to 'demodularization'; hence, Fodor's notion of non-modular 
central systems is untenable. 
Although Sperber's 'just so' story paints a plausible picture of the mind and its 
evolutionary origins, for our purposes the essence and value of Fodor's account remains 
the same. First, Fodor (1983) makes numerous ecological arguments for the modularity of 
perceptual systems - for example, the quote "If you're called by a panther/don't anther" 
(p.70) - which, with their appeal to survival advantage, are but one short step from an 
evolutionary account. Second, many of Sperber's objections to Fodor's arguments for the 
non-modularity of central processing hinge on what one understands by the terms 'module' 
and 'informational encapsulation'. If one chooses to classify an individual concept as a 
'micro-module', then so be it. The important point is that, unlike, say, the modules which 
comprise our visual system, one concept has a relatively large number of connections to 
other concepts; informational encapsulation - and hence, modularisation - is a question of 
degree. What is more, Sperber crucially admits that his own 'three-tier' model of the mind 
is at 'risk of computational explosion'; a way of saying that it is susceptible to the frame 
problem described by Fodor.31 
31 In order to address this issue, Sperber tentatively proposes the existence of an 'attentional buffer' which 
temporarily holds the most relevant information for processing at any given time. In an earlier work, Sperber 
and Wilson (1986) use relevance theory in an attempt to improve our understanding of central processing in 
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In conclusion, we should propose to steer a 'middle course' between the various 
positions described so far. First, our perceptual systems are modular in the way that Fodor 
describes: for instance, they are informationally encapsulated and produce shallow outputs. 
Second, the central workspace of the mind consists of the domain-specific mechanisms 
postulated by evolutionary psychologists in conjunction with more general-purpose 
mechanisms: therefore, the input problem may not be a problem after all, whilst its solution 
may provide us with a way of understanding the impact of the shallow outputs described. 
Third and final, at least some cognitive processes are globally sensitive or abductive in 
nature: as far as I can tell, the frame problem really is a problem; however, we need to 
obtain at least some idea of how central processing relates to the emotion system. 
Table 2.8: Central processing (see Fodor, 1983,2000) 
property description 
questions * general: 
(domain) i.e., fixation of perceptual belief 
(1) functional computational character / globally sensitivity (abduction) / 
default mode naive realism 
answers deep: 
(outputs) e.g., abstract categorization 
(2) neurobiological neural architecture equipotential: 
distributed 
• The evolutionary-ecological approach can be regarded as a complementary perspective. 
general and communication in particular, where the relevance of information is a function of cognitive effect 
(benefit) and processing effort (cost). 
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(b) Discriminating the cinema: seeing-as (type I) 
How should we understand our ' discriminatory ' relationship to the cinema? Say that we 
are presented with a cinematic representation of either a person, object, or event (call it X) . 
Given that the default mode of our perceptual systems is naIve realism, the central systems 
must effectively answer a hierarchy of key questions which can be arranged in a decision 
tree format (see Figure 2.22): first, Is our perception oj X based 011 the referent oj X or a 
representation of X?; and second (given that the latter is the case), How does the 
representation oj X relate to reality? Is it: (a) fictional or non-fictional; and (b) indexical 
or non-indexical? 
Figure 2.22: Central processing: decision tree of questions 
Q1. Referent or raprenntItion? 
~ 




.. Non-ftc:tion or fiction? b.lndaxlcal or non-induical? 
A A 
noo-fiction fiction indexical norHndexicaI 
(i) Question 1: ReJerent or representation? 
The 'referent or representation' question brings us back to the paradox of representation 
(discussed in section 2.2). So far, we have argued that the notion of a sensory illusion is not 
appropriate. How, though, should we understand the central process which ascertains that 
we are not in the actual 'presence' of Karen and her family in The Idiots and that we not 
actually 'immersed' in either the hillside environment of The Thin Red Line or the airfield 
environment of Heat? Similarly, how should we understand the central process which 
ascertains that Richard Hannay of The 39 Steps is not an actual 'intentional agent' and that 
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the snake which confronts Indiana Jones in Raiders of the Lost Ark is not of actual 
'emotional significance' to our own goals and concerns as viewers? 
All of these questions can be addressed by conjuring up a new example. To set the 
scene, two preliminary remarks will be necessary. First, Fodor (2000, p.3?) states: 'It's a 
striking peculiarity of Pinker's book in particular that he starts by remarking how 
hopelessly far we are from being able to build a serviceable robot, but never explains how 
to reconcile our inability to do so with his thesis that we know, more or less, how the 
cognitive mind works.' (Fodor also notes that neither Pinker nor Plotkin mention the frame 
problem in the indexes of their books (p.42}.) Second, Sperber proposes that the proper 
domain of a module is 'all the information that it is the module's biological function to 
process', whilst the actual domain of a module is 'all the information in the organism's 
environment that may ... satisfy the module's input conditions' (pp.136-138). In order to 
illustrate this distinction, Sperber tells another story about orgs. In the beginning, for 
instance, the proper domain of the org's 'perceptual module' was perceiving approaching 
elephants; that is, performing this particular function increased the org's chances of 
surviving and reproducing. In the modem day, however, when all the elephants have 
disappeared from the org's environment, the actual domain of the org's perceptual module 
is perceiving approaching trains; that is, trains just happen to satisfy the input conditions in 
question. 
Now let us take Sperber's story one step further by relating it to Fodor's comments 
about our inability to build serviceable robots. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that you 
construct a robotic org to perform an apparently simple task: namely, whenever it catches 
an approaching train in its sights, it moves out of the way so that it doesn't get crushed 
under the train's wheels. (In this case, perhaps, we can legitimately say that the proper 
domain of the org's 'perceptual module' is approaching trains, although this domain has 
been set by the real designs of a purposeful engineer as opposed to the apparent designs of 
what Richard Dawkins, 1986, might describe as 'the blind robot-maker'.) In order to test 
your new creation, you take the org down to your local railway line, placing it in between 
the two rails. Sure enough, as soon as an approaching train is visible in the distance the org 
moves safely out of the way. 
You are pleased with your engineering efforts but a potential problem is nagging at 
the back of your mind. The following day, you decide to take the org to your local cinema 
where, as fortune would have it, the cinema owner - a fan of early cinema - is showing a 
programme of short films by the Lumiere brothers (dating 1895). After a showing of 
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Workers Leaving the Lumiere Factory, Feeding the Baby, and Watering the Garden -
which, not surprisingly perhaps, leaves the org somewhat cold - the Arrival of a Train at 
the Station flashes up on the screen and, as you feared, the org makes swiftly for the exit 
(see Frame 2.9). Why? Presumably, the information provided by the film's 'optic array' 
satisfies the 'input conditions' of the org's perceptual module. How, then, could you 
program the org to discriminate the film of the train from an actual train? How could you 
place a 'frame' around the body of information which might be of relevance to making the 
appropriate discrimination?32 What 'assumptions' about the world - and the ritual of film 
viewing - would you have to build into its proprietary database? 
Ultimately, of course, we are concerned with the human viewers of such a film. 
According to popular myth, the viewers of 1895 confused the image of an approaching 
train for an actual train and responded in a similar fashion to the org in our imaginary 
story. Tom Gunning (1994, p.118) argues, however, that the Lumiere films were 'initially 
presented as frozen unmoving images, projections of still photographs. Then, flaunting a 
mastery of visual showmanship, the projector began cranking and the image moved.' As a 
result, the audience's screams were not motivated by fear; rather, they were motivated by 
astonishment at a technological achievement - namely, the invention of the moving image. 
(Gunning also cites the role of advertising and commentary.) To use Loomis's terms, there 
was sensory - but not epistemic - equivalence between the Lumiere film and an actual 
train. A better, and more contemporary, example is Loomis's anecdote (personal 
communication) about a show at the Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas. The audience believed 
they were watching the filming of a live television show, with live actors, studio set, 
cameras, and so forth. In actual fact, they were watching a film of a filming of a live 
television show; the film was presented in such a way that the edges and flatness of the 
projected image were imperceptible. After ten or so minutes, the actors began to vanish 
into thin air, to the astonishment of the audience. In this case, then, there was both sensory 
and epistemic equivalence. 
Considering Gunning's revision, perhaps we should appeal to the third, as opposed 
to the first, 'tier' of Sperber's model of the mind; namely, second-order 
metarepresentational modules. 33 In short, Sperber suggests that the proper domain of the 
32 Of course, the capacity to perceive an approaching train might be subject to the frame problem as well. 
33 Cosmides (personal communication) suggests that another potential candidate is Gazzaniga's theory of the 
left-brain interpreter - to be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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metarepresentational module may be folk psychology; in other words, it may be equivalent 
to the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM) described above. He suggests, however, that 
the module may have been 'exapted ' for various (cultural) purposes. The Lumiere 
brothers' film is an example of a public representation, and presumably the 1895 viewer's 
understanding of its non-veridical status entailed a mental representation about a public 
representation. From 1895, then, perhaps one of the cultural domains of the 
metarepresentational module became discriminating films of trains from actual trains. One 
could argue, however, that describing the capacity in question as 'modular' only ' frames' it 
in a convenient linguistic sense; it is still not clear which information was of relevance to 
the process in question. 
Frame 2.9: Central processing: Arrival of a Train at the Statio" (1895) 
Considering the apparent intractability of the frame problem, let us attempt to reach 
a reasonable compromise by turning to the notion of seeing-as. To set the scene, 
Wittgenstein (1958, p.200) proposes that we are capable of seeing a schematic triangle as 
'hanging from its apex', rather than, say, 'standing on its base' (see Figure 2.23, left). 
According to Turvey (1997, pA51), this type of example is significant because it serves to 
illustrate that when visual perception involves mental interpretation, the aspects in question 
'originate outside the figure, in the context of the beholder's imagination'. (The example of 
the schematic triangle is also cited by Allen, 1997, pp.86-87, in his discussion of the 
imagination theory.) 
The type of seeing-as that we will be concerned with, however, will be referred to 
seeing-as (type 1) - the bracketed qualification will serve to distinguish it from yet another 
type of seeing-as to be discussed below in section 2.5. In a criticism of Gibson 's theory of 
direct perception, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981 , p.189) cite the example of a man at sea who 
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is capable of seeing a dot of light in the night-time sky as the Pole Star, as opposed to, say, 
another type of star or a firefly (see Figure 2.23, right). Although this psychological 
capacity must make reference to an 'aspect' which, in some sense, 'originates outside the 
figure', it differs from the capacity described by Wittgenstein in two significant respects. 
First, the aspect in question does not originate in the context of the man's imagination as 
such; rather, it originates in the context of his epistemic mental states. In this particular 
case, we can divide the man's epistemic mental states into at least three categories: namely, 
his beliefs, knowledge, and memories regarding the composition of the night-time sky. 
Second, the capacity does not necessarily involve an element of mental (i.e., consciously 
controlled) interpretation: presumably, once the man has successfully identified the star, he 
does not have to keep reminding himself of its identity (in the way that he would have to 
keep imagining the schematic triangle as, say, 'hanging from its apex'). 
Figure 2.23: Suspended triangle (left) and Pole Star (right) 
If the psychological capacity to discriminate a cinematic representation from its 
actual referent involves seeing-as (type I), then which epistemic mental states might be of 
relevance?34 Let us consider each of the three categories cited above. (1) Beliefs. The main 
candidates here are what we have described as non-existence beliefs; that is, beliefs in the 
non-existence of the objects and events which are 'projected' onto the screen. Other 
candidates include a whole variety of beliefs relating to the ritual of film viewing in 
general, and the nature of the film being shown in particular. Notice, then, that the current 
account avoids the eliminative materialism mentioned in the first chapter. (2) Knowledge. 
With respect to the screen's edges, how is it that we perceive a finite image as opposed to a 
34 Currie (1995, p.85) discusses our capacity to discriminate paintings of horses from actual horses: in 
addition to acknowledging the importance of perception, he stresses the role of memory and 'the sorts of 
general principles I have developed over the years concerning what sorts of things are likely to be located in 
what sorts of places (art galleries are more likely to contain horse paintings than horses).' 
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'magic window' onto an infinite world? Even if the term 'screen' tends to conjure up a 
visual image, our conceptual understanding of what a screen is, what function it performs, 
and the like, is to a certain extent sensory independent, domain neutral, and therefore 
centrally mediated. It is also bound up with our conceptual understanding of what a 
projector is, what function that performs, and so forth. (3) Memories. With respect to the 
screen's flatness, it is plausible that 'cognizing' the screen as flat from an optimum 
viewing position at time t2 requires access to either the short-term or long-term memory of 
perceiving the screen as flat from a non-optimum viewing position at time tl. Such a 
memory would not be available to the visual system - which only has access to the outputs 
of transducers, a 'proprietary database', and a 'form-concept dictionary' - but would be 
available to central systems - which have unrestricted access to a variety of systems. 
(Furthermore, our memory that the screen is flat may be stored in 'propositional', as 
opposed to 'analogical', form.) 
In conclusion, the overall story might go as follows (see Figure 2.24). The first half 
of the story concerns regarding-as (type I): our visual system analyses the film's optic 
array and produces the basic categorization, "A train of such-and-such a description" as a 
shallow output. The second half concerns seeing-as (type I): central systems receive the 
output in question, and after considering perceptual information pertaining to the nature of 
the viewing situation, along with the types of non-existence beliefs, knowledge, and 
memory cited above, they produce the more abstract (and accurate) categorization, 
"Cinematic representation of a train of such-and-such a description" as a deep output. In 
conclusion, a global epistemic illusion does not take place: although our visual system 
'suggests' that there is a certain type of object in front of us, 'epistemically unbounded' 
central systems 'decide' - by a process of abductive inference - whether or not this is the 
'best explanation' for what is actually taking place, thereby fixating our perceptual beliefs 
as to the true state of our environment. 
98 
Figure 2.24: Central processing: referent or representation? 
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(ii) Question 2: Relationship to reality: 
jiction or non-jiction, indexicality or non-indexicality? 
The distinction between representation and referent can be thought of in binary tenns: viz. , 
an object is either physically present or not. How, though, should we understand the 
relationship that a cinematic representation bears to reality, or what Torben Grodal (1997) 
would describe as the representation's 'reality-status'? This question will bring us back to 
the threshold model of diegetic influence - adapted from the research on immersive virtual 
environments (IVEs) and introduced in section 2.2. Notice that the subjects who explore 
lVEs 'know' that a virtual character is only a representation; the factor of agency concerns 
the relationship that this representation bears to an actual person outside the lYE. 
o Question 2a: Fiction or non-jiction? 
The most obvious relationship between representation and reality lies in the distinction 
betweenjiction and non-jiction. To set the scene, let us consider an evolutionary-ecological 
perspective once again. Cosmides and Tooby (2000) observe that non-human species are 
only capable of responding to an aspect of the environment if they possess the 
corresponding circuit or program. Human beings, however, are capable of using 
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'contingent information' about 'local conditions' to guide their behaviour in appropriate 
ways - an adaptive mode described by Tooby and DeVore (1987) as the 'cognitive niche'. 
In this respect, the authors acknowledge the importance of fiction: stories may improve our 
knowledge of physical, biological, psychological, social, and emotional reality, thereby 
playing a role in 'organizing' the internal structure of various adaptations. (In addition to 
proper, actual, and cultural domains, therefore, an adaptation also has an organizational 
domain.) Cosmides and Tooby argue, however, that the capacity to use contingent 
information comes at a price. According to the scope problem, information which is true in 
a fictional world may be false outside the 'scope' of that world. How, then, does the mind 
prevent the potentially hazardous spread of false information? Following Alan Leslie 
(1987), the authors propose that the mind has evolved the design features of scope syntax 
and decoupling systems: a piece of fictional information will be labelled as a 
'metarepresentation' and 'decoupled' accordingly. 
In order to understand the relationship between fiction and non-fiction, we need to 
keep sight of the adaptive value of fiction, whilst taking on board some of the potential 
complications. To begin with, Cosmides and Tooby seem to subscribe to an 'empiricist 
theory' of fiction. Consider, once again, Colin Radford's (1975) thought experiment 
(introduced in the first chapter): 
Suppose that you have a drink with a man who proceeds to tell you a harrowing story about 
his sister and you are harrowed. After enjoying your reaction he tells you that he doesn't 
have a sister, that he has invented the story. In this case ... we might say that the 'heroine' 
of the account is fictitious. Nonetheless ... once you have been told this you can no longer 
feel harrowed. (p.68) 
According to the empiricist theory, a statement along the lines of, "My sister is 
terminally ill," would assert that: (1) the sister exists; and (2) the predicate "is terminally 
ill" applies to the sister. If both the existential condition and the predication hold, then the 
statement is true; if either of the two fails to hold, then the statement is false. In this case, 
then, we have two values - 'true' and 'false' - corresponding to existence beliefs and non-
existence beliefs respectively. 
Our first task is to supplement the empiricist theory of fiction with what Carl 
Plantinga (1997) describes as an 'index/stance view'. According to Carroll's (1983) theory 
of 'indexing', a story is marked as either an instance of fiction or an instance of non-
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fiction: for instance, a storyteller may begin their story by saying either, "It is fictional 
that" or "It is true that" respectively. Following Nicholas Wolterstorffs (e.g., 1976) theory 
of 'projected worlds', the type of indexing in operation determines the nature of the stance 
we take to the fiction: in the way that a speaker is able to utter a sentence either fictively or 
assertively, a listener is able to take either a fictive stance or an assertive stance towards 
that sentence.35 Given, however, that the default mode of the central systems is likely to be 
naive realism - that is, 'truth' or assertion is implicitly assumed - we need to make a 
fundamental adjustment to Plantinga's account. This adjustment can be illustrated by 
returning to Radford's example. Before the revelation, we have no reason to suspect that 
the man is telling us anything but the truth. It is not a case, therefore, of us actively taking 
the assertive stance towards the man's story; rather, it is a case of us not taking the fictive 
stance. (Or to put it another way, it is not a case of us actively believing that the man's 
sister exists; rather, it is a case of us not disbelieving that the man's sister exists - double 
negative intended.) After the revelation, the man's story is explicitly indexed as an instance 
of fiction. In light of this, we override the default mode in question by actively taking the 
fictive stance. (Correspondingly, it is now legitimate for us to say that we actively belief 
that the man's sister does not exist.) 
Our second task is to supplement the empiricist theory of fiction with what Edward 
Branigan (1994) describes as a 'psychologically real' theory. On the one hand, this move 
accounts for the possibility of 'mixed fictions' . Aspects of the man's story may be true: for 
instance, the hospital in which the sister is allegedly staying may genuinely exist and 
contain genuinely ill patients. On the other hand, it accounts for the possibility that fictions 
are related to reality in a variety of ways. In a discussion of how we 'sort the fruit from the 
chaff, Ellen Spolsky (2001) argues against Cosmides and Tooby's distinction between 
'truth' (existence) and 'falsity' (non-existence), proposing that 'what counted on the 
Pleistocene savanna was not truth, but "fitness", or appropriateness in a context.' In light 
of this, the man's story could be assessed for such values as plausibility and self-relevance 
- corresponding to plausibility beliefs, relevance beliefs, and so forth. 
How do these two considerations apply to film? Let us develop the threshold model 
of diegetic influence by placing 'fiction' at the low end of the reality-status continuum and 
'non-fiction' at the high end (see Figure 2.25). With respect to the 'index/stance' element, 
external indexing is provided through the process of distribution and exhibition, whilst 
35 Also see Searle's (1969) speech act theory. 
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internal indexing is provided through such conventions as titles and credits. With respect to 
the 'psychologically real' element, the fact that reality-status is described as a 'continuum' 
will allow for certain complications. 





(proc ... ed by centrll systems) 
N.B. For the sake of clarity, the line indicating diegetic presence has been omitted. 
(1) Low reality-status. Starting at the 'low end' of the reality-status continuum 
introduces us to the category of films which are externally indexed as fictional. At first 
glance, science-fiction films seem to be straightforwardly fictional in the sense that they 
feature either non-existent or impossible worlds. Upon closer examination, however, the 
implausibilities of such films are, and must be, surprisingly superficial: if they were not 
rooted in physical, biological, psychological, social, and emotional reality - thereby 
allowing the viewer to adopt the respective stances to the objects and events depicted -
then they would be both incomprehensible and unengaging. The fact, then, that George 
Lucas's Star Wars (1977) takes place 'a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away' is largely 
irrelevant; indeed, Lucas's film famously combines elements from Western and Eastern 
folklore. In a related fashion, the viewer may be more concerned with finding 'coherent' 
relations between elements within the diegesis, rather than finding referential relations 
between the diegesis and the world (see Bonjour, 1985, on 'coherence theories oftruth'). 
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What about more apparently plausible, or realistic, fiction films? Consider, for 
example, Ken Loach's dramas about working-class life in Britain. At first glance, the 
characters and events of Kes (1969) are straightforwardly fictional (see Frame 2.10). It is 
highly unlikely, for instance, that a teenage boy answering the exact physical description of 
Billy Caspar has ever raised a baby kestrel in the exact manner depicted. The fact that the 
character in question is embodied by an actual person (namely, the actor David Bradley), 
however, may have important implications for engagement (cf. the character in the original 
novel by Barry Hines). Much of the action, though staged, is actual: when Caspar / Bradley 
walks down the street, he is really doing so. And of course, the action takes place in actual, 
if non-identifiable, locations - in and around the Yorkshire town of Bamsley. 
Beyond the physical, however, the relationship between the film and the world can 
be complicated further in at least three ways. The first way is through assertion (see 
Plantinga, 1997). Loach' s film makes various 'assertions' about the state of the world, 
especially social and political issues - the potential unfairness of an education system 
which does not make allowances for a person's background, which only values academic 
subjects like English and mathematics as opposed to practical subjects like falconry, and so 
forth. The second way is through partially determined reference (see Branigan, 1994, Ch. 
7). Although the character of Billy does not have a determinate referent within the world, 
one could argue that he has many partially determined referents: in other words, there are 
teenage boys in twenty-first century Britain and elsewhere who resemble him and who 
have found themselves in similar situations (broken homes, poor job prospects).36 The third 
and final way is through self-relevance. The viewer may assess the relevance of the film's 
content to their own situation (with respect to their goals and concerns): for an affluent 
American viewer, the characters and events of Kes may have partial determination alone; 
for a working-class British viewer, however, they may have both partial determination and 
self-relevance. 
(2) Medium reality-status. Moving to the 'middle' of the reality-status continuum 
leads us to the problematic category of films which are externally indexed as docu-dramas: 
that is, 'dramatic' films which attempt to 'document' actual figures and events. In recent 
years, notable examples have been made by Steven Spielberg and Oliver Stone, both of 
whom have been accused of rewriting the history books for the current generation. 
36 Radford (1975) acknowledges the issue of real-world counterparts in his fifth solution to the paradox of 
fiction. 
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Consider, for instance, the Omaha beach sequence of Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan 
(1998) - to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. When it comes to the 
assessment of reality-status, which has the upper hand: the fact that the film 'refers' to 
actual people and events (in contrast to, say, a standard fiction film), or the fact that the 
people have been played by actors whilst the events have been staged for the camera (in 
contrast to, say, a standard documentary)? Does the result of this assessment hinge on the 
gravity of the original subject-matter or the 'realism' of the corresponding 
• ?37 representations . 
(3) High reality-status. Finishing with the ' high end' of the reality-status continuum 
leads us to the category offilms which are externally indexed as non-fictional: for instance, 
documentaries and news broadcasts. Although non-fiction films make use of actuality 
footage which is apparently 'objective' , this footage can be used in a variety of 'subjective' 
ways: for instance, it can be either placed out of context or used to perform a representative 
function; a documentary about the Battle of the Somme may include images taken at 
another part of the frontline. Alternatively, some documentaries - for example, Kevin 
Macdonald ' s Touching the Void (2003) - integrate interviews with staged re-enactments of 
the subject-matter. We need not dwell on this category, however, as the essential point has 
already been made in the discussion of the previous two: viz., the distinction between 
fiction and non-fiction (and truth and falsity) is more complex than it appears. 
Frame 2.10: Assertion, partial determination, and self-relevance: Kes (1969) 
37 What is the reality-status of 'docu-dramas' which look to the future as opposed to the past? Consider, for 
example, films about the potential dangers of nuclear war: both The War Game (1965) and The Day After 
(1983) caused public outcries. Radford (1975) acknowledges the issue of probability in his fourth proposed 
solution to the paradox of fiction. 
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(4) Reality-status versus realism. Beyond the reality-status continuum, an 
additional case - which blurs the distinction between reality-status and realism - is worth 
mentioning. Fiction films can be internally indexed as non-fiction (documentary) films . 
The Idiots, for instance, removes most indications of its fictional status, whilst deliberately 
including devices specifically associated with the documentary (for example, the six 
retrospective interviews to camera). One of the most well-known examples, however, is 
Myrick and Sanchez' s 1999 film The Blair Witch Project (see Frame 2.11). Although the 
majority of viewers were fully aware of the film's fictional status before they walked into 
the cinema, the film begins with a short statement claiming that it was pieced together from 
footage left by three student film-makers (making a documentary about the Blair Witch). 
Part of the film ' s outstanding box-office success may lie in the fact that it sticks 
resolutely to its premise by minimising the number and salience of 'fiction markers' on the 
one hand, and maximising the number and salience of 'reality markers' on the other. To 
begin with, the film exploits what Grodal (2002, p.77) describes as 'imperfect perceptual 
realism' by using a handheld camera and low quality filmstock. All of the film's sound is 
(apparently) diegetic, with the possible exception of a single sound effect used in the 
climactic scene; significantly, Myrick and Sanchez never succumb to the temptation of 
using non-diegetic music to heighten the suspense. In terms of characters, the three 
principal actors give highly naturalistic performances: Heather Donahue' s vocal 
expressions of fear are particularly salient. And in terms of narrative, the film-makers even 
go to the trouble of explaining away the fact that the three characters persist in filming 
each other whilst finding themselves lost in the woods. Finally, the credits are only 
presented at the film ' s conclusion. 
Frame 2.11: Realism versus reality-status: The Blair Witch Projea (1999) 
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Why is the fact that The Blair Witch Project sticks resolutely to its premise so 
important? It is tempting to say that including fiction markers during the film would have 
'shattered the illusion' that the film was a documentary, but we want to avoid the claim we 
are ever under an illusion in the first place. Conversely, we can hypothesise that the film's 
strategy of deliberately including reality markers influences the (largely nonconscious) 
assessment of reality-status. Significantly, Grodal proposes that '[a] more radical or 
paradoxical 'compensation' for lack of perceptual realism consists of emphasizing its 
shortcomings by making imperfect perceptual realism into a sign of 'reality'.' This 
functional, or compensatory, relationship can be described as follows: the lower the level 
of perceptual realism, the higher the (apparent) reality-status (see Figure 2.26). 
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In conclusion, part of the genius of The Blair Witch Project lies in the fact that it 
invents a premise which not only explains away the complete lack of production values, 
but also makes this lack into something of a virtue. Interestingly, then, the functional, or 
compensatory, relationship can be tentatively translated in the following monetary terms: 
the lower the budget, the higher the box-office return (see Figure 2.27). (This relationship 
may partly explain the recent success of the phenomenon of 'reality television'.) 
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Figure 2.27: Budget versus box office return 
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o Question 2b: lndexicality or non-indexicality? 
The relationship between representation and reality does not end with the distinction 
between fiction and non-fiction. Although Kes is a fiction film, the character of Billy 
Caspar bears an indexical relationship to the actor David Bradley. In contrast, the 
characters and events of animated films - and animated sequences - bear a non-indexical 
relationship to reality. Originally, animation was primarily hand-drawn, obvious examples 
including the cartoons produced by studios such as Disney. In the last twenty or so years, 
however, the digital revolution has given rise to the phenomenon of computer-generated 
imagery (CGI). Not only has CGI become the mainstay of the cartoon creations of Pixar 
Animations (beginning with Luxo Jr. in 1986); more significantly, perhaps, it has also 
become the mainstay of special effect sequences within live action films (a notable 
benchmark being the dinosaurs in Spielberg's Jurassic Park from 1993). 
In light of this development, the distinction between indexicality and non-
indexicality may merit a threshold model of diegetic influence in its own right (see Figure 
2.28). At first glance, it seems reasonable for us to say that we are capable of taking an 
indexical stance towards live action sequences and a non-indexical stance towards 
computer-generated sequences. Given, however, that the default mode of the central 
systems is na·ive realism - that is, 'truth' or indexicality is implicitly assumed - it is not 
strictly necessary for us to say that we take an indexical stance towards live action 
sequences. If a sequence is clearly indexed as an instance of CGI, on the other hand, then it 
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is legitimate for us to say that we override the default mode in question by taking the non-
indexical stance. 
Figure 2.28: The threshold model of diegetic influence: indexicality 
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N.B. For the sake of clarity, the line indicating diegetic presence has been omitted. 
Given the prevalence of CGI in contemporary cinema, a key question is: does CGI 
actually work? And, if not, is this because: (I) it is not sufficiently convincing in a 
perceptual sense (the factor of realism); (2) the viewer 'knows' that it is computer-
generated in a cognitive sense (the factor of reality-status); or (3) some combination of 
both? In order to answer these questions, let us consider an extreme example. Sakaguchi 
and Sakakibara's Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (2001) was externally indexed as the 
first feature-length CGI film to 'star' photorealistic human characters (see Frame 2.12). It 
is the year 2065: Dr Aki Ross (voiced by Ming-Na) and Captain Gray Edwards (voiced by 
Alec Baldwin) must discover the secrets of a race of phantom-like invaders in order to save 
both the planet and Ross's own life (her body is infected by alien particles). (Of particular 
interest is the question of whether or not the use of CGI impacts on the plausibility of the 
romantic subplot between the two characters.) 
With respect to the factor of realism, my own impression is as follows. Although 
CGI is capable of rendering the characters' bodily movements in a relatively realistic 
fashion, it is not yet capable of rendering the 'subtleties and nuances' of their facial 
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expressions. As a result, viewing the characters in question is a somewhat disconcerting 
experience, akin to continually switching between the two aspects of the Jastrow duck-
rabbit ('actual human ' versus 'CGI creation '). What about the factor of reality-status? 
Notice that in the case ofCGI, the ' imperfect perceptual realism' of the characters' facial 
expressions effectively operates as an internal ' non-indexical' or ' CGI marker' - an 
indication of the characters' low reality-status (the opposite of Figure 2.26). If the level of 
realism was sufficiently high (or ' perfect' ), then would our assessment of the characters' 
low reality-status be largely irrelevant? 
Given the counterfactual nature of this question, let us attempt to answer it by 
considering a certain thought experiment. Think of one of your favourite films: say that it 
is Milos Forman' s One Flew Over the Cuckoo 's Nest (1975). Now imagine being told that 
the film is, in actual fact, entirely computer-generated (an elaborate ruse by the film 
industry). Would the relevation of the film ' s ' non-indexicality' spoil your enjoyment of 
subsequent viewings? The answer to this question is uncertain (and susceptible to the 
frame problem). One viewer, for instance, might say yes: their admiration for the film is 
based primarily on an appreciation of Jack Nicholson's Oscar-winning performance as 
Randle Patrick McMurphy - an aspect which is emphatically dependent on indexicality. 
Another viewer, however, might say no: their admiration for the film is based primarily on 
their appreciation of Ken Kesey' s narrative - an aspect which is, in principle, independent 
of indexicality. 38 
Frame 2.12: Non-indexicality: Final Fantasy: The Spirits Wuhin (2001) 
38 I am indebted to Gary Bettinson for this particular example. 
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o Conclusion 
How should we understand the central process which assesses a film's reality-status, or, to 
use Spolsky's phrase, sorts the fruit from the chaff? As stated previously, Spolsky argues 
against Cosmides and Tooby's distinction between 'truth' (existence) and "falsity' (non-
existence), in favour of Wfitness", or appropriateness in a context'. Significantly, she goes 
on to claim that the assessment of fitness (and so forth) cannot be explained in terms of the 
"evolved algorithms' proposed by evolutionary psychologists. In a reply to Spolsky, 
Cosmides and Tooby (2001) argue that the majority of Spolsky's objections hinge on an 
aversion to 'the "mechanistic" nature of the computational theory of mind'. In light of the 
above arguments, however, we can offer a somewhat different interpretation of Spolsky's 
position. 
To begin with, the central process which assesses a film's reality-status can be 
classified as another instance of seeing-as (type I): first, the process makes reference to 
factors which, in some sense, 'originate outside' the cinematic representation in the 
'context' of the viewer's epistemic mental states; and second, the process proceeds in a 
largely nonconscious fashion (see Figure 2.29). As we have seen, the distinction between 
fiction and non-fiction - and between indexicality and non-indexicality - is more complex 
than it at first appears. On the one hand, a film may continually interweave fictional 
elements with non-fictional, and live action elements with CGI. On the other hand, it is 
possible that films are related to reality in a variety of ways. An assessment of fictionality 
may look beyond the values of 'truth' (existence) and 'falsity' (non-existence), other 
potential candidates including usefulness, coherence, assertion, partial determination, self-
relevance, and probability. Similarly, an assessment of indexicality may look beyond the 
objective matter of whether a scene is based on live action or CGI, a potentially relevant 
factor being one's subjective appreciation of an actor's performance. 
Considering these various complications, the main problem with Cosmides and 
Tooby's account is not the 'mechanistic nature' of the computational theory of mind per 
se. Rather, it is the possibility that the central process of sorting the fruit from the chaff 
must be globally sensitive, or abductive, in nature. Given that we cannot guarantee which 
of the listed factors will be referred to and which of them will be dominant - and given that 
the process is likely to be in a state of continual flux - the process in question is susceptible 
to the frame problem and cannot be straightforwardly explained in terms of the Classical 
computations originally proposed by Turing (and the 'evolved algorithms' proposed by 
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evolutionary psychologists) .39 The end-results of this central processing can be classified 
as deep outputs. If the default mode of the central systems is na"ive realism - i.e. , assertion 
and indexicality - then it is not a case of us taking the assertive stance towards the non-
fictional aspects of a film and the indexical stance towards the live action aspects; rather, it 
is a case of us taking the fictive stance towards the fictional aspects and the non-indexical 
stance towards the computer-generated aspects. 
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N.B. This diagram refers to Radford 's example of the man who tells us a 'harrowing story' 
about his sister. The bold full line shows the route taken by the man's story before the 
revelation, whereas the bold dashed line shows the route taken after the revelation. 
39 Grodal (\ 997, pp.32-35) proposes that the assessment of 'reality-status' occurs at ' global leve l' , whilst 
Branigan ( 1994, Ch. 7) proposes that the ' mental process of assigning reference' operates in a ' top-down' 
fashion. 
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2.5 OTHER MYSTERIES OF THE MIND 
(a) Attending to the world: conscious (attentive) processing 
The story does not end there. According to Fodor (2000, p.99), there are two primary 
candidates for the 'ultimate mystery' of the mind, the first being central processing of the 
abductive nature described and the second being consciousness. When I first considered 
the question of how we discriminate the world from the cinema, I assumed that the answer 
lay somewhere in the latter mystery as opposed to the former. In particular, I was 
influenced by John Searle's (1992, pp.106-109) discussion of the evolutionary advantage 
of consciousness and his argument that consciousness 'gives us much greater powers of 
discrimination' than are available to 'unconscious mechanisms'. While it is probable that 
consciousness - and the related phenomenon of attention - contributes to our discriminatory 
powers, for heuristic reasons we should think of conscious (attentive) processing as being 
dedicated to a variety of other psychological activities. 
(i) Consciousness 
How should we understand the role that consciousness plays in the world, and the 
relationship it bears to central processing? Once again, consciousness can be addressed 
from two basic perspectives. 
(1) A functional perspective. Following Dennett's (1978) discussion of the 
relationships between philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence, Currie (1995, 
pp.83-84) conceives of the mind as a 'hierarchy' of homunculi, with the least intelligent 
homunculi - for example, the 'object recognition capacities' cited above - occupying the 
lowest level and the most intelligent homunculus - namely, 'the person or agent' -
occupying the highest. Significantly, Currie states: 'Many operations of the mind are 
conducted by the person himself; jUdging that there is a horse in front of me, or that there 
is a picture of a horse in front of me, is something that I do.' Although the homuncular 
view of the mind is similar to the modular view described throughout this chapter, Currie's 
claim that a judgement is 'something that I do' is problematic in at least two respects. First, 
we should make a distinction between 'operations' of the mind which are consciously 
controlled, and central processes whose 'deep outputs' are merely accessible to 
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consciousness. Although the predicate 'to judge' can be only properly assigned to the 
person themselves, it is probable that the central processes underlying our capacity to 
discrimate, say, a picture of a horse from an actual horse proceed in a 'largely 
nonconscious' fashion. Second, we should think of the person as 'emerging' from the 
hierarchy as a whole rather than occupying the highest level alone. In a later work, for 
instance, Dennett (1991, p.21S) proposes that the conscious mind does not reside in a 
'Cartesian theatre'; instead, it is best thought of as a 'serial virtual machine' which is 
'implemented - inefficiently - on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us'. 
(2) A neurobiological perspective. Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi (2001) make 
a distinction between two types of consciousness. Primary consciousness is thought to 
exist in both humans and animals, and entails an awareness of the world (and the present). 
This awareness is based on the capacity to relate current perceptual categorizations with 
conceptual categorizations from memory - thereby forming a coherent 'scene' of objects 
and events - and requires the integration of the different sensory modalities with the 
frontal, temporal, and parietal areas of the brain. Building on the foundations of primary 
consciousness, higher-order consciousness is thought to exist in humans alone, and entails 
an awareness of both the world and the self (along with the past, present, and future). This 
awareness is based on the capacity to make both semantic and syntactical categorizations -
enabling us to refer to objects and events by 'symbolic means' - and requires the 
integration of the aforementioned brain areas with, for instance, the Broca's and 
Wernicke's language areas. Edelman and T ononi' s account supports the theory that there is 
no Cartesian theatre where everything 'comes together'; rather, the 'unified' and 
'indivisible' nature of our conscious experience is based on a 'dynamic core' of neural 
activity which is distributed across the whole brain, the 'binding' of the various elements 
in question being achieved through an ongoing process of 'reentrant looping'. 
(it) Attention 
The role of consciousness can be clarified by turning to a related phenomenon. Grodal 
(1997, p.32) suggests that the assessment of reality-status involves 'part of our limited 
capacity for conscious attention'. Although Grodal possibly conflates the operations of 
'conscious attention' with those of (nonconscious) central processing in the manner 
described above, his account suggests that the terms 'consciousness' and 'attention' are 
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approximately synonymous. Dirk Eitzen (1993) proposes a parallel processing model of 
selective attention in an attempt to explain why 'we experience difficulty in simultaneously 
attending to a movie as both an illusion and a construct'. According to this model, 
automatic processing is analogous to peripheral vision on the grounds that it is 'unlimited', 
parallel, and largely beyond conscious control. By way of example, Eitzen refers to 
capacities like object categorization and phoneme perception - both candidates for 
Fodorian modules or Dennett-style homunculi. Attentive processing, on the other hand, is 
analogous to foveal vision on the grounds that it is 'limited', serial, and within conscious 
control. Presumably, this capacity 'emerges' from the parallel architecture described. 
Given the obvious similarities that Eitzen's model bears to Dennett's homuncular 
view of the mind, and given the obvious similarities that the homuncular view bears to the 
modular view described throughout this chapter, the answer to the conundrum may lie in 
combining the three models, thereby yielding the following hypothesis (see Figure 2.30). 
When engaging with the cinema, automatic processing - operating in a 'parallel' fashion -
will perform a huge variety of psychological tasks. As we have seen, Fodorian modules 
will be concerned with the perception of depicted characters and events, Darwinian 
modules will be concerned with the cognition of intentionality and emotional significance, 
and central processing will be concerned with discriminating the film as a 'construct' 
whilst assessing the relationship that this 'construct' bears to reality.40 Simultaneously, 
conscious (attentive) processing - operating in a 'virtual' and 'serial' fashion - will be 
focused on the film's 'illusory' content: that is, the perceptual qualities of the diegesis as a 
spectacle and the cognitive qualities of the diegesis as a narrative. It is plausible that both 
types of processing are in a state of continual dialogue and flux, central representations 
moving in and out of conscious awareness. 
40 In addition, 'orienting response' mechanisms (otherwise known as 'demons') - operating in or around the 
perceptual systems - wiII be continually monitoring the environment of the theatre for potentially significant 
changes: for example, two people talking or a person walking down an adjacent aisle. 
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Adapted from Figure V from Eitzen (1993), p.54. 
(b) Attending to the cinema: seeing-as (type II) 
response 
How should we understand our conscious (attentive) relationship to the cinema? Given that 
the operations of conscious (attentive) processing may either support or contradict the 
'conclusions' of central processing described above, we need to re-consider the two 
questions cited previously by appealing to the intentional level of explanation. 
(i) Question J: Referent or representation? 
The impact of conscious (attentive) processing on the 'referent / representation' question 
can be addressed by introducing the notion of seeing-as (type II). The general root 'seeing-
as' is relevant because conscious (attentive) processing shares certain similarities with 
central processing as described above: that is, it makes reference to factors which, in some 
sense, 'originate outside' the cinematic representation in the 'context' of the viewer's 
psychology. The 'type II' qualification is necessary because our conscious (attentive) 
processing differs from central processing in at least one significant respect: by definition, 
it proceeds in a largely conscious (attentive) fashion. 
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The first potential example of seeing-as (type II) can be thought as going with the 
gram and can be understood in terms of the diegetic effect and sensory immersion. 
Following Pirenne and Polanyi's (1970) discussions of painting, Carroll (1988, pp.43-44) 
proposes that we are focally aware of what a film depicts (ie., the referent), and 
subsidiarily aware of the film as a representation (also see Smith, 1995b, p.120). This 
distinction can be taken one step further by returning to the research on immersive virtual 
environments (lVEs). Blascovich (2001) describes an IVE in which subjects are required 
to walk across a plank which traverses 'The Pit'; although the image of the pit does not 
'fill' the subjects' field of view, the HMD obscures their actual environment. In light of the 
above, it seems reasonable to say that the subjects are 'focally aware' of the pit's apparent 
depth but 'subsidiarily aware' that they are actually situated in a room with a solid floor. 
Nevertheless, the majority of subjects refuse to step onto the plank. Putting the factor of 
interaction to one side, Blascovich's anecdote suggests that two relationships are of 
importance. First, the level of sensory immersion can be thought of as a function of 
'equivalent' minus 'non-equivalent' sensory information (see Figure 2.3la). Second, the 
higher the level of sensory immersion, the lower the level of subsidiary awareness 
regarding a representation's virtual status (see Figure 2.3lb). (Blascovich's anecdote also 
suggests that the central process which discriminates representation from referent may be 
heavily reliant on the 'residual cues' presented by the subject's actual environment.) 
How do these two relationships apply to film? Following Eitzen's (1993) lead, let 
us answer this question by using the operations of vision as a guide to, or an analogy for, 
the operations of attention, and by comparing film viewing with its televisual counterpart. 
We can gain some idea of the impact of equivalent visual information by considering the 
role of focal attention / foveal vision. Focal attention has been compared to both a spotlight 
and a zoom lens: although it does not necessarily entail foveal vision, the two tend to 
coincide. Foveal vision involves the 'high acuity' regions in the centre of the retina and 
occupies only one or two degrees of the field of view - the size of a thumbnail held at 
arm's length. Although the act of focusing on central cues is within our conscious control, 
we tend to focus on the light and moving areas of our visual field. Both of these facts 
favour film over television. The larger the screen - and the closer our viewing position - the 
higher the 'acuity' of the depicted characters and events, whilst in the theatre (but not the 
home), the central cues of light and movement will be presented exclusively by the 
projected image. 
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Conversely, the impact of non-equivalent visual information can be addressed by 
considering the role of subsidiary attention / peripheral vision. By implication, subsidiary 
attention and peripheral vision also tend to coincide; peripheral vision involves the 'low 
acuity' regions in the periphery of the retina and occupies the majority of the FaY. 
Although peripheral cues tend to elicit 'automatic shifts of attention', the presentation of 
peripheral cues can be controlled to a greater or lesser extent. Once again, both of these 
facts favour film over television. The larger the screen - and the closer our viewing 
position - the lower the 'acuity' of the screen's edges, whilst in the theatre (but not the 





Figure 2.31a: Seeing-as (type II): sensory immersion 
ttlwllion film lYE 
medium 
N.B. Sensory immersion is calculated as a function of equivalent minus non-equivalent 
sensory infonnation (SI). The numbers are arbitrary and included for illustrative purposes. 
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Figure 2.31b: Seeing-as (type II): sensory immersion versus subsidiary awareness 
medium 
The second potential example of seeing-as (type II) effectively goes against the 
grain. If we are capable of consciously attending to what the film depicts (the referent), 
then are we also capable of attending to the film as a representation, thereby over-riding 
the default mode of naive realism? The notion of 'seeing-as' is relevant for the following 
reasons. Anderson (1996, pp.43-49) notes that a film presents 'two sets of information': 
one for a three-dimensional 'scene' and one for a two-dimensional 'surface'. On the basis 
of this observation, Anderson effectively offers a solution to the paradox of fiction: he 
claims that engaging with a fiction film is 'not a matter of suspending disbelief'; rather, the 
visual system 'alternates' between the two percepts in question, thereby creating a 'dual 
awareness'. Although Anderson's theory is capable of accounting for our experience of 
ambiguous figures like the Jastrow duck-rabbit (as noted previously), it is incapable of 
accounting for our experience of film viewing. If the viewer is a sufficient distance from 
the screen (and so forth), then the screen itself will be imperceptible: therefore, the 
'alternation' in operation is not between two states of perceptual awareness; rather, it is 
between a perceptual awareness of the scene and a central 'awareness' of the existence of 
the screen's surface. 
The 'type II' qualification is added because seeing a three-dimensional scene as a 
two-dimensional surface requires conscious effort. Here, a Fodorian account reveals the 
following irony. On the one hand, our capacity to see the 'aspects' of an image (i.e., the 
'scene' rather than the 'surface') - a possible candidate for a relatively advanced cognitive 
activity according to the mental interpretation theory of vision described by Turvey - is 
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dependent on perceptual analysis alone. On the other hand, our capacity to perceive an 
image in terms of its 'material properties' - an obvious candidate for a relatively basic 
perceptual activity - is actually dependent on conscious (attentive) processing. 
(iiJ Question 2: Relationship to reality: 
fiction or non-fiction, indexicality or non-indexicality? 
A re-consideration of the 'relationship to reality' question can be also framed in terms of 
seeing-as (type II). As last time, the first potential examples of seeing-as (type II) can be 
thought of as going with the grain; this time, however, they can be understood in terms of 
the diegetic effect and narrative immersion. Ed Tan (1996) argues that our primary 
emotion when viewing a fiction film is one of 'interest', where interest is approximately 
synonymous with attention (although it also involves the inclination to act). In particular, 
interest encourages us to devote our limited processing resources to following a film's 
narrative (the structure of which is described by Bordwell, 1985). The two primary 
determinants of interest are 'thematic structures' and' character structures' which influence 
our expectations regarding the outcome of the plot ('cognitive concerns') and the fate of 
the characters (,affective concerns') respectively. From our perspective, Tan's account 
suggests that two relationships are of importance. First, at any given point in a film, the 
level of interest (read: narrative immersion) can be thought of as 'a function of expected 
minus gained returns' (see Figure 2.32a). Second, the higher the level of narrative 
immersion, the lower the level of subsidiary awareness regarding the film's fictional and/or 
non-indexical status (see Figure 2.32b). 
How do these two relationships apply to live action and computer-generated films? 
The question about live action films can be answered by considering Tan's own remarks 
about Hitchcock's The 39 Steps. When the beautiful female spy is murdered by an 
unknown assailant, we hypothesise that Richard Hannay is innocent on the one hand (a 
cognitive concern), and 'we hope that this is the case' (an affective concern) on the other 
(p.92). A consideration of cognitive concerns can be used to bring the intentional stance 
back into the picture. In our discussion of Darwinian modularity, it was suggested that we 
read Hannay's mind in a 'swift' and 'effortless' fashion, in light of certain narrative 
developments - an instance of regarding-as (type II). At the level of conscious (attentive) 
processing, it is plausible that these assessments will be more or less duplicated; that is, we 
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consciously and attentively hypothesise about what Hannay might be thinking and feeling, 
and what the narrative might have in store for him - an instance of seeing-as (type II). A 
consideration of affective concerns, on the other hand, brings us back to the emotional 
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stance. In our discussion of Darwinian modularity, it was suggested that potential threats to 
Hannay's freedom will be assessed by what Ekman (2003, p.21) describes as 'auto-
appraisers'. At the level of conscious (attentive) processing, it is plausible that these threats 
will be assessed in tenns of what Ekman (ibid., p.24) describes as reflective appraising. 
The two relationships may account for the possible success of The 39 Steps in the sense 
that a sufficient level of narrative immersion allows us to 'forget' that Hannay is played by 
the actor Robert Donat. 
The question about computer-generated films can be answered by briefly returning 
to our discussion of Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within. Recall that Dr Aki Ross and 
Captain Gray Edwards must discover the secrets of a race of phantom-like invaders in 
order to save both the planet and Ross's own life. Although we may hypothesis that the 
characters will succeed in their mission (a cognitive concern) on the one hand, given the 
limitations of CGI described above, we may not hope that they will do so (the absence of 
the corresponding affective concern) on the other. The two relationships may account for 
the possible failure of Final Fantasy in the sense that an insufficient level of narrative 
immersion does not allow us to 'forget' that the characters of Doctor Aki Ross and Captain 
Gray Edwards are computer-generated. (This provides us with a further example of a 

















N.B. Based on Figure 4.2 from Tan (1996), p.1l4. Narrative immersion is calculated as a 
function of expected minus gained returns. 
Figure 2.32b: Seeing-as (type II): narrative immersion versus subsidiary awareness 
preIIntation 
The second potential examples of seeing-as (type II) effectively go both with and 
against the grain. If we are capable of consciously attending to a film's content, then are 
we also capable of deliberately adopting various stances towards it? In the previous section 
on central processing, we saw that if the default mode of a computational system is 'naIve 
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realism', then both the assertive and indexical stances are superfluous. At the emergent 
level of the 'person', however, it is plausible that we can take whatever stance we choose 
to whichever aspect of the film, in order to either further 'engage with' or 'detach from' 
the film's content. 
With respect to engagement strategies, we can take an assertive stance towards a 
fiction film - or an indexical stance towards a computer-generated film - by telling 
ourselves that, although the events in question may not have taken place, similar events 
could have taken place in the past, or will take place in the future, or are taking place in the 
present (albeit to different people in different places). In a similar vein, Carroll (1988, 
pp.99-100) suggests that what the notion of 'suspending disbelier really amounts to is our 
decision not to criticise certain 'narrative improbabilities'. With respect to detachment 
strategies, on the other hand, if the suspense of a thriller becomes too intense or the gore of 
a horror film too graphic, we can take a fictive stance towards the film by reminding 
ourselves that the film is only an artefact, that the characters are played by actors, that the 
events have been staged for the camera, and so on. Similarly, if the film is computer-
generated, we can take a non-indexical stance towards the film by reminding ourselves of 
this very fact. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
(a) A preliminary solution to the paradox of fiction 
Having outlined a modular (and computational) view of the mindlbrain from both a 
functional and a neurobiological perspective, we are in a position to offer a preliminary 
solution to the paradox of fiction. To recap, the main strategy is to revise the third 
proposition of the paradox, whilst the second strategy is to revise the Cartesian framework 
which underlies the paradox as a whole. 
(i) Revising the third proposition 
In the first half of the chapter, we outlined a direct approach to revising the third 
proposition (see Table 2.9). Following Turvey's seeing theory - and Wittgenstein's 
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discussion of the verb 'to see' - we identified two types of 'regarding-as'. Film viewing 
effectively poses a series of questions; each of these questions is answered by a different 
'level' of the mindlbrain. The first question is: what and where are the objects and events 
in my environment? The answers are provided by Fodorian modules which produce 
shallow outputs in the form of perceptual, and phenomenological, content. (Given that the 
default mode of any perceptual system is naIve realism, we need not describe this content 
as having existential import.) Examples of the second question are: what are the intentions 
of the agents in my environment, and what is the emotional significance of my situation? 
In this case, the answers are provided by Darwinian modules which produce shallow 
outputs in the form of intentional and emotional stances. Significantly, both of these levels 
of processing are encapsulated from existence beliefs. 
In the second half of the chapter, we went beyond Turvey's seeing theory - whilst 
continuing to follow Wittgenstein's discussion of the verb 'to see' - by identifying two 
types of 'seeing-as'. Once again, film viewing effectively poses a series of questions which 
are answered by different 'levels' of the mindlbrain. The third set of questions is: is that a 
representation or the referent itself, and what relationship does the representation bear to 
reality? The answers are provided by central processing which produces deep outputs in 
the form of perceptual beliefs on the one hand, and fictive and non-indexical stances on the 
other. The fourth and final question is: how should I (the viewer) attend to the 
representation? In this case, the answer is provided by conscious (attentive) processing 
which produces deep outputs in the form of either fictive or assertive stances, and either 
non-indexical or indexical stances. Significantly, both of these levels of processing make 
reference to the exact opposite of existence beliefs: namely, non-existence beliefs. 
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Table 2.9: A preliminary solution (I): revising the third proposition 
questions answers reliance on 
(domain) (outputs) existence beliefs? 
(I) Fodorian modularity perceptual scene analysis: shallow: no: 
(i) what? (i) basic categorizations complete 
- regarding-as (type I) (ii) where? (ii) basic localizations encapsulation 
- direct perception 
(2) Darwinian modularity mind-reading / emotional appraisal: shallow: • no: 
(i) intentions? (i) intentional stance partial 
- regarding-as (type II) (ii) significance? (ii) emotional stance encapsulation 
- affordances 
(3) central processing fixation of perceptual belief: deep: no: 
(i) referent or representation? (i) perceptual beliefs reliance on 
- seeing-as (type I) (ii) relationship to reality? (ii) fictive stance. non-existence beliefs 
non-indexical stance 
(4) conscious (att.) proc. attentional tasks: deep: no: 
(i) referent or representation? (i) sensory immersion reliance on 
- seeing-as (type II) (ii) relationship to reality? (ii) narrative immersion non-existence beliefs 
(various stances) 
• Also see physical, biological, and social stances. 
(ii) Revising the Cartesian framework 
Many film theorists assume that the viewer is a Cartesian ego: in other words, they only 
refer to one level of processing - hence, the problem of contradictory mental states. Other 
film theorists refer to as many as two levels of processing: for example, Smith (1995b) 
makes a distinction between the 'sensory' and the 'epistemic', whilst Grodal (1997) makes 
a distinction between the 'local' and the 'global'. In this chapter, we have referred to not 
two, not three, but/our levels of processing (see Table 2.10); a distinction which serves to 
combine either the sensory or the epistemic on the one hand, with either the local or the 
global on the other to produce four different permutations. 
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Table 2.10: A preliminary solution (II): revising the underlying framework 
sensory or epistemic? local or global'! '" 
(1) Fodorian modularity sensory local 
(2) Darwinian modularity epistemic local 
(3) central processing epistemic global 
(non-conscious. parallel) 
(4) conscious (attentive) both global 
processing (conscious. 'serial') 
• 'Local' and 'global' are relative tenns. 
(b) Further applications 
In addition to making a modest contribution to the field of cognitive film theory, the four-
fold distinction outlined in this chapter is intended to make a modest contribution to certain 
debates in both philosophy and science - a theme which will recur throughout the 
following chapters. 
(i) Distinctions in philosophy 
Although in a strict sense, film viewing only involves one type of access to the 
corresponding world (namely, perceptual access) whereas real world interactions involve 
two (both perceptual and enactive), film viewing is more complex than its real world 
counterpart in one significant respect: viz., the subject (or viewer) is effectively in two 
situations at the same time. In order to account for this duality, the film theorist is obliged 
to make distinctions - by referring to additional levels of processing - which the 
philosopher who is concerned with real world interactions may overlook. To borrow a 
phrase from the philosopher Stephen Stich (1978, p.517), however, it is possible that these 
distinctions 'mark real and psychologically interesting boundaries' which playa significant 
role outside the cinema. 
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(iiJ Distinctions in science 
Considering the duality of film viewing, the film theorist is also obliged to make 
distinctions which may be overlooked by the scientist - especially, the evolutionary 
psychologist. First, the distinction between Fodorian and Darwinian modularity is not 
made explicit in the literature: evolutionary psychologists tend to assume that both types of 
module have the same ontological status as 'adaptations'. As we have seen, however, the 
two differ in a significant number of respects - notably, the properties of informational 
encapsulation and psychophysical detectability - to be treated as separate entities. Second, 
the distinction between modularity and central processing is not given the attention it 
deserves: although evolutionary psychologists acknowledge the role of more general-
purpose mechanisms, they tend to ignore the more global, or abductive, aspects of 
cognition. It seems likely, however, that the frame problem really is a problem. Third and 
finally, the distinction between central processing and conscious (attentive) processing is 
not usually made: given that evolutionary psychologists disregard the former whilst 
assuming that adaptations operate below the latter, the relationship between the two does 
not tend to arise. The subject is capable, however, of making (nonconscious) abductive 
inferences about their environment in one respect, whilst consciously attending to the 
environment in another. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 1 
(a) Understanding emotions in the world 
The third proposition of the paradox of fiction can be revised by eliminating o-calIed 
'existence beliefs' from the psychological equation. As we have seen, the most obvious 
way of undertaking this task is to consider direct theories of psychological engagement. 1 n 
the previous chapter, we considered the first half of our 'direct relation hip' to the world 
and the cinema by focusing on the 'seeing stage' of the reception process; in total, four 
different ways of 'seeing' the world and the cinema were described. In this chapter, we 
will consider the second half of this direct relationship by turning to the reacting stage of 
the process; in particular, we need to understand how the different types of information 
already described feed into the emotion system, how the emotion system assesses this 
information, and how the emotion system initiates (appropriate) responses. 
How should we understand emotions? It makes sense to begin our investigation in 
the world itself by providing a working definition of the term 'emotion' and a brief 
overview of the emotional process. Following Robert Solomon (2000, pp.3- l5), we can 
approach this task by asking a 'why' question and a 'what' question respectively. 
I The tenn ' reacting' in the chapter title is inspired by Wittgenstein 's (\958) discussion of the verb ' to see', 
and his claim that we ' react' to both a human face and a picture of a face in similar, if not identical, ways. An 
early version of this chapter was presented at a conference organised by the Laterna Magica A socation, 
University of Pecs, Hungary (200 I). Thanks to Laszlo Tarnay for translating this paper for the Hungarian 
journal Passim - see Barratt (2005) . Thanks also to Howard Bowman for reading and commenting on the 
version in question. Later versions of the chapter were presented at postgraduate seminars organised by the 
Center for Evolutionary Psychology and the Department of Psychology, Univer ity of alifornia , Santa 
Barbara (2003). 
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(i) 'Why' are our reactions? 
In contrast to the traditional Western or Romantic view - which assumes that emotions are 
the enemy of reason - let us follow the recent comments of cognitive film theorists by 
assuming that emotions are functional processes which complement both perceptual and 
cognitive activities. According to the prototypical view of emotion advanced by many 
cognitivists, for instance, emotions have 'object-', 'goal-', and 'action-orientation'. This 
view can be illustrated by appealing to the prototypical emotion of fear and the 
prototypical example of a fear situation - originally cited by the 'father' of American 
psychology, William James (1884). Ifwe encountered a threatening bear in the woods, the 
object of our emotion would be the bear itself, the goal in operation would be self-
preservation, whilst the appropriate action would be to run in the opposite direction -
preferably, as quickly as possible. In such an encounter, the emotion of fear would serve to 
co-ordinate the operations of our perceptual (and attentional) systems, cognitive-
motivational systems, and physiological and behavioural systems.2 (As we will see, this 
type of example lends itself to our understanding of mainstream narrative films which 
usually feature purposeful characters facing various obstacles, and so forth.) 
Many emotion theorists make a distinction between two groups of emotions (see 
Table 3.1). By common consensus, the primary (or basic) emotions are thought to include 
fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness: these emotions are associated with both 
specific facial expressions and specific physiological patterns, and tend to occur 
universally. (The philosopher Paul Griffiths, 1997, refers to primary emotions under the 
rubric of 'affect programs'.) The secondary (or complex) emotions, on the other hand, are 
though to include embarrassment, guilt, jealousy, love, pride, and shame: these emotions 
are not associated with either specific facial expressions or specific physiological patterns, 
require a greater degree of cognitive processing, and tend to vary across cultures. (Griffiths 
refers to secondary emotions under the rubric of 'higher cognitive emotions'.) 
Each primary and secondary emotion can be regarded as performing a different 
function, with respect to a different type of human situation. Of course, some emotions 
may be less obviously functional than others. Similarly, it is not difficult to think of 
instances in which emotions are a detriment rather than a benefit, and each of the emotions 
2 One could argue that the emotion of fear comprises such processing. In this respect, the encounter with the 
bear could be described without referring to the terms 'emotion' and 'fear' at all; the terms are merely a way 
of assigning significance to certain situations, from the perspective of the observer. 
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is associated with a particular disorder. An evolutionary approach, however, may provide 
the answers we require: on the whole, a particular emotion served our ancestors well in a 
particular type of situation, whilst a less obviously functional emotion such as sadness is 
the inevitable price you pay for (adaptively) valuing an object or goal which is lost. In 
addition, one of the behaviours associated with sadness - namely, crying - may perform a 
communicative function. (Given that emotions have been defined as functional processes 
with respect to real world situations, how does this functionality persist in the unusual case 
of film viewing? Are emotional responses to fictional - i.e., non-existent - characters and 
events functional in any conceivable sense?) 
Table 3.1: 'Why' are our reactions? 
primary emotions secondary emotions 




sadness (distress) love 
happiness (joy) pride 
surprise (?) shame 
Adapted from Evans (2001), p.7 and p.29. 
(ii) 'What' are our reactions? 
The emotional process can be broken down into three basic stages; namely, the input, 
induction, and response stages. Each stage can be broken down further into individual 
components. Let us summarise each of these stages and components in tum (see Table 
3.2). 
(1) The input stage. Our emotions are usually 'about' something. For the sake of 
simplicity, let us assume that an emotion begins with the 'perception' of some sort of 
object or event which has emotional significance. Whereas an object may be immediately 
evident to the senses, an event can be as abstract as a meaning or implication. Both are of 
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relevance to film which is both an audiovisual medium dealing in sights and sounds, and a 
narrative medium dealing in meanings and implications. 
(2) The induction stage. Following a simple cause-and-effect logic, it is reasonable 
to assume that some sort of process must intervene between the 'perception' of an object or 
event and the initiation of an (appropriate) emotional response. Determining the exact 
nature of this process is problematic, however. From a neurobiological perspective, 
neuroscientists attempt to identify the anatomical structures which 'underpin' emotion. 
Although the cortex is thought to be involved in many aspects of emotion, regions of the 
(subcortical?) limbic system have been singled out in particular. From a cognitive 
perspective, on the other hand, psychologists propose that an object or event is 'cognitively 
appraised' for its emotional significance; this appraisal makes reference to the subject's 
goals or concerns. At this point, we should mention a general rule: the more abstract the 
object or event, the higher we must go in the mindibrain, both anatomically and 
functionally; and given the limitations of the neurobiological, the more we will have to rely 
on a cognitive level of explanation. 
(3) The response stage. Our emotional responses are comprised of at least three 
sub-components. The physiological component is mediated by the internal organs (the 
viscera) and includes changes in heart rate, respiration, and so forth. The behavioural 
component, on the other hand, is mediated by the skeletal muscles (the soma) and includes 
both instrumental behaviours (for example, the flight action associated with fear) and 
expressive behaviours (displayed by the face, body, and voice). The subjective component 
can be thought of as the conscious, 'qualitative' experience of both the physiological and 
behavioural components in conjunction with the cognitive component described above: for 
example, the feeling of 'butterflies in the stomach' along with the appraisal that one is 
about to sit an exam or attend an interview. (When most people talk about emotions, it is to 
this particular component that they are referring.) 
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Table 3.2: 'What' are our reactions? 
questions to be addressed 
(1) input stage stimuli. cues. or situational meaning? 
(2) induction stage affective appraisal or cognitive appraisal? 
(3) response stage bodily feedback: necessary or sufficient? 
N.B. Each stage and component of the emotional process raises a series of question which 
have been hotly debated: see Ekman and Davidson (1994). Also see Strongman (1996) for a 
review of different emotion theories. 
(b) Understanding emotions in the world and the cinema 
Given that direct theories posit an 'intimate connection' between 'seeing' and 'reacting' 
(Messaris, 1997, pA), how should we understand the nature of this connection? And 
having provided a brief summary of why and how we react to objects and events in the 
world, how should we understand our reactions to the objects and events presented by 
cinema? 
(i) A Wittgensteinian / Gibsonian approach to 'reacting' 
As we have seen, the first example of a direct approach is provided by Wittgenstein's 
(1958) discussion of the verb 'to see'. With respect to the seeing theory, Turvey (1997) 
applies the notion of 'regarding-as' to the case of emotion by citing a single quote from 
Wittgenstein: 'In some respects I stand towards [a 'picture-face'] as I do towards a human 
face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face.' 
(p.194) By conceptually relating perception and emotion, Turvey provides us with a 
possible way of eliminating (conscious) mental activity - and hence, existence beliefs -
from the equation. By choosing to dismiss causal mechanisms and processes of which we 
are unaware, however, he provides us with an incomplete account of this relationship. The 
second example of a direct approach is provided by Gibson's (1979) ecological approach 
132 
to visual perception. Anderson (1996) recogmses that Gibson's notions of 'direct 
perception' and 'affordances' are a 'priceless gift for film theory'. By doing so, Anderson 
opens the way for an ecological (and computational) way of understanding the intimate 
connection between perception and emotion. By only referring to causal mechanisms and 
processes in relation to the perceptual half of the equation, however, he leaves the 
emotional half in need of further description and explanation. 
(ii) A multi-level/neurobiological approach 
In light of these shortcomings, the direct theory must be supported and elaborated by 
considering what are known as multi-level theories of the mindlbrain: multi-level theories 
propose that the mindlbrain consists of a number of different 'systems' or 'levels', each 
level or system dealing with a different type of information processing. This will allow us 
to understand the relationship between both (modular) perceptual systems and (non-
modular) central systems on the one hand, and our emotion system on the other. How, 
though, should we undertake this task? Although Fodor (1983) makes a distinction 
between perception and cognition, he is silent on the subject of emotion (and the 
whereabouts of the emotion system). The answer may lie in a shift, or rather a reversal, of 
perspectives - a reversal which privileges a neurobiological level of explanation. As we 
have seen, Fodor starts his investigation of the mind by taking a functional perspective 
(concentrating on the notions of 'domain specificity', 'informational encapSUlation', and 
the like), and ends by acknowledging a neurobiological one (briefly citing the notions of 
'fixed' and 'equipotential neural architecture'). In contrast, we should approach our 
investigation of the emotions - and the emotion system - from the opposite direction by 
starting from a neurobiological perspective and ending with a functional one. In particular, 
we will concentrate on the research of two prominent neuroscientists: namely, Joseph 
LeDoux and Antonio Damasio. 
What do I mean when I talk of adopting a neurobiological perspective? Many 
theorists seem to severely underestimate the explanatory power of an account of the mind 
which is informed by what Radford (1975, p.67) describes as 'biological reasons'; indeed, 
I suspect that they fail to conceive of what such an account might look like. This failure 
may be based on at least two basic, and related, assumptions. The first assumption is that a 
neurobiological approach operates at an inappropriate level of description. In his 2002 
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book Synaptic Self, for instance, LeDoux is concerned with the neurobiological basis of the 
'self; his key claim is that 'you are your synapses' (p.ix). In a review of the book, Fodor 
(2002) criticises LeDoux for focusing on a microscopic level of analysis: referring to 
electrochemical processes which take place across the synapses between neurons is 
unlikely to capture what distinguishes one person from another. The second assumption is 
that a neurobiological approach generates uninformative (or trivially true) statements: for 
instance, there is nothing intrinsically illuminating about the claim that a particular part of 
the brain (call it A) 'lights up' when a certain task (call it x) is performed. In the same 
review, Fodor states that for many philosophers and psychologists, the neurobiological 
substrate of psychological processes is of little interest: he jokes that the mind could be 
made out of cardboard for all they cared, although 'it wouldn't wear well in wet weather'. 
Although both of these assumptions seem reasonable at first glance, they can be 
challenged in convincing ways. The first assumption fails to recognise that there are many 
different levels of explanation at play within neurobiology itself. In the 1998 book The 
Emotional Brain, LeDoux is concerned with the neurobiological basis of the emotions; 
from our perspective, one of his key claims is that 'anatomy can illuminate psychology' 
(p.170). Significantly, LeDoux focuses on a macroscopic level of analysis: he identifies the 
(neuro)anatomical structures - and pathways - which 'underpin' the primary emotion of 
fear, notably singling out an almond-shaped area of the limbic system called the amygdala. 
The second assumption fails to recognise that a neurobiological approach is capable of 
generating informative (non-trivial) statements in the following respect: aspects of our 
psychology can be 'illuminated' by considering the claim that anatomical structure A 
(which underpins function x) is connected to anatomical structure B (which underpins 
function y), and so forth. With respect to emotion, LeDoux claims that the amygdala - as 
the neuroanatomical structure which underpins fear - is connected to a number of other 
brain areas underpinning a number of other 'cognitive' functions. He states: 'It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that by knowing what the different inputs to the amygdala are, and 
having some idea of what function those areas play in cognition, we can get some 
reasonable hypotheses about what kinds of cognitive representations can arouse fear 
responses.' (p.169) (This type of possibility is briefly acknowledged by Fodor, ibid., 
though not in relation to the work in question.) 
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Whereas LeDoux gIves a more detailed account of the earlier stages of the 
emotional process, Damasio (1994, 1999) gives a more detailed account of the later stages. 
In particular, he argues for the importance of the body proper by describing the roles of 
somato-visceral feedback and the somatosensory structures of the brain. 
* * * 
In brief, my aim in this chapter is to offer a primary solution to the paradox of fiction by 
outlining a multi-level model of the emotion system at a coarse-grain level of analysis. The 
first part of the chapter will consider the ways in which we react to the actual objects and 
events that we encounter in the world, whilst the second part will consider the ways in 
which we react to the representations of objects and events that we encounter in the 
cinema. In both parts, the emotional process will be broken down into the input, induction, 
and response stages cited above. Throughout, the neurobiological accounts of LeDoux and 
Damasio will allow us to gain an understanding of the basic relationship between our 
perceptual, cognitive, and emotional systems on the one hand, and the role of the body on 
the other. The functional account exemplified by Fodor's account of the mindibrain, on the 
other hand, will allow us to clarify the precise nature of the information which is processed 
by, and passes between, each of these systems. In particular, the chapter will demonstrate 
how the first and third ways of seeing - namely, Fodorian modularity and central 
processing (regarding-as and seeing-as type I) - may relate to the emotion system. 
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3.2 REACTING TO THE WORLD 
Having should we understand our reactions to the real world? Although the aim of the 
following discussion is to illustrate a multi-level model of the emotion system which 
applies to a variety of emotions, it will focus on the primary emotion of fear. Susan Feagin 
(1997, p.55) states that fear 'crop[s] up in aesthetic discussions with depressing regularity'. 
Despite this regularity, it seems that fear still provides us with the best place to start. A 
preliminary argument comes from philosophy and film theory: both Walton and Carroll set 
the agenda by focusing on our responses to horror in their discussions of the paradox of 
fiction. The decisive argument, however, comes from neuroscience: if we wish to outline a 
multi-level model which begins at a neurobiological level, then fear is really the only 
emotion on the table. (Throughout the discussion, the reader is asked to bear in mind the 
following question: Could an equivalent model have been constructed from the 
neuroscientific research on any other emotion?) 
The predominance of fear lies in the fact that it is a 'relatively tractable emotion' 
which involves 'clearly defined stimuli and responses'. 3 The main research strategy is a 
procedure known as fear conditioning - based on the classical conditioning paradigm 
originally formulated by Ivan Pavlov (1927).4 The first method for tracing the neural 
systems and pathways which 'underpin' fear involves selectively damaging a certain 
region of the subject's brain, and then ascertaining whether or not the lesion interferes with 
fear conditioning. The second method involves injecting a 'tracer' into a certain region of 
the subject's brain, frightening the subject, and then examining sections of the brain under 
a microscope. For ethical and practical reasons, this research cannot be conducted on 
humans; it must be conducted, therefore, on mammals such as rats which are believed to be 
closely enough related to humans - in evolutionary terms - to make illuminating 
comparisons. Although it is relatively easy to elicit and condition the emotion of fear in 
rats, the elicitation and conditioning of emotions such as anger, disgust, sadness and 
happiness - not to mention love, guilt, jealousy, and so forth - is an entirely different story. 
3 Joseph LeDoux, 'Parallel Memories: Putting Emotions Back Into the Brain'. Interviewed by John 
Brockman at: http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/ledoux. 
4 The story of Pavlov ringing a bell prior to feeding his dogs is well-known. At first, the presentation of the 
food (an unconditioned stimulus) prompted the dogs to salivate (an unconditioned response). After repeatedly 
pairing the bell with the food, the sound of the bell ringing became a conditioned stimulus and salivation a 
conditioned response. 
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At certain parts of the discussion, we will need to compare fear with another 
primary emotion in order to demonstrate potential differences in the input, induction, and 
response stages of the emotional process. Perhaps the closest emotion to fear is the primary 
emotion of disgust in the sense that both emotions are fundamentally related to survival 
and often occur in conjunction. Indeed, Carroll refers to horror as a 'compound emotion' 
comprising both of the emotions in question. A consideration of this compound emotion 
also brings us to a related conundrum which Carroll describes as the paradox of horror: 
why would anyone subject themselves to negative objects and events, and the negative 
emotions which accompany them? 
(a) Shallow inputs: the role of emotional stimuli 
Let us assume that an emotional episode begins with the 'perception' of some sort of 
object or event which has emotional significance for the subject. And let us begin with the 
simplest type of object or event. This brings us to the notion of an emotional stimulus. 
Throughout the thesis, the term 'stimulus' will be used to refer to a single 'sensory object' 
which has relatively strong emotional connotations. An emotional stimulus can be 
perceived via any sensory modality but we are primarily concerned, of course, with the 
visual and the auditory. Following the classical conditioning paradigm, an emotional 
stimulus can be either unconditioned or conditioned; that is, 'biologically prepared' during 
the course of human evolution or learnt during the course of an individual's lifetime. In 
this respect, LeDoux makes a distinction between natural and learnt triggers. 
The first source of emotional stimuli is provided by the situation which confronts 
the person (see Figure 3.1). Following LeDoux's (1998) example from The Emotional 
Brain, imagine walking along a woodland path with a companion (pp.163-165, p.166). 
Suddenly, you catch a glimpse of a snake-like object - namely, 'a slender curved shape' - a 
few feet ahead. Many theorists propose that snakes - along with spiders - are natural 
triggers for fear; it is probable that both types of creature were encountered by our hunter-
gatherer ancestors during the Pleistocene era and posed a relatively significant threat to 
their survival and well-being. It is plausible that there are a variety of natural triggers for 
fear (see Damasio, 1994, p.131). In the visual realm, potential candidates include looming 
objects, heights, blood, injuries, and facial expressions of fear. In the auditory realm, 
potential candidates include the sounds of growls and screams. (With regard to learnt 
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triggers, Arne Ohman, 1993, has demonstrated that not all objects can become 'ondilioned 
fear stimuli: for instance, snake fear is more likely than fear of either guns or electric 
sockets.) 
Figure 3.1: Situational cue 
The second source of emotional stimuli would be provided by the p erSOI/ 
themselves (see Figure 3.2). You direct both your eyes and ears towards your companion 
and perceive that their face, body, and voice are ' displaying' expres ions of fear. ach of 
these expressions may operate as an emotional stimulus in its own right. 
Figure 3.2: .Personal cue 
Similar remarks can be made about the emotion of disgust. According to Paul 
Rozen et a1. (2000) snakes - and spiders - are also objects of revulsion; indeed, Davey 
(1993) suggests that our aversion to such creatures stems more from di gust than fear. 
Once again, there is a variety of natural disgust triggers. In the visual realm, pos ible 
examples include bodily excretions, mutilated and rotting flesh , and corpses. ]n the 
auditory realm, possible examples include the sounds which accompany the visual stimuli 
described: for example, the sound of a person vomiting. 
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(i) Sensory information from sensory (thalamic) systems 
How would we respond in such a situation (see Figure 3.3)1 LeDoux describes the first 
route to fear as the low road. Transducers at the retina would send relatively processed 
information to the visual thalamus (or LGN) - the subcortical structure which can be 
regarded as an evolutionarily 'old' part of our visual system. The thalamus would process 
the crude stimulus features of the snake-like object: for example, the slender and curved 
shape. The resulting sensory information would be sent to the amygdala via a direct 
pathway which bypasses the neocortex. Subsequently, the amygdala would initiate certain 
physiological and behavioural responses, in order to prepare our body for adaptive 'fight-
or-flight' action. 
(ii) Perceptual information from perceptual (cortical) systems 
The second route to fear is described as the high road. In the meantime, the visual 
thalamus would 'relay' the same information to the visual cortex - the neocortical structure 
which can be regarded as an evolutionarily 'new' part of our visual system. (To recap, the 
thalamus is described as a 'gateway' to the neocortex and a 'relay station' between the 
transducers and the neocortex.) The visual cortex would process a more 'complete' and 
'detailed' object representation of the snake-like object: for example, the specific colours 
and textures. The resulting perceptual information would be sent to the amygdala, which, 
in tum, would modify its activity accordingly. If the snake-like object was identified as an 
actual snake, then the amygdala would continue to initiate appropriate fear-type responses. 
If, on the other hand, the snake-like object was identified as a harmless stick, then the 
amygdala would cease to initiate the responses in question. 
Why are there two routes to fear? LeDoux offers an evolutionary explanation which 
builds on the principle of conservatism. Retaining a fast-acting circuit which sacrifices 
accuracy for speed has survival advantage: LeDoux (1993, p.112) suggests that the circuit 
in question effectively serves as an 'early-warning system'. What is more, 'false positives' 
are less costly than 'false negatives': LeDoux (1998, p.165) states that 'the cost of treating 
a stick as a snake is less, in the long run, than the cost of treating a snake as a stick'. 
* * * 
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How does LeDoux's neurobiological account square with Fodor's functional one (see 
Table 3.3)? Although Fodor refers to 'transducers' and the 'visual system' - corresponding 
to the retina and 'fixed neural architecture' respectively - he does not refer to anything 
resembling the thalamus from either a functional or a neuroanatomical perspective. 
LeDoux's account suggests, however, that rather than making a two-fold distinction 
between transducers and the visual system, we should make a three-fold distinction 
between transducers, and the 'early' and 'later' visual systems - corresponding to the 
retina, thalamus, and cortex respectively. Recall that Fodor suggests that the visual system 
produces basic categorizations of the objects in our environment as shallow outputs: the 
object representations "snake" and "stick" would be examples of such categorizations. 
LeDoux's account suggests that the early visual system produces outputs which are even 
'shallower' than basic categorizations: namely, information regarding the crude stimulus 
features of an object. (When describing the process from the perspective of the emotion 
system, these shallow outputs should be classified as shallow inputs.) If anything, however, 
these qualifications lend weight to Fodor's argument about the informational encapsulation 
(etc.) of the visual system (and they do not affect his arguments about the nature of the 
information being fed to central systems).5 
S A similar account could be given for the auditory system in tenns of both LeDoux's neurobiological 
account and Fodor's functional one. Imagine, for instance, suddenly hearing a loud and indiscriminate human 
sound. In this case, the auditory thalamus would process the crude stimulus features of the sound (in terms of 
volume and tone). The auditory cortex, on the other hand, would create a detailed object representation, 
identifying the sound as either an ominous scream or a hannless sneeze. 
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Adapted from Figure 6.13 (,The Low and the High Roads to the Amygdala') from LeDoux 
(1998), p.164, and Figure 69.2 from LeDoux (1995), p.I053. 
Table 3.3: Inputs to the emotion system (amygdala) 
neurobiological account (re. LeDoux): functional account (re. Fodor): 
origin of input content of input 
1 sensory (thalamic) systems * shallow: e.g. "snake" 
(stimulus features) 
2 perceptual (cortical) systems shallow: e.g. "stick" 
(object representation) 
• Not predicted by Fodorian account. 
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(b) Induction 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the snake-like object on the woodland path 
turns out to be an actual snake rather than a harmless stick and that it therefore poses a 
genuine threat to our survival and well-being. How should we understand the induction 
stage of the emotional process? Following Tooby and Cosmides (2001), let us make a 
pragmatic distinction between the 'emotion system' and the 'action system', which 
corresponds approximately to Damasio's (2003) distinction between 'triggering' and 
'execution' . 
(i) Activating the emotion system 
The activation of the emotion system can be tackled from two related perspectives (see 
Table 3.4). The first perspective is from the field of cognitive psychology and has come to 
be known as the Zajonc-Lazarus debate: does the induction of emotion depend primarily 
on cognitive processing - as Richard Lazarus (1982, 1984) proposes - or does it depend on 
affective processing - as Robert Zajonc (1980, 1984) argues? The second perspective is 
provided by the third proposition of the paradox of fiction: does the induction of emotion 
make reference to existence beliefs - as Radford (1975) and co. assume - or does it operate 
independently of existence beliefs - as some recent theorists have speculated? 
o Direct activation: affective processing 
Following Radford, Kendall Walton (1978, p.6) takes it to be 'a principle of common 
sense' that fear requires existence beliefs. In contrast, Carroll (1990, p.78) acknowledges 
that the possibility of fear not requiring existence beliefs 'remains at least an open 
question'. He does not, however, explore this question in any depth. In a later (1999) 
article, however, Carroll proposes a cognitive theory of the 'garden-variety' emotions: 
according to this theory, emotions require cognitive states as 'causes' and body states as 
'effects'. By way of support, he cites the following example: 'I cognize the scorpion next 
to my hand under [the category of] the harmful, that cognition causes my blood to freeze, 
and the overall state is fear.' (p.27) (Presumably, the cognition in question would make 
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reference to the belief that the scorpion exists.) Carroll is correct in assuming that some 
sort of 'appraisal' must intervene between the perception of the scorpion (as an emotional 
stimulus) and the elicitation of fear (as an emotional response). The neurobiological (and 
evolutionary) account suggests, however, that he is incorrect in assuming that this appraisal 
is necessarily cognitive in nature and necessarily involves an assessment of existence. 
Following Zajonc's terminology, the affective appraisal of the threat posed by 
either the snake or the scorpion would be mediated by the subcortex: the evolutionarily 
old, or 'reptilian', part of the brain. In particular, LeDoux singles out an almond-shaped 
area of the limbic system called the amygdala. In light of this, at least two arguments can 
be made for the irrelevance of existence beliefs. 
(1) The default mode of naive realism. If the amygdala evolved - both phylo- and 
ontogenetically - to cope with the existing world, then why do we need to postulate the 
'entities' of existence beliefs at all? Why not simply say that the default mode of the 
amygdala is appraising existing objects and events: for instance, actual snakes and actual 
scorpions? According to this view, non-existence beliefs are required to over-ride the 
default mode in question. Significantly, LeDoux (1998, p.165) proposes that: 'The cortex's 
job is to prevent the inappropriate response rather than to produce the appropriate one. ' 
(2) The property of informational encapsulation. As a subcortical structure, the 
operations of the amygdala are inaccessible to - that is, 'below' - consciousness. LeDoux 
(1993, p.l12) states that the amygdala is 'blind to the true nature of stimuli'; a fact which 
implies that it is at least partially encapsulated with respect to existence beliefs. Similarly, 
Damasio (1999, 2003) stresses the subcortical, subconscious nature of the induction 
process: according to his lock and key analogy, signals resulting from the perceptual 
processing of the emotional stimulus (the so-called 'key') activate 'emotion induction 
sites' which are 'preset' to respond to that particular class of stimulus (the 'lock'). (For 
Griffiths, 1997, the fact that an 'affect program' such as fear is informationally 
encapsulated distinguishes it - as a natural kind - from higher cognitive emotions.) 
It is intriguing that certain emotions seem to be more susceptible to the paradox of 
fiction than others. In contrast to fear, Carroll assumes that the primary emotion of disgust 
does not require existence beliefs. Why is this so? The reason might be as follows: 
Although fear may be partly stimulus-driven (or sensory-dependent), disgust seems to be 
almost entirely so: indeed, being disgusted by certain sights and sounds is such a 
commonplace phenomenon, perhaps, that we take it for granted. Presumably, the snake and 
the scorpion - as emotional stimuli qua 'sensory objects' - would be capable of activating 
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those 'disgust' induction sites which are 'preset' to that particular class of creature: these 
induction sites may be located in subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia (see 
Rozin et ai., 2000, pp.649-650). 
o Indirect activation: cognitive processing 
An advocate of Carroll's cognitive theory of emotions might make two objections. The 
first objection concerns the possibility of primary emotions (or 'affect programs') being 
elaborated by what could be described as 'higher cognitive processing'. It seems 
reasonable to propose that once the shock of seeing the snake or the scorpion had subsided, 
our fearful response would be influenced by the cognition that the snake or the scorpion is 
poisonous, that a snake bite or a scorpion sting would be fatal, that another hiker had 
recently fallen victim on the same trail, that we are many miles from the nearest hospital, 
and so forth. 
Following Lazarus's terminology, the cognitive appraisal of these implications 
would be mediated by the neocortex: the evolutionarily new, or 'human', part of the brain. 
In particular, LeDoux (1998, p.177) makes the following admission: 'We don't really fully 
understand how the human brain sizes up a situation . .. but these activities are 
unquestionably amongst the most sophisticated cognitive functions. ... From what we 
currently know, it seems likely that regions like the prefrontal cortex may be involved.' 
Significantly, cognitive (cortical) processing is potentially accessible to - that is, 'within' -
consciousness; the issue of whether or not it is dependent on existence beliefs will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 (see section 4.3). For the time being, it should be noted that the 
results of cognitive (cortical) processing would be fed back to the same subcortical region 
described above - namely, the amygdala. (Robert Roberts, 2003, Ch. 1 notes that this type 
of scenario challenges Griffith's claim that affect programs are entirely encapsulated.) 
The second objection concerns secondary emotions, or what Griffiths describes as 
'higher cognitive emotions'. Recall Radford's example of the man who tells us a 
'harrowing story' about his sister. Similarly, Damasio (1994, pp.134-139) asks us to 
imagine 'being told of the unexpected death of a person who worked closely with yoU,.6 In 
6 Damasio actually divides the process - from hearing the news to responding emotionally - into three stages. 
The first stage involves the conscious fonnation of appropriate 'mental images' in the sensory cortices of the 
brain. The second stage involves the nonconscious evaluation of the emotional implications of the situation 
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this case, it seems reasonable to propose that our 'harrowing' response to such news would 
be influenced by the cognition that the person had died at a relatively young age, that they 
had left behind a spouse and children, that we would never have the chance to work and 
socialise with that person again, and so forth. According to Damasio, the cognitive 
appraisal of such implications would be mediated by the prefrontal cortex. Once again, 
however, the results of such cognitive (cortical) processing would be fed back to 
subcortical regions such as the amygdala, which, in turn, would initiate appropriate 
physiological and behavioural responses. In other words, the machinery for the expression 
of primary emotions would be co-opted for the expression of the secondary emotions. (In a 
related fashion, the emotion of moral disgust would require an element of cognitive 
appraisal: for instance, the assessment that some social code had been contravened. It is 
plausible, however, that it would be expressed by the same machinery which underlies our 
disgust at the sight of the snake or scorpion: namely, the basal ganglia.) 
Table 3.4: Activating the emotion system 
neurobiological functional reliance on 
perspective perspective existence beliefs? 
(1) direct activation subcortex: primary emotions no: 
amygdala, basal ganglia (affect programs) partial encapsulation I 
- affective processing ('mammalian') lock-and-keyanalogy 
(see Zajonc) 
(2) indirect activation neocortex: - primary emotions answer: 
prefrontal cortex (elaborated by higher cognition) see Chapter 4 
- cognitive processing ('human') - secondary emotions (section 4.3) 
(see Lazarus) (higher cognitive emotions) 
(iiJ Engaging the action system 
To return to our encounter with the snake, the activation of the emotion system would be 
followed by the engagement of the action system (see Table 3.5). In order to fully 
understand the nature of this engagement, it will be necessary to refer to the first two 
components of our (subsequent) emotional response, and the two branches of the 
by the prefrontal cortex. The third and final stage involves the initiation of appropriate physiological and 
behavioural responses by the amygdala. 
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peripheral nervous system respectively (cf. Grodal, 1997, pp.42-45). (This two-fold 
distinction will be of significance when we come to consider the dual nature of film 
viewing.) The physiological component of our emotional response would be mediated by 
the autonomic nervous system (ANS) which is largely beyond voluntary control. The ANS 
transports signals from the CNS to the 'viscera': namely, the internal organs (and glands) 
which are composed of smooth muscle. If our emotion was one of fear, it would be 
associated with the sympathetic division of the ANS which is primarily concerned with the 
expenditure of energy: examples of sympathetic responses include increases in heart rate, 
respiration, and perspiration, and the directing of blood to the skeletal muscles to aid 
physical exertion. (In addition, the adrenal gland is activated, resulting in the release of 
adrenaline into the bloodstream.) If our emotion was one of disgust, on the other hand, it 
would be associated with the parasympathetic division of the ANS which is primarily 
concerned with the restoration of energy: examples of parasympathetic responses include 
decreases in heart rate and the directing of blood to the stomach to aid digestion. 
In contrast, the behavioural component of our emotional response would be 
mediated by the somatic nervous system (SNS) which is largely within voluntary control. 
The SNS transports signals from the CNS to the 'soma': namely, the striated muscles 
which are attached to the skeleton. In the case of fear, the main instrumental behaviour 
would be the flight response, whilst an example of an expressive behaviour would be the 
corresponding facial expression. In the case of disgust, on the other hand, the behavioural 
components would be less certain: Rozin et al. (2000, p.638) state that '[d]isgust is 
manifested as a distancing from some object, event, or situation, and can be characterized 
as a rejection.' Given, however, that it is not clear whether this 'distancing' or 'rejection' 
involves an active withdrawal from the object or the passive disinclination to approach the 
object, the most obvious behaviour - either instrumental or expressive - might be the 
corresponding facial expression alone. Indeed, the fact that the facial movements in 
question either 'discourage entry into the body' or 'encourage discharge' suggests that the 
expression is instrumental. In conclusion, invisible and involuntary physiology provides 
support for visible and voluntary behaviour; although the relevance of the physiological 
and behavioural components is more obvious for fear than disgust, the key point is that fear 
is a 'sympathetic' (active) emotion, whereas disgust is a 'parasympathetic' (passive) one. 
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Table 3.5: Engaging the action system 
fear disgust 
(1) physiological component sympathetic responses: parasympathetic responses: 
e.g., increases in heart rate, respiration, e.g., decreases in heart rate, etc. 
-autonomic and perspiration; release of adrenaline 
- involuntary, invisible 
(2) behavioural component instrumental response: flight instrumental/expressive response: 
expressive response: facial expression facial expression 
-somatic 
- voluntary, visible 
(c) Responses, feedback, and interpretation 
Remember that the snake on the woodland path poses a genuine threat to our survival and 
well-being. How should we understand the response stage of the emotional process? And 
how should we understand the role of the physiological, behavioural, and subjective 
components? These questions can be answered by addressing two well-known theories of 
emotion. 
(i) The James-Lange theory of emotion and the role of somato-visceral feedback 
According to the James-Lange theory of emotion, our experience of a particular emotion is 
the result of us cognitively 'perceiving' that our body is in a certain physiological and 
behavioural state: to cite a much used example, we do not run because we feel afraid; 
rather, we feel afraid because we run. Is bodily feedback necessary and sufficient for 
emotional experience? Different accounts give different answers - usually, on the 
inconclusive or negative side. Paul Ekman and colleagues claim that there are distinct ANS 
patterns for each of the primary emotions of fear, disgust, anger, and sadness (see Ekman, 
Levenson, and Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen, 1990). LeDoux (1998, 
pp.291-296) argues that we can justify the claim that bodily feedback has sufficient 'speed 
and specificity' to generate emotional experience, as long as we refer to both somatic and 
visceral feedback, and consider the overall context in which both types of feedback occur. 
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The lames-Lange theory can be both updated and given a (neuro)biological 
grounding by considering Damasio's (1994) account of somato-visceral feedback ( ee 
Figure 3.4). The first cycle is described as the body loop. Interoceptive information 
regarding our visceral body states and proprioceptive information regarding our somatic 
body states would be signalled to somatosensory structures in the central nervous system, 
from the brain stem upwards. Once this infolmation reached the somatosensory strllctures, 
it might be 'attended' and 'made conscious'. This might contribute to the subjective 
component of emotion: namely, the consciolls, qualitative experience which we commonly 
associate with the terms 'fear' and 'disgust'. The second cycle is described as the 'as if' 
loop. On certain occasions, the body may be bypassed and the somatosensory structures 
activated directly by the prefrontal cortex, thereby giving rise to an 'as if emotional 
experience.? According to Damasio's somatic-marker hypothesis, objects and events 
become associated with - and subsequently 'marked' by - certain somatic states; these 
somatic markers function as 'biasing devices' in the cognitive process of decision-making. 
(As we will see, the body loop plays a significant role in the case of film viewing: enabling 
us to understand the impact of a variety of bodily prompts - see Chapters 4 and 5.) 
Figure 3.4: The role of somato-visceral feedback 




Based on Figure 7.6 from Damasio (1994), p.156. 
7 The Cannon-Bard theory of emotion claims that activity within the brain is sufficient to produce an 
emotional state. 
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(ii) The Schachter-Singer theory of emotion and the role of conscious interpretation 
The Schachter-Singer theory of emotion adds the role of cognitive attribution and cognitive 
labelling.8 In a well-known experiment from 1962, subjects were injected with a form of 
adrenalin. Those subjects who were informed of the true side effects of their injections had 
an adequate causal explanation for the way they were feeling and remained calm. Those 
subjects who were not informed of the true side effects, however, performed a cognitive 
search for information which would provide them with the required explanation. 
According to attribution theory, social perceivers tend to use the most salient 
environmental cues to arrive at causal explanations for their own emotional responses; in 
certain circumstances, this tendency may lead to misattributions (see Fiske and Taylor, 
1991, p.23). In light of this, those subjects who were placed in the presence of an angry 
person causally misattributed and cognitively labelled their ambiguous feelings as 'anger', 
whereas those who were placed in the presence of a euphoric person causally misattributed 
and cognitively labelled their feelings as 'euphoria'. 
The Schachter-Singer theory can be both updated and given a neurobiological 
grounding by considering some of the earlier research which LeDoux conducted with 
Michael Gazzaniga on split-brain subjects (see Figure 3.5). Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978; 
Gazzaniga, 1992) presented either an emotional stimulus or an instruction to act to the 
subject's right hemisphere - the side of the brain usually associated with visuo-spatial 
capacities - but not to the left hemisphere - the side usually associated with language and 
thought. They found that the right hemisphere is capable of assessing the emotional 
significance of the stimulus and responding to the instruction to act, but incapable of 
verbalising what that stimulus and instruction are. The left hemisphere, on the other hand, 
is oblivious to the true nature of either the stimulus or the instruction but - on the basis of 
contradictory context - provides an incorrect 'interpretation' for why the subject feels and 
acts the way they do. The significant point is that these findings can be extended to normal 
subjects, and the distinction between unconscious and conscious processing. In the case of 
the snake, a contradiction would not arise: unconscious processing would result in the 
induction of fear, whilst conscious processing would interpret the situation correctly, 
causally attributing our emotional response to the snake and cognitively labelling it as fear. 
8 Although somato-visceral feedback may be sufficiently differentiated to specify primary emotions in the 
real world, we need to appeal to causal attribution and cognitive labelling in order to account for primary 
emotions in the cinema, and secondary emotions in both the world and the cinema. 
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(Here, we have another two-fold distinction which will playa significant role when we 
come to consider the dual nature of film viewing.) 





3.3 REACTING TO THE CINEMA 




Having described one of the ways in which we react to an emotional episode in the real 
world, how should we understand our reactions to an equivalent episode depicted by the 
cinema? Although a number of film theorists have referred to LeDoux's neurobiological 
account of the emotion system, they tend to take his two-fold distinction between the 'low' 
and 'high roads' at face value, assuming that it is adequate to explain the dual nature of 
film viewing as its stands.9 In order to ascertain whether or not this is really the case, we 
need to understand the Fodorian nature of the shallow inputs feeding into the emotion 
system and the true role of Wittgenstein's notion of 'regarding-as' in relation to the 
emotions. 
9 See Cynthia Freeland (1999), Patrick Colm Hogan (2003), and Greg M. Smith (1999,2003). 
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(i) Sensory / perceptual information: representation versus referent 
The distinction between representation and referent can be addressed by adapting 
LeDoux's story about the snake on the woodland path. Imagine that you leave the 
woodland in question and step into your local cinema. And imagine that the film that you 
choose to watch presents you with an image of an 'actual' snake on the one hand, and an 
image of an 'actual' person under threat on the other. To take an example from the 
adventure (action) genre, consider once again the scene from Spielberg's Raiders of the 
Lost Ark (1981) in which Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) is confronted by a venomous rattle 
snake (section 2.3; Frame 2.8). From the perspective of communications research, Barbara 
Wilson and Joanne Cantor (1987) used this particular scene to test the effects of visual 
exposure and verbal explanation on fear responses in child viewers. 
The impact of situational cues can be considered by taking a look at a cinematic 
version of what Wittgenstein might describe as a 'picture-snake' (see Figure 3.6). In the 
Raiders scene, the cinematic representation of the rattlesnake entails photographic, sonic, 
and behavioural realism. Following our discussion of Fodorian modularity (and regarding-
as, type I), it is plausible that the 'low road' - the 'fast-acting' thalamic-amygdala circuit -
would 'warn' our fear system (amygdala) that we are in the presence of a snake-like object, 
and our fear system would, in turn, initiate fear-type responses. What, though, would the 
'high road' - the 'slow-acting' cortical-amygdala circuit - 'tell' our fear system? What we 
really want to say here is that the cinematic representation would continue to resemble an 
actual snake in significant respects after the cortical processing had been completed; after 
all, that is how it appears to us as conscious observers. Perceptually speaking, the only 
thing clearly 'missing' from the image would be the 'depth cue' provided by binocular 
disparity (and this is more than compensated for by motion parallax). In conclusion, then, 
it is plausible that the 'high road' in a real-world encounter with a 'possible' snake is only 
the 'middle road' in a cinematic encounter with an 'actual' snake. 
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Figure 3.6: Cinematic 'picture-snake' 
The impact of personal cues can be considered by taking another look at a 
Wittgenstein's 'picture-face' (see Figure 3.7). In the Raiders scene, the cinematic 
representation of Jones's face entails photographic, sonic, and behavioural reali sm. (Later 
in the scene, Jones is re-united with the heroine of the film, played by Karen Allen. In 
order to control the variables, Wilson and Cantor edited out Allen's facial expressions of 
fear.) In this particular case, it is uncertain whether or not the ' low road' would playa 
significant role: for example, would the crude stimulus features of a face distinguish 
between an expression of either fear or disgust on the one hand, and an expression of, say, 
happiness on the other? Whatever the answer to this question, however, it seems plausible 
that the high road would inform our fear system that we are in the presence of an actual 
person in a state of fear. Signals from the later stages of visual processing - more 
specifically, from the facial area (TE) in or around the inferotemporal cortex - would 
activate those induction sites in the amygdala which are 'preset' to respond to that 
particular class of stimulus. In conclusion, then, it is plausible that the 'high road' in a real-
world encounter with an actual person is only the 'middle road' in a cinematic encounter 
with a character. 
Figure 3.7: Cinematic 'picture-face' 
In a related fashion, Cantor (2002) investigates fright responses to mass media 
presentations and addresses the paradox of fiction (although she does not use this particular 
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phrase). Following the classical conditioning paradigm, Cantor proposes a solution to the 
paradox in terms of 'stimulus generalization': 
In conditioning terms, if a stimulus evokes either an unconditioned or conditioned 
emotional response, other stimuli that are similar to the eliciting stimulus will evoke 
similar, but less intense emotional responses. This principle implies that, because of 
similarities between the real and the mediated stimulus, a stimulus that would evoke a 
fright response if experienced firsthand will evoke a similar, but less intense response 
when encountered via the mass media. (p.291) 
Cantor implies that mediated stimuli elicit less intense responses than their real-
world counterparts because they do not sufficiently resemble the original stimuli. tO One 
could argue, however, that mediated stimuli are at least as strong as their real-world 
counterparts. Indeed, films often present what biologists describe as super-stimuli (see 
Evans, 2001, p.89): in a film such as Luis Llosa's Anaconda (1997), for instance, the snake 
is larger than life in actual terms (whilst the close-ups of the faces projected onto the screen 
are larger than life in visual terms). Although Cantor only offers stimulus generalization as 
a 'preliminary explanation' for fright responses to mass media, we need to appeal to 
additional routes or 'levels' of discrimination in order to account for our emotional 
relationship to high resolution, moving images - i.e., stimuli that bear more than a transient 
resemblance to their 'referents'. 
(iO Sensory / perceptual information: fiction versus non-jiction 
The distinction between fiction and non-fiction can be addressed by returning to the 
threshold model of diegetic influence. Considering that the focus of our investigation has 
turned to the subject of emotion, let us replace the 'threshold of diegetic influence' with the 
more specific threshold of emotional influence (see Figure 3.8). The fiction / non-fiction 
distinction can be understood in terms of the general differences between the sensory / 
perceptual information presented in either instance; this understanding will require a 
10 Cantor lists three categories of objects and events which tend to elicit fear in exposure to both the real 
world and film: (1) dangers and injuries; (2) distortions of natural forms; and (3) the experience of 
endangerment and fear by others (pp.291-293). All of these categories will be touched upon in the following 
discussion. 
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further consideration of the factor of realism - and the sub-factor of perceptual access -
along with a new consideration of the various constraints in operation. Having discussed 
the adventure (action) genre, let us consider two further genres which also present extreme 
situations not usually encountered in the modem (western) world and post-industrial 
societies (Lenski, 1970). 
Figure 3.8: The threshold model of emotional influence 
fiction non·flctlon 
reallty .. tatu, 
(pl'OClllld by central tylttma) 
(1) Low reality-status. Starting at the 'low end' of the reality-status continuum, the 
most obvious examples of fiction films designed to elicit the emotions of fear and disgust 
are provided by the horror / science fiction genre. Walton (1978) cites the example of 
Charles watching a film featuring a 'terrible Green Slime' (as a non-existent or impossible 
being). In a related fashion, Carroll (1990) discusses the viewer's response to the 
'monster', where the monster, like the snake in the above example, is a 'heuristic device' 
standing in for any horrific object. Significantly, Carroll describes the monster as having 
the properties of being 'threatening' and 'impure' - corresponding to the emotions of fear 
and disgust respectively - and suggests that these two properties are achieved through a 
violation of cultural categories. How might this violation take place? According to 
Carroll'sfusion model, the monster in Ridley Scott's Alien (1979) is an unnatural 'fusion' 
of the cultural categories of 'human', 'insect', 'reptile', and so forth (see Frame 3.1). To 
describe this model in the terms of the current discussion, the alien can be regarded as a 
'fusion' of the types of (real-world) fear and disgust 'triggers' described previously (cf. 
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Carroll, ibid., p.166). (Indeed, the alien as a whole can be regarded as a ' super-stimulus ' 
for the emotions in question.) What about the character who is both threatened and 
repulsed by the monster? In a strict sense, the character of Ripley (played by Sigourney 
Weaver) is not an object of either fear or disgust (see Frame 3.2). Nevertheless, her facial , 
bodily, and vocal expressions of emotion may operate as fear (and disgust) stimuli by 
association. 
Frames 3.1 and 3.2: Low reality-status (science fiction I horror film): Alien (1979) 
In the case of horror films, there has been a 'general trend' towards realism, or 
more precisely, perhaps, a 'general trend' towards salience. This trend has been facilitated 
by a number of positive constraints which can be divided into three basic groups (see 
Table 3.6). First, the film-maker introduces various aesthetic and technological constraints 
into the equation. With respect to the aesthetic, one could argue that there has been an 
artistic move towards producing more realistic / salient depictions of the world; as noted 
previously, for instance, the domain of film acting may have been influenced by the 
standards of the documentary. With respect to the technological, on the other hand, an 
improvement in cameras, film-stock, and special effects - especially CGI and prosthetics -
has increased the realism / salience of the monster' s appearance (especially the textures of 
fleshy body parts). Second, the film viewer introduces various cognitive and emotional 
constraints: for instance, viewers may expect to see more realistic / salient depictions (a 
'cold ', cognitive factor), and, for a variety of reasons, they may be motivated to see such 
depictions (a ' hot' , emotional factor) . As we will see, the desire to subject oneself to 
particularly graphic or horrific subject-matter leads to the paradox of horror. Third and 
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finally, the film adjudicator introduces vanous moral and legal constraints: it seems 
reasonable to say that a relaxation of socio-cultural attitudes regarding the depiction of 
horrific subject-matter (partly a moral issue) has resulted in a gradual relaxation of the laws 
of film censorship (a legal issue). In the early days of cinema, when the monster may not 
have been particularly convincing, the main route to fear - and, to a lesser extent, disgust -
may have been (narrative-based) concern for the character (see Carroll on the role of 
sympathy). In the modem day, however, both the monster and the character (as spectacles) 
may 'satisfy the input conditions' of the viewer's fear and disgust systems. 
Table 3.6: The realism / salience of shallow inputs: positive constraints on fiction film-maker 
positive constraints description 
(1) film-making aesthetic general trend towards realism (behavioural, situational) 
techno logical improvement of cameras, film-stock, special effects. etc. 
(2) film viewing cognitive change of viewing expectations 
emotional change of viewing motivations (see paradox of horror) 
(3) film adjudication moral relaxation of socio-cultural attitudes 
legal relaxation of censorship laws 
N.B. This scheme makes a number of basic assumptions: (1) the film-maker is not subject 
to any economic constraints (i.e., they have access to adequate financial resources); (2) the 
film-viewer is 'prototypical' (Anglo-American); and (3) the film adjudicator adopts an 
Anglo-American perspective. 
(2) Medium reality-status. The 'middle' and 'high end' of the reality-status 
continuum can be tackled by considering a subject not discussed by either Walton or 
Carroll: the most obvious examples of docudramas and documentaries which elicit the 
emotions of fear and disgust are provided by the war genre. One of the most recent and 
well-known examples of a war docudrama is Steven Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan 
(1998): the opening sequence recreates the D-Day landings, depicting the first wave of 
American soldiers on Omaha Beach and presenting an array of fear and disgust stimuli (see 
Frame 3.3).11 With respect to the situational component, the most obvious fear stimuli are 
the various dangers faced by the (main) characters: examples include confrontations with 
the enemy, and exposure to flying bullets and hazardous terrain. With respect to the 
11 See Barratt (1999) for a more detailed analysis of the emotional power of this particular sequence which 
employs the same (cognitive) approach. 
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character-based component, on the other hand, a notable feature of the sequence is the 
sight and sound of wounded soldiers. In a review of the film, Richard Williams (1998) 
describes a particular shot as follows: ' A man is lying next to his own evacuated intestines, 
crying for death.' Although in a strict sense the object of our emotion is not the soldier 
himself but the environment which surrounds him, the soldier's facial , bodily, and vocal 
expressions of distress may operate as fear stimuli, whilst his physical injuries constitute 
one of the main sources of disgust. Indeed, the ' redness' of blood and the ' fleshiness ' of 
internal organs are further possible examples of super-stimuli employed by the film-maker. 
In the case of war films, there has also been a 'general trend' towards both realism (proper) 
and salience; it is probable that this trend has been facilitated by the same set of positive 
constraints described above. In particular, an improvement in cameras and film stock has 
facilitated filming the depicted environment from a position which could be occupied by a 
soldier: positioning the camera at eye-level and in proximity to the action results in a 
greater approximation of the soldier' s (perceptual) experience. Similarly, an improvement 
in special effects - especially CGI and prosthetics - has increased the realism (salience) of 
the depictions of physical injuries. 
Frame 3.3: Medium reality-status (war film / docudrama): Saving Private Ryan (1998) 
(3) High reality-status. A consideration of the ' high end' of the reality-status 
continuum leads us to the category of war documentaries. In this particular case, the level 
of realism / salience is limited by a number of negative constraints which can be divided 
into two basic groups (see Table 3.7). To set the scene, the war photographer Robert Capa 
(1947) famously stated: "If your pictures aren't good enough, you ' re not close enough." 
Capa' s reasoning was that proximity to the action increases the realism / salience of 
emotional stimuli. This ideal is tempered, however, by a group of practical constraints. 
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First, the documentary film-maker must balance the quality of their photographs with their 
own personal safety. With respect to World War II, for instance, Spielberg's Saving 
Private Ryan was partly inspired by John Huston's The Battle of San Pietro (L 944): Huston 
follows the soldiers with 'whip-pan' camera movements (see Frame 3.4). Similarly, with 
respect to the Vietnam War, the films of Coppola (1979), Stone (1986), and Kubrick 
(1987) may have been influenced by Pierre Schoendorffer's The Anderson Platoon (1966): 
Schoendorffer follows the American soldiers through the Vietnamese forests, the lens 
occasionally pushing against the blades of grass. Although both Huston and Schoendorffer 
got pretty close to the action - too close for their own comfort, no doubt - they didn't get 
that close; that is, not close enough to achieve the emotional impact to which Capa was 
alluding. 
Frame 3.4: High reality-status (war documentary): The Battle of Sail Pietro (1944) 
Second, it is probable that technology will continue to improve, resulting in smaller 
and lighter cameras, capable of producing higher quality pictures in a variety of lighting 
conditions. It is improbable, however, that the documentary film-maker who films actual 
people and events in 'real time' (using what could be described as a 'general-purpose' 
camera) will ever be able to compete with the fiction film-maker who can say 'cut!', take 
stock of the situation, choose a particular camera lens, and adjust the lighting (thereby 
benefiting from 'special-purpose' equipment). Third and fourth, the fiction film-maker can 
treat the camera as an 'ideally placed' and 'invisible' witness. With respect to ideal 
placement, for instance, the camera can be placed in a series of ' impossible' positions: 
given that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, filming a POV shot 
from the position of the character's head - or a long shot from the position of the 'fourth 
wall' - requires removing the offending object and filming the action out of sequence. For 
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the documentary film-maker, however, the spatio-temporal contradiction in question is not 
a problem awaiting either an aesthetic or a technological breakthrough; the physical aspect 
would require a world with different physical laws, whilst the logical aspect would be the 
same in all possible worlds. (Similar remarks could be made about the notion of 
'invisibility'. ) 
According to the novelist John Steinbeck (1954), Robert Capa knew that 'you 
cannot photograph war because it is largely an emotion. But he did photograph that 
emotion, by shooting beside it. He could show the horror of a whole people in the face of a 
child.' Steinbeck's reasoning was that proximity to, say, a child increases the realism / 
salience of their facial expressions of emotion. This ideal is tempered, however, by a group 
of ethical constraints. The documentary film-maker must consider various moral and legal 
issues with respect to the needs and rights of the both the subject and the viewer. The 
positive need for communication on the one hand, must be balanced with the negative 
consequences of being intrusive and gratuitous / voyeuristic on the other; in the majority of 
circumstances, a person in distress can be filmed for communicative purposes, but not for 
purposes of emotional contagion. As we will see, some theorists suggest that there are rules 
governing the display of facial expressions; similarly, there are rules governing both the 
filming and the viewing of such displays. 
Table 3.7: The realism I salience of shallow inputs: negative constraints on documentary film-maker 
negative constraints description 
personal photographic quality vs. safety 
(I) practical technological 'general-purpose' vs. 'special-purpose' cameras, etc. 
physical physical impossibility of camera invisibility I ideal placement 
logical logical impossibility of camera invisibility / ideal placement 
moral (re. subject) obligations towards subject: communication vs. intrusiveness 
(2) ethical moral (re. viewer) obligations towards viewer: communication vs. gratuitousness 
legal (re. subject) laws regarding subject: communication vs. illegality 
legal (re. viewer) laws regarding viewer: communication vs. illegality 
159 
(b) Deep inputs ('seeing-as') 
If the 'high road' in a real-world encounter with an object or event is only the 'middle 
road' in a cinematic encounter with that object or event, then how should we go about 
finding the real high road? Because LeDoux is explicitly concerned with our emotional 
relationship to the real world - and because he does not have reason to refer to Fodor's 
modularity thesis in this particular context - he does not realise that his two-fold distinction 
between the 'low' and 'high roads' may not be capable of accounting for the unusual case 
of film viewing. At this point, then, we need to refer to another model described by 
LeDoux, though not in relation to the story about the snake: the model of the amygdala as 
'a hub in the wheel of fear' describes two additional routes, or levels, of processing (see 
Figure 3.9). A consideration of these routes will allow us to understand the nature of the 
deep inputs feeding into the emotion system and the true role of Wittgenstein's notion of 
'seeing-as' in relation to the emotions. 
(i) Contextual information from central (hippocampal) systems 
The first potential candidate for the 'high road' is the hippocampal-amygdala circuit. As 
noted previously, the hippocampal formation is located in the 'limbic system' - the part of 
the subcortex which is believed to be of mammalian origin. Contrary to the problematic 
'limbic system theory', the hippocampus may playa role in central processing. Given that 
the hippocampus receives information from different sensory modalities, LeDoux proposes 
that it processes contextual information which may influence the activity of the amygdala 
accordingly. More specifically, the hippocampus is thought to playa role in the processing 
of conjunctive representations: whereas the visual (cortical) system is only capable of 
processing stimulus and contextual elements separately, it is plausible that the 
hippocampus is capable of processing the relations between stimulus Allil contextual 
elements (see Rudy and O'Reilly, 2001). How should we understand the possible nature of 
the contextual information / conjunctive representations at play in the unusual case of film 
viewing, and how does it square with Fodor's functional account (see Table 3.8)? 
(1) Contextual information: viewing situation. Significantly, the hippocampal 
formation may be capable of discriminating genuinely emotional situations from 
apparently emotional ones on the basis of context alone. By way of an example, leDoux 
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(2002, p.216) states that 'a beast in the wild elicits fear, but one in the zoo just fascinates'. 
This type of scenario suggests the following possibility. A snake viewed in the context of a 
real-world environment might elicit full-blown fear, whereas a film of a snake viewed in 
the context of a theatre might elicit a lesser form of that emotion or a completely different 
emotional state. In the latter case, the contextual cues might include the rows of seats and 
the edges of the screen (visual elements), as well as the crackle of sweet wrappers, the feel 
of the seat, and the smell of popcorn (auditory, tactile, and olfactory elements); in other 
words, those aspects of the situation which would be 'ignored' by a modular visual system 
with respect to the processing of the projected image itself In summary, LeDoux's account 
of the hippocampus presents us with a possible instance of what could be described as 
'stimulus-driven' discrimination; i.e., discrimination which is led by cues in our 
environment rather than being dependent on a conceptual awareness of the true nature of 
the viewing situation. 12 Considering this point, it is uncertain whether or not the inputs to 
the amygdala should be regarded as 'deep' in the Fodorian sense described. 
(2) Contextual information: dieges;s. Although we are primarily concerned with 
contextual information relating to the viewer's theatrical environment, it should be 
acknowledged that the hippocampal formation may be capable of processing contextual 
information relating to the diegetic world of the film. For instance, it seems plausible that a 
snake presented in the context of a wildlife documentary is less likely to elicit fear than a 
snake presented in the context of a narrative film. And with respect to narrative films, it 
seems plausible that the artificial snake in a film such as Anaconda is less likely to elicit 
fear than the real snakes in a film such as Raiders of the Lost Ark. One could point to the 
fact that the snake in the former film, despite being larger than life, is not sufficiently 
convincing as an 'emotional stimulus'. One could also argue, however, that the diegetic 
context of Anaconda (as a Hollywood 'B-movie') is altogether less realistic than the 
diegetic context of Raiders (as a Hollywood 'A-movie'), despite both films possessing 
fantastical elements. The fact that the neurobiological account cannot distinguish between 
the processing of 'viewing' and 'diegetic-based' elements reveals a potential shortcoming 
(which may need to be addressed by appealing to more obviously cognitive approaches). 
12 Is this really an instance of 'lower-lever or 'stimu1us~en' discrimination? Perhaps the point can be 
made more forcefully as follows. leDoux (2002, p.2IS) claims that 'when a rat is conditioned to a tone-
shock combination in a certain chamber, it will fteeze and otherwise act afraid if it simply finds itself back in 
the chamber at some Iater point'. The rat' s sensitivity to the co"text of the chamber is mediated by the 
hippocamPUS. It is unlikely, however, that the rat has a conceptual awareness of the chamber in the Fodorian 
sense described. 
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(i) Conceptual information from central (prefrontal) systems 
The second potential candidate for the 'high road' is the prefrontal-amygdala circuit. As 
noted previously, the prefrontal cortex is the part of the neocortex which has expanded 
most in humans. Although we have conjectured that the prefrontal cortex may playa role 
in the cognitive appraisal of a situation's emotional significance, we are currently 
concerned with a number of alternative functions. Given the prefrontal cortex's privileged 
status, LeDoux proposes that the prefrontal cortex processes conceptual information which 
may influence the activity of the amygdala accordingly (whilst describing the medial 
prefrontal cortex as an 'interface' between cognitive and emotional systems). More 
specifically, the prefrontal cortex is thought to play a role in a variety of executive 
functions, including the processing of metarepresentations: that is, representations Qf our 
relations to other representations (see O'Reilly and Munakata, 2000, pp.403-407; Sperber, 
2000). How should we understand the possible nature of the conceptual information / 
metarepresentations at play in the unusual case of film viewing, and how does it square 
with Fodor's functional account (see Table 3.8)? 
(1) Conceptual information: viewing situation. The above points suggest that the 
prefrontal cortex is involved in our centrally-mediated capacity to successfully 
discriminate a cinematic representation of a snake from an actual snake. Whereas the 
visual (cortical) system would process an object representation of the apparent snake in our 
environment, it is plausible that the prefrontal cortex would process a conceptual 
representation of our relation to that object representation (and, therefore, to the object 
itself), be it a relation of observing a real world event or viewing a film of one. Although 
central processing may be distributed across the whole brain - and although epistemic 
mental states such as non-existence beliefs cannot be pinned down in a neurobiological 
sense - we can tentatively suggest that the 'deep inputs' produced by such processing exert 
an influence on the amygdala via the (medial) prefrontal cortex in its role as an 'interface'. 
(2) Conceptual information: diegesis. Before exploring this idea further, it should 
be acknowledged that the prefrontal cortex may be capable of processing cognitive 
information relating to the diegesis: for instance, rattlesnakes are dangerous, poisonous, 
and so forth. In this respect, Jon Teasdale (1999) observes: 'It is striking that there is little 
mention of speech-level or propositional-conceptual processing in leDoux's accounts.' 
(Once again, the fact that the neurobiological account cannot distinguish between the 
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processmg of 'viewing' and 'diegetic-based' elements reveals another potential 
shortcoming. ) 
(3) Inhibitory processing. Significantly, the prefrontal cortex also plays a role in the 
monitoring and management of emotion. LeDoux suggests that the (medial) prefrontal 
cortex plays a role in the inhibition of inappropriate emotional responses. In a related 
fashion, Damasio (1994) describes the unfortunate case of Phineas Gage. In New England, 
1848, Gage was involved in a railroad accident - an iron bar pierced his brain, causing 
damage to the (ventromedial) prefrontal cortex. Afterwards, he became incapable of 
inhibiting inappropriate emotional behaviour - shouting, swearing, and so forth. Although 
Gage's case is an extreme example, it vividly demonstrates the importance ofan inhibitory 
process which exerts a continual influence on our emotional lives and which we may take 
for granted. Some theorists have argued that the prefrontal cortex specializes in 'activation-
based processing' as opposed to 'inhibitory processing' (see O'Reilly and Munakata, 2000, 
pA04). From our perspective, however, the essential point is that the cognitive (prefrontal) 
system is capable of over-riding the 'conclusions' of other systems, regardless of the 
manner in which this is achieved~ in this respect, the term 'inhibition' can be used in a 
partially descriptive or metaphorical sense. In summary, cognitive (prefrontal) systems 
both inform our emotion system about the true nature of the events taking place in our 
environment and inhibit our emotion system accordingly. Perhaps we should think of these 
two aspects - information and inhibition, 'content' and 'end-result' - as different ways of 
describing the same process. 
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Adapted from Figure 6.15 ('The Amygdala: Hub in the Wheel of Fear') from LeDoux 
(1998), p.170, and Figure 69.2 from LeDoux (1995), p.1053. 
Table 3.8: Inputs to the emotion system (amygdala) 
neurobiological account (re. LeDoux): functional account (re. Fodor): 
origin of input content of input 
1a sensory (thalamic) systems • shallow: e.g., "snake" 
(stimulus features) 
Ib perceptual (cortical) systems shallow: e.g., "snake" 
(object representation) 
2a central (hippocampal) systems • deep: e.g., "snake and [filmic] context" 
(conjunctive representation) 
2b central (prefrontal) systems deep: e.g., "film of snake" 
(metarepresentation) 
• Not predicted by Fodorian account. 
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(c) Induction 
Considering the vanous inputs being fed into the emotion system, how should we 
understand the nature of the induction process which follows? Once again, it will be 
helpful to make a pragmatic distinction between the emotion system and the action system. 
(i) The emotion system: activation versus inhibition 
A consideration of the emotion system allows us to challenge the third proposition of the 
paradox of fiction and to offer an explanation for the threshold model of emotional 
influence; albeit, with respect to the distinction between representation and referent. Let us 
begin by outlining a general principle. To recap, it seems reasonable to say that the default 
mode of the emotion system is appraising existing objects and events; a notable example 
being an actual snake. This statement can be extended as follows. The default mode of our 
emotion system is appraising existing objects and events as opposed to cinematic objects 
and events: for instance, actual snakes as opposed to films of snakes. Contrary, therefore, 
to the implications of Radford's example of the man's 'harrowing story' about his sister, 
existence beliefs are not required to activate our emotion system; rather, non-existence 
beliefs are required to inhibit our emotion system, thereby preventing it from running in the 
default mode in question. Similarly, contrary to the implications of Coleridge's illusion 
theory, responding emotionally to a film of a snake does not require the 'willing 
suspension of disbelief'; rather, it requires the 'unwilling application of disbelief'. If we 
managed to achieve the mental feat in question, then we would feel obliged to run out of 
the cinema, in the manner of the mythical 1895 viewer of the Lumiere brothers' film 
described in Chapter 2. 
How would this principle work in practice? If we combine LeDoux's 
neurobiological account of the emotional brain with Fodor's functional account of the 
modular mind, we arrive at the following hypothesis (see Figure 3.10). (1) Perceptual 
systems. The first half of the threshold model concerns the realism of the cinematic picture-
snake (or the cinematic picture-face). In virtue of being 'informationally encapsulated', the 
perceptual - thalamic and cortical - systems would produce the basic categorization, "A 
snake of such-and-such a description" as a shallow input. This account provides us with a 
more precise way of understanding Wittgenstein's notion of 'regarding-as' (and Gibson's 
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theory of direct perception). (2) Central systems. In contrast, the second half of the 
threshold model concerns the reality-status of the picture-snake (or the picture-face). In 
virtue of being sensitive to epistemic mental states such as non-existence beliefs, the 
central - hippocampal and prefrontal - systems would produce the abstract categorization, 
"Cinematic representation of a snake of such-and-such a description" as a deep input. This 
account provides us with a more precise way of understanding Wittgenstein's notion of 
'seeing-as' (adapted by Fodor and Pylyshyn in a criticism of Gibson's theory). (3) Emotion 
system. Considering that our emotion system (amygdala) would receive both shallow and 
deep inputs simultaneously, we have a possible case of the blind being led by the foolish as 
well as the (apparently) wise. Our capacity to respond emotionally to the picture-snake, 
therefore, can be thought of in terms of an ongoing conflict between contradictory signals -
resulting in both the activation and inhibition of the emotion system - where the balance of 
power continually changes according to the strength of the emotional stimulus presented 
and the nature of the viewing situation on the one hand, and the nature of our (conscious) 
attention on the other. If the 'activation level' of the emotion system exceeds a certain 
'threshold', then the system will generate an emotional response of a certain 'strength'. 13 
13 Thanks to Gregory Ashby at the Department of Psychology, UCSB, for two discussions about the 
applicability of LeDoux neurobiological account to the case of film viewing. Ashby introduces a 
developmental element into the equation. The prefrontal cortex does not stop growing until we are in our 
later teens: this fact may partly explain why adults tend to be better at inhibiting their emotional responses 
than children, and also why they may be less susceptible to the horrific content of certain films. Thanks also 
to Jeff Niehaus and Tim German for recognizing some interesting parallels between the proposed account 
and German et al.'s work on belief-desire reasoning in children, and for inviting me to present a paper at a 
graduate seminar on developmental and evolutionary psychology. Some theorists argue that a young child 
fails the 'false belief task' because they do not yet have the concept of false belief. In opposition, German et 
al. make two key points. First, a child does have the concept of false belief; rather, they are incapable of 
inhibiting the 'default mode' of the corresponding computational system. Second, although 'belief-desire 
reasoning' may be distributed and difficult to pin down in neurobiological terms, the (medial) prefrontal 
cortex is singled out as playing the inhibitory role in question. 
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N .B. For the sake of simplicity, the perceptual systems have not been divided into thalamic 
and cortical systems, whilst the central systems have not been divided into hippocampal and 
prefrontal systems. The numbers for activation, inhibition, and response strength are 
arbitrary and included for illustrative purposes. 
Considering the limitations of current brain imaging techniques and the 
intractability of the frame problem, a neurobiological approach does not enable us to 
separate the central process which distinguishes representation from referent, from the 
central process which distinguishes fiction from non-fiction. In light of the discussion of 
positive and negative constraints, however, we are able to make a distinction between our 
reception of fiction and non-fiction in terms of the general nature of the shallow inputs 
feeding into the emotion system. To take an extreme example, say that we are shown three 
film sequences featuring a soldier being shot down in combat: (1) a fiction film; (2) a 
docu-drama based on a specific event; and (3) a documentary (or news broadcast). How 
might our (emotional) reception of these three sequences differ? 
Radford and co. would assume that any difference lies in the factor of reality-status 
alone: viz., in the first instance, we do not hold the requisite 'existence beliefs', whereas in 
the second and third instances we do. The threshold model suggests that they are only 
considering one half of the story (see Table 3.9). Although the fictional sequence of the 
soldier would have low reality-status, this might be compensated by a high level of 
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realism: with respect to perceptual access, for instance, the fiction film-maker would be 
able to film the soldier from close-up in high resolution, wide screen format. As a result, 
the 'threshold of emotional influence' would be reached and an emotional response would 
occur. Considering that the docu-drama sequence would have 'medium' reality-status, in 
principle this could be compensated by a 'medium' level of realism, even if a higher level 
was actually chosen by the film-maker: in comparison with the documentary film-maker, 
the fiction film-maker would be able to get much 'closer' to the action. Finally, although 
the documentary sequence (or news broadcast) would have high reality-status, this might 
be hindered by a low level of realism: the documentary film-maker (or news reporter) 
would be subject to various practical and ethical constraints, resulting in reduced 
perceptual access to the event in question, and so forth. In addition, remember that the 
factor of 'realism' refers to the entire viewing experience, including the viewing 
conditions. Although some documentaries receive theatrical release and some news 
broadcasts are presented on large screens in public places, non-fiction is typically viewed 
on a television screen in the home, resulting in reduced perceptual salience. Contrary to our 
intuitions, therefore, the emotional influence of the documentary sequence might be at 
best, equal to - and at worst, less than - that for the fictional sequence. 
Table 3.9: Inhibiting the emotion system: fiction versus non-fiction 
reality-status realism 
(central systems) (perceptual systems) 
deep inputs negative constraints perceptual access shallow inputs 
(1) fiction fictive stance: none (?) close high activation 
high inhibition 
(2) docu-drama fictive stance: none (?) close high activation 
medium inhibition 
(3) documentary no stance: practical, ethical distant low activation 
low inhibition 
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(iiJ The action system: engagement versus disengagement 
Although the cognitive (prefrontal) system may be capable of inhibiting the emotion 
system (amygdala), the connection between the two is problematic. First, emotion 
'induction sites' are located in subcortical regions which are beyond conscious access. 
According to LeDoux (1998, p.303), for instance, the projections from the cortex to the 
amygdala are outnumbered by/less dominant than the projections from the amygdala to the 
cortex; in other words, conscious cognitions can trigger, but not control, our emotions. 
Second, the physiological responses necessary for emotional experience are mediated by 
the autonomic nervous system which, by definition, is beyond voluntary (conscious) 
control. Is there a more concrete alternative? Tooby and Cosmides (2001) state: 'While a 
cinematic version of a lion may evoke terror, the flight behavior that terror is ordinarily 
designed to produce is disengaged: We do not run from the theater. ,14 The 'intimate 
connection' between the 'central systems' and the behavioural component may provide us 
with the alternative we require: first, there are (direct) projections from the prefrontal 
cortex to the premotor and motor cortices (see Currie and Ravenscroft, 1997); and second, 
motor (behavioural) actions are mediated by the somatic nervous system which is largely 
within voluntary (conscious) control. 
This move brings us to what LeDoux (1998, p.177) describes as 'the crucial shift 
between reaction and action'; or, in the unusual case of film viewing, the crucial shift 
between reaction and non-action - and the role of what could be described as social display 
rules. Damasio (1994, p.133) argues that consciousness provides us with an 'enlarged 
protection policy', thereby allowing for more 'flexible' and (socially) appropriate 
responses. In a related fashion, Jeffrey Gray (1999) suggests that consciousness functions 
as a late 'error-detection system' which is capable of inhibiting inappropriate motor 
responses; according to this view, consciousness 'monitors' rather than 'guides' our 
emotional behaviour. (Gray cites Benjamin Libet et al.'s (1991, p.1754) claim that 
'[c]onscious sensory awareness can lag behind the real world by as much as 0.5 s.') 
14 For Cosmides, the fact that the emotion system is engaged, whereas the action system is disengaged, is one 
of the main features of interest with respect to film viewing (personal communication). It should be noted 
that Tooby and Cosmides's distinction between the 'emotion system' and the 'action system' is an over-
simplification: as discussed previously, it is plausible that emotions comprise actions, and that emotional 
experience depends on the somatic feedback resulting from such actions. In light of this, their distinction 
really amounts to the difference between the physiological (autonomic) and the behavioural (somatic) 
components of the emotional process. 
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Although it has been argued that it may be best to consider our discriminatory capacity in 
terms of (nonconscious) central processing, the basic point remains the same: the higher 
levels of the mindlbrain over-ride the erroneous conclusions of the lower levels. The 
alternative (or complementary) scenario can be summarised as follows (see Figure 3.11): 
even if we cannot switch our emotions on and off at will, we can prevent ourselves from 
running out of the cinema at the sight of the snake or the monster, and we can prevent 
ourselves from helping a character (say, a wounded soldier) in distress . (It should be noted , 
however, that we may engage in relatively inconspicuous fear behaviours, such as 
clutching the arms of our seat (see Walton, 1978). In addition, we may experience 
muscular tension: 'efferent inpulses ' may be transmitted to the striated muscles, as 
measured by electromyography.) 
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N.B. This diagram is to be considered in conjunction with Figure 3.10. 
It is intriguing that certain emotions seem to be more susceptible to the paradox of 
fiction than others. Consider, for example, David Cronenberg's 1986 remake of The Fly: 
following a failed attempt at teleportation, inventor Seth Brundle (played by Jeff 
Goldblum) becomes an unnatural ' fusion' of the cultural categories of ' man' and ' insect' 
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(see Frame 3.5). In the second half of the film, we witness the eponymous Fly overtaking 
Brundle ' s body like some sort of degenerative disease. In the closing scene, the ' Brundle-
Fly' - transformation complete - threatens Seth ' s former girlfriend Veronica (Geena Davis) 
and kills Veronica' s boss and former lover Stathis (John Getz) by vomiting an acidic 
substance on his hand and foot. 
From our perspective as Viewers, which emotion IS most appropriate here? 
Although the film ' s advertising slogan famously states 'be afraid, be very afraid ', a 
stronger case could be made for our being 'very disgusted '. To begin with, the claim "I 
was afraid of the image of the Brundle-Fly" certainly seems to be more problematic than 
the claim "I was disgusted by the image of the Brundle-Fly" - simply compare the role of 
the prepositions 'of and 'by' in the respective sentences. A more precise answer, however, 
can be spelt out in terms of either the engagement or disengagement of the action system. 
First, whereas genuine fear necessarily involves active withdrawal from the offending 
object (or at least the genuine inclination to withdraw), disgust encourages passivity by 
compelling us to refrain from approaching (and coming into contact) with that object. 
Second, whereas the main behaviour in fear is instrumental fight-or-flight action, the main 
behaviour in disgust is the corresponding facial expression; in the darkness of the cinema, 
it is plausible that we will not refrain from the characteristic wrinkling of the nose, and so 
forth . In conclusion, we cannot be 'very afraid ' without running out of the cinema; it is 
plausible, however, that we can act (and feel) 'very disgusted' and remain in our seats. 
Frame 3.S: The primary emotion of disgust: The Fly (1986) 
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In certain circumstances, it should be acknowledged that the action system for 
disgust may be disengaged in a similar way as the action system for fear. This 
acknowledgement brings us to the role of cultural display rules. Ekman and Friesen (1975) 
investigated the effect of cultural factors on the facial expression of disgust. IS In this 
experiment, American and Japanese subjects were videotaped whilst being shown neutral 
films and stress-inducing films (featuring disgusting subject matter). From our perspective, 
the significant aspect of the experiment is the subjects' responses to the stress-inducing 
films. In the absence of an interviewer, the American and Japanese subjects 'displayed' 
facial expressions of disgust to a similar extent. In the presence of an interviewer, however, 
the Japanese showed less disgust and tended to smile more frequently (in relation to the 
Americans). More significantly, slow-motion video replays revealed that the Japanese 
began to display the relevant facial expressions, but managed to suppress, or 'mask', these 
expressions several hundred milliseconds later. For our purposes, the slow-motion replays 
demonstrate - or at least suggest - that the conscious awareness preceding the presentation 
of an emotional stimulus (in this particular case, the Japanese subjects' awareness of the 
presence of the interviewer) cannot affect the early stages of 'basic' emotional responses, 
but can exert an influence on the overall expression of such emotions a fraction of a second 
later when consciousness has 'caught up' .16 
Table 3.10: Disengaging the action system: the role of display rules 
fear disgust 
(1) physiological component sympathetic responses: parasympathetic responses: 
- autonomic not subject to display rules not subject to display rules 
- involuntary, invisible 
(2) behavioural component flight: facial expression: 
- somatic subject to social display rules subject to cultural display rules 
- voluntary, visible 
IS For a good summary, see Evans (2001), pp.l5-16. Fridlund (1994) offers an alternative interpretation 
(personal communication). 
16 The technique of electromyography demonstrates that even when such expressions are successfully 
inhibited, the corresponding 'efferent inpulses' may be transmitted to the peripheral organs (cf. Ekman, 1984, 
pp.335-336). This suggests that the action system is only disengaged at the very last instant. 
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(d) Responses, feedback, interpretation, and organization 
How should we understand the response stage of the emotional process? In order to answer 
this question, we must address two related conundrums: first, should we regard our 
emotional responses to fiction films from, say, the horror and war genre as either 'real' or 
'quasi'?; and second (assuming that the former is the case), why do we choose to subject 
ourselves to horrifying objects and events, and the negative emotions which accompany 
them (the so-called paradox of horror)? 
(i) Real or quasi emotions? 
Another potential way of solving the paradox of fiction is to challenge the second 
proposition by replacing real emotions with 'pretend' or 'quasi emotions'. Carroll (1990) 
and others attribute the pretend theory to Kendall Walton (1978). Walton considers it to be 
'a principle of common sense' that emotions such as fear require existence beliefs (p.6). In 
light of this principle, he suggests that when we consume fictions, we engage in a game of 
make-believe: for instance, we pretend to believe that the proverbial snake or monster on 
the screen is real and a genuine threat to ourselves, using the corresponding images and 
sounds as 'props'. As a result, we experience 'pretend fear' or 'quasi-fear sensations' with 
physiological and behavioural components. 
Whether or not the pretend theory is attributed to Walton, a straightforward 'either-
or' distinction between 'real' and 'quasi emotions' is untenable, our emotional responses to 
both the real world and the cinema involving many of the same pathways and systems (see 
Figure 3.12).17 To begin with, research suggests that films of frightening and disgusting 
subject-matter are capable of eliciting the (real) physiological and behavioural components 
of an emotional response. IS Following the James-Lange theory of emotion - and Damasio's 
11 In a later article, Walton (1997) argues that it was not his intention to question the claim that our emotional 
responses to fiction are 'genuine' (p.38). Instead, his intention was to explain such responses by introducing 
the general notion of make-believe. Rather than challenging the second proposition, therefore, Walton can be 
regarded as challenging the third proposition by replacing existence beliefs with pretend beliefs; in this 
respect the pretend theory resembles the thought / simulation theory - to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
18 For evidence that images of frightening subject-matter are capable of eliciting physiological arousal in 
normal (,neurologically intact') subjects, we can consider some of the communications research literature on 
fright responses to horror films (see Cantor, 2002, for a review). For evidence regarding images of disgusting 
subject-matter, we can consider the experiments by Lazarus and his colleagues in the 1 960s which used films 
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account of somato-visceral feedback - infonnation regarding our somatic and visceral body 
states would be fed back to the somatosensory regions of the brain, where it would be 
attended and made conscious. If anything, the controversy surrounds the status of the 
subjective component. Following the Schachter-Singer theory of emotion - and Gazzaniga 
and LeDoux's account of conscious interpretation - we would attribute the somato-visceral 
arousal to the most salient objects in our environment. In light of this, the emotion of fear 
presents us with a strange, and potentially irresolvable, duality. On the one hand, the most 
salient objects in our environment - especially considering the viewing conditions - would 
be the apparently real objects presented by the film; it is plausible, therefore, that the 
negative arousal would be attributed to either the snake or the monster and labelled as 'real 
fear'. On the other hand, at some level the virtual status of the snake or monster would be 
recognised: it is also plausible, therefore, that the negative arousal would be labelled as 
'quasi fear'. In contrast, the emotion of disgust might largely sidestep this duality. Given 
that we do not seem to have any conceptual difficulty with the notion of our being 
genuinely disgusted by either an image or a sound (for the reasons discussed above), we 
might label the negative arousal as 'real disgust'. (Whatever the status of the subjective 
component, it will be argued that the physiological and behavioural components may serve 
as affective and motivational prompts.) 
of surgical operations, and Damasio's (1994) claim that photographic slides of mutilations and so forth are 
capable of eliciting strong galvanic skin responses (GSRs) in 'neurologically intact' subjects. 
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Figure 3.12: The roles of somato-visceral feedback and conscious interpretation 
R.H. L.H. 
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N.B. This diagram is a composite of Figures 3.4 and 3.5. The left and right hemispheres 
have been reversed for ease of representation. 
(ii) Solving the paradox of horror 
Although Carroll (1990) offers a solution to the paradox of fiction (namely, the thought 
theory), he proposes two separate solutions to the paradox of horror. The general theory 
proposes that horror is the price we pay for satisfying our curiosity about the film's 
narrative, whilst the universal theory proposes that the 'monster' - as a violation of cultural 
categories - is an object of fascination. The two theories are inter-related to a certain 
extent: for instance, the monster as an object of fascination may trigger our curiosity about 
the film's narrative. By appealing, then, to curiosity and fascination, Carroll explains our 
appetite for horror in primarily 'cold', cognitive terms. It is not my intention to question 
the value of the 'curiosity-fascination hypothesis' for it seems entirely plausible that both 
curiosity and fascination play an important role in our viewing experience. 19 In contrast to 
Carroll's approach, however, I would suggest that a solution to the paradox of fiction may 
19 Also see Smith (2000), pp.79-81. Smith extends the universal theory by making a case for 'morbid 
curiosity' . 
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lead to (at least) a partial solution to the paradox of horror. How might the two paradoxes 
be connected? Contrary to certain intuitions, our appetite for experiencing horror may be 
subject to a number of positive constraints; in order to make sense of these constraints, we 
must return to the emotional process, breaking it down into its constituent stages and 
components (see Table 3.11). For each stage and component, we can propose a distinct 
hypothesis regarding our appetite for horror; given the current discussion's place in the 
chapter and for additional reasons which will become clear, we must begin by considering 
the response stage. 
To recap, the response stage can be broken down into three main components. The 
physiological component may be related to what I will describe as the sensation-seeking 
hypothesis. Ron Tamborini (1991) suggests that some film viewers seek 'sensation' in 
terms of physiological arousal. How can we develop this claim with respect to the 
emotions of fear and disgust? Fear can be addressed by briefly returning to the experiment 
by Schachter and Singer. The results of this experiment suggest that the presence of 
adrenaline may be pleasurable - or at least interpreted as so - if it occurs in the absence of a 
certain cognitive component: namely, the component which tells us that we are in genuine 
danger. What about disgust? In contrast to both vision and audition, several theorists 
propose that disgust originated as an oral rejection of food and is therefore associated 
primarily with the senses of smell, taste, and touch. In light of this, the presence of visually 
or aurally-induced disgust may be pleasurable - or at least, tolerable - if it occurs in the 
absence of the modalities in question. Carroll briefly considers something akin to the 
sensation-seeking hypothesis, but he rejects it on the grounds that it is overly general and 
probably applies to every popular genre (ibid., p.167). If we take into account Ekman's 
claims about the specificity of ANS 'patterns', however, then we might be able to make a 
case for the appeal of the horror and war genres in particular. 
What about the behavioural and subjective components of the emotional process? 
The behavioural component may be related to what I will describe as the bravado 
hypothesis. Tamborini suggests that the appeal of horror may lie in the opportunity for 
viewers to display 'gender-specific behaviours'; for instance, male viewers may opt for 
bravado either by not reacting to what they see or by positively laughing in its face, 
whereas female viewers may opt for the complete opposite either by hiding behind their 
hands or by screaming out loud. We need not accept the sexist assumptions which lie 
behind such a hypothesis, however. Given that behaviour is within voluntary control, the 
crucial point is that horror and war films provide viewers of either sex with an opportunity 
176 
to test their strength and resolve in the manner described. Finally, the subjective 
component may be related to the escapist hypothesis. Although many aspects of our overall 
phenomenological experience may be unpleasant, the feelings associated with fear and 
disgust may provide us with the opportunity to escape from (and forget) our everyday 
concerns; indeed, one could argue that they almost force us to do so. 
The story does not end there, however. A move 'backwards' to the induction stage 
of the emotional process brings us to what I will describe as the organizational hypothesis. 
To set the scene, Cosmides and Tooby (2000, 2001) propose that a psychological 
adaptation is capable of operating in two distinct modes. The first and more obvious mode 
of operation is described as the functional mode: an adaptation is operating in this 
particular mode when it is performing the function for which it was biologically 'intended'. 
From our perspective, prime examples include the visual system solving the adaptive 
problem of scene analysis, and the emotion system appraising actual objects and events. 
Ironically, although Radford and co. explicitly reject 'biological facts', they must 
implicitly subscribe to the functionalist perspective: viz., our capacity to engage 
emotionally with fiction is problematic (partly) because it does not serve an obvious 
function in relation to the real world (cf. p.8). 
This implicit assumption brings us to the next part of Cosmides and T ooby' s 
theory. The second and less obvious mode of operation is described as the organizational 
mode: an adaptation is operating in this particular mode when it is 'organizing' its internal 
structure. Significantly, this organizational process can be achieved by engaging with 
phenomena which are more typically associated with the domain of aesthetics. 
Furthermore, our psychological make-up may motivate us to attend to the phenomena in 
question by making the corresponding experience 'intrinsically rewarding'. With respect to 
perception, for instance, 'complex sky scrapes and landscapes' may be 'experienced as 
beautiful because their invariant properties allow them to function as test patterns to tune 
our perceptual machinery' (p.17). With respect to emotion, on the other hand, the 
emotional scenarios presented by fiction may activate 'previously dormant algorithms' and 
adjust 'motivational weightings'. Presumably, the algorithms in question comprise the 
induction (appraisal) stage of the emotional process (stage 2). Why, then, have we waited 
until this point of the chapter to discuss the organizational mode? Crucially, Cosmides and 
Tooby imply that the corresponding 're-weightings' are dependent on feedback from our 
emotional responses (stage 3). In other words, the organizational process may only begin 
after the physiological, behavioural, and subjective components have been brought into 
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play. Interestingly, Cosmides and Tooby contrast their notion of the organizational mode to 
Aristotle's notion of catharsis, presumably assuming that 'catharsis' translates as the 
'purging' of emotions. Considering, however, that some theorists - for example, Martha 
Nussbaum (1986), p.388 - have suggested that 'catharsis' also translates as the 
'clarification' of emotions, the authors may be closer to Aristotle than they realise. 
Table 3.11: The nIm viewer: positive constraints on experiencing horror 
positive constraints description 
(1) inputs (1) sensory system organizational hypothesis 
(2) perceptual system (perceptual 'tuning') 
(2) induction (1) emotion system organizational hypothesis 
(2) cognitive (appraisal) systems (emotional 'clarification') 
(1) physiological component sensation-seeking hypothesis 
(3) responses (2) behavioural component bravado hypothesis 
(3) subjective component escapist hypothesis (?) 
N.B. According to the organizational hypothesis, feedback from stage 3 (responses) may 
change the 'motivational weightings' of the various algorithms which comprise stage 2 
(induction). Although the organizational hypothesis associated with stage 1 (inputs) is not 
directly relevant to either the subject of emotions or the paradox of horror, it is included for 
the sake of balance and interest. 
How should we understand the role of the organizational mode with respect to the 
emotions of fear and disgust on the one hand, and the ritual of film viewing on the other? 
Let us answer this question by first posing another. To what extent do our fear and disgust 
systems operate in the functional mode on an everyday basis? Starting with fear, think back 
to our hunter-gather ancestors who may have experienced frequent 'life-or-death' 
encounters with the snakes and lions cited above, along with violent conflicts with other 
tribes, and so forth. In contrast, our opportunities to experience 'life-or-death' fear in the 
modern (western) world and a post-industrial society are subject to a number of negative 
constraints (see Table 3.12). From a scientific and technological perspective, 
improvements in safety and the like have removed various potential dangers from our 
environment: for instance, humans as a species have succeeded in taming much of the 
animal world whilst resisting the worst effects of the elements. The majority of constraints, 
however, have an ethical dimension. From a socio-cultural perspective, people's attitudes 
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generally incline towards creating a world which minimises the possibility of dangerous 
scenarios arising: for instance, violence is usually rejected in favour of pacifism as a way 
of conducting our affairs. Similarly, in the political realm, the possibility of fascism and 
war is reduced by the pursuit of democracy and peace, whilst in the legal realm, the 
possibility of anarchy is reduced by the pursuit of law and order. In summary, then, the 
nearest many of us come to encountering physical danger is a brawl in the schoolyard 
during our childhood and teenage years. Unfortunately, short-term 'life-or-death' fear has 
been replaced by long-term 'existential' fear: for instance, anxieties about what will 
happen tomorrow, and the next day, and the day after that. Although such anxieties employ 
the same 'fear circuits' - and presumably the same inhibitory mechanisms - they may be 
far harder to cope with, as evidenced by the rising incidence rates of various anxiety 
disorders. 
What about disgust? In this case, perhaps, we only have to think back to the time of 
the 'Black Death' - when, for example, sewage flowed down the streets - to understand 
that our opportunities to experience 'full-blown' disgust in the modern (western) world are 
subject to a similar set of negative constraints (see Table 3.12). From a scientific and 
technological perspective, for instance, the development of sewerage systems has resulted 
in a substantial improvement in sanitation, whilst the development of domestic cleaning 
products has resulted in a substantial improvement in cleanliness and hygiene in the home. 
Once again, these developments are supported by ethical considerations. From a socio-
cultural perspective, people's attitudes have generally inclined towards higher standards of 
sanitation, cleanliness, and hygiene. In the political and legal realms, furthermore, these 
standards are governed to a greater or lesser extent by various policies and laws 
respectively. 
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Table 3.12: The real world: negative constraints on experiencing horror 
negative constraints description 
scientific / technological improvements in safety (etc.) 
(1) opportunities to socio-cultural attitudes reo pacifism (etc.) 
experience fear? political democracy and peace 
legal law and order 
scientific / technological improvements in sanitation (etc.) 
(2) opportunities to socio-cultural attitudes reo cleanliness and hygiene (etc.) 
experience disgust? political policies governing above 
legal laws governing above 
How do these various considerations help us to answer our original question? The 
negative constraints imposed by the modem (western) world suggest an inverse 
relationship between the functional and organizational modes which, if anything, favours 
the ritual of film viewing (see Figure 3.13). If our fear and disgust systems are constrained 
to operate in the functional mode to a lesser extent, then they may need to operate in the 
organizational mode to a greater extent; that is, to achieve the emotional 'clarification' 
which Aristotle may have alluded to. Considering that horror films, war films, and the like, 
present an array of fear and disgust stimuli - in what is ultimately a completely safe context 
- the experience of viewing such films may play a significant role in the organizational 
process. Furthermore, our psychological make-up may motivate us to view such films by 
making the corresponding experience 'intrinsically rewarding'. In light of these two points, 
one could argue that it is in fact rational to subject ourselves to horrific subject-matter, 
contrary to the implications of the paradox of horror. Of course, the modem (western) 
world may not give us the opportunity to use our 'clarified' fear and disgust systems, but 
our psychological makeup may be blind to this fact. 
On this note, the final issue which we must address is as follows. Given the 
possibility that film plays a significant organizational role, is our capacity to respond 
emotionally to film (as an example of fiction) a 'deliberate' design feature as opposed to 
an 'accidental' byproduct? To put it another way, does the mindlbrain deliberately - as 
opposed to accidentally - filter 'filmic information' to our emotion system so that we may 
benefit from its c1arificatory effects? I would argue for the negative. According to the 
argument outlined in this chapter, a filtering process as a design feature is unnecessary 
because the mindlbrain already allows such filtering as a byproduct of its structure. In 
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conclusion, then, it may be the case that our emotion system is only capable of operating in 
the organizational mode - another possible design feature - because, at some level, the 
mind fails to distinguish filmic representation from referent; in this respect, the so lution to 
the paradox of horror may be a byproduct of the solution to the paradox of fiction. 
Figure 3.13: The relationship between functional and organizational modes 
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(a) A primary solution to the paradox of fiction 
Having outlined a multi-level model of the emotion system from both a neurobiological 
and a functional perspective, we are in a position to offer a primary solution to the paradox 
of fiction. To recap, the first strategy is to revise the third proposition of the paradox, 
whilst the second strategy is to revise the Cartesian framework which underlies the 
paradox as a whole. In addition, Radford (1975, p.78) assumes an irrationality theory of 
emotional responses to fiction, concluding that the capacity in question 'involves us in 
inconsistency and so incoherence'. The prescriptive (normative) notion of 'rationality' in 
operation here must be redefined in order to bring it in line with descriptive (non-
normative) views of the mindlbrain which have both ecological and evolutionary 
plausibility. 
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(i) Revising the third proposition and the Cartesian framework 
The multi-level model of the emotion system demonstrates that the third proposition of the 
paradox of fiction is false: emotions do not require existence beliefs. This point can be 
illustrated by considering the induction stage of the emotional process (see Figure 3.14). 
To begin with, the 'default mode' of the emotion system is naive realism; that is, it is 
concerned with the appraisal of existing objects and events. On the one hand, the emotion 
system receives shallow inputs from the perceptual systems - systems which are 
informationally encapsulated and therefore operate independently of existence beliefs. On 
the other hand, the emotion system receives deep inputs from central systems - systems 
which are globally sensitive but which make reference to the exact opposite of existence 
beliefs (namely, non-existence beliefs). In opposition to the irrationality theory, this 
account is absolutely 'consistent' with our ecological present: the emotion system either 
'trusts' the results of perception and inevitably makes the occasional error, or it always 
'waits' for the results of cognition and eventually mistakes, say, an actual and deadly snake 
for a harmless stick (or even a film of a snake). Question: what happens when you cross 
say, 'fast-acting' perception (an 'early-warning system' which effectively sacrifices 
accuracy for speed) with 'slow-acting' cognition (a late 'error-detection system' which 
effectively sacrifices speed for accuracy). Answer: a susceptibility to 'false positives' 
which may appear irrational after conscious reflection. 
The multi-level model also challenges the Cartesian framework which underlies the 
paradox of fiction as a whole. Each of the three stages demonstrates the fact that the 
mindlbrain is not a single agent but a society of mental agents: the contradiction which has 
baffled many art and film theorists does not arise because different 'psychological 
predicates' can be attributed to different systems or levels of the mindlbrain - in other 
words, 'like' need not be contradicted by 'like'. In opposition to the irrationality theory, 
this account is absolutely 'consistent' with our evolutionary past; indeed, it seems to have 
an inescapable logic. The development of 'lower-level' perceptual and emotion systems 
must have preceded the development of 'higher-level' cognitive systems: if our ancestors' 
perceptual and emotional 'tasks' had not been performed automatically, then they would 
not have survived to evolve the capacities for language, abduction, and consciousness (see 
Ohman, 1999, pp.337-339). According to the principle of evolutionary conservatism, 
furthermore, older and more basic systems will not be discarded in favour of newer and 
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more advanced alternatives. In light of this, our capacity to respond emotionally to 
cinematic representations may be rational after all. 
Figure 3.14: A primary solution (I): Revising the third proposition and the Cartesian framework 
(1) Input stage 
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(iiJ The role of positive and negative constraints 
(3) l'llpontllflg. 
emotional responses 
In addition to outlining a multi-level model of the emotion system from both a 
neurobiological and a functional perspective, the discussion has introduced a variety of 
other perspectives into the proceedings: namely, aesthetic, technological, socio-cultural, 
ethical, political, and legal. Not only can we solve the paradox of fiction by appealing to, 
say, the role of non-existence beliefs with respect to the induction (appraisal) stage of the 
emotional process; we can also solve the paradox by appealing to the role of positive and 
negative constraints with respect to the input and response stages. 
The input stage of the emotional process can be addressed by considering the case 
of non-fiction films (see Figure 3.15). To recap, Radford and co. assume that the crucial 
difference between non-fiction and fiction lies in the factor of reality-status alone: in the 
first instance, we hold the requisite 'existence beliefs', whereas in the second instance we 
do not. According to the threshold model of emotional influence, however, there is a 
functional relationship between the factors of reality-status and realism. Although the 
reality-status of a documentary film is high, the level of realism (salience) is limited by a 
set of negative constraints (notably, practical and ethical factors). 
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Figure 3.15: A primary solution (II): negative constraints on non-fiction films 
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(3) ,.Iponlt stage 
emotional responses 
The response stage of the emotional process can be addressed by considering the 
case of the real world (see Figure 3.16). According to Cosmides and Tooby, our emotion 
system is capable of operating in a functional mode and an organizational mode. In 
contemporary western societies, however, the opportunities for our fear and disgust 
systems to operate in the functional mode are subject to a set of negative constraints (for 
example, scientific and technological factors). As a result, the onus is placed on the 
organizational mode. (Of course, these negative constraints could be understood as 
affecting the input stage; for the sake of balance and comparison, this aspect has not been 
illustrated. ) 
Figure 3.16: A primary solution (III): negative constraints in the real world 
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negative constraints 
(see Table 3.12) 
In contrast to either non-fiction (documentary) films or real world experience, the 
institution of the fiction film may provide us with the best of both 'worlds' (see Figure 
3.17). With respect to the input stage of the emotional process, on the one hand, a fiction 
film's low reality-status may be compensated by a high level of realism (or salience). As 
we have seen, the fiction's film 'general trend' towards realism and salience has been 
facilitated by a set of positive constraints (including advances in aesthetics and 
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technology). With respect to the response stage, on the other hand, the possibility that our 
fear and disgust systems are constrained to operate in the functional mode to a lesser extent 
(a negative condition of the real world) may be compensated by the possibility of their 
operating in the organizational mode to a greater extent (a positive condition of fiction 
film). In this respect, the solution to the paradox of fiction overlaps with the solution to the 
paradox of horror. 
Figure 3.17: A primary solution (IV): positive constraints on fiction films 
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(b) Further applications 
Although this chapter has focused on the primary emotions of fear and disgust, the aim has 
been to outline a multi-model of the emotion system which can be applied across the 
board. In this respect, LeDoux (2002, p.212) states that '[a]lthough different brain circuits 
may be involved in different emotion functions, the relation of specific emotional-
processing circuits to sensory, cognitive, motor, and other systems is likely to be similar 
across emotion categories.' The nature of the 'emotional-processing circuit' which is 
activated at any given moment is dependent on the nature of the emotional stimulus, and, 
in the case of film, the nature of the corresponding scene or genre: LeDoux states that 'a 
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given circuit is only activated when the sensory influx contains stimulus information 
relevant to its operation' (ibid., pp.206-207). 
(i) Other primary emotions 
In addition to activating 'fear circuits' in the amygdala and 'disgust circuits' in the basal 
ganglia, shallow outputs from the perceptual (thalamic and cortical) systems may be 
capable of activating the circuits underlying a variety of other emotions - including the 
remaining three primary emotions of anger, sadness, and happiness (see Table 3.13). 
Damasio (2001, p.61, p.79) states that the principal emotion induction sites are located in 
four subcortical regions of the brain - namely, the brain stem, hypothalamus, basal 
forebrain, and amygdala - and one cortical region - namely, the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. He claims that recent studies using PET imaging suggest that the induction of all 
three emotions involves the activation of a number of these sites, but that 'the pattern [of 
activation] for each emotion is distinctive'. Similarly, deep outputs from contextual 
(hippocampal) systems and cognitive (prefrontal) systems may playa role in inhibiting the 
emotion system and/or disengaging the action system to a greater or lesser extent. 
Table 3.13: Primary emotions 
(1) in put stage (1) Induction stage (3) response stage 
(e.g. film genres) (neural sites) pbyslologlcal behavioural 
negative I (1) fear borror, war amygdala sympathetic 'flight' (S) 
active (1) anger action, war four plus one (distinct pattern) ibid. 'fight' (S) 
negative I (3) disgust horror, war basal ganglia parasympathetic facial expo (C/O) 
passive (4) sadness melodrama four plus one (distinct pattern) ibid, crying (C/O) 
pos.1 pass. (5) bappiness romance, comedy four plus one (distinct pattern) ibid, smiling, laughing (C/O) 
N.B. For each primary emotion, the behavioural (somatic) component is subject to certain 
display rules: S = social; C = culture-specific; and G = gender-specific, 
The primary emotion of anger can be classified as both negative and active -
closely related to fear in both the world and the cinema. Starting with the input stage, the 
most obvious examples of fiction films which are believed to elicit anger - or aggressive 
tendencies - are provided by the action and war genres: such films often feature a main 
character (or hero) engaging in aggressive - and possibly retaliatory - behaviours against an 
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identifiable enemy. Possible examples are provided by Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan, 
albeit examples which fall into the problematic category of docu-drama as opposed to the 
straightforward category of fiction film (see Frame 3.6). At the end of the Omaha beach 
sequence, the American soldiers have gained the upper hand. Two German soldiers rise 
from a trench with their hands up and are shot down in cold blood. In the review of the 
film cited previously, Richard Williams observes that the viewer experiences a retaliatory 
reflex, effectively condoning the Americans' actions by 'pulling the trigger' along with 
them. 
Following Damasio (ibid.), it is possible that the induction stage would involve the 
activation of several of the aforementioned sites - including the brain stem and the 
amygdala - but would not involve the 'intense' activation of either the hypothalamus or the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. From our perspective, however, the crucial point is that 
these sites - as subcortical entities - would be 'below' consciousness and therefore 
relatively insusceptible to our beliefs in the non-existence, or virtual status, of the 
characters in question (and the immoral nature of their actions). With respect to the 
response stage, we can make a two-fold distinction. The physiological component would 
be mediated by the sympathetic division of the ANS - responsible for energy expenditure -
and possibly result in increased blood flow to the arms (and the 'trigger-finger') in 
preparation for retaliation. Given that this component would be both involuntary and 
invisible, it is possible that it would go largely uncensored. The main behavioural (or 
somatic) component, on the other hand, would be the physical activity of actual retaliation. 
Given that this component would be both voluntary and visible - and potentially cause 
considerable embarrassment - it would be subject to the social display rules described 
above.2o 
20 Needless to say, viewers are not known for attacking the characters on the screen. Another example of a 
retaliatory reflex, however, can be found at the end of the film when Corporal Upham (played by Jeremy 
Davies) shoots a German soldier (Joerg Stadler). When I frrst saw the film, Upham's retaliation was 
accompanied by cheering and clapping in the cinema audience - possible instances of verbally, as opposed to 
physically, aggressive behaviours. 
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Figure 3.6: The primary emotion of anger 
The final two primary emotions can be considered in tandem. Sadness is another 
example of a negative emotion, whereas happiness is the one and only example of a 
positive emotion; considering that both emotions are passive, they share certain similarities 
with disgust. Starting once again with the input stage, the most obvious examples of films 
designed to elicit sadness and happiness are provided by the melodrama (or 'tearjerker' ) 
and the romance / comedy genres (or the proverbial ' happy ending' to any classical film) 
respectively. Of course, individual scenes within any type of fiction film may elicit either 
sadness or happiness, archetypal examples being the scene of a crowd of people either 
mourning at a funeral or laughing and dancing at a wedding. An example of the latter is 
provided by Coppola' s The Godfather from 1972 (see Frame 3.7): at a Sicilian wedding, 
the young Michael Corleone (AI Pacino) dances with his first wife Apollonia (Simonetta 
Stefanelli). (This example will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 .) 
Following Damasio (ibid.), it is possible that the induction stage for sadness would 
involve both the activation of the brain-stem and the ' intense' activation of the 
hypothalamus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The induction stage for happiness, on 
the other hand, would involve the activation of a number of the aforementioned sites but in 
a different pattern. With respect to the response stage, the physiological components for 
both sadness and happiness would be mediated by the parasympathetic division of the 
ANS - responsible for energy restoration - though it is plausible that each emotion would 
be associated with a distinct pattern of parasympathetic activity. One of the main 
behavioural (somatic) components for sadness would be crying, whilst the behavioural 
components for happiness would include smiling and laughing. Although these 
components might be subject to both culture-specific and gender-specific display rules, it 
is not unknown for viewers to cry, or at least experience a moistening of the eyes. In 
conclusion, then, both sadness and happiness may rival disgust in terms of ' behavioural 
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completeness' . In terms of 'emotional intensity', however, the sadness or happiness that 
the viewer may feel towards a filmic situation is unlikely to approach the sadness or 
happiness they would feel towards a real-world counterpart, whereas in the case of disgust, 
the difference between the viewer's response to an image and its real-world 'referent' may 
be negligible. 
Frame 3.7: The primary emotion of happinellll: The Godfather (1972) 
(ii) Other response tendencies 
It is intriguing that an emotion such as disgust is relatively immune to the paradox of 
fiction. Although some theorists question whether or not sexuality should be regarded as an 
emotion, a similar point can be made with respect to sexuality as an example of a ' response 
tendency' . Carroll (1990) assumes that sexual arousal does not require existence beliefs: 'If 
an attractive member of the sex of one' s preference is described or depicted, desire will not 
be staunched by saying the description (or the depiction) is concocted.' (p.??) In a related 
fashion, Dawkins (1989, p.249) states: ' A man can be aroused .. . by a printed photograph 
ofa woman's body. He is not 'fooled' into thinking that the pattern of printing ink really is 
a woman. He knows that he is only looking at ink on paper, yet his nervous system 
responds to it in the same kind of way as it might respond to a real woman.' Although 
many people might morally disapprove of the notion of a person being sexually aroused in 
the manner described, few people would have any conceptual difficulty with understanding 
such a scenario. The key question is why? 
Dawkin' s example captures the essence of the proposed solution to the paradox of 
fiction and can be applied to the erotic content of pornographic films (see Table 3.14). To 
begin with, it seems plausible that men are more visually aroused than woman: in this case, 
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then, sexual arousal - like disgust - is primarily 'stimulus-driven' (see Fisher, 2004, p.82). 
According to the multi-level model outlined above, the man's visual system would produce 
the basic categorization, "A woman of such-and-such a description" as a shallow output, 
thereby telling his nervous system that an actual woman was present. The induction stage 
would involve the activation of 'sex circuits' in the brain stem and limbic system - i.e., 
those regions of the brain which are insusceptible to existence beliefs - whilst the resulting 
arousal would be mediated by the autonomic nervous system - i.e., that part of the nervous 
system which is beyond voluntary control. (See Shibley-Hyde and Delamater 2000, Ch. 9, 
on the physiological underpinnings of sexual arousal.) Simultaneously, it is plausible that 
contextual (hippocampal) systems and cognitive (prefrontal) systems would produce the 
abstract categorization, "Audiovisual representation of a woman of such-and-such a 
description" as a deep output, thereby telling the nervous system that the sexual encounter 
was not a genuine one. It is plausible that this would result in the inhibition of the 
aforementioned circuits and a possible reduction in the overall level of arousal. 
Table 3.14: The response tendency of sexual arousal 
(1) input stage (2) induction stage (3) response stage 
(film genre) (neural sites) (physiology) 
sexual arousal e.g., pornography brain stem, autonomic 
limbic system (sym. / parasym.) 
In the case of pornographic films, the distinction between representation and 
referent is obviously significant. In a genre where an increasing majority of the action may 
be actual as opposed to staged, however, the distinction between fiction and non-fiction 
may be largely irrelevant. Nevertheless, the threshold model is of relevance in the manner 
described above. All other things being equal, the more graphic - and realistic - the 
depiction, the greater the likelihood that the 'threshold' of sexual arousal will be reached. 
(Given that films entail both movement and sound, they have the upper hand on still 
photographs.) In a related fashion, one could argue that pornographic films have exhibited 
a 'general trend' towards realism / salience. It is probable, furthermore, that this trend has 
been facilitated by the same set of positive constraints (re. film-making, film viewing, and 
film adjucation). With respect to technology, for instance, an improvement in cameras has 
allowed for the production of high resolution images at a relatively low cost. (In this 
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respect, Grodal (1997, p.33) suggests that the 'flourishing pornographic industry' is based 
on the "local' activation of perceptual cues'.) With respect to moral and legal constraints, 
on the other hand, it seems reasonable to say that a relaxation of socio-cultural attitudes 
regarding the depiction of sexually explicit subject-matter (primarily a moral issue) - in 
conjunction with the development of the internet (primarily a technological issue) - has 
resulted in a relaxation of the laws of film censorship (a legal issue), most obviously 
reflected by the shift from 'softcore' to 'hardcore' pornography. 
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Although the neurobiological approach allows us to gain an understanding of the basic 
relationship between our perceptual , cognitive, and emotion systems (and the role of the 
body), whilst providing us with an overview of the input, induction, and response stages of 
the emotional process, it adheres to the classical conditioning paradigm by centring on the 
notion of an emotional stimulus (defined previously as a 'sensory object' with relatively 
strong emotional connotations). In the review of the 2002 book Synaptic Self cited 
previously, Fodor criticises LeDoux for 'working on a model for the brain that imp I ment 
an associationist psychology'; a similar criticism could be levelled at the model described 
in LeDoux's 1998 book The Emotional Brain, which, though operating at a higher level of 
explanation, is based on the associative connections between emotional stimuli and 
(un)conditioned responses. Likewise, Damasio's (1999) lock and key analogy assumes that 
signals resulting from the perceptual processing of an emotional stimulus (the so-called 
'key') activate 'emotion induction sites' which are 'preset' to respond to that particular 
class of stimulus (the 'lock'); in other words, the emotional impact of the stimulus can be 
explained in terms of the associative matching of a perceptual pattern with some sort of 
'template' in the emotion system. 
To what extent can our emotional lives - both inside and outside the cinema - be 
explained in these particular terms? This question brings us to a reconsideration of the 
input stage of the emotional process. To begin with, it should be acknowledged that the 
term 'emotional stimulus' is more inclusive than it at first appears: for instance, LeDoux 
(1993, p. lll) claims that the amygdala is capable of responding to 'complex, socially 
relevant stimuli ', whilst Damasio (1999, pp.56-59) stresses that he is referring to a 'range 
of stimuli' which includes both objects and situations. At this stage of the discussion, 
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however, we must address two additional types of emotional elicitor. First, in contrast to 
individual (but relatively strong) emotional stimuli, we need to introduce the notion of 
multiple (but relatively weak) emotion cues. Treating a complex social situation (for 
example, a scene at a wedding) as an emotional stimulus in its own right fails to recognise 
that that situation may present a number of emotion cues at any given moment (people 
talking, smiling, laughing, dancing, a picturesque setting, background music, and so forth). 
A film-maker such as Coppola, furthermore, would be able to accentuate these emotion 
cues (through such devices as close-ups and lighting), whilst deliberately adding emotion 
cues from outside the world of the film (the most obvious example being non-diegetic 
music). Although this distinction is not necessarily a genuine concern for either LeDoux or 
Damasio, we need to be able to account for certain principles which are plausibly exploited 
by the film-maker: for instance, the greater the number of (congruent) emotion cues 
presented by a given film scene, the greater the likelihood of eliciting an emotional 
response in the viewer. 
Second, in contrast to both emotional stimuli and cues as examples of 'sensory 
objects', we need to introduce the notion of situational meaning as an example of an 
'abstract object'. Consider, for instance, the 'existential fears' which pervade our 
emotional lives. Many, if not all, of these fears can be thought of as relating to the various 
levels of Abraham Maslow's (1970) hierarchy of needs.! Although each of these needs 
may conjure up a multitude of mental images with salient perceptual elements, it is 
primarily their meaning (or implication) with respect to our goals and concerns which is of 
emotional significance. And because the process of appraising this meaning - and inducing 
appropriate emotional responses - cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of the 
associative matching process described above, we are obliged to propose that our goals and 
concerns play some sort of causal role in the proceedings. Both LeDoux (2002, p.213) and 
Damasio (1999, p.59) acknowledge (at least indirectly) that their neurobiological accounts 
may not be able to explain the type of case in question. Unlike their failure to recognise the 
distinction between emotional stimuli and emotion cues, however, this acknowledgement 
constitutes a major admission which has not been given the weight it deserves. 
I From the bottom-up, these needs include the physiological (e.g., obtaining food, water, and oxygen), safety 
(e.g., finding security and receiving a steady financial income), belongingness and love (e.g., gaining 
acceptance and forming meaningful platonic I romantic relationships), esteem (i.e., gaining other people's 
respect), and self-actualization (i.e., realising our true potential). 
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(a) Multi-level models from cognitive fIlm theory 
Considering the potential limitations of the neurobiological account, how should we 
attempt to account for the impact of emotion cues and situational meaning? This question 
brings us to a reconsideration of the induction stage of the emotional process. In short, we 
need to develop a multi-level model of the emotion system which posits two routes to 
emotion: one based on an associative network (which is capable of dealing with emotion 
cues) and the other based on cognitive appraisal (which is capable of dealing with 
situational meaning). Given that our ultimate concern is cinematic emotions, are there any 
potential candidates from the field of cognitive film theory? 
(i) The jlow model 
A small group of theorists have offered 'cognitivist' accounts of cinematic emotions. 
Torben Grodal (1997, 1999) describes the way in which we process a film's 'narrative 
floW'. In order to illustrate the basic stages of Grodal'sjlow model, let us return briefly to a 
film which he cites on numerous occasions: namely, Spielberg's Raiders of the Lost Ark 
(see Table 4.1). Consider, once again, the scene in which Indiana Jones is confronted by a 
rattlesnake. Moving in a 'downstream' direction, the first stage of the flow model would 
describe our perceptual processing of the filmic image: a visual analysis of the 'primal' and 
'2.5-D sketches' of the snake. In the second stage, a '3-D model' of the snake would be 
matched with a structural representation in memory; significantly, the process of memory-
matching would coincide with the activation of corresponding 'affective labels' in an 
associative network. If the processing of the narrative flow ended there - as in the case of 
certain commercials and music videos - the scene would be described as 'lyrical-
associative' in nature (and entail a saturated modal quality). 
In most fiction films, however, the processing progresses to the third stage: at this 
point, we would cognitively appraise the scene for its emotional significance. Significantly, 
this process would require us to 'cognitively identify' with the character of Jones, thereby 
adopting his goals and concerns. (The process of 'cognitive identification' will be 
discussed in the following chapter.) The fourth and final stage comprises our emotional 
responses. If Jones took control of the situation and overcame the obstacle presented by the 
snake, our responses would operate in the telic mode: that is, we would experience 
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voluntary, teleological (goal-directed) motor and cognitive activity (entailing a tense modal 
quality). If, on the other hand, he was unable to overcome the obstacles in question - that 
is, his goals were 'blocked' - our responses would operate in the autonomic mode: that is, 
we would experience involuntary emotional responses (entailing an emotive modal 
quality). 
Although the second stage of the flow model corresponds to an associationist 
account of the emotions, whilst the third stage corresponds to a cognitivist account, at least 
two aspects of the model require clarification and elaboration. First, Grodal does not pay 
sufficient attention to the associative part of the process. Because he is primarily concerned 
with fiction films - featuring goal-oriented characters - he tends to focus on the role of 
cognitive identification. Second, although Grodal acknowledges that all of the stages may 
occur simultaneously, we need to make this point explicit, whilst spelling out additional 
relations between the various levels. In addition, one could argue that the modal quality is 
not simply dependent on either 'blockage' or 'flow'; rather, it also depends on the nature of 
the emotion cues presented and emotional appraisals performed, the type of emotion 
system activated, and the nature of the physiological, behavioural, and subjective responses 
elicited. 
Table 4.1: The flow model (GrodaJ, 1997, 1999) 
Stage 1: first visual analysis of primal or 2.5-0 sketch 
Stage 2: second visual analysis involving 3-D models and memory matching 
0 lyrical-associative [mode] (saturated modal quality): associations 'saturated' with affect 
Stage 3: cognitive appraisal 
Stage 4: reactions 
0 telic mode (tense modal quality): voluntary, teleological (goaVobject-directed), 
motor/cognitive, sequential activity 
0 paratelic mode (emo-tense modal quality): semi-voluntary, non-teleological (subject-
centred), motor/cognitive, repetitive activity 
0 autonomic mode (emotive modal quality): involuntary, autonomic responses 
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(if) The associative network model 
In a recent addition to the field of cognitive film theory, Greg M. Smith (2003) 
acknowledges the value of the 'cognitivist' accounts of filmic emotions advanced by 
Grodal and others.2 He argues, however, that many emotional states do not fit the 
prototype in question: for instance, happiness inspired by a sunny day does not seem to 
have a precise object, whilst depression is not obviously functional. Drawing on a range of 
research from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, Smith proposes an 
associative network model of the emotion system in which 'multiple input channels' are 
linked to a system of 'emotion nodes' via a network of associative connections; the greater 
the number of 'emotion cues' presented to the input channels, the greater the likelihood 
that the corresponding emotion node will be activated. Although there are some 
'universals' in the emotion system, different viewers in different cultures will build up 
different networks of associations through personal and sociocultural experience. Smith 
builds on this model by making a crucial distinction which has not been recognized by film 
theorists so far. Contrary to popular belief, empirical research suggests that emotions only 
tend to last for a matter of seconds or minutes. So how can we account for the apparent 
longevity of our emotional experiences? The answer lies in a set of 'orienting states' 
commonly known as moods which may persist for hours or even days. Significantly, Smith 
describes an interactive relationship between the two phenomena: moods incline us to 
experience certain emotions - by, for example, directing our attention to congruent stimuli 
in our environment - whilst emotions incline us to experience certain moods. 
Given the short-lived nature of emotion, Smith proposes that a film's primary aim 
is to 'cue' moods in the viewer. In light of this aim, he introduces the mood-cue approach 
as a way of analysing the 'emotional appeals' of filmic texts. The emotion cues presented 
by film include: a character's facial, bodily, and vocal expressions; dialogue, sound, and 
music; and mise-en-scene, camera-work, and editing (p.42). In this respect, then, the 
importance of film style is acknowledged. Smith initially demonstrates the approach - and 
associated terminology - with a series of short analyses. Significantly, Spielberg's Raiders 
of the Lost Ark is described as a 'densely informative' emotional film; in order to establish 
and maintain the mood of fear and excitement, the opening sequence presents a series of 
'emotion markers' - configurations of 'redundant' emotion cues - to elicit 'bursts' of the 
2 See Barratt (2004) for a more extensive discussion of Smith's book. 
197 
corresponding emotions. Forsyth's Local Hero (1983), on the other hand, is described as a 
'sparsely informative' emotional film; considering its understated subject-matter, the film 
presents less redundant emotion cues - primarily of a comedic nature - although the pacing 
of emotion cuing changes as the film progresses. 
Smith's recognition of the possibilities of the associative network and the 
significance of moods alone marks his project as a valuable contribution to the field of film 
studies. Having acknowledged the shortcomings of the prototypical view of emotion, 
however, Smith may go too far in the opposite direction when he claims that associations 
form the 'foundation' of all emotional phenomena (p.23). Although he refers to 'conscious 
thought' as another channel of processing (pp.30-31), he has little to say about the role that 
cognition plays in our emotional lives; for instance, the type of appraisal we might make 
when encountering the proverbial bear in the woods. When Smith talks about 'narrative 
situations' and 'emotion scripts' in the later sections, he seems to be referring to 
phenomena which cannot be accounted for in straightforwardly associative terms. In a 
related fashion, the term 'emotion cue' is occasionally used in an overly general sense; that 
is, to refer to any type of emotional elicitor. Considering these points, we need to integrate 
Smith's primarily associative approach with the more obviously cognitivist (and narrative-
based) approaches of, say, Tan and Grodal, by developing a model which posits two 
principal routes to emotion - one based on associative networks, and the other on cognitive 
appraisal. 
(b) Multi-level models from cognitive psychology 
Given the potential limitations of both Grodal's flow model and Smith's associative 
network model, we need to find a multi-level model of the emotion system from the field 
of cognitive psychology which will provide us with a general framework for developing 
and integrating the associative network and cognitive appraisal routes to (cinematic) 
emotion. 
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(i) The ICS approach 
The first example of interest is the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) approach 
advanced by Jon Teasdale and Phil Barnard (1991, 1993). ICS divides the mind into nine 
'cognitive subsystems'. In the event of being confronted by an emotional situation - say, 
the proverbial snake - crude sensory data would be processed by the (1) Visual and (2) 
Acoustic subsystems. In tum, visual and acoustic codes would be 'parsed' by the (3) 
Object and (4) Morphonolexical (speech-level) subsystems to form representations of 
coherent, and nameable, objects. Significantly, Teasdale and Barnard only describe one 
principal route to emotion. The 'cold' and cognitive meaning of the situation would be 
assessed by the (5) Propositional subsystem, whereas the 'hot' and emotional meaning 
would be assessed by the (6) Implicational subsystem. Although propositional codes can 
be expressed by sentences in natural language, implicational codes cannot be expressed in 
linguistic terms: the transformation of the former into the latter involves a 'pattern-
matching process' (i.e., it does not make reference to either goals or concerns). Finally, the 
(7) body state, (8) limb, and (9) articulatory subsystems would correspond approximately 
to the physiological, behavioural, and subjective components of emotion respectively. 
In addition to introducing the importance of certain types of cognitive subsystem, 
the ICS framework provides us with a possible stepping stone between the neurobiological 
account of the emotion system outlined above and a more cognitive account to be outlined 
below. In a recent overview of multi-level theories, Teasdale (1999) attempts to combine 
the ICS framework with LeDoux's neurobiological account, thereby integrating cognitive 
and neurobiological 'levels of analysis' (see Figure 4.1). In particular, Teasdale suggests 
that the 'fast-acting' subcortical route in LeDoux's model corresponds to the 
transformation of sensory codes into implicational codes in leS, whereas the 'slow-acting' 
cortical route corresponds to the transformation of 'higher-level' object, morphonolexical, 
and propositional codes into implicational codes. (To recap, Teasdale notes that '[i]t is 
striking that there is little mention of speech-level or propositional-conceptual processing 
in LeDoux's accounts' l 
3 May and Barnard (1995) apply the ICS framework to the case of film viewing and the perception of film 
editing. 
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Inspired by Teasdale (1999). 
A second, and more recent, example of a multi-level model is the Schematic. 
Propositional. Analogical. and Associative Representation Systems (SP AARS) approach 
advanced by Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish (1997). SP AARS divides the mind into four 
basic levels (see Figure 4.2). The analogical level of the mind comprises the perceptual 
systems; it deals with representations (for example, visual and auditory images) which are 
analogous, in significant respects, to their 'referents'. The propositional level, on the other 
hand, contains information about the world and the self; it deals with representations which 
can be expressed by sentences in natural language. Following Teasdale and Barnard, the 
schematic model level integrates information from both of these levels with information 
relating to the subject's goals, thereby producing a 'schematic model' of the situation; this 
level is equivalent to the Implicational subsystem in ICS. Finally, the associative level of 
the mind consists of the associative connections between the three levels described; this 
level is involved in automatic, as opposed to controlled, processing. 
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Significantly, Power and Dalgleish describe two routes to emotion, involving 
different levels of the mind. The first route involves the schematic model level: the 
meaning of a situation is cognitive/y appraised with respect to the subject's goals and 
concerns, resulting in an appropriate emotional response. According to this view, emotions 
perform a functional role: the emotion of fear, for example, is related to the goal of self-
preservation. The second route involves the associative level: in this case, an emotional 
event is linked to an emotional response by an associative connection (usually) established 
through past experience. (The second route is more automatic, and less functional, than the 
first.) In summary, the SPAARS approach is simpler than ICS on the one hand (in the 
sense that it divides the mind into four, as opposed to nine, systems), and more 
comprehensive than ICS on the other (in the sense that it proposes two routes, as opposed 
to a single route, to emotion).4 















Based on Figure 5.7 from Power and Dalgleish (1997), p.l78. 
* * * 
4 Eysenck and Keane (2000, p.494) compare the SPAARS framework with LeDoux's neurobiological 
account in relation to phobia: an inappropriate fear response could be initiated by the 'associative level', 
whilst correct beliefs - concerning the harmlessness of the phobic object - could be produced by the 
propositional and schematic model levels. 
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In brief, my aim in this chapter is to develop a multi-level model of the emotion system at 
a fine-grain level of analysis, thereby offering what could be described as a secondary 
solution to the paradox of fiction. Given the advantages of the SPAARS approach, I will 
adopt it as a basic framework for developing and integrating the associative network and 
cognitive appraisal routes to (cinematic) emotion. Although Power and Dalgleish assume 
that association is subsidiary to cognition, it is my intention to follow on from the 
neurobiological - and associationist - account outlined in the previous chapter, and to 
outline a multi-level model which begins with the simplest or 'lowest-level' associative 
processes, and ends with the most complex or 'highest-level' cognitive ones. In addition, 
the chapter will demonstrate how the second and fourth ways of seeing - namely, 
Darwinian modularity and conscious / attentive processing (regarding-as and seeing-as, 
type II) - may relate to the emotion system. 
4.2 TRACING THE ASSOCIATIVE NETWORK ROUTE TO (CINEMATIC) EMOTION 
(a) Another approach to (cinematic) emotion: the role of emotion cues 
How should we go about tracing the associative network route to (cinematic) emotion? For 
a variety of reasons discussed above, fear is the prototypical emotion. And the prototypical 
example of a fear situation is being confronted by a threatening creature, be it a bear in 
William James's 1884 account of emotions, or a snake in Joseph LeDoux's 1998 example 
of walking along a woodland path. In order to allow for continuity - and to keep as many 
elements of the discussion constant as possible - we should stay with the prototypical 
emotion of fear and the prototypical example of being confronted by a threatening creature. 
In order to control the independent variables, however, we need to somehow remove the 
creature qua emotional stimulus from the emotion equation. 
In short, we need a source of examples in which a character is confronted by a 
threatening creature but this creature is neither seen nor heard but implied. This example 
must present both personal cues - for instance, facial, bodily, and vocal expressions of fear 
_ and situational cues - which tap into memories of some type of common experience. In 
addition, this example must present certain non-diegetic cues - the most obvious examples 
being provided by a musical score - thereby allowing us to introduce aspects of film style 
into the discussion; what is more, this music must be relatively simple so that we are able 
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to understand it in layman's terms on the one hand, whilst relating it to both associative 
and cognitive processes on the other. What, then, is the archetypal example? 
(i) A story about a shark 
In 'Fearing Fictions', Kendall Walton (1978, p.lO) only makes reference to one film 
example - namely, Steven Spielberg's Jaws (1975), a story about a Great White shark 
terrorising the community of Amity Island on the East Coast of America.s Walton states: 
'Jaws caused a lot of people to fear sharks which they thought might really exist. But 
whether they were afraid of the fictional sharks in the movie is another question.' How 
should we understand the status of the viewer's fear? And how should we understand the 
film's status as both a box-office and a cultural phenomenon? 
In terms of its fear content, the basic structure of this two-hour film can be 
summarised as follows. The first shark attack occurs in the opening sequence. During a 
night-time gathering at the side of a beach, a young man and woman sneak away for a 
moonlight swim in the sea. Although the man Tom Cassidy (played by Jonathan Filley) 
collapses in a drunken stupor before he makes it to the water, the woman Chrissie Watkins 
(Susan Backlinie) dives in enthusiastically, calling back to Cassidy to join her. At this 
point, two underwater shots in conjunction with John Williams's famous musical score 
signal the shark's approach. Suddenly, Watkins is pulled under the water, screaming and 
thrashing her body from side to side. Meanwhile, Cassidy lies on the beach, completely 
oblivious to the horror which is happening out at sea. 
The following morning, the local police chief Martin Brody (played by Roy 
Scheider) is alerted when the remains of Watkin's body are swept up on the beach. (In this 
scene, we catch a glimpse of the aftermath of the attack: Watkin's severed forearm is 
visible beneath a crawling pile of crabs.) Later that day, Brody sits in a deckchair, keeping 
watch. During this time, we are witness to two false alarms from his optical point-of-view: 
a black blob moving through the water which turns out to be a woman's swimming cap, 
and a girl screaming as she is lifted out of the water upon her boyfriend's shoulders. 
(Significantly, neither of these false alarms is accompanied by Williams's musical score.) 
Immediately afterwards, however, the second shark attack occurs. On this occasion, the 
S The subsequent quotes from Steven Spielberg and John Williams are taken from the documentary 'The 
Making of Jaws': available on the Special 25th Anniversary Edition DVD of the film. 
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victim is a young boy: once again, a combination of underwater shots and musical score 
signals the shark's approach. (In this instance, we are allowed to see a contemporaneous 
consequent of the attack: namely, a fountain of blood rising from the sea.) Following the 
second attack, Brody seeks the help of a young marine biologist called Matt Hooper 
(played by Richard Dreyfuss), allowing him to analyse Watkin's remains. (During the 
post-mortem, we catch another glimpse of Watkin's severed forearm and we hear Hooper's 
graphic description.) Later that day, the two men unwittingly stumble upon the aftermath 
of the third shark attack: in an attempt to locate a local fisherman who may be able to help 
them kill the shark, Hooper discovers the fisherman's body in the wreckage of his boat. 
During the subsequent Fourth of July celebrations on the island, we are witness to a third 
false alarm: as a prank, two boys construct a shark fin out of a piece of cardboard. (Once 
again, this false alarm is not accompanied by Williams's musical score.) 
After one hour of screen time, the fourth shark attack occurs: for the first time, we 
see the shark's fin and we catch a glimpse of the shark's head and body as it attacks a male 
swimmer in the estuary. (In this instance, we are allowed to see clouds of blood and the 
man's severed leg falling to the seabed.) The fourth attack prompts Brody and Hooper to 
seek the help of an old shark hunter called Quint (Robert Shaw). The three set sail in 
Quint's boat, the 'Orca', in a final attempt to rid the island of the shark. After eighty 
minutes, we catch our first proper sight of the shark as Brody throws bait into the sea; a 
genuinely shocking moment which prompted Scheider's adlibbed line to Shaw, "You're 
gonna need a bigger boat." (see Frame 4.1 ). (Paradoxically, this sighting occurs in the 
absence of Williams's musical score.) In the final ten minutes of the film, we witness the 
first direct confrontations between human and shark. Hooper faces the shark in an 
underwater cage, whereas Brody undergoes his ordeal in the water-filled cabin of the 
sinking boat. Quint is the ill-fated one of the three, practically bitten in half as he is pulled 
under the water, screaming and spewing blood. 
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Frame 4.1: A story about a sbarl<: Jaws (1975) 
In summary, for at least the first two thirds of the film, the shark as an emotional 
stimulus is conspicuous in its absence. The only scenes which correspond to the 
prototypical examples of fear situations - as described by both James and LeDoux - occur 
at the film's conclusion. Why is this so? Spielberg offers two reasons for the shark's 
absence. The first reason is based on practical considerations: for instance, the life-size 
replica of the shark constructed for the film was not working for much of the film's 
production. The second reason is of more significance to the project in hand. In order to 
outline this reason, it will be necessary to turn briefly to the original novel by Peter 
Benchley. In the opening chapter, Benchley provides a detailed description of the first 
shark attack involving the Watkins girl: 
[I] The fish was about forty feet away from the woman, off to the side, when it turned 
suddenly to the left, dropped entirely below the surface, and with two quick thrusts of its 
tail, was upon her. 
[2] At first. the woman thought she had snagged her leg on a rock or a piece of floating 
wood. There was no initial pain, only one violent tug on her right leg. She reached down to 
touch her foot. treading water with her left leg to keep her head up, feeling in the blackness 
with her left hand She could not find her foot. She reached higher on her leg, and then she 
was overcome by a rush of nausea and dizziness. Her groping fingers had found a nub of 
bone and tattered flesh . She knew that the warm, pulsing flow over her fingers in the chill 
water was her own blood. 
These representative paragraphs provide two possible sources of horror. In the first 
paragraph, we are provided with a description of the shark (qua emotional stimulus), whilst 
in the second paragraph, we are provided with a graphic description of the girl ' s injuries. 
In reference to Benchley, Spielberg acknowledges that showing the shark would have 
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produced a spectacular opening to the film, but argues that it would have been a 'monster 
moment' that we have all seen before - interestingly, the sort of moment to which Walton, 
presumably, is referring. In contrast, Spielberg states that he felt that it would be more 
effective not to show the shark. Presumably, similar remarks could be made about his 
choice to refrain from showing us the girl's injuries (although this choice might have been 
subject to censorial, as well as aesthetic, constraints). Instead, Spielberg chooses to depict 
the shark attacks either by presenting us with an array of contemporaneous emotion cues, 
or by allowing us to catch glimpses of the aftermath (notably, the girl's severed forearm). 
In this respect, Spielberg follows the type of wisdom espoused by Hitchcock during 
his making of Psycho (1960); a wisdom which states that what a film doesn't show the 
viewer is as important as what it does show. Indeed, the notorious shower scene in which 
Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) is attacked by an unknown assailant will serve as a useful 
point of comparison in the following discussion. Although Hitchcock allows us to see the 
attacker, he keeps these sightings to a minimum, framing the attacker in silhouette and 
quickly cutting away. Contrary to first impressions, moreover, we never actually see the 
knife piercing Marion's flesh. Once again, then, the emphasis is placed on 
contemporaneous emotion cues. 
(ii) The role of association in SPAARS 
How should we understand the associative level of the mind? Power and Dalgleish (1997) 
cite two types of example (see Figure 4.3). First (from our perspective), certain 
associations have been established - or 'biologically prepared' - over the course of human 
evolution. The authors cite the example of Julia finding a spider in a kitchen cupboard and 
responding with fear (p.l83). Such an encounter would begin with the analogical level of 
the mind: that is, the perception of the spider. Because spider fear has been 'biologically 
prepared', subsequent encounters with spiders would generate fear via an associative 
connection. 
Second (and most significant from Power and Dalgleish's perspective), certain 
associations become established during the course of an individual's lifetime. The authors 
cite the example of Peter who, as a child, was shouted at by his father (p.176). Originally, 
the event of the father shouting would have inspired a cognitive appraisal of the situation, 
resulting in the emotions of fear and anger. After repetition, however, the sound of 
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shouting would become associatively connected with the emotions In question. In 
summary, both of the examples conform to the classical conditioning paradigm described 
above: for instance, a spider can be regarded as what LeDoux would describe as an 
unconditioned (visual) stimulus or 'natural trigger', whilst the sound of a person shouting 
can be regarded as a conditioned (auditory) stimulus or 'learnt trigger'. 
EMOTIONAL 
STIMULUS 
spider I shouting 
Figure 4.3: The associative level route to emotion 
ANALOGICAL ASSOCIATIVE 
LEVEL .. LEVEL 
visual I auditory image associative connection 
(b) Understanding the associative level of the mind 6 
EMOTIONAL 
RESPONSES 
How should we develop our understanding of the associative level of the mind? Although 
Power and Dalgleish only describe examples with single associative connections, they 
suggest two important avenues of enquiry which may help us to develop a more network-
based route to emotion. It is to these two avenues that we now tum. 
(i) Associative networks 
The ftrst avenue of enquiry can be thought of as a precursor of the classical conditioning 
paradigm: namely, the associative network. This tradition can be traced back to the British 
empiricists: for instance, David Hume (1748, p.24) proposed that the 'association of ideas' 
is based on three types of relation - namely, 'Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, 
and Cause and Effect'. (The classical conditioning paradigm - advanced by the 
behaviourists Ivan Pavlov, James Watson, and B. F. Skinner - replaced ideas with 
reflexes.) 
Power and Dalgleish (1997, p.174) suggest that the associative level bears some 
resemblance to Gordon Bower's (1981, 1982) associative network model of memory and 
6 For a recent discussion of associative network theories of emotion, see Forgas (1999). 
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emotion, although they do not develop this comparison in any detail. In short, Bower 
proposes that emotions are encoded (in propositional form) as nodes in an associative 
network 'stored' in long-term memory (see Figure 4.4). An emotion node is connected to 
associated concepts, memories, behavioural expressions, and physiological patterns. In 
addition, different emotion nodes are connected to each other by either excitatory or 
inhibitory connections: for instance, the connection between the fear node and the anger 
node might be excitatory, whilst the connection between the fear node and the happiness 
node might be inhibitory. The associative network model is used to explain the relationship 
between affect and cognition. In a typical experiment, the process allegedly begins with the 
activation of an emotion node: either a positive or a negative mood is induced in the 
subject. (An emotion node can be activated by either external or internal stimuli. 
Interestingly, one of the methods of mood-induction is showing the subject a happy or sad 
film.) Subsequently, activation 'spreads' from the emotion node to, for instance, associated 
'memory structures' or event nodes, bringing these nodes to a state of 'subthreshold 
excitation'. This model yields hypotheses about mood congruity and thought congruity: 
people in good moods tend to recall positive memories and think positive thoughts, whilst 
people in bad moods tend to recall negative memories and think negative thoughts. 
From our perspective, two properties of the associative network model are of 
interest. First, the model gives us an idea of the general architecture of a network: in 
particular, the notion of an emotion node associatively connected to a number of other 
states. In the case of film viewing, however, we need to approach the model from the 
opposite direction, as it were: viz., we are interested in how the activation of the states in 
question - connected, directly or indirectly, with what we have seen or heard on screen -
results in the activation of an emotion node, thereby increasing our chances of responding 
emotionally. To put it another way, we are concerned with the effects of perceptual and 
cognitive associations on emotion rather than with the effects of emotion on perceptual and 
cognitive associations. Significantly, the connections between nodes are bi-directional: 
considering that an emotion node cannot be activated directly, we should think of the states 
in question as input nodes.7 Second, Bower implies that an associative network is capable 
of dealing with multiple emotions cues: the greater the number of (congruent) emotion 
cues presented - i.e., the greater the number of nodes that 'light up' in the network - the 
greater the likelihood that the corresponding emotion node will be activated. 
7 Presumably, when films are used as a means of inducing moods. these films must access the emotion node 
via input nodes - to my knowledge, this point is not made explicit in the literature. 
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It should be acknowledged that certain aspects of Bower's associative network 
model of memory and emotion are problematic. Many of these problems concern 
experimental limitations (the failure to repeat the results of the original experiments on 
mood congruity, and so forth). Considering that we are concerned with the general 
implications of the associative network model, these problems will not concern us. It is 
necessary, however, to acknowledge some of the theoretical limitations. The first set of 
limitations stems from the propositional nature of the proposed network. Power and 
Dalgleish (ibid., p.74) state, for instance, that 'a theory that gives emotion the same status 
as words or concepts is theoretically confused'. (Other theorists argue that the notion of an 
'emotion node' is problematic - see Berkowitz, 2000, p.124.) As we will see, these 
problems will be solved by spelling out the network in connectionist (and neurobiological) 
terms. The second set of limitations stems from the uni-level nature of the proposed model. 
Power and Dalgleish suggest that the model requires a higher level of representation in 
order to organise the information encoded in the network. (Other theorists point out that 
Bower's network relies on 'passive' associations rather than 'active' cognitions.) These 
problems will be solved by placing the network into a multi-level model of the mind in 
which the 'passive' associative network route to emotion runs alongside a more or less 
'active' cognitive appraisal route. 
Figure 4.4: Bower's (1981) associative network model of memory and emotion 
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(iiJ Connectionist networks 
The second avenue of enquiry can be thought of as a modem-day version of the associative 
network. Considering some of the theoretical limitations discussed above, Power and 
Dalgleish (1997, p.1l2) propose that associative network models should be replaced with 
'the emergent properties of massively parallel distributed process networks' but concede 
that 'the types of PDP networks currently available may need to be substantially modified 
before an adequate theory is achieved'. Nevertheless, we need to push the discussion in 
this direction in order to gain a reasonable idea of what such a model might look like. 
A PDP network is also known as a connectionist network (see Rumelhart, 
McClelland, and the PDP Research Group, 1986).8 The basic properties of a connectionist 
network can be summarised as follows (see Figure 4.5). A node is analogous to a neuron, 
or a group of neurons; individual nodes are linked to each other by weighted connections 
which are analogous to either excitatory or inhibitory synapses. The nodes in a 
connectionist network are typically organised into three layers: an input layer, a hidden 
layer, and an output layer. The presentation of a stimulus pattern will produce a 'pattern of 
activation' in the nodes of the input layer. The value of the input from an 'input node' (I) 
to a 'hidden node' (H) is equivalent to the level of the activation at I multiplied by the 
weight of the connection between I and H. The hidden node will effectively sum the 
inputs, and if the 'net input' exceeds a certain threshold - as determined by an activation 
function - it will send activation to the output nodes, and so on. 
A consideration of two types of connectionist network in particular provides us 
with an alternative way of understanding (the impact of) the first way of 'seeing' described 
in Chapter 2 under the rubric of 'Fodorian modularity' and shallow outputs. From our 
perspective, a pattern recognition network is capable of recognizing a single type of 
pattern: for instance, it receives a stimulus pattern as an input and produces a basic 
category as a (shallow) output. Significantly, the term 'pattern' need not refer to either a 
visual or a static phenomenon: in theory, a pattern can be presented by any sensory 
modality, including the auditory and the somatosensory, whilst displaying the type of 
changeability exemplified by a piece of music. In contrast, a pattern association network is 
capable of associating one type of pattern with another: for instance, it receives a stimulus 
8 For a more recent discussion, see McLeod et al. (1998), especially Chapters 1 and 3. An overview of 
connectionism is provided by Pinker (1997) and Hogan (2003). 
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pattern as an input and produces a response pattern as an output. According to the Hebb 
Learning Rule, if both the stimulus and response patterns are 'presented' to the network 
simultaneously, then the weight of the associative connection between the two is 
strengthened; subsequently, the presentation of the stimulus alone may be sufficient to 
elicit the corresponding response. (The most obvious example of Hebbian learning is 
Pavlov's dogs learning to associate the sound of a bell ringing with a salivatory response.)'> 
Both stimulus and response patterns are encoded in a connectionist network in 
terms of distributed representations: that is, the relevant information is stored in the 
weights of the connections between individual nodes. (The notion of distribution implies 
that more than one representation can be stored across the same network.) The processes of 
pattern recognition and pattern association can be understood in terms of parallel 
constraint satisfaction: that is, the network settles on those representations which satisfy 
the greatest number of constraints (see Thagard, 1996, Ch. 7; Thagard and Verbeurgt, 
1997). Distributed representations have a number of important properties: they are 
'content-addressable' (being presented with any aspect of the stimulus may be sufficient to 
reinstate the entire memory); they are capable of dealing with 'noisy' information (read: 
projected, potentially degraded two-dimensional images); and they 'generalise' when 
presented with new information (i.e., sights and sounds which are similar, but not identical, 
to those encountered through prior experience). 
9 In a strict sense, a pattern recognition network could be classified as an example of a pattern association 
network: viz., it learns to associate a stimulus pattern (qua input pattern) with a basic category (qua output 
pattern). The distinction between the two networks is largely a pragmatic one, intended to reflect the different 
nature of the corresponding tasks. 
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Figure 4.5: Connectionist network: pattern recognition I pattern association 
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(c) lIIustrating the model 
Having considered associative and connectionist networks, we are in a position to propose 
a model of the associative network route to (cinematic) emotion (see Figure 4.6). 
According to the proposed model, the analogical level of the mind can be thought of as 
comprising a number of different 'input nodes': this way of thinking provides us with an 
alternative way of understanding the notion of ' regarding-as (type 1)' with respect to 
perception. Correspondingly, the associative level can be thought of as comprising the 
associative connections to related 'emotion nodes': this way of thinking provides us with 
another way of understanding regarding-as (type I) with respect to emotion. 
The macro-structure of the model is based on an associative network. This time, 
the input nodes are lined up on the left-hand side for ease of representation (and to 
facilitate comparison with connectionist networks). Moving from left to right, the input 
nodes for different emotion cues are located in their respective sensory modalities: for 
instance, the visual, the auditory, and the somatosensory. Each of the lines represents a 
weighted connection; some of these connections have been 'biologically prepared' over the 
course of human evolution, whilst others - possibly the majority - are established during 
the individual 's lifetime through socio-cultural experience. An emotion node is 
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approximately equivalent to the emotion-induction sites - for example. the amygdala -
described in Chapter 2. (For the sake of simplicity, event nodes have been omitted from the 
basic model but will be taken into account below.) 
The micro-structure and basic operating principles of the model are based on 
connectionist networks. Imagine that a number of emotion cues are presented to the input 
layer of the model. First, each input node is equivalent to a connectionist (pattern 
recognition) network in its own right and operates in the manner described above (see 
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986). Second, the model as a whole operates by connectionist 
principles and is equivalent to a pattern association network in the sense that it ultimately 
connects stimuli with responses. If the input nodes for different emotion cues are 
successfully activated, then they will send activation to a corresponding emotion node (for 
example, the fear node) via a weighted connection. In tum, the emotion node will 
effectively sum the inputs, and if the 'net input' exceeds a certain threshold, then it will 
produce an output; i.e., it will send activation to the nodes (or brain systems) which 
generate emotional responses. In summary, the model provides us with a possible 
explanation for how the emotion cues described by Greg M. Smith (2003) actually operate 
on the mind of the viewer, both individually and collectively. 
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Figure 4.6: The associative network route to (cinematic) emotion 
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(i) Diegetic cues 
How should we attempt to classify emotion cues? Although the input nodes for different 
emotion cues may be located in their respective sensory modalities, from the perspective of 
film viewing we may have to rely on a more artificial way of carving up the world. The 
category of diegetic cues can be used to refer to emotion cues which are presented from 
inside the world of the film. These cues can be divided into two sub-categories. 
o Personal cues 
How should we understand the personal cues presented by fiction film? In terms of 
perceptual salience, the first type of personal cue is provided by a character's face: the 
most obvious examples of facial cues are facial expressions of emotion. In the opening 
sequence of Spielberg's Jaws, the Watkins girl displays facial expressions of surprise and 
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fear at the beginning of the attack, and facial expressions of pain and fear towards the end. 
These expressions are especially salient in the final close shot, as the girl is pulled under 
the water (see Frame 4.2a). An alternative example is provided by the shower scene from 
Hitchcock' s Psycho in which Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) is attacked by an unknown 
assailant (see Frame 4.2b): one could argue that the well-known publicity frame still of 
Leigh' s face provides us with an archetypal example of the facial expression of fear. 
Frame 4.2a: Diegetic (personal) cues: Jaws (1975) 
Frame 4.2b: Diegetic (personal) cues: Psycho (1960) 
How do the facial expressions in question communicate emotion on the one hand, 
and elicit emotion on the other? In order to answer this question, a brief and selective 
historical overview will be necessary. In a famous experiment by Kuleshov, three identical 
shots of the actor Ivan Mozhukhin' s inexpressive face were attached to shots of a plate of 
soup, a man' s corpse, and a half-naked woman (for a good summary, see Mitry, 1998). 
Legend has it that the audience interpreted Mozhukin's facial expressions as conveying 
hunger, pain, and desire respectively, whilst marvelling at the quality of his performance. 
The so-called 'Kuleshov effect' allegedly demonstrates that facial expressions are 
'emotionally amorphous', and that, therefore, our interpretation of such expressions is 
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dependent on the emotional context alone. Carroll (1996) argues against the Kuleshov view 
but resists the temptation to go to the opposite extreme; instead, he proposes that the close-
up of a character's face establishes an 'emotional range', whilst the context - provided by a 
POV shot or the narrative situation - provides an 'emotional focus'. 
Carroll's notion of the face as a reliable 'range finder' is supported by Paul 
Ekman's two-factor neurocultural model of facial expressions. Ekman proposes that there 
are distinct (cross-cultural) facial expressions for each of the primary emotions: namely, 
fear, disgust, surprise, anger, sadness, and happiness. According to the first factor of the 
model, a facial expression is a 'read-out' of a primary emotion (,facial effect programs'). 
In this respect, Ekman and Friesen (1978) have developed the Facial Action Coding 
System (F ACS) which enables trained researchers to identity each of the muscle units 
(MUs) and action units (AUs) underlying every 'visually distinguishable facial movement' 
(see Table 4.2). According to the second factor, on the other hand, such expressions can be 
over-ridden by the type of cultural display rule described previously. In contrast to 
Ekman's neurocultural model, Alan Fridlund (1994) proposes a behavioural ecology view 
of facial expressions which stresses the importance of context and (intentional) 
communication - a view which harks back to Kuleshov's original experiment. 1o Upon 
showing Fridlund the frame still from Psycho, he pointed out that it also depicts the kind of 
facial expression an athlete might display if they had just won a marathon; in other words, 
the specificity of facial expressions is overridden by the primacy of context. 
Table 4.2: Facial cues: tbe Facial Action Coding System (FACS) 
AU number FACSname muscular basis 
1 inner brow raiser frontalis. pars medialis 
2 outer brow raiser frontalis. pars lateralis 
4 brow lowerer depressor glabellae; 
depressor supercilii; corrugator 
10 Thanks to Alan Fridlund, Department of Psychology, UCSB, for a number of discussions about facial 
expressions of emotion in film. 
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This overview raises three main questions. The first question concerns the process 
of emotional communication. Given that there may be a 'facial affect program' for the 
display of an emotion, is there a corresponding program for the recognition of such a 
display? One could argue that the existence of a 'recognition program' is implicit in 
Ekman's neurocultural model: for instance, what would be the point of having universal 
displays if there was not universal recognition as well? Surprisingly, Ekman (2003, p.219) 
is noncommittal on this issue, stating that our recognition capacity may be either innate 
(' operating from preset instructions') or learnt during our formative years. The second 
question concerns the process of emotional context. Following Ekman and Fridlund's 
dispute, what role does context actually play? According to one extreme, it plays a primary 
role; according to the other, it merely plays a secondary, or qualifying, role. The third and 
final question concerns the process of emotional elicitation. In short, how does the activity 
of observing another person's facial expressions generate an emotional response? 
Possible answers to all three questions are provided by the neurobiological account 
outlined in the previous chapter: for instance, LeDoux (2002, p.220) suggests that the 
amygdala plays a role in both the recognition and emotional appraisal of facial expressions 
of fear, whilst the hippocampal formation plays a role in the processing of contextual 
information. More conclusive, or sophisticated, answers, however, may be provided by the 
associationist (connectionist) account currently under consideration (see Figure 4.7). This 
account may allow us to support the theories of both Ekman and Carroll on the one hand, 
whilst explaining the role of context described by Fridlund and Kuleshov on the other. Say 
that we observe the facial expressions of the Watkins girl in Jaws or Marion in Psycho. For 
the sake of argument, let us describe Watkin's and Marion's facial expressions as 
comprising a particular combination of muscle and action units - call it 'combination X'. 
And let us assume that Ekman would claim that facial expression X displays the primary 
emotion of fear, whilst Fridlund would argue that, in different circumstances, facial 
expression X might display the aggressive triumph of a victorious athlete. 
First, with respect to emotional communication - and the establishment of an 
'emotional range' - the 'input node' for the recognition of facial expression X may be 
equivalent to a connectionist (pattern association) network in its own right: recall that such 
networks may be capable of dealing with patterns of considerable complexity and 
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subtlety .11 What is more, although X may be associated with a variety of emotions (in 
accordance with Fridlund's view), it is plausible that the connections between X and the 
'fear node', are more heavily weighted - through either 'biological preparedness' or 
learning - than those connections between X and, say, the 'happiness node' (pro Ekman). 
Second, with respect to emotional context - and the establishment of an 'emotional focus' -
an associative (connectionist) network may be capable of taking various types of context 
into account. If, for instance, facial expression X occurs in conjunction with a cue which 
specifies that a person is being attacked - as opposed to, say, winning a marathon - then the 
fear node will be activated to a greater extent than the happiness node, thereby identifying 
X as a display of fear as opposed to one of triumph. Third and final, emotional elicitation 
can be explained in terms of the fear node exceeding a certain 'activation threshold' and, 
consequently, sending activation to the nodes (or brain systems) which generate fear 
responses. 
II A connectionist model for facial expression recognition is described by Lisetti and Schiano (2000), section 
3.2.2. Figure 1 depicts a simple network with an input layer - comprised of nodes for face, brow/forehead, 
eyesllids, and mouth/nose/chin - and corresponding hidden and output layers. 
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Figure 4.7: Diegetic (personal) cues: the role of emotional communication, context, and elicitation 
(1) emoIJonal COIIIIIIIIIIeaf 
(emoIJonal ",.,) 
Inputnodll emotion nodII 
The second type of personal cue is provided by a character's body. Bodily cues can 
be broken down into two basic categories: namely, instrumental and expressive behaviours 
(see Table 4.3). In the middle of the shark attack in Jaws, the Watkins girl's facial 
expressions are largely obscured by splashing water; therefore, her bodily behaviour has 
the highest degree of salience. This behaviour is primarily instrumental in nature: the girl 
thrashes her body from side to side (an example of a fighting behaviour), and, at one point, 
she grabs hold of a buoy in an almost hug-like embrace (a possible example of a coping 
behaviour). It is plausible that the expressions in question will be associated with the 
emotion of fear, and that our viewing of such expressions would result in the activation of 
the fear node. In addition, Spielberg states that he wanted the girl's 'violent jerking 
motions' to 'trigger our imagination' about what is happening below the surface of the 
water. (These motions serve as an indirect indication of the size and strength of the shark.) 
Similar remarks can be made about the shower scene from Psycho. With respect to 
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instrumental behaviours, Marion attempts to shield her body with her hands, an example of 
a defensive behaviour. Given that Hitchcock refrains from showing us the face of Marion's 
attacker - and given that we never actually see the knife piercing Marion's flesh - much is 
left to the proverbial imagination; Marion's bodily expressions serving as important 
prompts in the imaginative process. (The notion of imagination and its relation to appraisal 
will be discussed in greater detail below.) 
Table 4.3: Bodily cues: instrumental and expressive behaviours 
basic examples 
(1) instrumental approach / withdrawal: 
fight / flight 
(2) expressive postural, gestural 
Moving from the visual modality to the auditory, the third type of personal cue is 
provided by a character's voice: the most obvious examples of vocal cues are vocal 
expressions of emotion. In the opening sequence from Jaws, the Watkin girl's vocal 
expressions of fear are audible beneath Williams's musical score. (Similarly, in the shower 
sequence from Psycho, Marion's screams are audible beneath Herrmann's musical score.) 
Although there is no vocal equivalent of Kuleshov's experiment - at least in the field of 
film theory - the story of the face's emotional status can be adapted with respect to the 
voice. From a filmic perspective, it is plausible that the sound of a character's vocal 
expressions of emotion establish an 'emotional range', whilst the context - provided by a 
POV shot or the narrative situation - provides an 'emotional focus'. Similarly, the notion of 
the voice as a reliable 'range finder' can be supported by the findings of psychology. 
What Ekman is to psychological research on the face, Klaus Scherer IS to 
psychological research on the voice (see Scherer, 1993; Scherer and Johnstone, 2000). 
Whilst Ekman acknowledges that there are likely to be distinct (cross-cultural) vocal 
expressions for each of the primary emotions, it is Scherer who describes the 'perceptual 
dimensions' associated with the emotions in question (see Table 4.4). It is plausible that 
both Watkin's and Marion's vocal expressions comprise some of the perceptual 
dimensions associated with fear. (In addition, human (and animal) screams may act as 
natural and/or learnt fear triggers.) Conversely, Fridlund might argue that our interpretation 
of such vocal expressions is primarily dependent on context. How many times, for 
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instance, have we started at the sound of a person's scream, only to realise a few seconds 
later that the cause of our alarm is actually a shriek of delight? As in the case of the face, a 
consideration of the emotional impact of the voice raises three main questions, regarding 
the processes of emotional communication (range-finding), emotional context-assessment 
(focusing), and emotional elicitation. Although answers can be provided by the 
neurobiological account - the amygdala playing a prominent once again - a more 
sophisticated account may be provided by the associationist (connectionist) model outlined 
in Figure 4.7. Given that input patterns can be auditory as well as visual, simply replace the 
input node for 'facial expression X' with one for 'vocal expression X'. 
Table 4.4: Vocal cues: perceptual dimensions 
acoustic variable measure 
(1) loudness intensity decibel (dB) 
(2) pitch fundamental frequency (PO) hertz (Hz) 
(3) time duration second (sec) 
The fourth and final example of a personal cue is provided by the dialogue spoken 
by a character. Certain verbal cues - i.e., words and phrases - may have emotional salience 
in their own right; that is, independently of vocal delivery and semantic content. The 
opening sequence of Jaws presents a number of potential examples: for instance, as the 
Watkins girl is pulled under the water (see Frame 4.2a), she screams "Oh my God!" and 
"God help me!" How should we understand the emotional impact of such exclamations? 
Experiments on perceptual defense demonstrate that subjects take longer to recognize so-
called 'taboo' words - for example, sexual swear words - than they do neutral words (see 
LeDoux, 1998, p.56). This result is typically explained, however, in terms of the Freudian 
notion of 'repression'. A more promising line of enquiry lies in what has come to be 
known as the emotional stroop task (see Figure 4.8). In this task, the subject is presented 
with lists of words and asked to name the ink colour of the word rather than read the word 
itself. Investigators find that subjects tend to take longer to name the ink colour of 
emotional words (like 'fear'), as opposed to neutral words (like 'table'). Although the 
emotional stroop task involves 'seeing' words rather than 'hearing' them, the impact of 
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emotional words can be explained in associative (connectionist) terms. 12 The 
words/phrases uttered by the girl have strong associations with the emotive subjects of 
religion, blasphemy, and helplessness. 
o Situational cues 
Figure 4.8: Emotional stroop task 
table 
fear 
Any given situation in a film presents a number of situational cues which are capable of 
activating corresponding perceptual representations in the input layer of an associative 
network. In the opening sequence of Jaws, the sight of the sea would result in the 
activation of the input node for 'sea', whilst the sight of a person swimming would result 
in the activation of the input node for 'swimming' (see Frame 4.3). Given the obviously 
tautological nature of such statements, however, let us use a consideration of situational 
cues to illustrate another aspect of the associative network model. One explanation for the 
phenomenal box office and cultural success of Jaws is that it taps into readily available 
autobiographical or episodic memories of universal experiences. Although very few of us 
have been in the sea with a shark, Spielberg points out that most of us have been 
swimming. (A similar argument could be made with respect to Psycho, perhaps, by citing 
the commonplace activities of checking into a motel and taking a shower.) 
12 A connectionist model for the 'slow emotional stroop effect' has been proposed by Bradley Wyble, Dinkar 
Sharma, and Howard Bowman (2005) at the Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Systems, 
University of Kent. This model consists of three layers: an input layer, a category layer, and a response layer. 
The input layer contains input nodes for ink colour and word-form processing and is presumably located 
within what SpAARS describes as the analogical level of the mind. The category layer, on the other hand, ' is 
intended to represent activity in a semantic workspace' and is therefore located somewhere in the 
propositional level: for the sake of simplicity, this level has not been included in the main associative 
network model under discussion. 
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Frame 4.3: Diegetic (situational) cues: Jaws (1975) 
How should we develop Spielberg's argument in associative network terms (see 
Figure 4.9)? To recap, Bower (1981) proposes that episodic memories are encoded as event 
nodes in an associative network: the memory would not be contained 'within' the event 
node itself; rather, the node would serve to connect the different details of the experience 
(spanning different levels of the mind). Allison Barnes and Paul Thagard (1997) propose 
that if the target person's situation sufficiently resembles an analogous situation in the 
observer's episodic memory, then retrieval can be spelt out in terms of parallel constraint 
satisfaction: that is, the network arrives at a memory which satisfies numerous constraints. 
In a related fashion, the distributed representations underlying our episodic memories are 
'content addressable'; that is, being presented with a single aspect of a situation may be 
sufficient to reinstate a corresponding memory in its entirety. 
In different circumstances, the situational cues 'sea' and 'swimming' would be 
capable of reinstating positive episodic memories, a possible example being the childhood 
memory of having spent an idyllic summer holiday at a seaside resort. All other things 
being equal, the corresponding event node would be strongly connected to the 'happiness 
node'. In the case of viewing the opening sequence, however, the situational cues' sea' and 
'swimming' would occur in conjunction with the various fear cues described both above 
and below. In light of this, the sequence would be more likely to 'reinstate' a negative 
episodic memory, a possible example being the childhood memory of having been (quite 
literally) 'thrown in at the deep end'. This time, the corresponding event node would be 
strongly connected to the fear node. Following Patrick Hogan (2003, pp.155-165), the 
memory in question would not have to be fully activated to playa role in eliciting a fear-
type response; rather, it could be in a state of 'semi-activation', operating below the 
threshold of consciousness. Given, furthermore, that we have a tendency to attribute our 
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emotional responses to the most salient objects in our environment, it is plausible that we 
would (mis)attribute our fear-type response to the sequence itself. 
Figure 4.9: Diegetic (situational) cues: the role of event nodes 
Input nocItt ,motion nodIt 
Based on Figure 1.3 from Bower (1992), p.25. 
The opening sequence presents a number of other situational cues which may play 
an important role. Power and Dalgleish (1997, p.202) suggest that the situational cues of 
'approaching' and 'fast-moving' may act as natural fear triggers. How does the sequence 
create such triggers? Significantly, this question brings us to a consideration of film style. 
The impression of 'approach' is partly created by means of camera-work. The sequence 
presents two underwater shots - apparently from the shark's point-of-view - which centre 
on the swimming girl (see Frame 4.3 again). The first underwater shot exploits the factor 
of camera-placement: the fact that the camera is placed in a non-anthropomorphic position 
224 
- i.e., below the earth-air interface described by Gibson - alerts us to the shark's presence 
and proximity. (Notice that at this point we know more than the girl, a point noted by both 
Carroll, 1990, and Grodal, 1997. Interestingly, the shot in question is followed by a long 
shot which confirms that the girl is in the middle of the sea with no coping resources. Both 
of these points will be addressed in the discussion of appraisal.) The second underwater 
shot introduces the factor of camera-movement: the camera closes in on the girl's body as 
her arms and legs paddle away in happy oblivion. Although the movement in this shot is 
created indirectly - i.e. camera moving to girl, as opposed to shark moving to camera - it 
exploits a visual phenomenon known as 'looming': this phenomenon occurs when an 
object increases in relative size, occupying a larger and larger proportion of our field of 
view. Crucially, Anderson (1996, p.85) explains the emotional impact of looming in 
nativist (and potentially associative) terms: he states that looming is 'universally perceived 
as threatening' and typically elicits responses of 'avoidance, retreat, and alarm'. 
The impression of 'fast-movement', on the other hand, is partly created by means 
of editing. As soon as the shark attack begins, the editing rate (or transitional speed) 
increases by a potentially significant factor of around 1.6. (Similarly, in the shower scene 
from Psycho, Hitchcock employs an Eisensteinian 'montage of attractions': the filming of 
the murder allegedly involving seventy-odd camera setups (see Rebello, 1998).) Crucially, 
Messaris (1994, p. 91) explains the emotional impact of a high editing rate and fast 
transitional speed in explicitly associative terms, suggesting that both 'can be seen as 
deriving their significance from a real-world association between speed and intensity'. 
Because we are incapable of attending to content and form simultaneously - and the 
emotional content is more salient - we are more likely to attribute this intensity to the 
situation itself - the shark attack or the murder - as opposed to the editing rate. 
(ii) Non-diegetic cues 
The proposed model suggests that the greater the number of (redundant) emotion cues 
presented, the greater the likelihood of generating an emotional response. The proposition 
that the film-maker works with something like this principle in mind is supported by the 
fact that they frequently add emotion cues from outside the world of the film. The most 
obvious examples of non-diegetic cues are provided by the film's music track. 
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A consideration of music brings us to a series of complex issues. In a discussion of 
music and film, Jeff Smith (1999) argues that many of the claims made about music in 
general - for example, that it lacks intentionality - do not apply to film music in particular, 
which accompanies a narrative featuring both characters and events. With respect to the 
relationship between music and emotion, Smith outlines two basic, and opposing, schools 
of thought. On the one hand, cognitivists such as Peter Kivy (1989) propose that music is 
merely capable of communicating the emotional state of a character or the emotional 
significance of a situation. On the other hand, emotivists such as Colin Radford (1989) 
propose that music is actually capable of eliciting an emotional state in the listener. Smith 
argues that the cognitivist and emotivist theories are not 'mutually exclusive', citing the 
fact that emotions comprise both cognitive and affective (physiological) components. With 
respect to cognition, he notes that music can influence the comprehension of affective 
meaning ('polarization'), and with respect to affect per se, he notes that music can have an 
'additive effect' ('affective congruence'). Smith does not, however, attempt to incorporate 
these two components into an overall model of the emotion system, thereby showing how 
the cognitive relates to the affective. The integration of the cognitivist and emotivist 
theories of music can be strengthened by making reference to the SP AARS framework and 
a specific, and relatively simple, example of film music. 
The affective power of music emphasised by emotivists can be partly explained in 
terms of the associative network route to (cinematic) emotion. The first underwater shot of 
the Watkins girl swimming cues the famous musical score written by John Williams (see 
Figure 4.10). When Williams first demonstrated the shark theme on a single piano - a 
simple 'two-note progression', beginning with E and moving to F - Spielberg thought he 
was joking. Nevertheless, the final (orchestrated) version of the score has been heralded as 
one of the most effective in movie history. In order to illustrate the importance of film 
music, for instance, Kalinak (1992, p.31) asks: 'Would the ocean seem menacing without 
the shark theme in laws?' In light of this undisputed success, is there something innately 
threatening about Williams's musical choice? Or to put it another way, does our 
interpretation of its threatening content rely on 'nature' as opposed to 'nuture'? 
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Figure 4.10: The shark theme (two-note progression) 
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Reprinted from Drannon (2000) . 
In a discussion of the byproduct explanation for the arts, Steven Pinker (1997, 
p.537) cites the shark theme as an example of 'pseudo-music': he suggests that 'the 
stripped-down figures and rhythms at the heart of a melody are simplified templates of 
evocative environmental sounds'. To what extent, can the emotional impact of the shark 
theme be understood in these terms? First, the final piece was scored for eight basses and 
five trombones - as partly indicated by the bass clef at the beginning of the notation 
(Kalinak, ibid., p.190). It is plausible that deeper sounds tend to be associated with larger, 
and more threatening, creatures, although, strangely, such associations are more likely to 
be based on human experience of certain land animals than human experience of oversized 
fish: for instance, Damasio (1994, p.131) cites growling as a possible example of a natural 
fear trigger. Even more strangely, perhaps, such associations may be based on human 
experience of potentially threatening but non-animistic phenomena, a possible example 
being the rumbling of thunder. 
Second, music does not consist of individual sounds but collections of notes. The 
lack of resolution to the two-note progression creates an instant tension, whilst the increase 
in pitch, albeit by a semi-tone, may possibly signal approach. In addition, the two-note 
progression is manipulated in at least two simple ways: the alteration of dynamics (soft to 
loud) and tempo (slow to fast) may signal that whatever has been approaching from a 
distance has now entered the realm of one's personal (that is, immediate) space. Anderson 
(1996, p.85) suggests that the auditory equivalent of 'looming' may be as innately 
threatening as its visual counterpart, citing the sound effect of the approaching footsteps of 
a killer. In addition, a fast tempo may be naturally associated with a fast pulse, which, in 
tum, may be naturally associated with threatening situations: Damasio (ibid.) also cites 
'certain configurations of body state'. To summarise, then, the shark theme - as an example 
of 'pseudo-music' - may comprise a number of natural fear triggers: each of these triggers 
may activate corresponding 'input nodes', which, in tum, send activation to the 'fear node' 
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by means of associative connections which have been established, or 'biologically 
prepared', over the course of human evolution. 
An even stronger case can be made for learning - 'nuture' as opposed to 'nature' -
especially with respect to the reception of later scenes in the film. Following the research 
of Annabel Cohen (1993), Smith (ibid., p.165) proposes an associationist (connectionist) 
model for understanding our reception of film music. For our purposes, the key feature of 
this model is its relation to the associative network model described above: for instance, 
musical expressions (leitmotifs, signatures) become associatively connected with 
characters, situations, and ideas. As a result, musical expressions gain emotional 
significance, or, to use Bower's language, the 'input nodes' for musical expressions 
become connected with 'emotion nodes'. In the case of Jaws, it is plausible that the shark 
theme qua two-note progression becomes associatively connected with the shark, and, 
thereby, with the fear node: in other words, it becomes a learnt fear trigger (see Figure 
4.11). Indeed, Williams talks explicitly about the viewer becoming 'conditioned', the two-
note progression coming to elicit a fear response in the way that the sound of the bell 
ringing in Pavlov's famous experiment came to elicit a salivation response. Given, 
furthermore, that the two-note progression (qua input pattern) and fear response (qua 
output pattern) are 'presented' to the network simultaneously, the two may become 
associated by the process of Hebbian learning described previously. 
Interestingly, Spielberg exploits the process of Hebbian learning to its full. As 
noted previously, the three false alarms - in the first half of the film - are not accompanied 
by the shark theme. Having conditioned the viewer to only expect the shark in the presence 
of the two-note progression, the first clear sighting of the shark - two thirds of the way into 
the film - occurs in the absence of any music whatsoever and, therefore, is all the more 
shocking. The insights of Williams and Spielberg also shed light on the 'additive effect' of 
music described by Smith: Spielberg, for instance, states that the musical score was 
responsible for 'half the success' of the film. When a preliminary version of the film was 
shown to test audiences without the musical score, it gained a disappointing reception. 
Conversely, the soundtrack album - musical score without film - has been described as a 
poor listening experience, one commentator asking, 'Who wants to sit and listen to the 
shark theme on a snowy day in Montana?' These two anecdotes suggest that the realisation 
of the film's affective potential requires the additional activation of the fear node provided 
by the music, whilst the realisation of the music's affective potential requires the additional 
activation of the fear node provided by the film. 
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Figure 4.11: Non-diegetic (musical) cues: the role of Hebbian learning 
Input nodll 
N.B. According to the Hebb rule, if a musical input node m and an emotion node e are 
activated simultaneously. then the weight of the associative connection between m and e is 
strengthened. 
It should be acknowledged that Williams's musical score develops in terms of 
complexity (see Figure 4.12a). As soon as the shark starts to attack the Watkins girl, the 
shark theme segues into what Andrew Drannon (2000) describes as 'Hermannesque horror 
scoring'. (presumably, Drannon is thinking here of the famous 'screeching violins' which 
accompany the shower scene cited previously - see Figure 4.12b.) At this point, brass and 
strings 'dissonances' express the emotional state of the girl (the seventh motif), whilst 
variations of the shark theme continue to signal the presence of the shark. (When the music 
calms during the inserts of the man lying on the beach, we hear instances of 'shimmering 
harp'.) Despite the increase in complexity, however, we can still offer tentative 'mimetic-
type' explanations for the affective impact of the music: for instance, the Hermannesque 
strings approximate the sound of human screams - and affectively complement the sound 
of the girl's screams on the diegetic soundtrack - whilst the 'dissonances' create tension in 
a similar way to the unresolved two-note progression playing beneath. It should be noted 
that the music reaches a climax and terminates as the girl is pulled under the water (see 
Frame 4.2a). Considering that this music occurs in conjunction with the facial, bodily, and 
vocal expressions of fear - and the dialogue "Oh my God!" and "God help me!" - described 
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above, the shot in question presents the densest 'configuration' of emotion cues in the 
entire sequence, plausibly resulting in the strongest activation of the fear node. 
Figure 4.12a: The seventh motif (Jaws, .1975) 
I  
Figure 4.12b: 'The shower' (Psycho, t 960) 
Figures 4.12a and b are reprinted from Drannon (2000) and Tagg (1992) respective ly. 
(iii) Somata-visceral cues 
The third and final category of emotion cues originates in the 'theatre' of the viewer's 
body and brain: namely, somata-visceral cues. Given the reputation of both Jaws and 
Psycho as significant examples of the horror genre, it is plausible that the horrific content 
of the scenes described above will generate fear-type responses in a significant number of 
viewers. (Note that these responses might also be generated via the cognitive appraisal 
route to (cinematic) emotion - to be discussed below.) To recap, our fear responses would 
comprise two components. The physiological component would involve the internal organs 
(viscera): for instance, upon seeing the Watkins girl attacked by the shark we might 
experience changes in heart rate, respiration, and perspiration, along with an adrenaline-
rush. The behavioural component, on the other hand, would involve the skeletal muscles 
(soma): although we would refrain from both running out of the cinema and offering the 
character of Marion Crane any assistance, our muscles might tense up in 'preparation' for 
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fight-or-flight action. According to Damasio's account of somato-visceral feedback 
(described in section 3.2), interoceptive information (regarding visceral body states) and 
proprioceptive information (regarding somatic body states) would be signalled via the 
'body loop' to somatosensory structures in the central nervous system, from the brain stem 
upwards. 
The associative network model allows us to clarify and elaborate on the role of 
somato-visceral feedback (see Figure 4.13). To begin with, we should think of the somato-
visceral cues in question as emotion cues in their own right, and the somatosensory 
structures described by Damasio as input nodes in a 'massively distributed' associative 
network. In particular, the associative (network) account improves our understanding in 
two respects. First, the account allows us to demonstrate how our emotional responses to 
fiction film may be self-perpetuating: as the diagram illustrates, somato-visceral cues 
might activate the fear node by means of associative connections, thereby generating 
further fearful states. (This claim is supported by neurobiological evidence: LeDoux, 1993, 
p.115, claims that 'the amygdala also receives messages back concerning the visceral 
responses it produces'.) Second, the account allows us to support LeDoux's (1998, p.294) 
proposal that somato-visceral feedback has sufficient 'specificity' to distinguish, say, the 
adrenaline-fuelled fear we might experience upon (observing a character) being attacked, 
from the adrenaline-fuelled excitement we might experience upon (observing an athlete) 
winning a marathon, as long as we consider the 'biological context' in which such 
feedback occurs. As we have seen in the discussion of diegetic (personal) cues, an 
associative (connectionist) network may be capable of taking biological context into 
account (see Figure 4.7). In order to adapt this model to suit our current purposes, simply 
replace the input node for 'facial expression X' with one for 'somato-visceral feedback X', 
and the 'happiness node' with an 'excitement node'. 
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Figure 4.13: Somato-visceral cues: the role of somato-visceral feedback 
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In conclusion, the account of the associative network route to (cinematic) emotion enables 
us to understand the impact of the (multiple) emotion cues presented by both the world and 
the cinema. The sequences from Jaws and Psycho present us with an array of fear cues: 
diegetic cues are presented from inside the filmic world (the main sources being the person 
and the situation); non-diegetic cues are presented from outside the filmic world (the main 
source being the music track); and somato-visceral cues are presented via the 'theatre' of 
the brain and body, Individually and collectively, these fear cues would be capable of 
activating the fear node and eliciting a fear-type response. According to attribution theory 
(introduced in section 3.3), we would causally attribute these responses to the respective 
sequences as the most salient aspects of our environment. 
The final issue we need to address concerns the question of why it seems to be 
more effective to 'leave something to the imagination'. The exact nature of the imagination 
_ otherwise known as emotional imagery - will be discussed in Chapter 5. For the time 
being, we should note a simple dynamic (see Figure 4.14). On the one hand, it is plausible 
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that each of the fear cues described operates as an affective prompt: Spielberg states that he 
wanted the girl's 'violent jerking motions' to 'trigger our imagination' about what is 
happening below the surface of the water. On the other hand, by denying us the view of the 
emotional stimulus - either the threatening creature or the unknown assailant - the film 
does not provide us with sufficient information to afJectively constrain this imaginative 
process once it has been brought into play. There is nothing to tie our imagination down, 
nothing to stop it spiralling, as it were - hence, our tendency to 'imagine the worse'. 






4.3 TRACING THE COGNITIVE APPRAISAL ROUTE TO (CINEMATIC) EMOTION 
(a) Another approach to (cinematic) emotion: the role of situational meaning 
How should we go about tracing the cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion? In 
Chapter 3 (section 3.2), we introduced the role of cognitive appraisal but did not describe it 
in any detail. In particular, we did not answer the question of whether or not cognitive 
appraisal relies on existence beliefs. It is time now to address these outstanding issues. 
Let us begin by reiterating two emotional extremes. The first extreme is represented 
by the primary emotions - otherwise known as 'affect programs' (Griffiths, 1997) - and 
centres on the notion of an 'emotional stimulus' (qua sensory object). Once again, the most 
obvious example is the prototypical fear scenario of being confronted by a threatening 
creature. In this case, a neurobiological account seems to be sufficient: if the emotional 
impact of the creature can be explained in tenns of the associative matching of a perceptual 
pattern with some sort of 'template' in the emotion system, then we need not refer to 
cognitive appraisal - and the entities of goals and concerns - at all. The second extreme is 
represented by the secondary emotions - otherwise known as 'higher cognitive emotions' 
(ibid.) - and centres on the notion of 'situational meaning' (as a type of abstract object). 
Possible examples are the 'existential' or 'abstract fears' described in section 4.1. In this 
case, a cognitive account is required: if the emotional impact of situational meaning cannot 
be explained in tenns of the associative matching process described above, then we are 
obliged to propose that cognitive appraisal - in reference to goals and concerns - plays 
some sort of causal role in the proceedings. 
For the pragmatic purpose of bridging the gap between the neurobiological and 
cognitive accounts - whilst dealing with a short, and relatively self-contained, film 
sequence - it will be best to find a kind of halfway point between the two extremes: that is, 
primary emotions (or 'affect programs') which are elaborated by 'higher cognitive 
processing'. Perhaps the best example is being in the apparent presence and proximity of a 
threatening creature which is 'sensory' and 'stimulus-based' on the one hand, but out of 
sight - and therefore 'abstract' and 'meaning-based' - on the other. As we have seen, 
LeDoux (1998, p.177) states that cognitive appraisal is probably mediated by the prefrontal 
cortex. Given the limitations of brain imagining techniques and so forth, however, we need 
to go beyond the neurobiological level of explanation. For a philosopher such as Robert 
Roberts (2003, Ch. 1) - who is critical of the neurobiological account - the answer lies in 
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conceptual analysis; an approach which investigates 'the ways people talk about the 
emotions in the contexts of their life'. From my perspective as a cognitive theorist, it lies in 
appealing to a cognitive (and an intentional) level of explanation; an approach which will 
allow us to make a distinction between different types of appraisal. 
(i) A story about a shark within a story about a beach 
In order to trace the cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion, we need to compare 
the appraisal processes which are inspired by cinematic situations with those which are 
inspired by their real-world counterparts. In the opening sequence from Jaws, the 
underwater POY shots and ominous musical score serve as indirect indications of the 
presence and proximity of the shark; considering that a real-world situation is unlikely to 
present such emotion cues, we need to find a film sequence which begins by placing us in 
the same position as the 'target character', whilst relying on a more natural form of 
communication, the most obvious example being human speech. In addition, it will suit our 
purposes to demonstrate - at least implicitly - how appraisals (and associations) operate not 
only between a cinematic situation and a real-world counterpart, but also between one film 
and another. 
These various considerations bring us to our chosen example. A short, and 
relatively self-contained, sequence from Danny Boyle's The Beach (2000) pays homage to 
the cultural legacy of Spielberg's earlier film. Richard (played by Leonardo DiCaprio) is 
travelling in Thailand with a young French couple, Etienne (Guillaume Canet) and 
Fran90ise (Virginie Ledoyen). In an attempt to reach an island which houses the legendary 
beach of the film's title, the three travellers are forced to swim the final stretch of their 
journey (see Frame 4.4). Halfway across, Etienne fearfully informs Richard that he has 
seen a shark fin about one hundred metres away. A few moments later, we hear Etienne cry 
out off-screen as Fran~oise is "pulled under" the water. In a state of panic, Richard 
remonstrates with Etienne about what might have happened to Fran~oise. The scene ends 
with a series of underwater POV shots which close in on Richard. The final POY shot is 
only inches away from his body. Richard cries out but, contrary to our expectations, 
Francoise - rather than a shark - breaks through the surface of the water. Etienne and 
Francoise burst out laughing. It transpires that both Richard and we, the viewer, have been 
the dupes of an elaborate joke. 
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Frame 4.4: A story about a shark within a story about a beach: The Beach (2000) 
Etienne's story about a shark bears an obvious resemblance to Radford's example 
of the man's 'harrowing story' about his sister: i.e., we are told a 'harrowing story' which 
turns out to be false. Notice, however, that this is an instance of a story within a story. In 
order to appreciate the potential strangeness of this fact, it will be informative to tum 
briefly to the original novel by Alex Garland (1997). In the fourth part of the novel, 
Garland describes the three characters' swim to the island by using the character of 
Richard as a first-person narrator: 
The swim passed in stages. The first was full of confidence, chatting as we found a kicking 
rhythm, and making jokes about sharks. Then, as our legs began to ache and the water no 
longer felt cold enough to cool us down, we stopped talking. By this time, as on Ole boat 
ride from Ko Samui, the beach behind us seemed as far away as the island ahead. The jokes 
about sharks became fears, and I started to doubt iliat I had the strength to finish the swim. 
Or doubt, quote unquote. We were about halfway between the two points. Not being able to 
finish the swim would mean dying. (p.7l) 
Although Garland places us in the position of Richard - in terms of narrational 
knowledge - and refers to the characters 'making jokes about sharks', he does not attempt 
to fool us in the manner described: for instance, he does not write a dialogue exchange in 
which Etienne informs Richard that he has seen a shark fin about one hundred metres 
away. Whether or not Garland entertained this option (and then rejected it), it is intriguing 
to speculate whether or not Etienne's story would have been capable of eliciting a fear 
response of equivalent intensity in the context of the novel. Ifwe are inclined to argue for 
the negative, then we are left with the following question: What is it about the medium of 
film in particular that makes it plausible that we appraise Etienne's story as if it were of 
direct relevance to our own personal well-being as viewers? 
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(a) The role of cognition in SPAARS 
How should we understand the role of cognition in SPAARS? Imagine being in an 
equivalent situation in the real world, swimming in shark-infested waters with two friends, 
one of whom fearfully infonns you that they have seen a shark fin about one hundred 
metres away. Following the SPAARS framework advanced by Power and Dalgleish, our 
emotional response to this situation can be broken down into two key stages (see Figure 
4.15).13 
(1) The propositional level of the mind. The first stage of the process would involve 
the propositional level of the mind where, to paraphrase Power and Dalgleish, knowledge 
about sharks and their likely behaviour would be activated. This process would result in an 
interpretation of the situational meaning: for instance, "It is possible that the shark is going 
to attack us." Significantly, however, this interpretation would be 'cold' and 'non-
emotional' in nature; that is, it would not be capable of generating an emotional response 
in its own right. 
(2) The schematic model level o/the mind. The second stage of the process involves 
the schematic model level of the mind. According to Oatley and Johnson-Laird's (1987) 
cognitive theory of emotions, each of the five 'basic' emotions occurs when there is a 
'juncture' (i.e., a critical moment) in either a goal or a plan: for instance, fear occurs when 
a survival goal is 'threatened', disgust when a gustatory goal is 'violated', anger when an 
active goal is 'frustrated', sadness when a significant goal is 'lost', and happiness when a 
significant goal is 'achieved'. In light of this, the 'cold' and 'non-emotional' interpretation 
would be related to our survival 'goal structures' to produce a 'hot' and 'emotional' 
appraisal of the situation: we can think of this appraisal as effectively adding an 
exclamation mark to the above statement. The end-result would be the generation of an 
adaptive emotional response (namely, fear) with its associated physiological, behavioural, 
and subjective components. 
13 Power and Dalgleish cite a version of the prototypical fear situation originally described by William James 
in 1884: Susan encounters a threatening bear in the woods (pp.l69-173). According to the authors, the 
process begins with the analogical level of the mind: 'the bear would be perceived and recognised via visual 
analogical representations.' In order to separate the cognitive account from the neurobiological one, however, 
we need to remove the 'analogical' from the emotional equation. Although in a strict sense our friend's 
words would be processed by analogical systems - namely, auditory and language-processing systems - this 
processing would not be of direct emotional significance. 
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Figure 4.15: The schematic model level route to emotion 
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Adapted from Figure 5.5 from Power and Dalgleish (1997), p.I72. 
Power and Dalgleish (pp.204-205) go on to describe the 'cycles of appraisal' in 
operation when we are confronted by a potentially threatening situation in the real world 
(see Figure 4.16). The fIrst cycle of appraisal effectively says "I am confronted by an 
emotional event (i.e., an event which is of relevance to goals and concerns).", whilst the 
second cycle effectively says "This event is potentially incompatible with those goals and 
concerns." In the third and fourth cycles, the true nature of the threat - and its relation to 
our goals - is appraised, with reference to available 'coping resources'. Significantly, 
Power and Dalgleish propose that fear can be a 'function' of the first two cycles of 
appraisal alone, citing the following example: 'When we sit strapped in to the roller coaster 
before it starts, we cannot help feeling a tingle of fear, even though we have chosen to be 





Figure 4.16: Cycles of appraisal (appraisal cycle format) 
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Based on Figure 6.3 from Power and Dalgleish (1997), p.205. 
(b) Understanding the cognitive level of the mind 14 
How should we develop our understanding of the cognitive level of the mind? The 
relevance of Power and Dalgleish's rollercoaster example to film viewing is obvious: 
simply replace the seat in the rollercoaster with a seat in a cinema. In order, however, to 
develop our understanding of the appraisal process - and to clarify the specific role played 
by the different appraisal cycles - let us consider two examples of appraisal theory. 
(i) Lazarus's appraisal theory 
The first example of appraisal theory is provided by Richard Lazarus (1991 ).15 Lazarus 
proposes that each type of emotion corresponds to a particular 'person-environment 
relationship' and each type of relational meaning corresponds to a core relational theme. 
In the case of fear, for instance, the core relational theme is 'the concrete and sudden 
danger of imminent physical harm' (p.234). If a person values the goal of self-preservation 
(an example of a personal variable) on the one hand, but their environment contains a man-
eating shark (an environmental variable) on the other, then the most appropriate emotion is 
fear. If either of these conditions fails to hold, however, then fear will not ensue. (An 
alternative scenario is as follows: the person may value the goal of self-preservation but 
not believe that the shark poses a genuine threat.) 
14 For a recent discussion of appraisal theories of emotion, see Scherer (\ 999). 
IS Also see Lazarus (1966); Smith and Lazarus (1993). 
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The assessment of the relational meaning in operation requires cognitive appraisal. 
In this respect, Lazarus makes a significant distinction between three types of apprai al 
(see Figure 4.17).16 Primary appraisal typically involves the assessment of the components 
of goal relevance, goal (in)congruence, and type of ego-involvement. At thi s stage, a key 
question would be: "Is apparent proximity to a shark potentially incongruent with my 
(survival) goals?" The answer to this question - "Yes: some sharks are man-eaters!" -
would suggest that a negative emotion is appropriate. Secondary appraisal, on the other 
hand, typically involves the assessment of the components of accountability, coping 
potential, and future expectancy. At this stage, a key question would be: 'What are my 
coping resources?' The answer to this question - ''None: I am in the middle of the ea with 
no means of protection!" - would determine the exact nature of the negative emotion 
(namely, fear). Third and final, reappraisal would entail a further evaluation of the 
situation in light of emotional feedback from primary and secondary appraisal. It should be 
stressed that we should not think of these stages as occurring in sequence; rather, they may 
occur simultaneously (or even in reverse): Lazarus states that 'a decision-tree format helps 
the reader to understand the theoretical or explanatory logic of appraisal but does not 
describe how a person goes about appraising in the real world' (p.IS1). 




(1) goal relevance? 
(2) goal (In)compatibllity? 




(2) coping potential? 




In Ugh! 01 above 
16 In the case of fear, Lazarus proposes that ego-involvement is not essential; no secondary appraisal 
components are essential, as accountability (blame) is 'irrelevant' and both coping resources and future 
expectancies are 'uncertain' (pp.236-238). 
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(ii) Frijda 's appraisal theory 
The second example of appraisal theory is advanced by Nico Fridja (1986), whose work 
forms a significant part of Ed Tan's (1996) account of filmic emotion. Frijda proposes that 
each emotion corresponds to a particular situational meaning structure. Because this 
structure incorporates both personal and environmental variables in the way described 
above, it should not be thought of as a 'stimulus pattern' (p.195). Similarly, the assessment 
of situational meaning requires cognitive appraisal. Considering these two points, then, 
Frijda's notion of 'situational meaning' corresponds to Lazarus's notion of 'relational 
meaning'. Following Lazarus's earlier work, moreover, Frijda also makes a distinction 
between primary and secondary appraisal (pp.204-214). According to Frijda, primary 
appraisal involves the assessment of the 'core components' of situational meaning, 
whereas secondary appraisal involves the assessment of the 'context components'. Once 
again, the end-results of secondary appraisal may determine the status of the experienced 
emotion. (Frijda, 1988, cites various laws of emotion: for example, the 'Law of Situational 
Meaning', the 'Law of Concern', and the 'Law of Apparent Reality'.) 
Significantly, Frijda (1993) questions the complexity and conscious nature of the 
appraisal process, claiming that appraisal theorists tend to confuse the 'cognitive 
elaboration' of emotional experience (accessible by self-report) for the 'cognitive 
antecedents' of emotion (not accessible by self-report). In contrast, Frijda suggests that the 
assessment of situational meaning and the status of the experienced emotion is achieved by 
primary appraisal alone; this appraisal should be thought of as an automatic, nonconscious 
process (ibid., p.374). Interestingly, Frijda compares the primary appraisal of an event's 
emotional significance to the 'direct perception' of what that event affords - or, more 
precisely perhaps, does not afford - the subject (ibid., p.381). To return to our shark 
example, then, the initial appraisal of situational meaning would occur automatically and 
non-consciously; we would respond fearfully to the apparent danger without consciously 
weighing up the pros and cons of the situation. Subsequent appraisals would merely 
elaborate upon our fearful experience. 
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(c) Illustrating the model 
Having considered two examples of appraisal theory, we are in a position to propose a 
model of the cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion (see Figures 4.ISa and b). 
This model combines the different appraisal cycles described by Power and Dalgleish with 
a revised interpretation of the different appraisal stages described by Lazarus and Frijda -
and is illustrated in two formats accordingly. 
Although Lazarus (1991, pp.292-296) briefly discusses the 'aesthetic emotions', he 
acknowledges that psychologists have given little attention to this subject, citing Frijda 
(1989) as the only example of significance. Frijda, however, appeals to the problematic 
notion of 'suspending disbelief'. Ironically, the proposed model suggests that a key to 
understanding such emotions lies in revising their own two- (and three-) fold distinctions 
between the different stages of appraisal - a revision which, moreover, allows us to 
reconcile the earlier and later versions of Frijda's theory. This revision also allows us to 
account for the emotional impact of the second, third, and fourth ways of 'seeing' 
described in Chapter 2. 
SITU. 
lEANING 
Figure 4.18a: The cognitive appraisal route: appraisal cycle format 
.' , , 
PRIMARY APPRAISAL 
... nII .... (type II) 
cycle 1 cydt 2 
" l , 
• 
, 
>"'" feedback 1: 
potential intensity tMg8 
>"'", feedback 1: 
polentisl inIen8Ity range 
pot. fear (neg. 8tDUS8I) pot. fur (neg. 8IOU8BI) 
242 
SECONDARY APPRAISAL I REAPPRAISAL 
_ ..... (type I) I (type II) 
• 
." , 
eyel .. 3a/b 
\""feedback 3elb: 
maximal I minimal anxiety 
.,-, 
\" ... ftedbeck 3e Ib: 
maldmal I mlnlm8l8flxJety 




,/ feedback 1: 




reprdillfl·. (type n) 
(1) 8IV. goal "vanat? 
(2) 8IV.goaI (lIl)compalibility? 
--------------------, 
l ...... _ .. 11 
, pot. fear (neg . ... ""'-, SECONDARYAP~ 




I , , 
I 














/r------------ (3&) thlllllt to my Irv. goals? -------------'-_, 
/ feedback 2: (41) my coping 18IOUI'CIII? '\ 
: reduced /nt8nsIty range 
REAPPRAISAL 1IIin,.. (type H) 
,/ (3b) tnat to my 8IV. goals? 
:' (4b) my coping re8OUl'08I? 
I 
I • I 
I 
I 




b) IInat k) cll.'s srv.ps? '-, 

















































_____________ 'f' ... , ___ ~, I , 
low high 
(i) Primary appraisal (automatic appraisal) 
According to the proposed model, the primary appraisal stage assesses the meaning of the 
depicted situation with respect to the characters as protagonists. 17 This move allows us to 
accept Frijda's (1993) proposal that primary appraisal alone is capable of determining the 
specific nature of the most appropriate emotion, whilst adding the qualification that the 
emotion in question relates to the characters as protagonists (as opposed to ourselves as 
viewers). 
A consideration of the primary appraisal stage allows us to understand the 
emotional impact of the second way of 'seeing' described in Chapter 2. Following our 
17 Although the situational meaning for the character and the viewer may differ - according to the distribution 
of narrational information - in this particular case it coincides (see Tan, 1996, p.184; Hogan. 2003, p.150). 
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discussion of Darwinian modularity, we should think of primary appraisal as being 
performed by what Ekman (2003, p.21) describes as an 'automatic-appraising mechanjsm', 
or autoappraiser for short. With respect to film viewing, automatic appraisal provides us 
with another example of regarding-as (type II) in the sense that it is relatively' sensitive' to 
the personal and environmental variables cited by Lazarus on the one hand, but relatively 
'insensitive' to those variables - existence beliefs, knowledge, and memories - which 
pertain to the true nature of our environment on the other. Subsequent feedback effectively 
determines the potential 'intensity range' of our emotional responses, generating a negative 
emotional state which has the potential to become full-blown fear. 
Frame 4.5: Innuences on primary appraisal: close shot from The Beach (1999) 
o Adoption of goals: the role of the diegetic effect 
In order to understand the dynamics of the primary appraisal stage, let us consider two key 
questions. The first key question is: why do we assess the meaning of the depicted situation 
with respect to the characters - effectively adopting the characters' goals - when we 'know' 
that they are only fictional? On the one hand, Alex Garland as a novelist is able to describe 
the swimming stage of the three characters' journey. In a discussion which focuses on 
literary fictions, Keith Oatley (l994) implies that the reader 'adopts' the goals of the 
character through an act of will. On the other hand, Danny Boyle as a film-maker is able to 
realise the journey's true 'affective potential'. In a discussion of filmic fictions, Grodal 
(1997) proposes that the viewer 'adopts' the goals of the character through the process of 
'cognitive identification' . The proposed model suggests an alternative explanation. 
Because our survival 'goal structures' are, by definition, fundamentally related to survival, 
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it stands to reason that they are always 'on standby' and always 'on a hair-trigger', readily 
brought into play by apparently dangerous situations. 
This point brings us back to the diegetic effect in terms of presence and immersion 
(see section 2.2). Considering that our perceptual access to the sea environment in question 
is partially determined by the nature of the viewing situation, let us assume that we view 
the sequence in a modem multiplex theatre. In this particular situation, the size of the 
filmic image (as measured by visual angle) and the shape of the filmic image (2.35: I 
widescreen aspect ratio) would produce a high level of what Loomis would describe as 
'equivalent visual information'. Conversely, the lack of illumination in the theatre would 
incidentally playa significant role in minimising the salience of the theatrical environment 
in which we are actually situated, thereby producing a low level of 'non-equivalent visual 
information'. In addition to the viewing situation, our perceptual access to the sea 
environment is obviously manipulated by Boyle himself. With the notable exception of a 
single long shot discussed below, all of the shots are filmed close to both the characters 
and the water's surface (see Frame 4.5, above): filming close to the characters increases the 
salience of certain personal cues (for example, facial and bodily expressions of fear and 
alarm), whilst filming close to the undulating surface of the water maximises motion 
parallax and visual kinesthesis (in other words, we may feel as if we are actually floating 
along with the characters). 
In conclusion, we can propose a first functional relationship (see Figure 4.19): the 
higher the level of diegetic influence - and the higher the level of 'apparent reality' - the 
higher the probability of a successful primary appraisal taking place; that is, a primary 
appraisal which is capable of eliciting potential fear (negative arousal). 
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Figure 4.19: Functional relationship I: the role of the diegetic effect 
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o Appraisal cycles 1 and 2: goal relevance and goal incompatibility 
The second key question is: how does the process of primary appraisal operate? In the 
proposed model, the process goes through at least two basic cycles. The first cycle 
determines that the depicted situation is of potential relevance to our goals in general by 
effectively saying, "I am in an emotional situation," whilst the second cycle determines 
that the situation is incompatible with our survival goals in particular by saying something 
along the lines of, "I am in danger." 
How is goal relevance and goal incompatibility communicated? The first channel 
of communication originates within the world of the film. In the sequence in question, the 
main source of diegetic communication is provided by the dialogue. The appraisal of the 
statement, "I saw a (shark) fin," would be similar - if not identical - to the appraisal of its 
real-world counterpart: for instance, it would involve the automatic processing of 
information at the propositional and schematic model levels of the mind in the manner 
described above, the 'cold' interpretation, "fin equals shark," being followed by the 'hot' 
appraisal, "shark equals danger!,,18 
18 In the opening sequence from Jaws, the presence of the shark is partly communicated by the two 
underwater POV shots, whilst the size and threat of the shark is partly communicated by the Watkins girl's 
'thrashing' body movements. 
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Another source of diegetic communication is provided by the 'affective cues' 
presented by the given situation (see Figure 4.20). According to Blascovich and Mendes's 
(2000) 'biopsychosocial model', we assess an 'active performance situation' - for instance, 
taking an exam - for either challenge or threat: following Lazarus's distinction between 
primary and secondary appraisal, we perform various 'demand' and 'resource appraisals' 
respectively.19 If the situational resources outweigh the situational demands (for example, 
we are well-prepared for the exam), then we experience a sense of challenge; if, on the 
other hand, the situational demands outweigh the situational resources (the exam questions 
tum out to be more difficult than we had expected), then we experience a sense of threat. 
Although Blascovich and Mendes cite 'viewing a scary film' as an example of a 
'passive performance situation' - in other words, a case which falls outside the rubric of 
their particular model - at the level of primary appraisal, the depicted situation would be 
treated in a decidedly active fashion (p.60). Given that this is the case, we can consider the 
authors's proposal that demand appraisals involve an assessment of at least three different 
factors: the depicted situation entails 'danger' (a possible shark), 'uncertainty' (regarding 
the exact nature and whereabouts of the shark), and 'required effort' (regarding the 
possibilities of escape). Significantly, each of these demand appraisals might be influenced 
by affective cues: for instance, the close shots of the sea might be associated with danger 
(drowning), uncertainty (depth of water), and required effort (swimming to safety). (The 
relationship between affective cues and resource appraisals will be discussed in the section 
on reappraisal, below.) 






rtprdIng .. (type H) 
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19 Thanks to Jim Blascovich, Department of Psychology, UCSB, for introducing me to this model. 
247 
The second channel of communication originates outside the world of the film: the 
most obvious source of non-diegetic communication is the music track (see Figure 4.21). 
As we have seen, the associationist (connectionist) account allows us to support the 
emotivist proposal that music is actually capable of eliciting an emotional state in the 
listener. How, though, should we understand the cognitivist proposal that music is merely 
capable of communicating the emotional state of a character or the emotional significance 
of a situation? And how should we reconcile the cognitivist and emotivist positions? The 
musical score written by Angelo Badalamenti is another example of what Pinker describes 
as 'pseudo-music' (resembling Williams's score for Jaws in significant respects). 
Regarding the cognitive process of communication, it is plausible that Badalamenti's score 
would be interpreted as signalling the presence of the shark, whilst the alteration of 
dynamics (soft to loud) and tempo (slow to fast) would be interpreted as signalling the 
shark's approach. These interpretations would be performed at the propositional level of 
the mind and be essentially cognitive - that is, 'cold' and 'non-emotional' - in nature. 
The cognitivist's mistake is to assume that the story ends here. As stated 
previously, Smith argues that many of the claims made about music in general - for 
example, that it lacks intentionality - do not apply to film music in particular which 
accompanies an audiovisual narrative featuring both characters and events. In a related 
fashion, the assumption that music lacks emotionality need not apply to film music which 
accompanies an audiovisual narrative which somehow encourages us to 'take on' the goals 
of the characters as they encounter the events in question. This acknowledgement brings us 
to the crucial link. At the schematic model level of the mind, the 'cold' and 'non-
emotional' interpretation of the music track would be related to the goal structures in 
question to produce a 'hot' and 'emotional' appraisal of the situation, thereby generating 
some sort of fear response. In conclusion, the appraisal account provides us with a 
potential way of resolving the cognitivist-emotivist debate - at least with respect to film 
music - by allowing us to causally relate the communicative function emphasised by 
cognitivists with the affective function emphasised by emotivists. 
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Figure 4.21: Reconciling the emotivist and cognitivist theories of music and emotion 
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According to the proposed model, the secondary appraisal stage assesses the meaning of 
the depicted situation with respect to ourselves as viewers. This move allows us to accept 
both Lazarus's (1991) and Frijda's (1986) proposal that secondary appraisal is required to 
determine the specific nature of the most appropriate emotion, whilst adding the 
qualification that the emotion in question relates to ourselves as viewers (as opposed to the 
characters as protagonists). 
A consideration of the secondary appraisal stage allows us to (further) understand 
the emotional impact of the third way of 'seeing' described in Chapter 2. Following our 
discussion of central processing, we should think of secondary appraisal as being 
equivalent to the central process which is 'sensitive' to those variables - non-existence 
beliefs, knowledge, and memories - pertaining to the true nature of our situation. With 
respect to film viewing, the central process in question provides us with another example 
of seeing-as (type J) in the sense that it successfully distinguishes a cinematic 
representation from its actual referent, thereby stipulating that the depicted situation is not 
of emotional significance with respect to our own goals and concerns. The subsequent 
feedback would effectively reduce the potential intensity range of our negative responses, 
thereby determining that our emotional state could not develop into full-blown fear. 
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o Adoption of goals: the viewing situation 
In the case of secondary appraisal, the first key question is: why do we assess the meaning 
of the depicted situation from the perspective of - and adopt the goals of - a person placed 
in a non-threatening viewing situation? In this instance, the answer is simple: we really are 
in a non-threatening viewing situation. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that we 
possess the relevant set of goals. 
o Appraisal cycles 3a and 4a: ego-involvement and coping resources 
The second key question is: how does the process of secondary appraisal operate? In the 
proposed model, the process proceeds via the first branch of appraisal cycles. The third 
cycle would assess the level of ego-involvement and effectively say, "My survival goals 
are not being threatened," whilst the fourth cycle would assess the available coping 
resources by saying something along the lines of, "I am in a cinema and I am watching a 
fiction film." 
To return to the 'biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat', Blascovich and 
Mendes's claim that 'viewing a scary film' is an example of a 'passive performance 
situation' is correct at the level of secondary appraisal. The authors propose that resource 
appraisals involve an assessment of the presence or absence of coping resources. Given 
that the resources inherent in the viewing situation outweigh the situational demands 
presented by the sequence, it is unlikely that we would experience a full-blown sense of 
threat. 
(iii) Reappraisal (reflective appraisal) 
According to the proposed model, the reappraisal stage re-assesses the meaning of the 
depicted situation with respect to either the characters as protagonists or ourselves as 
viewers. This move allows us to accept Lazarus's (1991) proposal that reappraisal serves to 
clarify the specific nature of the most appropriate emotion in the light of primary and 
secondary appraisals. 
250 
A consideration of the reappraisal stage allows us to understand the emotional 
impact of the fourth and final way of 'seeing' described in Chapter 2, by leading us once 
again to the intentional level of explanation. Following our discussion of conscious 
(attentive) processing, we should think of reappraisal as being equivalent to what Ekman 
(2003, p.24) describes as reflective appraisal. With respect to film viewing, reflective 
appraisal provides us with another example of seeing-as (type J/) in the sense that it 
operates in a conscious, 'serial' fashion, emerging from a hierarchy of central processors 
operating in parallel. The subsequent feedback would either minimise or maximise the 
intensity of our negative responses 'within' the reduced range described previously, 
thereby determining that our emotional state is either a minimal or a maximal form of 
anxiety. 
Frame 4.6: Influences on reappraisal: long shot from The Beach (2000) 
o Re-adoption of goals: the role of motivational prompting 
The first key question is: why do we consciously re-assess the meaning of the depicted 
situation with respect to either the characters as protagonists or ourselves as viewers -
effectively re-adopting the corresponding goals - when we know that the characters are 
only fictional and that we are not in danger? Although the automatic results of primary 
appraisal would be largely over-ridden by the discriminatory powers of secondary 
appraisal, a causal link between the film and a negative emotional response - made known 
to us by means of the body loop - would still remain. According to attribution theory, 
furthermore, we would causally attribute this response to the depicted situation as the most 
salient aspect of our environment. This point brings us to the role of motivational 
prompting. Given that negative arousal is unpleasant - almost by definition - it stands to 
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reason that we will seek to reduce it in some way. With respect to our discussion of the 
paradox of horror, this proposal need not contradict the sensation-seeking hypothesis for 
we can add the following proviso: experiencing negative emotions is desirable if and only 
if we are provided with a suitable 'get-out clause'. 
(1) Engagement strategies. The first option effectively goes with the grain and 
involves maintaining the causal link in question. As conscious and attentive beings, we can 
keep our eyes rooted on the screen and devote our processing resources to re-assessing the 
meaning of the depicted situation with respect to the characters as protagonists, whilst 
hoping that everything turns out for the best. We can think of this feedback as effectively 
maximising the intensity of our emotional responses 'within' the reduced range described, 
thereby determining that our emotional state is a maximal form of anxiety.20 (2) 
Detachment strategies. The second option effectively goes against the grain and involves 
severing the link in question. As behavioural and cognitive beings, we can employ various 
coping strategies: for instance, we can look away from the screen or we can remind 
ourselves that what we are seeing is only a film. The employment of such strategies, 
however, is more likely in cases of graphic horror than in cases of non-graphic suspense. 
We can think of this feedback as effectively minimising the intensity of our emotional 
responses 'within' the reduced range described above, thereby determining that our 
emotional state is a minimal form of anxiety.21 
In conclusion, we can propose a second functional relationship (see Figure 4.22): 
the higher the level of negative arousal (resulting from primary appraisal), the higher the 
probability of reappraisal taking place; that is, a reappraisal which is capable of either 
maximising or minimising the overall level of negative arousal. 
20 Koriat et a1. (1972) found that subjects who employed various involvement strategies whilst viewing the 
events depicted by stressful films generated greater psychophysical responses. Examples of such strategies 
included "I tried to imagine that it is happening to me." and "I tried to imagine that it is happening to 
somebody 1 know." 
21 In a series of experiments conducted by Lazarus and his colleagues in the 1960s (for example, Lazarus and 
Alfert, 1964) subjects were shown stressful films: one of these films documented a tribal 'rite-of-passage' 
ceremony in which adolescent boys underwent a surgical operation known as 'subincision'. Significantly, 
Lazarus and co. found that subjects who employed various detachment strategies whilst viewing the film 
reduced the intensity of their psychophysical responses. Examples of detachment strategies included telling 
oneself that the events in question were not as serious as they appeared (the 'denial' condition) and adopting 
the scientific perspective of an anthropologist (the 'intellectualization' condition). 
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o Appraisal cycles 3b and 4b: ego-involvement and coping resources 
The second key question is: how does the process of reappraisal operate? In the proposed 
model, the process proceeds via the second branch of appraisal cycles. If we chose to 
employ engagement strategies, then the third cycle would re-assess the level of ego-
involvement and effectively say, "The characters' survival goals are being threatened," 
whilst the fourth cycle would re-assess the available coping resources by saying something 
along the lines of, "The characters are in the middle of the sea with no means of 
protection." If, on the other hand, we chose to employ detachment strategies, then the third 
cycle would re-assess the level of ego-involvement by reiterating that, "My survival goals 
are not being threatened," whilst the fourth cycle would re-assess the available coping 
resources by reiterating that, "I am in a cinema and 1 am watching a fiction film." 
Given that engagement is more central to our concerns than detachment, how is the 
threat to the characters' goals and the availability of coping resources dealt with by the 
sequence itself? First, we should offer a further explanation for why it may be more 
effective to 'leave something to the imagination': this explanation can be spelt out in terms 
of either the visibility or invisibility of the given threat and the corresponding employment 
or non-employment of cognitive coping strategies. Although the reality of a threatening 
object or event which we are allowed to see may by truly terrible, at least it has specific 
and definable limits; because we are aware of these limits, we can set about employing 
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appropriate coping strategies. In the sequence, however, we are denied the view of the 
threatening object or event; therefore, this coping option is not available to us. 
Second, both factors may be communicated in the ways described previously: the 
meaning inherent in the dialogue, situational cues, and the music track could be assessed at 
the level of conscious (attentive) processing. Certain filmic strategies, however, may 
specifically facilitate the reappraisal stage by making us aware of the absence of coping 
resources (see Figure 4.23). Following Franc;:oise's disappearance, we are presented with a 
single long shot of Richard and Etienne: this shot serves to remind us that the three 
characters are still a mile or so from the island (see Frame 4.6, above). To return to the 
'biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat', Blascovich and Mendes's claim that 
'viewing a scary film' is an example of a 'passive performance situation' is problematic 
once again at the level of reappraisal. Significantly, the assessment of the absence of 
coping resources might be influenced by affective cues: for instance, a long shot of the 
open sea might be associated with being 'cut off from safety. Given that the situational 
demands presented by the filmic world outweigh the situational resources available within 
it, we might experience a mild sense ofthreat.22 
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22 Spielberg employs similar strategies in Jaws. In the opening sequence, the first underwater shot of the 
Watkins girl swimming - filmed from the shark's point-of-view - is followed by a long shot which reminds 
us that the girl is some distance from the shore. In the fmal section of the film - when Brody, Hooper, and 
Quint set sail in the 'Orca' in a fmal attempt to rid the island of the shark - Spielberg states that he was very 
careful to avoid catching the sight of land in the frame: "I wanted the audience to feel very cut off - like they 
couldn't just run back to shore because there was no shore to run back to." 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
(a) A secondary solution to the paradox of fiction 
Having developed a multi-level model of the emotion system from both a connectionist 
and a functional perspective, we are now in a position to offer a secondary solution to the 
paradox of fiction. Let us continue with the task of revising the third proposition of the 
paradox and the Cartesian framework which underlies the paradox as a whole (see Table 
4.5). 
(i) The associative network route to (cinematic) emotion 
In the first part of the chapter, we traced an associative network route to (cinematic) 
emotion, thereby enabling us to account for the impact of the (multiple) emotion cues 
presented by film. Following a consideration of associative and connectionist networks, we 
described the impact of three types of emotion cue: namely, diegetic cues, non-diegetic 
cues, and somato-visceral cues. Significantly, we found that the impact of these cues can 
be explained without making reference to existence beliefs (re. regarding-as, type 1). From 
a connectionist perspective, shallow inputs reSUlting from the perceptual processing of 
emotion cues result in the activation of input nodes (perceptual memories) and event nodes 
(episodic memories) in an associative network; both processes can be understood in tenns 
of parallel constraint satisfaction. (We also saw that all of these emotion cues may act as 
affective prompts for emotional imagery.) 
(ii) The cognitive appraisal route 
In the second part of the chapter, we traced a cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) 
emotion, thereby enabling us to account for the meaning of the situations encountered by 
(goal-oriented) characters. Following a consideration of appraisal theory, we distinguished 
three types of appraisal. The notion of 'primary appraisal' has been related to the second 
way of seeing described in Chapter 2 (regarding-as, type II): it refers to the automatic, 
indiscriminate process which appraises the meaning of situations presented by film as if 
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they were real and of personal significance, thereby producing 'appropriate' emotional 
responses. (In this instance, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the 
presence of the diegetic effect.) The notion of 'secondary appraisal', on the other hand, has 
been related to the third way of 'seeing' (seeing-as, type I): it refers to the 'globally 
sensitive' central process which appraises the representational and fictional status of the 
situations in question, thereby reducing the potential 'intensity range' of our emotional 
responses. Finally, the notion of 'reappraisal' has been related to the fourth and final way 
of 'seeing' (seeing-as, type II): it refers to the conscious, attentive process which appraises 
the depicted situation from the perspective of the characters, thereby either maximising or 
minimising our emotional responses 'within' the reduced intensity range described. (In this 
instance, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the presence of motivational 
prompts.) 
Table 4.5: A secondary solution: revising the third proposition and the Cartesian framework 
induction stage reliance on existence beliefs I 
adoption of goals? 
(1) associative network route input and event nodes no: partial encapsulation I 
- regarding -as (type I) parallel constraint satisfaction 
primary appraisal no: partial encapSUlation / 
- regarding-as (type II) diegetic effect 
(2) cognitive appraisal route secondary appraisal no: reliance on 
- seeing-as (type I) non-existence beliefs 
reappraisal no: reliance on 
- seeing-as (type II) motivational prompting 
N.B. The above scheme does not make reference to affective prompting. 
(b) Further applications 
So far, we have traced two different routes to the same primary emotion: namely, the 
associative network and cognitive appraisal routes to fear. In light of this, we need to 
demonstrate how the proposed model improves our understanding of other types of 
emotion - both primary and secondary - and how the two routes may perform contradictory 
functions. 
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(i) The primary emotion of sadness 
How should we understand those subtler emotions which are not fundamentally rclatcd to 
survival? How, for instance, should we understand the primary emotion of sadness (and 
related emotions such as regret)? In order to answer this question, let us tum to a well-
known scene from Ridley Scott's science-fiction drama Blade Runner (1982) - discussed 
by Carl Plantinga (1999) as an example of a 'scene of empathy'. It is the year 2019. Rick 
Deckard (Harrison Ford) is an ex-'blade runner' who is co-erced into tracking down and 
destroying a group of 'replicants' who have returned to Earth in a quest to prolong their 
short life-span. At the film's conclusion, the replicants' leader Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer) -
in a reversal of roles - pursues Deckard across the dark and rain-swept rooftops of Los 
Angeles, before unexpectedly saving him from falling to his death. As Batty stands over 
the bewildered Deckard, it is uncertain whether he should be regarded as friend or foe. Our 
fears, however, are quickly assuaged by a different emotion altogether. 
The subsequent exchange is presented by means of six shot/reverse shot 'couplets', 
the forward shot focusing on Batty who has seated himself on the rooftop (see Frame 4.7), 
and the reverse shot focusing on Deckard who lies exhausted (Frame 4.8). As the rain falls, 
Batty delivers a heart-felt speech, describing some of the incredible sights he has witnessed 
during his short life, before delivering the much-quoted line, "All those moments will be 
lost in time like tears in rain.", bowing his head and passing away. At this point, an 
inserted shot shows a white dove flying skyward, symbolizing a 'spirit' or 'soul' departing 
from Batty's body. 
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Frames 4.7 and 4.8: The primary emotion of sadness: Blade Runner (1982) 
o The associative network route to sadness 
How should we understand our emotional response to this scene? Let us begin by tracing 
the associative network route to sadness. Starting with diegetic (personal) cues, arguably 
the most perceptually salient aspect of the scene is Batty's (Hauer's) face. Although the 
source of the water running down Batty's face is ambiguous, the phrase 'tears in rain' may 
index a facial indication of sadness. Other facial expressions are more clearly defined. An 
instant before saying the 'tears in rain' line, Batty displays a momentary wince of regret. 
With respect to the Facial Action Coding System cited above, this 'wince' can be analysed 
in terms of certain action units (see Table 4.6). (Another possible measure is eye position: 
the fact that Batty looks into the distance may be perceived as a sign of introspection.) 
Halfway through the line, Batty displays a frown (associated with seriousness) and a 
swallowing action (associated with crying). At the end of the line, Batty displays what 
could be described as a 'rueful smile' which - considering the resumption of eye-contact -
is aimed at Deckard and seems to mark a momentary understanding between the two 
characters. 
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Table 4.6: Facial cues: possible action units (AUs) 
AU number FACS name 
4 brow lowerer 
6 cheek raiser 
12 lip comer puller 
44 squint 
45 blink 
As we have seen, the processes of emotional communication and emotional 
elicitation can be explained in associationist (connectionist) terms: the individual 
expressions in question being 'recognized' by input nodes understandable as connectionist 
(pattern recognition) networks, and activating the 'sadness node' by means of associative 
connections. Plantinga argues, however, for an alternative, or less direct, means of 
emotional elicitation. Many theorists refer to affective mimicry: the tendency to 
(automatically) mimic the facial expressions of other people in our company. In addition, 
these theorists posit the role of facial feedback: the strong version of the 'facial feedback 
hypothesis' proposes that facial feedback is sufficient for emotional contagion, whereas the 
weak version proposes that facial feedback only gives rise to emotional contagion in 
conjunction with other emotional elicitors. 
Given that Plantinga only subscribes to the weak version of the facial feedback 
hypothesis, he cites various strategies used by the film-maker to 'maximise the affective 
potential of the human face'. The first strategy is described as attention: 'catching' another 
person's emotions requires us to attend to their face in some way. Having established that 
Deckard and Batty are facing each other, the camera closes in on both characters -
employing close-ups and shallow focus - thereby increasing the salience of their facial 
expressions. The second strategy is duration: emotional contagion takes requires time (see 
Figure 4.24). Some of the close-ups are of sufficient length in their own right, whilst the 
POV structure allows Batty and Deckard to be on screen for a total of around seventy and 
forty-five seconds respectively. (In the fourth and fifth couplets, the use of slow-motion 
emphasises the bowing of Batty's head and the departure of the dove on the one hand, and 
increases the salience of Deckard's response (a gulping action, a blink, and the fall of a 
raindrop / tear) on the other. In the sixth and final couplet, the rain falls around Batty's 
bowed head and our attention shifts to Deckard's sorrowful face.) 
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The final strategy is affective congruence: the 'affective potential' of a character's 
face is improved if it is presented in conjunction with 'congruent' images and sounds. 
Examples of diegetic (situational) cues include the grey/dark backgrounds and the sight 
and sound of falling rain: all of these cues may act as learnt triggers for a 'melancholic' 
response. The non-diegetic (musical) cues are provided by an evocative score written by 
Vangelis: following Anderson's account of 'cross-modal confirmation', the leading high 
notes of the synthesizer set the emotional tone and tend to coincide with the pensive pauses 
in Batty's speech. (The flight of the dove occurs in synchrony with the high notes of a 
synthesized xylophone, whilst the fall of the rain drop/tear from Deckard's face occurs in 
synchrony with the crash of a synthesized cymbal.) 
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Elaine Hatfield et al. (1994) state that there is convincing evidence for both 
mimicry and feedback with respect to the face and the body. In spite of this evidence, they 
do not offer an explanation for why mimicry and feedback exert the influence that they do. 
Following the associative (network) account outlined above, however, an account of 
affective mimicry and facial feedback can be spelt out in associationist (connectionist) 
terms; indeed, this may be the only option available. According to Damasio, somatic 
feedback provides information about the movements of (striated) skeletal muscles; 
significantly, these muscles include those which comprise the face. If facial feedback is a 
type of somatic feedback, then it can be understood in terms of the impact of somatic cues 
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(re. Figure 4.13). Given that Damasio regards the face as part of the body, these somatic 
cues would be presented to the network via the 'body loop' once again (see Figure 4.22). 
Crucially, the activation of corresponding 'input nodes' (or 'somatosensory maps') might 
lead to the activation of associated 'emotion nodes', thereby influencing our emotional 
state. Notice that this account constitutes an argument for the weak, as opposed to the 
strong, version of the facial feedback hypothesis. 
Figure 4.25: Somato-visceral cues: the role of affective mimicry and facial feedback 
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In order to conclude our discussion of Batty's (Hauer's) face, a potential problem 
with Plantinga's account should be acknowledged. One could argue that Batty's facial 
expressions are too subtle to affectively mimic. Furthermore, his most salient expressions 
are the two (rueful) smiles, which, in purely perceptual terms, represent the antithesis of 
sadness. In a related fashion, Fridlund (personal communication) argues that if you 
removed Batty's face from the equation, you wouldn't lose that much. In contrast to both 
Plantinga and Fridlund, however, even if - both direct and indirect - emotional elicitation 
are potentially problematic, Batty's face may perform at least two crucial functions (see 
Figure 4.26). First, Batty's face may function as a target for our emotional responses: we 
require an intentional agent, preferably a (realistic) human one as a 'subject' for our 
(causal) attributions. Second, Batty's face may function as a gauge for measuring the 
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appropriateness of our emotional responses: for instance, if Batty had burst into fits of 
hysterical laughter, we would have had cause to reconsider the meaning of the situation. 
Figure 4.26: A reassessment of the affective role of the face 





o The cognitive appraisal route to sadness 
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The second route to sadness is the cognitive appraisal route. To recap, Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird (1987) propose that emotions occur when there is a 'juncture' (i.e., a critical 
moment) in either a goal or a plan: sadness occurs when a significant goal is 'lost'. Lazarus 
(1991, p.248) describes the core relational theme for sadness as 'not just loss, but 
irrevocable loss.' More specifically, the scene can be broken down into at least four formal 
structures: (1) the nostalgia of Batty; (2) the regret of Batty; (3) the death of Batty; and (4) 
the sorrow of Deckard. A key question is: how and why do we adopt the goals of either 
Batty or Deckard - as fictional characters - in the first place? Unlike the 'survival' goal 
structures underlying fear, the 'significant' goal structures underlying sadness, regret, and 
so forth, need not be on standby, readily brought into play by cinematic representations. A 
possible answer lies in the notion of 'cognitive identification' advanced by Grodal and 
others; this notion will be addressed in the following chapter (albeit in relation to the 
emotions of anxiety and concern). 
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For the time being, let us outline the basic relationship between the three appraisal 
stages (see Figure 4.27). According to the appraisal account, the automatic process 
described as primary appraisal (regarding-as, type II) would be responsible for the initial 
assessment of situational meaning. One of the scene's methods for communicating this 
meaning is through dialogue: the emotion of nostalgia is expressed in Batty's descriptions 
of the incredible sights he has witnessed, whilst the emotion of regret is expressed by the 
'tears in rain' line. (In terms of vocal delivery, Batty's mid-sentence pauses might be taken 
as indications of pensiveness - hence, the phrase 'a pregnant pause'.) Another means of 
communicating situational meaning is through the music track. Following Anderson, Smith 
(1999) states: 'Through the process of cross-modal confirmation, the shared affective 
meanings of music and visuals direct attention to shared formal features which in tum 
reinforce and engender the affective meaning of the scene'. At the very least, the formal 
features of the music track seem to compliment the formal features of the scene as outlined 
above: for instance, a 'gentle' tone accompanies both the sudden change in the relationship 
between the two characters - animosity to intimacy - and Batty'S verbal expressions of 
nostalgia and regret; the music 'builds' as Batty's death approaches. 
The central process described as secondary appraisal (seeing-as, type I) would 
effectively reduce the potential 'intensity range' of our negative responses, thereby 
determining that our emotional state is not full-blown sadness, but, say, a form of 
melancholy - a congruent emotional state or mood. It is plausible, however, that residual 
arousal would operate as a motivational prompt, compelling us to reassess the meaning of 
the situation at the level of conscious (attentive) processing. Indeed, it is plausible that the 
reappraisal stage (seeing-as, type II) - in the form of engagement - would playa relatively 
substantial role, maximising the intensity of our melancholic responses within the reduced 
range. Our evaluation of the implications of 'moments being lost in time', for instance, 
would benefit from the greater sophistication and flexibility afforded by the highest level 
of processing: such an evaluation is a prime candidate for the frame problem, taking into 
account a variety of factors such as the irrevocable nature of the losses in question, the 
ceaseless nature of time, and the transient nature of life. In a related fashion, the cognitive 
appraisal route to sadness might interact with the associative network route in a number of 
interesting ways. Consider, for instance, our comprehension of both Batty'S 'regretful 
wince' and 'rueful smiles'. The 'emotional range' would be established by an 
associationist-connectionist network (regarding the recognition of the wince and smile), 
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whilst the 'emotional focus' would be provided by reappraisal (discriminating mental 
regret from physical pain, and negative ruefulness from positive happiness respectively). 
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(ii) The secondary emotion of nostalgia 
____ J "I' 
From a functional perspective, individual emotions can be thought of as 'modules'. 
Significantly, Power and Dalgleish (1997, pp.191-194) suggest that two or more primary 
'emotion modules' can be combined to produce a secondary emotion. Integrating the 
results of the 'happiness' and 'sadness modules', for instance, may give rise to the emotion 
of nostalgia. How should we understand this particular combination and how might it 
apply to fiction film?23 
23 Freeland (1999, p.81) defines 'the sublime' as a conflict between feelings of pain and pleasure: 
significantly, she proposes that 'such conflicts reflect the simultaneous operation of multiple emotion 
systems'. 
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o The associative network route to happiness 
In the final sequence from Francis Ford Coppola's The Godfather, Part III (I990), we are 
presented with two flashbacks from earlier in the trilogy. The first flashback is from The 
Godfather (1972) and features the scene described at the end of Chapter 3: we see Michael 
Corleone (Al Pacino) as a young man, dancing with his first wife Apollonia (Simonetta 
Stefanelli) during their Sicilian wedding (see Frame 4.9). The second flashback originates 
from The Godfather, Part II (1974): here, we see a still youthful Michael dancing with his 
second wife Kay (Diane Keaton) at a similar type of social gathering. 
In this instance, the primary emotion of happiness might be generated via the 
associative (network) route to emotion. The associations in question would span both the 
real world and film. With respect to the first flashback, for instance, the social occasion of 
a wedding - and the emotion cues which it presents (smiling, dancing, and so forth) - might 
trigger a number of positive associations. Similarly, the sight of Michael as a young (and 
relatively uncorrupted) man and Pacino as a young (and relatively fresh-faced) actor might 
be perceived in a positive light. More intriguingly still, a viewer old enough to have seen 
the original film in 1972 might associate the scene with the positivity of their own youth. 
(Although happiness could be explicated in terms of the satisfaction of certain goals, it is 
not clear what or whose goals should be taken into account.) 
Frame 4.9: The primary emotion of bappiness: The Godfather (1972) 
N.B. Repeat of Frame 3.7. 
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o The cognitive appraisal route to sadness 
After flashing backwards to the past, the film flashes forwards to the future. In the final 
two shots of the film, we see Michael as a lonely old man - his first wife deceased, his 
second wife divorced, and the rest of his family in tatters - sitting in a deckchair in his 
garden (see Frame 4.10). Given that the camera focuses on Michael's aged face, we are 
likely to interpret the preceding flashbacks as memories 'seen' from his psychological 
point-of-view. In this instance, the primary emotion of sadness might be generated via the 
sight of Michael as an old man and the cognitive appraisal route to emotion: our realisation 
that the events in question are in the past (and, therefore, beyond reach) . This realisation 
would make reference to certain narrative / biographical information and involve an 
appraisal that certain significant goals have been lost - hence, the role of the propositional 
and schematic model levels of the mind. (Once again, a key question is: how and why do 
we adopt the goals of Michael - as a fictional character - in the first place? The older 
viewer, however, might partly appraise the scene as an indirect indication that their own 
youth has been and gone.) 
Frame 4.10: The primary emotion of sadness: The Godfather, Part/II (1990) 
In the final stage of the process (see Figure 4.28), the happiness encapsulated by 
Michael's memories would be counterbalanced by the sadness of his (and our) realisation 
that the events in question are in the past (and, therefore, beyond reach); the two emotions 
would 'blend' - like the colours in a painter' s chart - to produce the ' bitter-sweet' feeling 
we associate with nostalgia. 
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(i) 'Constraints' on simulation 
(iii) 'Alternatives' to simulation (and theory) 
(b) Further applications 
(i) The case of the IInfaithflll spouse 






5.1 INTRODUCTION I 
(a) Two approaches to the paradox of fiction 
Having outlined and developed a multi-level model of the emotion sy tern, we are in a 
position to address two issues which were introduced in the opening chapter and remain 
outstanding. Our first task is to relate one fundamental approach to another. Although the 
main strategy for solving the paradox of fiction is to revi e the third propo ition by 
demonstrating that emotions do not require existence beliefs, there are at lea t two ways of 
achieving this task. So far, we have explicitly focused on developing the direct approach to 
revising the third proposition, using Malcolm Turvey's (1997) seeing theory as a starting-
point. In light of this, we need to redress the balance by explicitly focusing on the in dire l 
approach as exemplified by what Noel Carroll (1990) and others have described as the 
thought theory. Among other things, this will enable us to understand how we come to 
experience the subtleties and nuances of the emotional I ives of fictional characters. 
(i) The direct approach: the seeing theory 
From a cognitive perspective, direct approaches begin with the world or the film, and trace 
a line of processing through the mindlbrain; significantly, they do not make reference to 
existence beliefs in order to explain how our emotions are activated (although they make 
I Part of this chapter was presented at the fourth CCSMI conference, alvin ollege, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, July 2004. Thanks to Noel Carroll for his comments. 
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reference to non-existence beliefs in order to explain how our emotions are inhibited). In 
total, we have traced two 'direct routes' to (cinematic) emotion: one based on 'automatic 
association' (involving pattern matching) and one based on 'automatic appraisal' 
(otherwise known as primary appraisal). Although we have also traced two 'indirect 
routes' - represented by 'reflective association' (involving emotional imagery) and 
reflective appraisal (otherwise known as reappraisal) respectively - the 'indirectness' of 
these routes has not been the focus of the discussion. 
(ii) The indirect approach: the thought theory 
From the perspective of film theory, Carroll (1990, pp.88-96) advances the thought theory 
of emotional responses to fiction: according to this theory, we do not respond emotionally 
to the mistaken belief that the monster actually exists; rather, we respond emotionally to 
the thought of the monster, where the act of thinking is defined as the capacity to 'entertain 
a proposition non-assertively' - that is, without existential commitment. Murray Smith 
(1995b, p.118) proposes a similar solution to the paradox: for instance, we are not the 
unwitting subjects of some sort of delusion; rather, we 'imaginatively entertain' the 
scenarios which the fiction either describes or depicts. Carroll and Smith's thought theory 
also relates to Gregory Currie's (1995) imagination theory: following a similar line of 
reasoning, Currie proposes that we 'simulate' the scenarios presented by film along with 
the mental states of the featured characters. 
Thought and imagination can be divided into two basic types (see Table 5.1 ).2 
According to the notion of primary imagining, we imagine a fictional situation 
'impersonally' or 'acentrally'; that is, from a neutral, third-person perspective. Currie 
(ibid., p.152) describes primary imagining as 'imagining what is fictional in a story'. An 
example of this imaginative activity is perceptual imagining: we 'perceptually imagine' 
that the events depicted by a film are taking place. Although the thought theory assumes 
that we appraise the proverbial monster as 'threatening' and 'impure' in line with the 
character's view of the situation, Carroll makes a case for acentral imagining: he argues 
2 The distinction between 'central' and 'acentral imagining' is made by Wollheim (1987), p.I03. Cited and 
summarised by Smith (1997), p.413. 
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that we 'assimilate' the situation as a whole, including both the monster and the character 
( emotional responses). 3 
According to the notion of secondary imagining, we can imagine a fictional 
situation 'personally' or 'centrally'; that is, from the perspective of a character. Currie 
(ibid.) describes secondary imagining as imagining 'various things so as to imagine what is 
true in the story'. An example of this imaginative activity is imagining seeing: we imagine 
that we are perceiving the characters and events depicted by the film from the perspective 
of an observer positioned within the filmic world - a phenomenon described by the 
Imagined Observer Hypothesis (lOH). Following the argument cited above, Carroll argues 
against central imagining, claiming that the psychoanalytical notion of 'identification' 
commits us to the problematic view that we enter into a 'mind-meld' with a given 
character by duplicating their mental states; his view of assimilation assumes that there is 
an asymmetry between the information appraised by ourselves as viewers and the 
information appraised by the character which results in asymmetrical mental states. 
Table 5.1: The distinction between primary and secondary imagining 
perspective example 
(1) primary imagining impersonal (acentral) perceptual imagining 
(2) secondary imagining personal (central) imagining seeing 
(see Imagined Observer Hypothesis) 
How do the 'indirect' processes of imagination and thought relate to the more 
'direct' processes described above? Smith (1995) challenges the everyday notion of 
'character identification', integrating imagination and thought into an overall model of 
character engagement (see Table 5.2). According to this model, the 'structure of 
sympathy' (acentral imagining) comprises the components of recognition, alignment, and 
allegiance. To engage with a character, we must recognise them as 'an individuated and 
continuous human agent'; we must be aligned with them by means of the 'interlocking 
functions' of spatio-temporal attachment and subjective access; and we must feel an 
allegiance to them by morally approving of their actions, and so forth. Significantly, Smith 
also accounts for 'empathic phenomena' (central imagining), referring to the mechanisms 
3 For a discussion, see Smith (1995), p.78 and Grodal (1997), p.84. 
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of affective mimicry and autonomic responses (involuntary processes) on the one hand, 
and emotional simulation (a voluntary process) on the other. 
Table 5.2: Smith's (1995) model of character engagement 
components sUb-components 
recognition 
(1) structure of sympathy alignment spatio-temporal attachment 
(acentral imagining) subjective access 




(2) empathy autonomic responses 
(central imagining) (involuntary) 
emotional simulation 
(voluntary) 
(b) Two approaches to the paradox of empathy 
Our second task is to relate one fundamental paradox - and one fundamental aspect of our 
emotional lives - to another. Although the main conundrum with which we are concerned 
is the paradox of fiction - the paradox of why we respond emotionally to fictional 
characters and events - at this stage of the proceedings it will be illuminating to consider a 
related conundrum known as the paradox of empathy - the paradox of why we respond 
emotionally to actual people and events. To recap, Alex Neill (1996, p.175) defines 
empathy as the capacity to feel with another person, and sympathy as the capacity to feel 
for that person. (According to this distinction, the root pathos translates as 'feeling' period, 
whilst the prefixes em- and sym- translate as 'with' and 'for' respectivelyl 
4 This is a deliberate simplification. According to Klein's Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the 
English Language, the term 'empathy' is a loan translation of the German word Einfiihlung, coined by the 
German philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze in Mikrokosmus (1858), whereas the term 'sympathy' originated 
in the moral philosophy of the 1700s. The root of both terms is pathos, meaning 'suffering' (or Fuhlung, 
meaning 'feeling'); this root is qualified by either the prefix em- (from ein-) meaning 'in, into', or the prefix 
sym-, meaning 'together, like'. 
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As we have seen, the paradox of empathy can be spelt out in terms of three 
propositions, the third proposition stating that belief in the 'self-relevance' of a situation is 
necessary for an appropriate emotional response. Once again, the main strategy for solving 
the paradox is to revise the proposition in question by demonstrating that emotions do not 
require relevance beliefs. And once again, there are at least two ways of achieving this 
task. In the literature to date, the direct approach has been represented by associationism, 
whereas the indirect approach has been represented by simulation theory. To the best of 
my knowledge, theorists have not recognized the role of emotional appraisal. 
(i) The direct approach: the associative route 
In this section, I will review two theories of empathy which are, to my knowledge, 
representative of the current way of thinking. From the perspective of social psychology, 
Martin Hoffman (1984, 1987) proposes that empathetic responses are based on at least six 
different 'modes', the more basic modes preceding the more advanced ones both phylo-
and ontogenetically (see Table 5.3). 
Following Hoffman, Mark Davis (1996, p.13), classifies these modes as follows.5 
Starting with the 'non-cognitive' modes, an example of a primary circular reaction is a 
newborn baby's automatic response to the sound of another baby crying, whilst motor 
mimicry can be regarded as an automatic response to the sight of a target person's bodily 
(or facial) expressions. (Hoffman does not make a terminological distinction between 
motor mimicry and affective mimicry.) Moving on to the 'simple cognitive' modes, 
classical conditioning involves learnt responses to a specific type of stimulus (namely, the 
'affective cues' of the target person), whilst direct association involves learnt responses to 
a general type of stimulus (for example, the cues presented by the target person's 
situation). Finally, with regard to the 'advanced cognitive' modes, language-mediated 
association involves learnt responses to related words and sentences. Role taking, on the 
other hand, is the act of imaginatively projecting oneself into the place of the target person. 
(Hoffman describes this imaginative activity as a voluntary process.) 
How does Hoffman's multidimensional theory of empathy relate to the multi-level 
model of the emotion system outlined and developed above? At first glance, motor 
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mimicry seems to be the odd one out in the sense that it appears to be a type of behaviour 
rather than a psychological process per se. As we have seen, however, ultimately an 
account of mimicry can be spelt out in associative terms. Similarly, one could argue that 
the distinction between, say, 'classical conditioning' and 'direct association' is an artificial 
one. Although the distinction between personal cues and situational cues may be of 
significance with respect to appraisal, there is no reason to believe that the mindlbrain will 
treat the two types of cue as radically different cases in a purely associative sense. Finally, 
one could question the distinction between 'simple cognitive' and 'advanced cognitive'. 
Although language-mediated associations presuppose a certain level of cognitive 
development - namely, the grasp of a natural language - once this cognitive capacity is in 
place, the associative processes in operation may not differ greatly from those involved in 
standard cases of classical conditioning. 
In summary, modes I to 5 are all instances of the associative network route to 
emotion; the key differences between these modes concern whether the stimuli in question 
are external or internal, specific or general, and analogical or symbolic in nature. The odd 
one out is not mimicry but role-taking (mode 6) which operates more clearly within the 
simulative (i.e., non-associative) realm; significantly, there is no role for emotional 
appraisal. 
Table 5.3: Hoffman's (1984, 1987) multidimensional theory of empathy (revised) 
original classification mode 
(Independence from relevance beliefs) 
(1) non-cognitive (I) primary circular reaction 
(2) motor mimicry 
(1) associative route (2) simple cognitive (3) classical conditioning 
(4) direct association 
(3) advanced cognitive (5) language-mediated association 
(2) simulative route (6) role-taking (voluntary) 
From the perspective of communications research, Dolf Zillmann (1991) proposes 
a three-factor theory of empathy, based, in turn, on a three-factor theory of emotion. In his 
review of the literature on empathy, Zillmann cites the example ofa target person caught in 
5 The six modes proposed by Hoffman fonn the second ('processes') stage of Davis's 'organizational model' 
of empathy. 
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an inferno (pp.136-140); he recognises that the subject is capable of responding to the 
target person's situation ('causal circumstances') as well as the target person themselves 
('expressive elements'). The 'dispositional component' of empathy comprises our 
'reflexive' (unconditioned) and 'learned' (conditioned) behavioural responses to the 
emotional states of the target person, an obvious example being motor mimicry. Similarly, 
the 'excitatory component' involves our reflexive and learned physiological responses to 
the aforementioned states, an example being an autonomic response. The 'experiential 
component', on the other hand, is broken down into three 'subcomponents': our emotional 
response to the target person undergoes 'appraisal' for 'hedonic parallelity' and 
'monitoring' for 'appropriateness', before possibly serving as a trigger for 'role taking'. 
How does Zillmann's three-factor theory of empathy relate to the multi-level model 
of the emotion system outlined and developed above? Zillmann (pp.143-144) indirectly 
acknowledges the shortcomings of the 'classical conditioning paradigm' by referencing 
Humphrey (1922), who 'suggested that in the absence of sufficient stimulus similarity, a 
complex integrating related percepts and sensations would be activated'. (Interestingly, 
Humphrey cites the example of a target person in danger of falling from a precipice, a 
scenario which resembles the case of the struggling climber to be discussed below. Is the 
'complex' in operation here approximately equivalent to an 'appraisal pattern'?) For some 
reason, however, Zillmann does not (explicitly) encorporate these insights into his three-
factor theory. Significantly, he only refers to 'appraisal' in the third stage of his model, in 
order to describe a cognitive process which effectively labels the empathiser's emotional 
response as either 'feeling with' or 'feeling for' the target person. According to Zillmann, 
therefore, empathy is mainly elicited by associative processes, and merely elaborated by 
appraisive (and simulative) ones. 
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Table 5.4: Zillmann's (1991) three-factor theory of empathy (revised) 
original classification description 
(independence from 
relevance beliefs) 
(1) dispositional component e.g., affective mimicry 
(behavioural) 
(1) associative route 
(2) excitatory component e.g., autonomic response 
(physiological) 
(3) experiential component (a) appraisal 
(2) simulative route (subjective) (b) monitoring 
(c) role-taking 
N.B. The simulative route is represented by (3c) role-taking. Zillmann's three-factor 
theory resembles Smith's (1995) three-factor account of empathy. 
(ii) The indirect approach: the simulative route 
Having focused on the associative route to empathy, how should we understand the nature 
of the simulative route? This question brings us to a recent debate in the philosophy of 
mind: how do we gain an understanding of other people's minds and make sense of their 
behaviour? The arguments can be divided into two main camps.6 In the previous discussion 
of the mind-reading system and the 'intentional stance', we touched upon the first position: 
according to theory theory (TT), we employ a (tacit) folk psychological theory about how 
people's beliefs and desires, for example, relate to their perceptions and behaviours. At this 
stage of the proceedings, we are in a position to introduce the second position: according to 
simulation theory (ST), we simulate the target person's beliefs and desires, feed the 
resulting states into our 'decision-making system', allow the system to run 'offline', and 
then see what the system comes up with. The simulative route to 'behaviour prediction' is 
described in visual, boxological terms by Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols (see Figure 
6 For a discussion of the TT versus ST debate see the twin anthologies Folk Psychology and Mental 
Simulation (1995) edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone. The articles most commonly cited - and included 
as the first three chapters of the first volume - are by Jane Heal (1995a), Robert Gordon (1995a), and Alvin 
Goldman (1995a). 
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5.1). With respect to cognitive film theory, Currie's (1995, Ch. 5 and 6) account of the 
imagination can be understood in these particular terms. 
The TT versus ST debate is a complex one. From our perspective, two aspects of 
the simulation account are of particular significance. Key point J. Currie (ibid., pp.151-
152) argues that the claim that 'imagination is simulation' is not an instance of conceptual 
analysis akin to the claim that 'a bachelor is an unmarried man'; rather, the claim is in line 
with the essentialist identification that (apparently continuous) water actually consists of 
(discontinuous) H20 molecules. This essentialist claim can be approached from the 
opposite direction by appealing to the notion of emergence: for instance, from H20 
molecules 'emerges' the fluidity of water. Key point 2. Currie (p.161) argues that 
'simulation, if it really does help us to understand the minds of others, must be done 
unintentionally, mostly at a subconscious level'. 
Figure 5.1: The simulative route to behaviour prediction 
BEHAVIOUR 
Based on Figure 5.3 from Stich and Nichols (1995). 139. 
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Given, however, that empathy has been defined as the capacity to 'feel with' a 
target person, it is less a case of our simulating that person's decision-making and more a 
case of our simulating their emotional states (see Figure 5.2). In the 'simulation-based 
account of empathy' described by Nichols et al. (1996), desires are removed and the 
decision-making system is replaced by an 'emotional response system' alone. Many 
theorists, however, claim that emotions are dependent on both beliefs and desires; negative 
emotions, for example, come about when there is discrepancy between what we believe the 
world to be on the one hand, and what we desire the world to be on the other (see Currie, 
1990, Ch. 5). In addition, there is an important distinction to made between a system which 
appraises such discrepancies, and a system which initiates the emotional responses 
themselves. In light of these considerations, I have added both desires (real and pretend) 
and an emotional appraisal system to Nichol et al.'s model. With respect to cognitive film 
theory, Smith's (1995, pp.96-98) account of 'emotional simulation' can be understood in 
. I 7 these partlcu ar terms. 
In the case of empathy, we must consider two groups of arguments from the TT 
versus ST debate. Key point 3. The first group of arguments is against simulation theory 
(and thereby for theory theory) and can be expressed as a single question: namely, how 
does simulation begin? The theory theorist might object that simulating another person's 
emotions depends on us having some sort of folk psychological theory about what those 
emotions are. As we will see, simulation theorists propose that simulation begins with the 
external world; in the case of film viewing, the external world is the film itself. Key point 
4. The second group of arguments is against theory theory (and thereby for simulation 
theory): how does folk psychology bridge the gap between theory and experience? The 
simulation theorist might argue that the activity of theorising about another person's 
emotional states does not lead to the experience of those emotions; the activity of 
simulating another person's emotional states, however, seems to entail some kind of 
emotional experience almost by definition. 
7 In order to illustrate this process, Smith eites the work of one of the main proponents of simulation theory: 
Gordon (1987, pp.l52-153) proposes that 'our emotion-producing system may be run off-line. disengaged 
from its natural input and output systems'. 
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Figure S.2: The simulative route to empathy 
EMOTIONAL RESPONSE 
Based on Figure 4.3 from Nichols et al. (1996), p.61. 
* * * 
In brief, my aim in this chapter is to address our 'indirect' relationship to the world and the 
cinema, thereby offering what could be described as a tertiary solution to the paradox of 
fiction. My approach, however, will be slightly unconventional. With respect to simulation 
in general, I do not wish to argue that we are incapable of imaginatively entertaining any of 
the scenarios presented by real world and filmic situations (or any of the mental states held 
by actual persons and characters). In this respect, the proverbial sky may be the limit; as 
Currie (1995, p.170) acknowledges, '[p ]eople can imagine just about anything'. With 
respect to emotional simulation in particular, however, it is my contention that we should 
regard appeals to the imagination as something of a last resort. 
From a theoretical perspective, on the one hand, it is precisely because the sky is 
the limit that we should search for more concrete alternatives whenever possible; as Neill 
(1996, p.185) acknowledges, 'appeals to imagination are all too often a signal that 
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explanation has come to an end'. From a practical perspective, on the other hand, it is 
precisely because the sky is not the limit that we should be aware of the various constraints 
in operation; although we may be capable of imagining just about anything - in a 
perceptual and a cognitive sense - it seems that we cannot switch our emotions on and off 
with the same degree of freedom. Before appealing to the role of emotional simulation, 
therefore, we should consider at least two questions: first, to what extent does the multi-
level model of the emotion system outlined thus far act as a 'constraint' on emotional 
simulation?; and second, to what extent does the multi-level model act as an 'alternative' 
to emotional simulation? The first question will be addressed by reconsidering the 
associative network route to (cinematic) emotion, whilst the second question will be 
addressed by reconsidering the cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion. 
5.2 ASSOCIATION AS A 'CONSTRAINT' ON SIMULATION 
(a) A neurobiological perspective 
To begin our re-evaluation of the simulative route to empathy, we need to consider the 
perceptual workspace of the mind (the first half of Fodor's dichotomy). In particular, we 
must examine cases of empathy in which we are allegedly required to replicate certain 
perceptual states: according to popular definition, for instance, imagination typically 
involves mental imagery - especially of the visual variety.s The key question is: to what 
extent does the multi-level model of the emotion system outlined thus far act as a 
'constraint' on this particular type of emotional simulation? In the following discussion, 
this question will be addressed by reconsidering the associative network route to 
(cinematic) emotion. Our first task is to address the distinction between primary and 
secondary imagining as outlined above; in order to do this, we will need to develop our 
understanding of the associative network route by taking a primarily neurobiological 
perspective. 
8 Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, Ch. 5) make a distinction between perceptual and propositional forms of 
imagination. The propositional form will be discussed in section 5.3. 
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(i) Primary imagining 
The main argument can be established by considering the case of primary imagining. To 
recap, Currie states that an example of primary imagining is perceptual imagining: we 
'perceptually imagine' the characters and events depicted by a film from an impersonal 
(acentral) perspective. He goes on to propose that the relationship between perceptual 
imagination and our perception of the film itself is one of counterfactual dependence . How 
should we understand this proposal? In reference to his blue eyes, the actor Paul Newman 
once joked: "I picture my epitaph: 'Here lies Paul Newman, who died a failure because his 
eyes turned brown.'" Consider our perceptual imagining of Newman's character Prof 
Michael Armstrong in Hitchcock's Tom Curtain (1966) (see Frame 5.1): this perceptual 
imagining is counterfactually dependent on the blueness of his eyes - as well as the other 
features of his appearance - in the sense that if Newman's eyes really had 'turned brown' , 
then our perceptual imagining would have differed accordingly. 
Frame 5.1: Primary imagining: Torn Curtain (1966) 
We can arrive at a different understanding of the relationship between perception 
and perceptual imagining by returning to a neurobiological perspective and by considering 
what Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, p.67) describe as the implementation hypothesis.9 
Stephen Kosslyn (1994, p.76) proposes that (high-level) vision and visual imagery 'share' -
9 The relationship between vision and visual imagery is addressed by Currie (1995b), whilst tIle relationship 
between motor performance and motor imagery - not considered here - is addressed by Currie and 
Ravenscroft (1997). Some of the findings of these two papers are brought together in Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002, Ch. 4). Following more ~nt research by Kosslyn (1997), they reassess the implementation claim 
with respect to vision and visual Imagery but argue that there is still evidence of a 'substantial overlap' 
between the two. 
281 
or are implemented by - 'common mechanisms'. This proposal can be developed as 
follows. Following the research of Kosslyn et al. (1993), Damasio (1994, Ch. 5; 1999, 
App.) discusses the neurobiological relationship between perception on the one hand, and 
imagination and memory on the other (see Figure 5.3). He proposes that our mental images 
are based on 'neural patterns'; these patterns are 'topographically organised' and realised 
in early sensory cortices - otherwise known as the image space. (Significantly, the term 
'mental image' does not does not refer exclusively to either a visual or a static 
phenomenon: images can be realised in any sensory modality, including the auditory and 
the somatosensory.) 
The formation of a perceptual mental image - for example, a 'percept' of 
Newman's character - would be triggered in a direct, 'bottom-up' fashion by the external 
world of Hitchcock's film. As we have seen, this process would begin with sensory signals 
from the sensory receptors (or transducers). Conversely, the formation of a recalled mental 
image - i.e., our memory or imagination of Newman's character - would be triggered in an 
indirect, 'top-down' fashion by dispositional representations (or 'firing patterns') in the 
internal world of the mindlbrain. These representations are not topographically organised 
and are stored in 'convergence zones' in, for example, higher-order cortices - otherwise 
known as the 'dispositional space'. The crucial point, however, is that both perceptual and 
recalled mental images are ultimately formed in the same 'image space'. 
In conclusion, Damasio's neurobiological account suggests that the relationship 
between perception and perceptual imagining is one of mutual exclusivity: if our perception 
and perceptual imagining of Newman's character involve the same networks or 'nodes' in 
the mindlbrain - the main difference being the 'source' of the activation (external versus 
internal) - then perhaps the 'presence' of the one is only necessary (or possible) in the 
'absence' of the other. Considering, then, that Hitchcock's film presents us with a 
continual stream of (external) perceptual information, the activity of (internal) perceptual 
imagining may be largely superfluous. (In addition, we may not be given the opportunity to 
perceptually imagine the scenarios presented to us, the continual stream of new 
information 'soaking up' our processing resources.) 
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Figure 5.3: Image space vs. dispositional space 
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This particular line of argument can be strengthened by turning to the case of secondary 
imagining. To recap, Currie (1995) states that an example of secondary imagining is 
imagining seeing: we imagine that we are perceiving the characters and events depicted by 
the film from the personal (central) perspective of an observer positioned within the filmic 
world - a phenomenon described as the Imagined Observer Hypothesis (lOH). Although 
Currie (ibid., pp.170-171) rejects imagining seeing / IOH as a 'general thesis', he concedes 
that certain shots 'encourage' such an imaginative activity. In this respect, he cites the 
famous zoom-dolly shot used in Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958) to depict the vertiginous 
experiences of John 'Scottie' Ferguson (played by James Stewart) - a retired San 
Franciscan policeman who suffers from acrophobia (see Frame 5.2). In reply, Smith (1997, 
p.422) argues: 'Surely the zoom-dolly effect is no more an exact replication of how vision 
appears to one experiencing vertigo than is a POV shot an exact replication of ordinary 
vision.'; in other words, the rule - as well as the exception - may encourage the imaginative 
activity in question. 
From our perspective, the main challenge to IOH is to apply Ockham's razor - the 
philosophical maxim which states that 'entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity'. 
Indeed, IOH is a classic case of where Ockham's razor should be wielded with a 
vengeance. JO Although neither Currie nor Smith propose that either type of shot' mandates' 
imagining seeing, both seem to overlook two fundamental points. First, in the real 
(immediate) world, we only see situations through our own eyes: perhaps, then, this 
constitutes a 'default setting', as it were, of our perceptual system. Second, Hitchcock does 
10 Conversation with Richard Allen and Warren Buckland. In a conference paper presented at the third 
CCSMI conference, Buckland (2001) attempts to revive IOH. 
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not simply present Scottie's view from the top of the stairwell and rely on the viewer to 
simulate vertigo: the combination of a forward zoom and a reverse tracking shot creates 
two sets of conflicting 'optic flow patterns' which (presumably) 'specifies' the appropriate 
visual experience. Conversely, consider Scottie's views of the streets of San Francisco 
during his solitary drives around the city, and his longing glances at Madeleine / Judy (Kim 
Novak) as the object of his obsession: these shots present us with only one set of optic flow 
patterns, thereby specifying a relatively ordinary visual experience. In both cases, however, 
our visual system will analyse the optic array - through modular and computational 
processing - and inform other systems of the mind of either an exceptional or an ordinary 
state of affairs (re. shallow outputs). In light of this, there is no need to posit the 'entities' 
of either 'imagining seeing' or 'perceptual imagining'; such a challenge is only 
'uneconomical' in the sense that we still do not fully understand how the visual system 
processes optical information. 
Frame S.2: Secondary imagining: Vertigo (1958) 
(b) A connectionist perspective 
Our second task is to address certain objections aimed at Carroll and Smith's thought 
theory; defending the thought theory in certain respects will demonstrate how thought and 
imagination are constrained in others. First, Turvey (1997, pp.432-441) argues that the 
thought theory's appeals to thought and imagination relegate the film to the status of a 
dispensable vehicle for perceptual information, whilst failing to explain why our emotional 
responses when actually watching a film are 'more intense' than our emotional responses 
when, say, we think about the film's subject matter after we have left the cinema. Second, 
Berys Gaut (1997) argues that Smith's account of central imagining conflates emotional 
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simulation with affective mimicry and autonomic responses. (In reply, Smith, 1997, 
ppAI6-417, proposes that affective mimicry and autonomic responses function as a.flective 
prompts for emotional simulation, enabling us to imagine - in a more 'vivid' fashion - what 
it would be like to be in the character's situation.) In order to defend the thought thocry 
against both of these objections (and support Smith's reply), we will need to develop our 
understanding of the associative network route by returning to a connectionist perspective. 
(i) Emotional media and emotional imagery 
Peter Lang (1984) proposes an associative network model of memory and emotion (see 
Figure 5A). For any given scenario, we can think of there being a cluster of relevant 
propositions in associative memory; depending on the universality of the situation and 
people's background and experience, some people's memory will contain more relevant 
propositions than others. These propositions can be divided into three basic types. Think 
back to the situation of being confronted by a threatening animal. First, stimulus 
propositions would encode information relating to the physical appearance of the animal 
and the environmental context in which such animals are usually found. Second, response 
propositions would encode somatic, visceral, and phenomenological information relating 
to the physiological, behavioural, and subjective responses of, say, a person unfortunate 
enough to encounter a shark whilst swimming in the sea. Third, meaning propositions 
would encode conceptual information relating to the emotional significance of such an 
encounter (e.g., 'sharks are potentially dangerous'). Activation of the network (as a 'unit') 
is dependent on a critical number of 'matching' input propositions; if the network is 
activated, then the relevant 'visceral' and 'somatomotor programs' will be run as output. 
With respect to emotional media and emotional imagery, Lang describes four 
potential factors which 'determine' the activation of an emotion network; the first two 
factors are of particular relevance to the current discussion. The first factor relates 
primarily to stimulus information: 'In general, the more complete and consistent the 
stimulus information matches the [emotion] prototype, the more likely it is that the 
emotion response program will be accessed and run.' According to this factor, a real world 
situation is more likely to elicit emotion than its filmic counterpart, whilst analogical media 
(film, television, and so forth) are more likely to elicit emotion than propositional media 
(spoken or written accounts). The second factor relates primarily to response information: 
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'Degraded stimulus input is more likely to access the [emotion] prototype if other 
propositions in the prototype are independently instigated. ' This factor can be illust rated by 
referring to a group of experiments - conducted by Lang et al. - in which subj ects were 
asked to imagine the emotional events described in propositional form by written script : 
the subjects who were given scripts which included both 'stimulus propositions' and 
'response propositions', generated greater emotional responses - as mea ured by verbal 
reports and physiological tests - than those who were given scripts containing stimulu 
propositions alone. 
Figure 5.4: Lang's (1984) associative network model of memory and emotion 
(iz) Reconciling the seeing and thought theories 
A combination of Lang's associative network theory with Damasio's neurobiological 
account allows us to reconcile Turvey's seeing theory with Carroll and Smith's thought 
theory. In particular, it allows us to defend the thought theory against Turvey's objection 
that appeals to imagination relegate the film to the status of a dispensable vehicle for 
perceptual data, whilst (in answer to Gaut's objection) allowing us to spell out Smith' 
notion of an 'affective prompt' in more literal, causal terms. Think of the main scenes of 
empathy discussed thus far. The scenes centring on fear stimuli have included Indiana 
Jones being confronted by the snake in Raiders of the Lost Ark, Ripley being confronted by 
the monster in Alien, and the soldier lying wounded on Omaha Beach in Saving Private 
Ryan. The scenes centring on emotion cues and the appraisal of situational meaning have 
been represented by the Watkins girl in Jaws and the three characters from The Beach 
being confronted by either an unseen or a non-existent shark. Finally, the scenes centring 
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on different emotions altogether - sadness, regret, and so forth - have been represented by 
Roy Batty in Blade Runner and Michael Corleone in The Godfather. Part III 
contemplating their own mortality. 
For each of the depicted scenarios, we can think of there being an image space -
located in sensory cortices - which contains an associative network of related nodes (see 
Figure 5.5). Starting with the seeing theory, each associative network could be activated in 
a direct, bottom-up fashion by the external world of the film. First, the nodes which 
correspond to stimulus information would be activated by the features of the threatening 
creature, the facial, bodily, and vocal expressions of the threatened character, and so forth. 
As we have seen in our discussion of equivalent and non-equivalent information, the level 
of 'completeness' would be maximised by the size, shape, and so forth, of the projected 
image, whilst the level of 'inconsistency' would be minimised by the viewing conditions. 
(Furthermore, the film-maker would be able to maximise the salience of this information 
through various devices, including the use of close shots.) Second, the nodes which 
correspond to response information would be activated by 'body looped' somato-visceral 
feedback, resulting from any emotional responses which are already in play and our 
affective mimicry of the character's facial expressions, and the like. (Some of these 
emotional responses might be generated by an appraisal of situational meaning.) If a 
'critical number' of input nodes was activated - or the nodes were activated to a critical 
level - then the network would be accessed as a unit, thereby generating appropriate 
emotional responses. 
Moving onto the thought theory, the same image space - and the same associative 
networks - could be activated in an indirect, top-down fashion by the internal world of the 
mindlbrain: for each of the depicted scenarios, we can think. of there being a dispositional 
space - located in higher-order cortices - which underlies our capacity to (deliberately) 
conjure up appropriate emotional imagery. Significantly, this imaginative capacity would 
be dependent on the film in two ways. First, the emotional responses just described would 
operate as affective prompts, encouraging us to imagine what it would be like to be 
confronted by a threatening creature, to be stranded in the middle of the ocean, to be lying 
wounded on a beach thousands of miles from home, and so forth. (More precisely, the verb 
'to prompt' could be spelt out in terms of the verb 'to activate': both the nodes for stimulus 
and response information would send activation to appropriate 'memory structures' and 
'thought patterns' via associative connections in accordance with the phenomenon of 
thought congruity described by Bower and others.) Second, although the entertaining of 
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such imagery would result in the activation of nodes in a corresponding a soc iat iv 
network, our capacity to respond emotionally to such imagery would be dependent on the 
overall activation of a critical number of such nodes, many of which would be brought into 
play by the film itself. 
In light of this account, what would happen after we left the cinema? Say we try to 
' imaginatively entertain' the content of the scenarios in question. With re pect to timulus 
information, Damasio's research suggests that our merely imagining thi s content would 
involve the activation of the aforementioned 'nodes' ; significantly, however, the e nodes 
would not be activated to the same extent (although related brain regi n might be 
activated more strongly - see Currie, 1995b, p.3l). With respect to response information, 
furthermore, emotional responses (especially, startle responses) and affective mimicry tend 
to be triggered by 'external', as opposed to 'internal', stimuli; therefore the corresp nding 
nodes might not be activated at all. Given that a critical number of nodes would not be 
activated - and the impact of affective prompts would be severely reduced - our po t-film 
imaginings would be less likely to generate emotional responses of an intensity which 
compared to that of the original viewing experience (as noted by Turvey). 
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5.3 APPRAISAL AS AN 'ALTERNATIVE' TO SIMULATION (AND THEORY) 
(a) Two cases from the real world 
To complete our re-evaluation of the simulative route to empathy, we need to consider the 
central workspace of the mind (the second half of Fodor's dichotomy). In particular, we 
must examine cases of empathy - from both the real world and the cinema - in which we 
are allegedly required to replicate a target person's propositional attitudes: for instance, 
their beliefs about how the world happens to be and their desires about how the world 
should be. The key question is: to what extent does the multi-level model of the emotion 
system outlined in the previous chapters act as an 'alternative' to this particular type of 
emotional simulation? In the following discussion, this question will be addressed by 
reconsidering the cognitive appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion, and by appealing once 
again to a cognitive (and intentional) level of explanation. In order to fully understand the 
status of appraisal theory (AT) as a suitable alternative, we must consider the debate 
between simulation theory (ST) and theory theory (TT): viz., as mind-readers and 
empathisers, do we simulate other people's mental states, do we theorise about their mental 
states, or do we appraise their situations (as if they were our own)? In the light of appraisal 
theory, many of the clear-cut distinctions between simulation theory and theory theory 
begin to disappear: as we will see, appraisal comes somewhere in between simulation and 
theory, perhaps combining - and reconciling - the basic elements of both. 
In addition, the following discussion will be used to address the relationship 
between empathy and sympathy (and between central and acentral imagining). Neill's 
distinction implies that empathy is not a specific emotion; when we empathise with 
someone, we experience the emotion that they are experiencing, be it fear or joy. Although 
sympathy should not be regarded as a specific emotion either, it is commonly related to 
emotions with negative hedonic valence: for instance, it feels unnatural for us to say that 
we sympathise with a person who is in a state of joy. (In virtue of this fact, the term 
'sympathy' covers a smaller range of emotions than the term 'empathy'.) Considering that 
the aim will be to spell out possible connections between empathy and sympathy, the 
primary focus will be negative, as opposed to positive, emotions. In a related fashion, the 
discussion will touch upon the relationship between egoism and altruism. In the way that it 
seems unreasonable to say that we feel concern for a joyful person, it also seems 
unreasonable to say that we feel obliged to help that person overcome their joy (unless, of 
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course, we begrudge them their good fortune). Thus, it is plausible that altruistic behaviour 
is motivated primarily by negative emotions. 
(i) The case of the struggling climber 
(default mode J: perceptual access) 
In a discussion of empathy, the philosopher Ian Ravenscroft (1998) describes the time he 
witnessed a rock climber ' struggling with an overhang' and about to fall to his death. 
Ravenscroft states that he 'vividly experienced' what it was like to be in the climber' s 
situation. A filmic counterpart would be viewing Kevin Macdonald' s Touching the Void 
(2003), a recent documentary about two British men who successfully climbed a mountain 
in the Peruvian Andes in 1985, before facing a series of equivalent ordeals on their descent 
(see Frame 5.3). Why is it plausible that we would respond emotionally to the fate of the 
anonymous climber in the first instance, or the fate of either Joe Simpson or Simon Yates 
in the second, as people who exist separately - in physical, kindred, and platonic terms -
from ourselves? 
Frame 5.3: The case of the struggling climber: Touching the Void (2003) 
N.B. Repeat of Frame 1.3. 
Ravenscroft briefly acknowledges the role of the associative route to emotion, by 
citing the mechanism of classical conditioning: obvious examples would include the 
climber' s facial , bodily, and vocal expressions of fear, pain, distress, and so forth . His main 
concern, however, is the theory theory (TT) versus simulation theory (ST) debate. 
Ravenscroft suggests that the only way that theory theory could bridge the gap between 
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theory and experience is as follows: we employ a folk psychological theory in order to 
make mental state attributions and each of these attributions is causally linked to an 
experiential state. In the case in question, then, we theorise about what emotions the 
climber is experiencing, and our subsequent attributions cause us to actually experience 
these emotions. Ravenscroft rejects this solution on the grounds that it posits, and 
'duplicates', causal pathways beyond the realms of plausibility. Instead, he argues for a 
version of simulation theory, claiming that we 'imaginatively identify' with the climber's 
situation by simulating his perceptions, beliefs, and desires. In an attempt to defend theory 
theory by bridging the theory/experience gap, Frederick Adams (2001) suggests that our 
perception of the climber's situation triggers memories of analogous situations and related 
experiential states; subsequently, we employ a folk psychological theory and fill in the 
resulting 'd-that' clauses with the appropriate qualia. 
Although the associative-type solution proposed by Adams and the simulative-type 
solution proposed by Ravenscroft are both plausible, both authors overlook a possible 
alternative. Imagine, instead, that you are the unfortunate climber. It seems reasonable to 
say that if you were really staring death in the face in the manner described, you would not 
need to rely on either emotion cues in an associative sense or exercises of the imagination 
in a simulative one. Rather, you would cognitively appraise the meaning of the situation 
with respect to your goals and concerns, and you would respond fearfully. And we should 
not think of this appraisal process as being either slow or deliberative in nature. For some 
reason, neither Ravenscroft nor Adams acknowledge this insight or carry it over into their 
account of empathy. To return to a third-person perspective, however, what I am 
suggesting is that the observer in Ravenscroft's example would appraise the climber's 
situation in a similar fashion to the climber himself. 
In a related fashion, Vittorio Gallese and Alvin Goldman (1998) propose that recent 
research on mirror neurons lends support to the simulation theory. Say that you perform a 
goal-directed action such as attempting to grasp an object (read: overhang on cliff-face) 
with your hand: it is plausible that this action is mediated by circuits in the motor regions 
of your brain. The next step, however, is more counterintuitive. When you watch a target 
person performing the same goal-directed action - i.e., attempting to grasp an object 
(overhang) with their hand - the aforementioned circuits 'light up' once again, thereby 
'mirroring' that person's action. In one key sentence in the article, Gallese and Goldman 
make the crucial link between mirror neurons and simulation: 'Our conjecture is only that 
[mirror neurons] represent a primitive version, or possibly a precursor in phylogeny, of a 
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simulation heuristic that might underlie mind-reading.' The link in question, however, may 
be even more tentative than the authors suggest. Although postulating the role of mirror 
neurons seems reasonable when the main 'starting point' for a simulation is a target 
person's action, we may have to look elsewhere when the main 'starting point' is the 
situation in which that person finds themselves. Contrary to the claim that the same type of 
neural substrate underlies both the performance and observation of the climber's actions, 
the 'substrates' underlying the climber's situation (the drop) on the one hand, and their 
psychology on the other, are fundamentally different; in this case, then, the closest 
approximation to mirror neurons may be the corresponding 'appraisal pattern'. 
* * * 
According to the proposed account, an appraisal process fails to distinguish the observer 
(the 'self') from the climber (the 'other') in some particular sense. Why, though, would an 
appraisal process exhibiting 'self-other fusion' occur in the first place? And how does the 
altruistic behaviour which potentially results from such a process square with the egoistic 
overtones of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection? In order to address these 
questions, let us consider the case from an evolutionary perspective, addressing the 
adaptationist and byproduct hypotheses in turn (see Figure 5.6). 
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N.B. FM is an abbreviation for filtering mechanism. The upward arrows indicate activatio" 
via the perceptual systems (not represented), whereas the downward arrows indicate 
inhibition from central systems (exhibiting global sensitivity). 
(1) The adaptationist hypothesis. Our consideration of the adaptationist hypothesis 
can be broken down into two key questions. First, what are the potential advantages of 
automatic appraisal with respect to the appraiser? If the appraiser is in close proximity to 
the target person, then the target person's situation may be of direct relevance to the 
appraiser's own goals and concerns; viz., if our environments are one and the same, then 
an event of emotional significance taking place in your environment also takes place in 
mine. Considering that emotions are thought to perform a functional (i.e., adaptive) role -
the emotion of fear having 'object-', 'goal-', and 'action-orientation' - a degree of 
'emotional contagion' is likely to be adaptive. Second, what are the potential advantages of 
automatic appraisal with respect to the target person? The appraiser's emotional responses 
may facilitate their awareness and understanding of the target person's situation, which, in 
tum, may increase the probability of their offering that person (suitable) assistance. More 
significantly, the appraiser's emotional responses may facilitate the shift from egoism to 
altruism: if the appraiser is capable of experiencing some of the target person's fear, then it 
is plausible that they will be motivated to assist that person in order to ease their own 
suffering. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1996) note that evolutionary theorists have proposed two 
principal 'pathways' to altruism: namely, reciprocal altruism and kin selection. The basic 
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principle underlying reciprocal altruism - introduced by Williams (1966) and developed by 
Trivers (1971) - is best expressed by the old saying, 'You scratch my back and I'll scratch 
yours.' It is obviously advantageous for us to enter into reciprocal exchanges of this kind. 
and a series of mechanisms may have evolved to ensure that the probablity of "0"-
reciprocation is minimised: a possible example of such a mechanism is the Cheater 
Detection module discussed previously. Although such exchanges may lead to feelings of 
guilt and shame, they are primarily social, as opposed to emotional, in nature. 
In contrast, the phenomenon of kin selection involves apparently selfless and 
potentially emotional relationships between members of the same kin, the most obvious 
example being parental care. All other things being equal, we are more likely to help 
offspring and close relatives than we are complete strangers. Given, however, that empathy 
and altruism often extend to non-kin, we need to widen the scope of our enquiry. 
According to Dawkins (1989, p.94), kin selection is a 'special consequence' of a more 
general process: namely, gene selection. This claim brings us to Dawkin's central thesis: 
'the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not the species, nor the 
group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit of heredity.' (p.ll) 
Following Dawkins's notion of the 'selfish gene', Davies (1996, p.2S) suggests that the 
existence of empathy / altruism at the level of the individual loses its sense of paradox 
when we consider the view that the 'self and the 'other' are of equal importance as genetic 
'survival machines'. 
In light of these two arguments, have we evolved a separate set of appraisal 
mechanisms for appraising other people's situations, a potential candidate being the case of 
the struggling climber? Nichols (2001, p.449) proposes that there is a Concern Mechanism 
which, significantly, may be both functionally and neurobiologically distinct from the 
mechanism underlying the simulative activity of perspective-taking; he argues that studies 
on young children and autistic children - who are capable of concern but not adept at 
adopting another person's perspective - suggest that there is a 'double dissociation' 
between the mechanisms in question. Alternatively, have we evolved some sort of/ilter 
mechanism which deliberately filters information regarding, say, the climber's situation to 
the original set of appraisal mechanisms outlined above - an instance of evolutionary co-
optation? 
(2) The byproduct hypothesis. In order to address the byproduct hypothesis, let us 
consider a factor which relates to the first half of Smith's (1995) structure of alignment: 
namely, the factor of perceptual access (as opposed to subjective access). In the real world, 
294 
we only tend to have (close) perceptual access to our own 'emotional situations'. Consider 
our passing relationships with relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Sometimes we catch a 
glimpse of other people's lives, sometimes other people's lives overlap with our own; for 
the most part, however, our view of the world is inevitably egocentric. Perhaps. then, this 
constitutes a 'default setting' of the mindlbrain - let us call it default mode I. 
How does this relate to the case of the struggling climber? Both Ravenscroft and 
Adams fail to recognise two key points. First, although the climber is 'in danger' whereas 
the observer is 'not in danger', the distinction between the climber's perspective and the 
observer's perspective is not a question of all-or-nothing. The two perspectives overlap in a 
perceptual sense at the very least; for instance, the climber may see their arms straining to 
hold onto the overhang from a distance of a few centimetres, whilst the observer may sec 
this action from a distance of many tens of metres. I I Considering this perceptual overlap, it 
is plausible that the observer would 'draw on' the personal and environmental variables in 
the automatic manner described by Lazarus and Frijda. Of course, the observer's primary 
appraisals would be counter-balanced by secondary appraisals which would effectively say 
something along the lines of "Fortunately, it's not you up there!" In light of this, the end-
result would be a deeply harrowing, though ultimately vicarious, emotional experience. 
How does the byproduct hypothesis apply to a filmic version of the case of the 
struggling climber? In a non-fiction (documentary) film such as Touching the Void, the 
perceptual perspectives of the climber and observer overlap to an even greater extent; 
indeed, the two perspectives may occasionally fuse into one. Notice, however, that our 
primary concern here is not the historical nature of the film's subject-matter but the 
artificial nature of the film's reconstructions. In this respect, similar remarks can be made 
about fiction film. In Hitchcock's hands, for example, not only would we see the climber's 
anns straining to hold onto the overhang from close up; we would also receive the 
vertiginous view from the top of the cliff, possibly by means of the zoom-dolly shot cited 
previously. First, we would not need to imagine that we were positioned within the 
climber's world, for our perceptual system would operate as if this were the case by 
default. Second, the more affective primary appraisal afforded by the greater perceptual 
'overlap' would be counterbalanced by a secondary appraisal which would not only 
effectively say 'Fortunately, it's not you up there!', but also, 'That climber is only a 
II Cf. Humphrey (1922): 'the visual experience of cutting one's fmger is essentially the same as that of 
seeing another person cutting his or her fmger.' Cited by Zillmann (1991), p.143. 
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fictional character, played by a trained stunt man wearing an invisible harness', and so on. 
In conclusion, as viewers of a cinematic, as opposed to a real (immediate), situation, our 
emotional response to the climber's plight would be harrowing, even if it did not reach the 
intensity of Ravenscroft's own experience. 
(3) Conclusion. So which is the best solution: the adaptationist hypothesis or the 
byproduct hypothesis? If appraisal is necessary for producing empathetic responses in 
certain circumstances, then one could argue that it does distinguish the 'self from the 
'other', but, given the relative safety of the appraiser and the adaptive value of empathy, 
cognitive processing resources are devoted to appraising the target person's situation. With 
respect to fiction film, however, this move takes us back to the paradox of fiction: viz., 
why would a Concern Mechanism 'care' about the situation of a (non-existent) fictional 
character, or why would a filtering mechanism deliberately filter information regarding 
such a situation to our appraisal system? Following Ockham's razor, moreover, the 
adaptationist hypothesis posits either four or five mechanisms; the byproduct hypothesis is 
the most economical in the sense that it only posits a total of three mechanisms. 
Considering these questions, perhaps it is better to attribute the apparent 'self-other fusion' 
to a lack of discriminatory power, a deficit which, incidentally, has adaptive value. (After 
all, the embarrassment that 'false positives' may cause is of no consequence to the 'selfish 
gene'.) 
(iiJ The case of the anxious stranger 
(default mode 2: spatio-temporal attachment) 
In the case of the struggling climber, the cause of the climber's emotional state - namely, 
the drop - is immediately available to our senses. To what extent, though, is this case 
typical? In order to answer this question, let us consider the second half of Smith's (1995) 
structure of alignment: namely, the factor of spatio-temporal attachment. In the real world, 
we only tend to have (sustained) spatio-temporal attachment to our own 'emotional 
narratives'. Perhaps, then, this constitutes another 'default setting' of the mindlbrain - let 
us call it default mode 2. 
Imagine, for instance, sitting opposite an anxious stranger on a train journey (see 
Frame 5.4). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the stranger is alone, so the option of 
eavesdropping onto an illuminating conversation is unavailable to us. Considering that the 
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cause of the stranger's emotional state lies in the past or the future, or the ongoing, but 
' absent' , present, it is plausible that we would not have access to a sufficient amount of 
contextual and biographical information to perform an emotional-related appraisal of their 
situation. 
Frame 5.4: The case of tbe anxious stranger: DBC news story on stress 
Given that the stranger's appearance is all that we have to go by, association and 
simulation would seem to be our only options. To begin with, we could focus on the 
stranger' s face and body: by doing so, we might ' catch' some of their anxiety via the 
mechanisms of affective and motor mimicry on the one hand, and facial and bodily 
feedback on the other. Alternatively, we could 'imaginatively project' ourselves into the 
stranger' s place: the stranger is carrying a briefcase - are they anxious because they have 
an important deadline to meet at work? The latter point, however, raises two issues. Fir t, 
it is not clear how such an imaginative exercise would actually begin. Following an 
exchange with Daniel Dennett, Robert Gordon (I995b, p. lO 1) suggests that such exercises 
do not occur naturally, stating ' if people did this routinely, we wouJdn ' t have to ay to 
them, "Put yourself in her place".' (In a related fashion, postulating the role of mirror 
neurons - as simulative ' precursors' - is untenable when the main ' starting point' for the 
simulation is resolutely behind closed doors.) Second, it is not clear how this imaginative 
exercise would bridge the gap between theory and experience: remember that the act of 
empathising with another person is not merely to understand their emotions; rather, it is to 
actually feel them (or something approaching them). 
Suppose, though, that the case of the anxious stranger was included as a scene in a 
(classical) fiction film exhibiting causal coherence and featuring goal-directed characters. 
(When Richard Hannay catches the train to flee to Scotland in Hitchcock ' s The 39 Steps, 
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for instance, he glances nervously at his travelling companions who are reading a 
potentially incriminating newspaper.) In the filmic version, the term 'stranger' might no 
longer be appropriate: following Gordon's observation, even if the film did not put us in 
the character's place in a literal sense, it would 'routinely' provide us with sufficient 
information about that place; we might be allowed a look at the emotional narrative of the 
stranger prior to the scene in the train (and possibly during it, via, for example, POV shots 
and flashbacks). Does this fact favour appraisal or simulation? Considering the default 
mode in question, this information might play a role in activating corresponding 'goal 
structures', a fact which would facilitate the role of appraisal processes. Of course, this 
argument does not constitute a definite challenge with respect to the simulation account for 
the availability of information might facilitate exercises of the imagination as well; it does 
suggest, however, that simulation, as commonly defined, might be largely superfluous. 
In conclusion, we have identified two default modes of the mindlbrain which are of 
potential significance in film viewing (see Table 5.6). Smith suggests that the phenomenon 
of 'recognition' is so fundamental to our engagement with characters that it goes 
completely unnoticed by lay viewers and academics alike; the notion ofa 'default mode' is 
proposed in the same revelatory spirit. Film, especially in its televisual form, is such an 
accepted part of our everyday lives that we fail to realise just how extraordinary it really is. 
Contrary to our intuitions, the fact of the matter is that even if we were exposed to film for 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, our experience of being given detailed and 
sustained access to other people's lives - their perceptions, actions, situations, and 
narratives - would remain the exception rather than the rule - in a phylogenetic sense if not 
an ontogenetic one. And it is phylogeny, rather than ontogeny, that establishes the 
fundamental properties of our perceptual, cognitive, and emotional systems. 
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Table 5.6: Default modes of the mind/brain 
structure of alignment default mode principal method of over-ride 
(I a) "My sensory perceptions." central processing 
(I) perceptual/subjective access (see perceptual analysis) (representation versus referent) 
(1 b) "My emotional situation." central processing 
(see primary appraisal) (= secondary appraisal) 
(2a) "My behavioural actions." central processing 
(2) spatio-temporal attachment (see perceptual analysis) (representation versus referent) 
(2b) "My emotional narrative." central processing 
(see primary appraisal) (= secondary appraisal) 
(b) Two cases from the cinema 
Having considered two cases of real world empathy, let us tum to cases of cinematic 
empathy (and sympathy). And given that theorists tend to agree on the role of association, 
let us concentrate on appraisal as some sort of an 'alternative' to simulation. When 
considering situations presented by fiction film, it is often difficult, if not impossible to 
disentangle the effects of appraisal from those of association on the one hand, and 
simulation on the other - largely due to a high level of 'emotional redundancy'. For this 
reason, amongst others, the following discussion will be based on two further examples of 
pure cinema from the films of Alfred Hitchcock. 
(i) The case of the protective son 
(empathy. central imagining) 
The storyline of Hitchcock's Psycho (1960) is well-known. Marion Crane (played by Janet 
Leigh) works in a real estate office in Phoenix, Arizona. In the opening scene, Marion 
meets her lover Sam Loomis (John Gavin) in a hotel room during her lunch break; through 
expositional dialogue, we learn that the two are forced to conduct their relationship in 
secret and that they cannot marry until Sam pays off his father's debts and his ex-wife's 
alimony. When Marion returns to work later that afternoon, her employer entrusts her to 
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deposit $40,000 at the bank. With visions of a new future, Marion decides to abscond with 
the money and join Sam at his hardware store in Fairvale, California. 
After driving for many hours - darkness drawing in and rain lashing against the 
windscreen - she pulls off the highway and checks into a motel. The proprietor, of course. 
is Norman Bates (played by Anthony Perkins), a nervous young man who lives with his 
old and domineering mother. The scene of interest is not, however, the notorious shower 
scene discussed in Chapter 4 - in which Marion is unexpectedly murdered by an unknown 
assailant (apparently Norman's mother) - but a relatively low-key scene which follows 
soon after. Grodal (1997, pp.94-95) briefly discusses the scene in question in order to 
illustrate his theory of cognitive identification, empathy, and motivation; the following 
account, though established independently of Grodal and for a number of ditTerent reasons, 
will develop certain aspects of his theory. 
After Marion is murdered, Norman discovers her body lying on the bathroom floor. 
In a celebrated series of interviews with Hitchcock, the French New Wave director 
Fran~ois TrutTaut (1986) makes the following observation: 
One intriguing aspect is the way the picture makes the viewer constantly switch loyalties. 
At the beginning he hopes that [Marion] won't be caught. The murder is very shocking, 
but as soon as [Norman] wipes away the traces of the killing, we begin to side with him, 
to hope that he won't be found out. (p.417) 
After 'wiping away the traces of the killing' and placing Marion's body into the 
boot of her car, Norman drives to a nearby swamp. In the first shot of the given scene, 
Norman pushes the car into the water. From this point onwards, we are presented with a 
series of shot/reverse shot couplets: beginning with a shot of Norman chewing gum whilst 
nervously clasping his hands in front of his mouth (shot 2), followed by a POV shot of the 
car slowly sinking (shot 3), and so forth. 
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Frames 5.5 and 5.6: The case of the protective son: Psycho (1960) 
In shot 9, the car stops sinking; a fact which is corroborated by the sudden abs nce 
of bubbling noises on the sound track. Nonnan stops chewing (shot 10), and after the 
camera confinns that the car is stationary (11), he looks quickly around to see if anyone i ' 
nearby (12). Considering that Hitchcock provides us with approximately the sam 
narrational infonnation as Nonnan - at least with respect to his attempt to cover up a crime 
_ the scene confonns to Hitchcock' s criterion for producing surprise (see Gottlieb. 1995). 
This point is exemplified by the particular relationship between the shots: Hitchcock gives 
us optical access to the event in question by means of the POV structW"e. 
Following Truffaut's previous remark, Hitchcock describes our subsequent 
emotional response as follows: 
Earlier, we talked about the fact that when a burglar goes into a room, all the time he's 
going through the drawers, the public is generally anxious for him. When [Norman] is 
looking at the car sinking in the pond, even though he's burying a body, when the car 
stops sinking for a moment, the public is thinking, 'J hope it goes all the way down!' It' s n 
natural instinct. (pp.420-421) 
In shot 13, the car begins to go 'all the way down' - this movement is corrob rated 
by the sound track - and in the subsequent reaction shot (14), Bates begins to smile. In h t 
15, the car finally disappears; Bates smiles fully (16) and the scene fades out on the image 
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of the still swamp (17). Given our previous anxiety, it is reasonable to assume that the 
disappearance of the car is accompanied by a feeling of relief. 
Given that our 'loyalties' have been resolutely with Marion for the first quarter of 
the film and Norman's attempt to dispose of her body is an example ofa criminal act, why 
do we feel anxious when the car stops sinking and why do we experience a sense of relicf 
when the car' goes all the way down' - possible examples of what Smith (1999) describes 
as perverse allegiance? And how should we understand the 'natural instinct' which 
Hitchcock describes? 
Assuming that we are sitting comfortably in our cinema seat, our feeling of anxiety 
conforms to Hoffman's (1987, p.48) definition of empathy; namely, 'an affective response 
more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own.' More specifically, our 
capacity to feel anxiety with the character of Norman seems to be a good candidate for 
central imagining. To paraphrase Currie, the scene in question seems to leave something to 
our imagination; Hitchcock does not tell us how we should feel when the car stops sinking. 
In light of this, one could argue that to 'empathetically reenact' Norman's situation, we 
must simulate his belief that he is attempting to dispose of a person's body along with his 
desire to cover up a crime, and we must 'feed' these simulated mental states into our 
emotional appraisal system, and so forth. 
In order to trace the cognitive appraisal route to empathy, our first task will be to 
'rule out' the influence of the associative network route as far as possible (see Table 5.7). 
One way of doing this is to control the independent variables, as it were, by attempting to 
remove emotion cues from the empathy equation. This is where the scene's status an 
example of 'pure cinema' comes into play. To begin with, the scene is devoid of dialogue 
and potentially emotive elements of film style. In particular, it is a testament to 
Hitchcock's intuitive understanding of human psychology - and his skill as a film-maker -
that he realised that Bernard Herrmann's famous musical score was not required in order to 
heighten the tension in this particular scene. (Interestingly, in the 1998 remake of Psycho, 
Gus Vant Sant chooses to add an adaptation of Herrmann's musical score written by 
Danny Elfman. In this respect, VanSant does tell us how we should be feeling.) 
With respect to personal cues, Norman 'displays' facial and bodily expressions of 
anxiety. One could argue, however, that our empathetic response is not dependent on these 
facial and bodily expressions. First, they are not sufficiently accentuated to elicit a strong 
emotional response in the viewer either directly as emotional stimuli or indirectly via 
affective mimicry and facial feedback. Second, there is a five second delay between the 
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sound of the car ceasing to sink in shot 9 and Norman's overt behaviour in shot 12; this 
delay provides adequate time for an emotion-related appraisal process to go through a 
sufficient number of 'cycles'. If anything, then, Norman's behaviour in shots 10 and 12 
serves merely to confirm that the car has, in fact, stopped sinking, and that this event is, 
indeed, of emotional significance. With respect to situational cues, perhaps the sight of a 
half-submerged car - with its possible associations with the themes of crashing and 
drowning - could be classified as an emotional stimulus in its own right. One could argue, 
however, that this is stretching Damasio's notion of a 'range of stimuli' too far. What 
would have happened, for instance, if we had not known that Marion's body was in the 
boot of the car? 
Table 5.6: Controlling the independent variables 
associative network route cognitive appraisal route 
personal cues? situational cues? situational meaning? 
standard case yes yes yes 
Hitchcockian case no no yes 
Examples of the standard case include the case of the inferno cited by Zillmann (1991) 
and the case of the struggling climber cited by Ravenscroft (1998). 
(if) The case of the compulsive thief 
(sympathy, acentral imagining) 
The distinction between empathy and sympathy - and suspense and surprise - can be 
demonstrated by bringing Hitchcock's story about the burglar into play. To recap, 
Hitchcock refers to this story whilst discussing the scene from Psycho with Truffaut 
(1986). The story itself, from earlier in the interview, goes as follows: 
A curious person goes into somebody else's room and begins to search through the 
drawers. Now, you show the person who lives in that room coming up the stairs. Then you 
go back to the person who is searching, and the public feels like warning him, • Be careful, 
watch out. Someone's coming up the stairs.' Therefore, even if the snooper is not a 
likeable character, the audience will still feel anxiety for him. (p.90) 
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In actual fact, Hitchcock filmed a version of this scenario in his later work Mamie 
(1964). The eponymous heroine of the film (played by Tippi Hedren) is a kleptomaniac 
who uses her good looks to gain employment at one company, before absconding with a 
substantial sum of money, changing her identity, and starting the whole process again in a 
different location. In the introductory scenes, Mamie starts working at a Philadelphian 
publishing company run by Mark Rutland (Sean Connery). In the scene of interest, Mamie 
attempts to steal some money from the company safe after the office has closed for the 
day; the potential 'discoverer' is a cleaning woman (played by Edith Evanson) who is 
walking along an adjacent corridor whilst mopping the floor. Instead of employing parallel 
editing to show us one person followed by the other, Hitchcock utilises a single frame (see 
Frame 5.7). Considering that Hitchcock provides us with more narrational information than 
Mamie - at least with respect to her attempt to get away with a crime - the scene conforms 
to Hitchcock's criterion for producing suspense. This point is exemplified by the particular 
arrangement of the elements within the frame: Hitchcock denies Mamie optical access to 
the event in question by means of a wall between the room containing the company safe 
and the adjacent corridor. 
Frame 5.7: The case of tbe compulsive tbief: Mamie (1964) 
In the following shot, Mamie walks out of the room containing the safe and 
suddenly freezes: a first POV shot confirms that the cleaner is within her sights. Mamie 
looks around for a possible escape route and a second POV shot reveals a staircase in front 
of her. In order to make a silent exit, she takes off her shoes and puts them in her coat 
pocket. As Mamie creeps passed the cleaner, the camera switches to the 'third person' 
once again, three close shots revealing that one of her shoes is slipping out. When the shoe 
finally crashes to the ground, she turns round in alarm, but a third and final POV shot 
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shows that the cleaner continues to mop the floor with her back turned. Ceasing the 
opportunity, Mamie creeps down the staircase before a man enters and walks over to the 
cleaner. In a subsequent conversation between the two, we learn that the cleaner is 
practically deaf - the punchline, as it were, of a joke by Hitchcock. 
Following Hitchcock's remark, why is it plausible that we feel like warnmg 
Mamie, "Be careful, watch out. Someone's coming along the corridor." - another possible 
example of perverse allegiance? Considering that we are aware of the cleaner's approach 
whereas Mamie is oblivious to it, our affective response conforms to the definition of 
sympathy (see Table 5.7). More specifically, our capacity to feel anxiety for the character 
of Mamie seems to be a good candidate for what Currie (1995) describes as primary 
imagining (acentral imagining). In order to spell out this imaginative exercise in terms of 
simulated beliefs and desires, however, Currie (ibid., p.148) would be obliged to claim that 
we imaginatively project ourselves into the place of an invisible witness of a real-world 
counterpart of Mamie's situation (see Currie, 1997, and Turvey, 2004).12 
Placing considerations of simulation to one side, how should we rule out the 
influence of the associative route to sympathy? Once again, Hitchcock's love of 'pure 
cinema' allows us (effectively) to control the independent variables by removing emotion 
cues from the empathy equation. To begin with, the scene is practically devoid of diegetic, 
as well as non-diegetic, sound: the closing of the safe door is only audible if one listens 
very carefully. With respect to personal cues, the fact that the scene is filmed in long shot 
means that it does not present close-ups of facial or bodily expressions of emotion. 
Similarly, with respect to situational cues, there is nothing intrinsic to either the sight of the 
cleaning woman approaching (frame left), or the sight of Mamie opening the safe (frame 
right) which is of emotional significance; it is only when these elements are considered 
together that such significance potentially emerges. 
12 In order to solve the 'paradox of caring', Currie (1997) argues that the reader of a fictional account 
simulates the mental states of a hypothetica.1 reader .of a/actual ~ccount, who, in turn, is (unproblematically) 
simulating the mental states of real people m real situations. This argument was discussed by Turvey (2004) 
at the fourth CCSMI conference. 
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Table 5.7: Empathy versus sympathy 
state of viewer's associated emotion 
narrational knowledge 
case of empathy equal to character's surprise 
(central) (symmetry) 
case of sympathy more than character's suspense 
(acentral) (asymmetry) 
(c) Three arguments against simulation theory 
Having ruled out the influence of the associative network route to empathy, our second 
task is to introduce the cognitive appraisal route as a possible 'alternative' to the simulative 
route outlined above. In order to undertake this task, let us address four arguments from the 
theory theory (IT) versus simulation theory (ST) debate. In this section, I will consider 
three of the main arguments against simulation theory - and thereby for theory theory - as 
outlined by Martin Davies and Tony Stone (1995) in their twin anthologies on folk 
psychology and mental simulation (see key point 3).13 
(i) How does simulation (appraisal) begin? 
How should we understand our capacity to feel empathy for Norman and sympathy for 
Mamie? Even if this capacity involve simulation, the theory theorist might argue that 
simulating another person's emotions depends on us having some sort of folk 
psychological theory about what those emotions are. This point brings us to the first 
argument from the TT versus ST debate: namely, how does simulation (appraisal) begin? 
This argument is tackled by simulation theorists Jane Heal (1995a) and Robert 
Gordon (1995a). First, Heal proposes what can be described as the direction-ofgaze 
argument (pp.48-49). According to this argument, the theory theorist misinterprets the 
13 Questions (i) to (iii) are based on the three arguments outlined by Davies and Stone (1995, section 3.1, 
pp.l8-24). These arg~ments ar~ ordered ~d ~~tled as foll~-:vs: (I) 'Theory-driven or process-driven 
simulation'; (2) 'Gettmg started; and (3) Cogntttve penetrablhty . Some of these arguments have been 
addressed by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 
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'direction' of the simulator's 'gaze': the simulator 'is not looking at the subject to be 
understood but at the world around that subject'. From our perspective, Heal's claim that 
'It is what the world makes the replicator think which is the basis for the beliefs he 
attributes to the subject.' can be translated as follows: 'It is how the replicator appraises 
the world which is the basis for the emotions he attributes to the subject.' Second, Gordon 
makes a distinction between two types of imaginative projection (pp.l 02-1 05). Total 
projection is the method we use when we are already in the target person's shoes; by virtue 
of this fact, it can be classified as 'the default mode of simulation'. Partial (or 'patched ') 
projection, on the other hand, is the method we use when our shoes occupy a slightly 
different place to those of the target person; it may involve the 'recentring' of our 
'egocentric map'. 
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N.B. In the case of sympathy, we are directing our gaze at the target person' s situation, but 
the character does not serve as an emotional gauge for measuring the appropriateness of our 
appraisals / simulations. 
How should we understand these two arguments with respect to the scene from 
Psycho: first, are we directing our gaze at the character of Norman or his situation?; and 
second, which type of imaginative projection is most appropriate? Starting with the first 
question, Grodal's (1997) theory of cognitive identification suggests that we are directing 
our gaze at Norman himself. With respect to the scene from Psycho, Grodal proposes that: 
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'The viewer has cognitively identified himself with [Norman] over a longer period of time, 
and has, during this period, been 'forced' to 'actualize' the emotions which arc 
presupposed in order to give coherence and meaning to his acts.' (pp.94-95) It is unclear, 
however, how such identification actually comes about. 
This brings us to the second question. According to Smith's (1995) model of 
character engagement, total projection is sufficient for we are already in Norman's place 
in terms of the structure of alignment. To begin with the function of spatio-temporal 
attachment, Hitchcock allows us to witness Norman's attempts to 'wipe away the traces of 
the killing' in a sequence which precedes the scene in question: for instance, we see 
Norman laying the shower curtain on the bedroom floor as a shroud for Marion's body, 
before washing the blood off his hands in the bathroom sink, removing the blood from the 
bath, walls, and floor with a mop, and drying the tiled surfaces with a towel. Although the 
camera often keep its distance - framing Norman in tableaux - it occasionally moves in for 
a better view of the action: notable examples include close shots of Norman washing his 
hands and Norman mopping the bath (see Frames 5.8 and 5.9). To move on to the function 
of subjective access - and the role it plays in the scene itself - Hitchcock presents us with a 
series of shots from Norman's optical perspective; namely, the shots of the car slowly 
sinking described previously. Smith argues against the popular conception that the POV 
shot is the 'essence' of subjective access; that is, access to a character's psychology 
(pp.156-165). His argument can be supported, perhaps, by pointing out that if the POY 
shot gives us (direct) access to anything in this particular scene, then it is to Norman's 
situation. (In this respect, perhaps the term 'subjective access' should be replaced with the 
more neutral term 'perceptual access'.) 
Significantly, a combination of Heal and Gordon's simulation account with Smith's 
model of character engagement suggests a reversal of the type of explanation which might 
be offered by Smith (and Grodal) with respect to the scene from Psycho. The direction-of-
gaze argument implies that we do not primarily engage (identify) with the character of 
Norman; rather, we primarily engage (identify) with Norman's situation. Despite the shift 
from character engagement to situational engagement, however, Smith's structure of 
alignment serves to clarify that Norman's situation does not end with the environment 
which immediately surrounds him - the swamp in front or the night-time sky behind - but 
includes his narrative up to and including the moment when the car stops sinking. In 
summary, our capacity to empathise with Norman does not begin with us employing a folk 
psychological theory about what people usually think and feel when they find themselves 
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in the type of situation in question (pro theory theory) . Nor does it begin with u making 
adjustments in our imagination by 'recentring' our 'egocentric map ' (pro simulati n 
theory). Hitchcock, as manipulator of the filmic world, effectively perform these 
psychological operations on our behalf. In the Ptolemaic universe of the cin mil , then, we 
remain stationary whilst the filmic world revolves around us. 
Considering the shift of emphasis, what role does the character of Norman actuall y 
play? To recap, Carroll (1990) argues that we assimilate the situation a a wh Ie, in ' Iudin ) 
both the object of the character's emotions and the character them elves. How h lIld we 
understand the notion of 'assimilation'? Ed Tan (1995 , pp.14-15) sugge t that '[t]h' film 
viewer tries to construct situational meaning as perceived by the character, cucci by the 
latter's expressive behaviour and by what is known about the situational conte t' . In li ght 
of this suggestion, it is plausible that Norman functions as a kind of emotional aug for 
measuring the appropriateness of our simulations (appraisals) in the manner de cribed in 
section 4.4: for instance, if he had burst into fits of hysterical laughter when the car stopped 
sinking, then we would have had cause to reappraise the situational meaning in questi n. 
(Norman may also serve as a target for our causal attributions - this point will be 
developed below.) 
Frames 5.8 and 5.9: The 'cleaning sequence' 
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How should we understand the direction-of-gaze argument with respect to the 
scene from Mamie: are we directing our gaze at the character of Marnie or her sihlalioll? 
And which type of imaginative projection, if any, is most appropriate? To tackle the 
functions of spatio-temporal attachment and perceptual/subjective access in tandem, 
Hitchcock allows us to witness Mamie waiting for her colleagues to leave the building in a 
sequence preceding the scene in question: for instance, Marnie says goodbye to her 
colleagues and walks into the restroom. In one notable shot, Mamie stands in a cubicle 
listening to the sound of people's voices gradually die away (see Frame 5.10). As soon as 
there is silence, Marnie exits the cubicle and the camera follows her from the restr om 
door into the office, and from the office into the room containing the safe; this tracking 
shot is intercut with three POV shots, the final one featuring the safe combination. 
Frame 5.10: The 'waiting sequence' 
With regard to a simulation account, postulating that we ' imaginatively project ' 
ourselves into the place of Mamie, on the one hand, or an invisible witness on the other 
would fail to produce a satisfactory explanation. In the first instance, the act of , recent ring 
our 'egocentric map' would effectively cut us off from the relevant ' channel ' of 
information (namely, "a cleaning woman is approaching"), whereas in the second instance, 
we would be obliged to ' multiply entities' beyond plausibility as well as necessity. As we 
will see, the appraisal account has a distinct advantage in this respect: because it does not 
appeal to the notion of ' imaginative projection' , it is capable of explaining our (potentially) 
sympathetic response in terms of the ' hot' , and indiscriminate, processing of two 
' channels' of information; namely, the information provided by both the left and right-
hand sides of the frame. 
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(ii) Is simulation (appraisal) theory-driven? 
Even if a folk psychological theory is not required to start our simulation (appraisal) of 
either Norman or Mamie's situation, the theorist theorist could still argue that such a 
theory is required to guide our simulation (appraisal) once it has begun. This point brings 
us to the second argument from the IT versus ST debate: namely, is simulation (appraisal) 
theory-driven? In reply, simulation theorists acknowledge that a computer-generated 
simulation of a given phenomenon (say, a weather system) must be guided by a theory of 
how that phenomenon behaves. They argue, however, that a human's simulation of 
another human's mental states need not be guided by a theory of any kind. If the subject's 
'input states' sufficiently resemble those of the target, and the subject's decision-making 
system operates in a similar way to that of the target, then an adequate simulation can be 
guided by the process of (normal) decision-making; in other words, simulation is process-
driven. 
Contrary to both sides of the debate, the distinction between theory- and process-
driven capacities may tum out to be a superficial one. To illustrate this point, it is 
important to clarify what we mean by the term 'theory'. Some theory theorists draw literal 
comparisons with the theories proposed by scientists: for instance, Alison Gopnik and 
Henry Wellman (1995) propose that a folk psychological theory relies on theoretical 
constructs and law-like relations. Significantly, however, Stich and Nichols (1995, pp.132-
135) describe two less ambitious conceptions of theory. According to the narrow 
conception, all 'cognitive capacities' are dependent on 'internally represented knowledge 
structures' which are 'sentence-based and rule-based'. According to the broad conception, 
on the other hand, at least some cognitive capacities can be modelled by connectionist 
(neural) networks. The decision-making system cited by simulation theorists must rely on 
theory in at least one of the senses described. 
Of course, our simulation (appraisal) of Norman and Mamie's situation involves 
empathy and sympathy as opposed to behaviour prediction; therefore, the decision-making 
system should be replaced with an emotional appraisal system. In light of this fact, do the 
above arguments still apply? And how do we go about appraising the meaning of the 
respective situations? These questions bring us back to the SP AARS approach originally 
advanced by Power and Dalgleish (1997) and outlined in the previous chapter (see Figure 
5.8). Given that the proposition that 'an appraisal process is process-driven' is trivially 
true, our main task is to ascertain whether or not such a process is 'theory-driven' in any 
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meaningful sense. Considering that the car ceasing to sink and the cleaning woman 
entering the scene are both examples of situational meaning, the first significant port of 
call in the mind would be the propositional level where knowledge relating to the given 
situation would be activated. This process would result in an interpretation of the meaning 
of the respective situations: for example, 'There is a danger that Marion's body may be 
discovered' or 'There is a danger that the cleaning woman may discover Mamie.' 
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The key question is to what extent do interpretations at the propositional level make 
reference to theory in the senses described? To begin with, we need not commit ourselves 
to the Gopnik and Wellman-type claim that the knowledge in question constitutes some 
sort of rigorous scientific theory. According to Power and Dalgleish, however, it is 
plausible that the propositional level contains models of the world. self, and other (see 
Figure 5.9). With respect to the scenes from Psycho and Mamie, possible examples include 
models of the criminal justice system on the one hand, and models of what is to attempt to 
either cover up or commit a crime on the other. It seems reasonable to suggest that these 
models must be in place in order for 'the self to respond emotionally to equivalent 
situations which are of personal relevance. More significantly, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that when these models are centred on 'the other', they constitute some sort of folk 
psychological theory about how the target person's beliefs and desires relate to their 
perceptions and behaviours. Given, furthermore, that these models entail 'internally 
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represented knowledge structures' which are 'sentence-based and rule-based', they arc 
equivalent to theory in the narrow sense defined by Stich and Nichols. 14 
Figure 5.9: Understanding the propositional level: domains of mind content 
Based on Figure 5.3 from Power and Dalgleish (1997), p.l58. 
(iii) Is simulation (appraisal) cognitively penetrable? 
The issue of theory- versus process-driven simulation (appraisal) is closely related to the 
third and final argument from the TT versus ST debate: namely, is simulation (appraisal) 
cognitively penetrable? According to Stich and Nichols (1995, pp.150-152), if our mind-
reading capacity is dependent on theory, then it should be cognitively penetrable with 
respect to, say, gaps in our knowledge. If, on the other hand, our mind-reading capacity is 
dependent on simulation, then it should be cognitively impenetrable in the sense described. 
Stich and Nichols offer the following example to illustrate this point. If subjects are asked 
to select the most superior item from a collection of consumer products which are all, in 
actual fact, identical, which one will they choose? If we use simulation to answer this 
\4 Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, Ch. 3) also address the relationship between simulation and theory. They 
defme the activity of theorizing as passing 'from one or more propositions to some other proposition via 
mental processes that are apt to track relations of logical or evidential dependence' (p.60). According to this 
defmition, our propositional interpretations of Norman's situation can be legitimately regarded as examples 
of theorizing. Currie and Ravenscroft conclude that '[s]imulation is theorizing if and only if what it is a 
simulation of is theorizing' (p.63). According to this view, it is possible that our interpretations can be 
regarded as simulations of Norman's mental states. 
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question, then we should expect our prediction to be unaffected by our ignorance of the so-
called 'position effect'. The fact of the matter, however, is that we are unlikely to correctly 
predict that subjects tend to choose the item on their right; this failure suggests that our 
prediction is dependent on the employment of a folk psychological theory which does not 
contain the relevant information. In reply, simulation theorists argue that an adequate 
simulation of the scenario in question would require the manipulation of sensory (and 
other) inputs which are not provided by a spoken or written description. 
Once again, the appraisal account may provide us with a way of reconciling the two 
sides of the debate. Imagine being in the place of a real-world counterpart of Norman or a 
witness of a real-world counterpart of Mamie's situation. Although your emotional 
appraisal of the event of the car failing to go 'all the way down' or the event of the 
cleaning woman entering the scene would occur automatically, it would be cognitively 
penetrable in the sense that it would make reference to your relatively accessible beliefs 
and knowledge about the world. This point can be illustrated by way of a simple thought 
experiment. Suppose that, for some strange reason, you acquired the false belief that half-
submerged cars were such a commonplace occurrence in Californian swampland that they 
never provoked investigation by the police or that every cleaner employed in a 
Philadelphian publishing company was hard of hearing. If you witnessed the events in 
question whilst holding such beliefs, then your appraisal of their emotional significance 
would still occur in a mandatory fashion but the appraisal would be less likely to result in 
the feeling of anxiety. To return to our role as film viewers, the crucial point with regard to 
simulation is as follows. Considering that we do not conjure up emotional states out of thin 
air, one could argue that an adequate 'simulation' of the emotions of either Norman or the 
real-world witness of Mamie's situation would be cognitively penetrable in the way 
described. IS 
15 Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, Ch. 5) tackle the 'cognitive penetrability' argument by appealing to the 
condition of cognitive conservation: this condition stipulates that when you simulate a subject 8's reasoning 
or decision-making, 'you should appeal to just the same theories or beliefs or information that 8 appeals to in 
his reasoning or decision-making' (p.92). 
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(d) One argument against theory theory 
Our consideration of three of the main arguments against simulation theory (and thereby 
for theory theory) suggests that the appraisal account is dependent on theory in certain 
respects. If this is the case, however, then we must address one of the main arguments 
against theory theory, and thereby for simulation theory (see key point 4). 
(i) How does folk psychology (appraisal) bridge the gap between theory and experience? 
In order to bridge the problematic gap between theory and experience, we must return to 
the SPAARS framework once again (see Figure 5.10). With respect to the propositional 
level of the mind, the interpretations of situational meaning - for example, 'There is a 
danger that Marion's body may be discovered' and 'There is a danger that the cleaning 
woman may discover Mamie.' - would be 'cold' and non-emotional in nature. At the 
schematic model level, however, these interpretations would be related to appropriate 'goal 
structures' to produce an appraisal (proper) of the respective situations; this appraisal 
would result in the generation of a 'hot', emotional response (namely, anxiety) with its 
physiological, behavioural, and subjective components. 
Figure 5.10: Tbe SPAARS framework: bridging tbe gap between theory and experience 
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The next important issue to consider is how these goal structures come to be 
activated in the first place. Starting with Psycho, the cleaning sequence described 
previously lasts for over eight minutes. One can speculate as to why Hitchcock devotes 
nearly one-tenth of the film's running time (excluding the credits) to a sequence which 
does not clearly advance the film in terms of either spectacle or narrative: Greg M. Smith 
(2003, p.80), for instance, describes Norman's cleaning efforts as 'an extraordinarily 
mundane sequence of action' .16 There are two possible explanations. The first explanation 
has a degree of historical specificity: it is plausible that Hitchcock wanted to allow the 
unsuspecting viewer of 1960 to recover, at least partially, from the emotional shock of the 
shower scene, before introducing new twists and turns in the narrative. The second 
explanation, however, is more relevant to the project in hand: following Truffaut's remark, 
it is plausible that Hitchcock wanted to give the viewer, from both then and now, a 
sufficient opportunity to 'switch' their 'loyalties' from Marion to Norman. 
How should we understand this switching of loyalties? Grodal (1997, p. 95) 
explains the switching in terms of cognitive identification, proposing that we identify with 
Norman because there is no other character for us to identify with: he notes that after 
Marion is murdered, 'a vacuum is created which the young man [Norman] partially fills'. 
Smith (1995) would spell out these identificatory relationships in the more precise terms of 
character engagement. 
The appraisal account suggests a different explanation, however. According to the 
notion of default modes 1 and 2 introduced previously, in the real world we only tend to 
have (close) perceptual access to our own emotional situations and (sustained) spatio-
temporal attachment to our own emotional narratives. In light of this, when we focus 
exclusively on, say, a (goal-directed) action for a reasonable period of time, it tends to be 
an action that we, ourselves, are performing. Although the cleaning sequence may be 
mundane in terms of content, the fact that we are exposed to that content is truly 
extraordinary: the close shots of Norman washing his hands and mopping the bath provide 
us with an optical approximation of the views we would have if we were washing our own 
hands or mopping the bath ourselves (see Frames 5.8 and 5.9). First, it is plausible that 
certain levels of the mindlbrain do not make a distinction between the proposition, 
16 The only apparently significant 'unit' of narrative information concerns Norman's discovery of a folded 
newspaper which, unbeknownst to him, contains the stolen $40,000. This turns out to be something of a red 
herring, however, for the psychologist's monologue at the film's conclusion reveals that Norman disposes of 
the money along with Marion's body. 
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"Norman is wiping away the traces of the killing," and the proposition, "1 am wiping away 
the traces of the killing." Second, in the way that some psychologists propose that 
'emotional contagion' occurs when we are allowed to witness another person's facial 
expressions, perhaps something like goal contagion occurs when we are allowed to witness 
another person's actions: this process of contagion results in the activation of the goal 
structures which correspond to Norman's situation (as a person attempting to cover up a 
crime), and the de-activation of the goal structures which correspond to Marion's situation 
(as a person on the run from a crime). 
A similar, and possibly stronger, argument can be made with respect to the scene 
from Mamie. The film aligns us with Mamie from the very outset; the scene occurs a third 
of the way into a two hour plus film. Significantly, the waiting sequence described 
previously lasts for nearly three minutes. Of particular interest is the shot of Mamie 
standing in a cubicle; Hitchcock chooses to stay with this shot for the best part of a minute 
(see Frame 5.10). Once again, one can speculate as to why Hitchcock devotes such a 
section of the film's running time to a sequence (and shot) which does not clearly advance 
the film in terms of either spectacle or narrative. It is plausible, however, that the duration 
of the sequence (and shot), in conjunction with the fact that Mamie's intentions to steal 
money from the company safe are clearly signalled earlier in the film, is sufficient to 
activate goal structures which correspond to Mamie's situation, as opposed to, say, the 
situation of the cleaning woman. As a result, we do not have to make a conscious decision 
to root for Mamie when the cleaning woman enters the scene. 17 
Given that the appropriate goal structures have been activated by default, how do 
we go about cognitively appraising the events themselves? Although cognitive appraisal is 
potentially susceptible to the frame problem, it can be partly thought of in terms of Stich 
and Nichols's broad conception of 'theory': the fact that at least some cognitive capacities 
can be modelled by connectionist networks brings us to back to the notion of 'parallel 
constraint satisfaction' (see Figure 5.11). 
According to Thagard and Verbeurgt (1997), a goal G and an event E can be 
regarded as nodes in a connectionist network. If the achievement of goal G is facilitated by 
17 Following Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988, Ch. 3), analogues of Norman's and Mamie's active-pursuit 
goals may be constructed 'as and .when needed'. It seems reasonable to propose that we are capable of 
constructing A-goals when embarkmg on a new task - say, a game of chess. Alternatively, the constructive 
process could be achieved by mod.ifying existing A-g?als: at some stage of our lives, no doubt, we have tried 
to either cover up or get away WIth some sort of misdemeanour, however minor. In addition. the goals in 
question may be subordinate to interest goals which are already in place, an example being the preservation 
of one's personal liberty. 
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event E, then there is a positive constraint between the nodes in question; this positive 
constraint is equivalent to an excitatory link. Alternatively, if the achievement of goal G is 
hindered by event E, then there is a negative constraint between the two nodes; this 
negative constraint is equivalent to an inhibitory link. In the scene from P~ycho, the goal 
structure (G I) of attempting to cover up a crime - brought into play at time tl (the cleaning 
sequence) - is negatively constrained by the event (EI) of the car failing to go 'all the way 
down' which occurs at time t2. (Alternatively, we can think of the goal-directed action 
(G I) initiated by Norman in the forward shot as being negatively constrained by the event 
(E I) depicted in the reverse shot.) In the case of Mamie, the particular arrangement of the 
elements within the frame almost enables us to visualise the process of parallel constraint 
satisfaction in action; the event (E2) of the cleaner entering the scene on the left-hand side 
of the frame negatively constrains the goal-directed action (G2) performed by Mamie on 
the right. 
Significantly, Thagard and Verbeurgt (ibid., p.3) state: 'A negative constraint 
between two elements can be satisfied only by accepting one element and rejecting the 
other.' In the cases in question, where we effectively wish to maintain the goal but cannot 
conceivably ignore the event, the negative constraints in question cannot be satisfied. In a 
related paper, Barnes and Thagard (1997, p.8) claim: 'Emotions are very important to this 
sort of process, since we have no conscious access to the mental operation of parallel 
constraint satisfaction, and feelings such as happiness, relief, fear, and anxiety provide 
consciousness with a reading of the overall state of constraint satisfaction.' In light of this, 
it is plausible that the failure of the corresponding neural network to achieve parallel 
constraint satisfaction is signalled by the feeling of anxiety already discussed. Similarly, 
the 'rejection' of the corresponding event - upon the car finally going 'all the way down' 
and the cleaning woman failing to discover Mamie as she creeps away - is accompanied by 
a feeling of relief. 
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(e) Literalizing the metaphor: the three key stages 
Having introduced the cognitive appraisal route to empathy as a possible 'alternative' to 
the simulative route, our third and final task is to show how the appraisal account may 
actually improve upon its simulative counterpart. With respect to the type of model 
outlined in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, Currie and Ravenscroft (1997, pp.177-178) suggest that the 
notions of 'feeding in pretend versions of beliefs and desires' and 'running the decision-
making apparatus off-line' have a largely metaphorical status. In contrast, we can conceive 
of the appraisal account as an attempt to go beyond the level of metaphor in certain ways: 
each of the three key stages of the simulation account - namely, inputs, processing, and 
outputs - can be spelt out in more literal terms. 
(i) Inputs 
Starting with the scene from Psycho, our capacity to feel anxiety with the character of 
Norman seems to be a good candidate for central imagining. To paraphrase Currie, the 
319 
scene in question seems to leave something to our imagination; unlike Van Sant, Hitchcock 
does not tell us how we should feel when the car stops sinking. In light of this, one could 
argue that to empathetically reenact Norman's situation, our 'pretend belief and desire 
generator' must generate the 'pretend belief that we are attempting to dispose of a 
person's body along with the 'pretend desire' to cover up a crime. (Note that a 
propositional attitude consists of two key elements: namely, a proposition and an attitude 
towards that proposition.) Subsequently, we must 'feed' these pretend beliefs and pretend 
desires into our emotional appraisal system, and so forth. 
The appraisal account provides us with a potential way of 'literalizing' these 
particular metaphors (see Figure 5.12). Generating the pretend belief that one is attempting 
to dispose of a person's body may be equivalent to processing information which stipulates 
that a body is being disposed of. Here, the propositional content of the belief is provided by 
the given information, whilst the attitudinal element is implicit in the processing of this 
information. Similarly, generating the pretend desire to, say, cover up a crime may be 
equivalent to processing the information in question with respect to certain goal structllres 
which, through the function of spatio-temporal attachment, are already activated by the 
time the car stops sinking. Here, the propositional content of the desire is provided by the 
corresponding goal structure, whilst the attitudinal element is implicit in the activation of 
this goal structure. 
With respect to the scene from Mamie, our capacity to feel anxiety for the 
character of Mamie seems to be a good candidate for acentral imagining. Following 
Currie, once again, one could argue that we are required to imaginatively entertain that the 
events depicted by the scene are actually taking place, including the simulation of 
appropriate beliefs and desires. According to the appraisal account, however, generating 
the pretend belief that Mamie is attempting to break into the company safe is equivalent to 
processing information which stipulates that a safe is being broken into. Similarly, 
generating the pretend desire that Mamie manages to get away with her crime is equivalent 
to processing this information with respect to certain goal structures which, through the 
function of spatio-temporal attachment, are already activated by the time the cleaner enters 
the scene. 
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Figure 5.12: Literalizing the metaphor (I) 
(1) Metaphorical interpretation (limUlatlon) 
pret.nd belief and dIIi,. gtnIrator 
(I) pretend beliefs 
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PB2: '\ believe that Mamie • is breaKing into a.,' 
(II) pretend delli'll 
PD1: 'I (Nonnan) desire to cover up a Cline,' 
PD2: 'I desil'8lhat Mamie • gels WIIa'f with her crime,' 
(2) Uttrallntlrprltltion (appraisal) 
fiction film: Paycho I ",.",. 
(I) InfonnIIIon 
eventE1: a body is being disposed of 
event E2: a safe is being broken Ink> 
(II) Ipitlo-temporIl altlchmlnt 
goal G1: covering up 8 crime 
goal G2: getting away with 8 crime 
In a related fashion, the simulation theorist might propose that we are required to 
'imaginatively project' ourselves into the place of Norman (central imagining) on the one 
hand, or the place of an invisible witness of a real-world counterpart of Mamie's situation 
(acentral imagining) on the other. Once again, the appraisal account provides us with a 
potential way of 'literalizing' these particular metaphors (see Figure 5.13). In short, we are 
not required to project ourselves into the place of either a character or an invisible witness; 
rather, the film presents us with information and we (automatically) process this 
information. Period. In conclusion, the appraisal account replaces the more metaphorical 
terms of 'simulation' with the more literal terms of 'hot', as opposed to 'cold', information 
processing. Although this account still leaves us with a potentially intractable problem 
from a computational perspective, it does not burden we, the viewer, with an unreasonable 
work load: the task of simulating the extraordinary is effectively undertaken by the film 
itself, whilst the task of appraising the extraordinary is automatically undertaken by 
psychological mechanisms which are already in place. 
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e interface with activated goal structures 
N.B. Although the direction of the arrow illustrating 'imaginative projection' is in the same 
direction as the arrow which illustrates our 'gaze' (see Figure 5.7), the two arrows refer to 
fundamentally different phenomena: the former refers to a process of the imagination, 
whereas the latter refers to a process of attention. 
(ii) Processing 
How should we understand the processing stage? In opposition to theory theory, many 
simulation theorists appeal to the factors of parsimony and simplicity: for instance, the 
simulation account is parsimonious in the sense that, in Goldman's words, it gets 'both its 
'data base' and its control mechanism for free', and simple in the sense that it apparently 
dispenses with a (complicated) psychological theory. To what extent does the appraisal 
theorist appeal to the factors in question? To begin with, the appraisal account is 
parsimonious in the sense that it appeals to appraisal processes (or 'patterns') which are 
'freely' available, so to speak; in this respect, it is very much in the same spirit. The 
question of whether or not the appraisal account is simple, on the other hand, is more 
problematic. 
In order to illustrate this point, let us briefly return to the simulation account. 
Contrary to first appearances, it is plausible that the notion of 'simplicity' in play merely 
amounts to the following: by drawing a line around the so-called 'decision-making system' 
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in the case of behaviour prediction - and the so-called 'emotional appraisal system' in the 
case of empathy - the simulation theorist is not obliged to describe the internal operations 
of either system. Given, however, that both decision-making and emotional appraisal may 
appeal to theory in the ways cited above, the simulation theorist actually exchanges the 
complex problem of formulating the principles employed by a psychological theory with 
the equally complex problem of formulating the principles employed by the mechanisms in 
question. To my knowledge, this point has not been given the attention it deserves. III In 
conclusion, both the simulation and appraisal accounts of empathy may appeal to exactly 
the same phenomena, however simple or complex; the only difference lies in the scope of 
their particular enquiries, in what they choose to investigate and what they choose to 
ignore. 
(iii) Outputs 
According to the simulation account of behaviour prediction described by Stich and 
Nichols, the decision-making system operates in an ofJline fashion: its outputs are diverted 
away from the 'action control system' and sent to the 'behaviour predicting and explaining 
system' instead. In contrast, the simulation account of empathy described by Nichols et at. 
(1996, p.60) proposes that the 'emotional response system' operates in an online fashion: 
although it is 'input deviant', it elicits 'genuine emotional responses'. Following the 
argument in the third chapter, the appraisal account can take this proposal one step further. 
The physiological and subjective components of our emotions can be described as 'online': 
hence, the possible feeling of anxiety - which apparently originates in the pit of our 
stomach - when the car stops sinking and the cleaning woman enters the scene. (It is 
plausible that these components could be measured by GSR tests and verbal reports 
respectively.) The behavioural component, on the other hand, should be described as 
'offline': ultimately, we do not offer the characters assistance, or shout out warnings, even 
though we may feel the inclination to do so. 
)8 Fodor has argued that the decision-making system exploits some sort of internally represented theory: sec 
Stich and Nichols (1995), note 7, p.154. This point is also cited by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). p.91. 
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(f) Literalizing the metaphor: final considerations 
The attempt to literalize the metaphor does not end with the three key stages, however. 
Once our emotions have been brought into play by the film, how should we understand the 
subsequent processes of 'transferring' our emotions to the character and 'monitoring' ollr 
emotions for appropriateness? And how should we understand the relationships between 
empathy and sympathy on the one hand, and between egoism and altruism on the other? 
(i) Attribution 
In the model outlined thus far, the emphasis has been on situational engagement as 
opposed to Smith's notion of character engagement: following simulation theory, it has 
been proposed that we direct our gaze at the character's situation as opposed to their 
psychology, thereby finding ourselves in a congruent emotional state. Both the proponents 
and critics of such a theory might argue, however, that our happening to be in the same 
emotional state as the character is not sufficient for either simulation or empathy: 
somehow, we must transfer our emotional states to the character (see Fuller, 1995, and 
Heal, 1995b). (In a related fashion, Noel Carroll (personal communication) points out that 
for the model in question to be classified as a model of empathy in particular - as opposed 
to a model of the emotions in general - it must propose that we are in a certain emotional 
state because the character is in that state.) 
How should we understand the transferral process in question? From the 
perspective of behaviour prediction, Gordon (1995c, pp.54-57) states that the argument for 
such a process is based, in turn, on an argument from analogy which requires that: (I) we 
introspect our mental states; and (2) we have theoretical knowledge about which of those 
mental states are likely to be 'shared' by the target person. His objections to the first point 
concern the difficulties of introspecting propositional attitudes, and so forth; his main 
objection seems to be to the second point, which 'threatens to collapse the simulation 
theory into a form of theory theory'. In short, Gordon argues that the theorists who assume 
that a transferral process is necessary do not account for the difference between simulating 
oneself in the target person's situation and simulating the target person in that situation: if 
we 'transform' ourselves into the target person by 'recentring our egocentric map', then a 
subsequent transferral process - 'from me to you' - is simply not required. (As we have 
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seen, the film-maker effectively performs the psychological operation of 'recentring' on 
our behalf.) 19 
Despite these arguments, understanding the potential shift from the type of 
situational engagement described previously to the type of character engagement originally 
described by Smith, requires us to take the notion of a transferral process seriously -
hopefully, a reconsideration of this process will provide us with at least a partial answer to 
Carroll's objection (see Figure 5.14). First, it is plausible that we have some sort of access 
to our own emotional responses; this access can be accounted for in terms of somatic 
feedback, and so forth. Notice, then, that in this particular instance, introspection need not 
be problematic. Second, according to attribution theory, we tend to causally attribute our 
emotional responses to the most salient objects in our environment. From an 
anthropomorphic perspective, it is plausible that these objects are often fellow human 
beings, whilst from a perceptual perspective, it is plausible that these objects are often 
well-lit and mobile: when presented with repeated close-ups of a character whilst sitting in 
a dark (and static) theatre, it stands to reason that the character stands out from both their 
environment and our own. 
This brings us to the following conclusion with respect to the case of empathy. 
Even though, as 'appraisers', we are directing our gaze at Norman's situation rather than at 
his psychology, as 'attributors', we (mis )attribute our feeling of anxiety to Norman's 
psychology rather than to either his situation as a character or our situation as a viewer. It 
should be acknowledged that some kind of theory may come into play here. This theory 
can be spelt out, however, in terms of a relatively simple 'rule-of-thumb' which can be 
expressed as an if-then conditional: for instance, 'If person X is placed in situation Y, then 
they are likely to experience emotion Z.' The end-result is that we label our feeling of 
anxiety as 'feeling with' his character. In the case of sympathy, the transferral process is 
slightly different. As 'appraisers', it is plausible that we are directing our gaze at Mamie's 
situation. With respect to our role as 'attributors', however, the converse claim cannot be 
made: considering that we are aware of the cleaning woman's approach whereas Mamie is 
oblivious to it, it is implausible that we attribute our feeling of anxiety to Mamie's 
psychology. At this point, another theoretical 'rule-of-thumb' may come into play, 
expressible, once again, as an if-then conditional: for example, 'If person X cannot see 
19 Gordon's argument is challenged by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, section 3.2). They argue that an 
inference 'from me to you' is necessary if the simulation in question is to contribute to my beliefs and 
knowledge regarding the nature of your mental states. 
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person Y, then they are unlikely to experience emotion Z.' Given, however, that Mamie 
has a high level of salience as both a human being and the film's heroine, it is likely that 
we label our feeling of anxiety as 'feeling/or' her character. 
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N.B. This diagram should be considered in conjunction with Figure 5.7. (It also incorporates 
one of the findings of Figure 5.13: namely, the interface with activated goal structures.) In 
the case of sympathy, we are directing our gaze at the character's situation; although the 
character may serve as a target for the causal attributions of our emotional responses, they 
do not serve as an emotional gauge for measuring the appropriateness of our appraisals / 
simulations. 
In order to fully understand the nature of attribution and labelling, it is important to 
ascertain to what extent the words 'empathy' and 'sympathy' refer to natural kinds (see 
Table 5.8). In the light of various arguments cited above, the general root pathos (meaning 
'feeling') may refer to states of the brain and body common to both empathy and 
sympathy. From an in/ormation-processing perspective, for instance, the two cannot be 
distinguished in terms of basic characteristics of the appraisal process: both the scenes 
from Psycho and Mamie present an event which is incompatible with an activated goal 
structure. Period. Similarly, from a psychophysiological perspective, the two cannot be 
distinguished in terms of physiological and phenomenological components. First, many 
emotion theorists believe that there are only distinct physiological 'patterns' for each of the 
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five basic emotions: namely, fear, disgust, anger, sadness, and happiness. Second, 
articulating the nature of our emotional experience is notoriously difficult: all that we can 
reasonably say is that our experience is 'affectively congruent' - in terms of hedonic 
valence - with what we commonly understand by the terms in question. 
Given the inconclusiveness of both the information-processing and 
psychophysiological perspectives, the qualifying prefixes em- (meaning 'with') and sym-
(meaning 'for') may be ultimately dependent on the properties of the filmic world -
especially, the method of alignment employed by the film-maker and the state of ollr 
narrational knowledge as viewers. If, for instance, we are provided with approximately the 
same narrational information as the character of Norman - at least with respect to his 
attempt to cover up a crime - then perhaps our emotions should be classified as 
'empathetic'. Alternatively, if are we provided with, say, more narrational information than 
the character of Marnie - at least with respect to her attempt to get away with a crime - then 
perhaps our emotions should be classified as 'sympathetic'. As we have seen, these points 
are exemplified by either the particular relationship between shots or the particular 
arrangement of the elements within the frame: if the forward and reverse shots from 
Psycho are 'optically connected', then the long shot from Mamie is 'optically divided' so 
to speak. In conclusion, the key difference between empathy and sympathy is external, as 
opposed to internal, to the brain and body; the 'centring' or 'acentring' in question is a 
function of the filmic world itself. Intriguingly, this move may lead us to a partially 
extemalist, as opposed to intemalist, view of the mind: in McCulloch's (1995, esp. pp.184-
224) words, the view that the mind is 'constituted by the objects which are its phenomena'. 
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Table 5.8: The relationship between empathy and sympathy: internalism versus externalism 
internal factors (brain, body) external factors (filmic world) 
physiology phenomenology state of narrational knowledge'? 
general root: negative ANS patterns negative affect 
pathos ('feeling') 
qualifying prefix: as above as above equal to character's 
em- ('with') 
qualifying prefix: as above as above more than character's 
sym- ('for') 
(ii) Monitoring 
The appraisal account outlined above has focused on one half of Smith's (1995) model of 
character engagement: namely, the 'structure of alignment' in tenns of the factors of 
perceptual/subjective access and spatio-temporal attachment. How, though, should we 
understand the other half of Smith's model: namely, the issue of allegiance (see Figure 
5.15)? In order to answer this question, let us return to the third stage in Zillmann' s three-
factor theory of empathy. To recap, Zillmann proposes that our emotional responses to a 
target person (and their situation) undergo 'monitoring' for appropriateness. If the target 
person is conceived of as being moral and/or likeable in nature, then the affective response 
may be labelled as an instance of empathy or sympathy. If, on the other hand, the target is 
conceived of as being immoral and/or dislikeable, then the affective response may be 
(dispositionally) overridden and re-Iabelled as, say, an instance of antipathy - usually 
defined as 'having opposite feelings'. 
Smith proposes that allegiance is based on moral evaluation: we feel an allegiance 
to a character because we morally approve of their actions, and so forth. Considering, 
however, that both Norman's and Mamie's actions - covering up a crime on the one hand, 
and committing a crime on the other - are morally dubious, our empathetic and 
sympathetic responses present us with possible examples of perverse allegiance; indeed, as 
Hitchcock implies, this is partly what makes our responses so intriguing. In a subsequent 
article, Smith (1999, pp.222-223) argues that the issue of perverse allegiance is not a 
problem for his model, stating that the key question to be considered is as follows: 'do we 
feel an allegiance with - a sympathy for - a character because of the perverse act that they 
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engage III or in spite of that act?' According to this argument, our empathetic and 
sympathetic responses are not genuine examples of perverse allegiance, on the grounds 
that they are elicited 'because of the structure of alignment, the process of automatic 
appraisal, and so forth; not the possible immorality of the actions in question. How, 
though, should we understand the 'in spite or clause? Given that we are led to believe that 
Norman is attempting to protect his mother (as opposed to perverting the course of justice), 
whilst Mamie's behaviour is largely compulsive (and aimed at a faceless corporation), it is 
unlikely that our empathetic and sympathetic responses will be dispositionally overridden 
and re-Iabelled. 
The issue of allegiance need not end with moral evaluation, however. In a review of 
Smith's model cited previously, Gaut (1997) argues that 'clearly I can identify with 
characters because of many qualities besides moral ones: they may be physically attractive, 
witty, interesting, wild or whatever.' This argument - acknowledged by Smith (ibid.) - can 
be supported by two additional points. First, in reference to Marion's murder, Grodal 
argues that 'a vacuum is created which [Norman] partially fills'. Although the camera 
occasionally lets him out of its sights during the eight minute plus sequence in which he 
cleans the bathroom, it neither departs thematically from his attempt to cover up the crime 
nor focuses on another character. As a human agent, then, Norman not only acts as a target 
for our empathetic response; he also acts as an exclusive target. 
Second, according to the familiarity hypothesis, the more familiar a person is, the 
more we tend to like them. Conversely, Hatfield et al. (1994, p.148) propose that we are 
more susceptible to emotional contagion if we regard our relationship to the target person 
as 'one of relatedness and/or likeness rather than independence and uniqueness' - such a 
relationship is based in part on familiarity (paraphrased by Plantinga, 1999, p.2S0). 
Considering that the scene from Mamie occurs a third of the way into a two hour plus film, 
we have more than sufficient time to become acquainted with Mamie's character, at least 
in terms of her physical appearance. As a human agent, then, Mamie not only acts as a 
target for our sympathetic response; she acts as afamiliar (and potentially likeable) target. 
Given that the factors of exclusivity and familiarity facilitate the transferral and 
development of our empathetic and sympathetic responses, it is unlikely (once again) that 
they will be dispositionally overridden and re-labelled. 
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(iii) Reflection 
Following Hoffman's multi-dimensional theory of empathy, Davis (1996) proposes that 
our capacity to empathise with a target person - and sympathise with their situation -
facilitates the shift from egoism to altruism: if we are capable of experiencing some of a 
target person's negative emotions, then it is plausible that we will be motivated to help that 
person in order to ease our own suffering. This line of reasoning can be developed as 
follows. If the body is the 'theatre for the emotions', then egoism and altruism are 
inevitably interwined: I (the ego in the equation) can only feel your emotions in my body; 
therefore, the (altruistic) act of helping you will (inevitably) serve to help me. What is 
more, this argument not only expresses a contingent fact about the way we happen to be 
constructed as human beings; it also seems to have a certain necessary (that is, logical) 
force. Contrary to first appearances, then, the argument may actually provide us with a way 
of challenging the negative connotations of the term 'egoism': viz., we should not think of 
egoism as an unfortunate fact about human nature; rather, we should think of it as a 
contingent (and necessary) consequent of the way the world happens to be (and the way 
the world must be). 
Following Damasio's notion of the image space, we can think of appraisal patterns 
as being realised in an appraisal space (see Figure 5.16). Starting with the role of egoism, 
the appraisal process can be brought into play in a nonconscious and unintentional fashion 
by the external world of the film. As we have seen, automatic appraisal does not make a 
distinction between the self and the characters: when the car stops sinking and the cleaner 
enters the scene we experience a negative emotion akin to anxiety. Given that a negative 
emotion is unpleasant - almost by definition - it stands to reason that we will seek to 
reduce it in some way. The key question is how does this reduction take place? 
Considering the transferral process described above, our feelings of anxiety are centred 
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firmly on the characters of Norman and Mamie, albeit through some sort of attribution 
error. (Considering the subsequent monitoring process, moreover, these feelings will not 
ruled out by dispositional override.) Given that these characters are virtual and fictional 
beings, however, the option of our offering them any sort of assistance is obviously not 
available to us. 
Moving onto the role of altruism, the same appraisal space - and the same appraisal 
patterns - may be brought into play consciously and intentionally by the internal world of 
the mindlbrain, thereby leading us to the intentional level of explanation. Following 
Damasio's discussion, we can think of appraisal patterns as being stored in a dispositional 
space. Significantly, our negative responses may serve as motivational prompts of a 
particular kind (operating via the body loop). The most plausible, and apparently natural, 
way of reducing our negative responses is to keep our eyes rooted on the screen and devote 
our conscious (attentive) processing resources to reflectively appraising the pros and cons 
of the depicted situation, whilst hoping that everything turns out for the best. If we wish to 
reduce the negative arousal which results automatically from constrain 'dissatisfaction' 
when the car stops sinking (an instance of egoism), then we may consciously assess the 
likelihood of the car remaining half-submerged and so forth, whilst hoping that the car 
'goes all the way down' on Norman's behalf (an instance of altruism). Similarly, if we 
wish to reduce the negative arousal which is brought into play automatically when the 
cleaning woman enters the scene ( egoism), we may consciously assess the likelihood of the 
woman catching sight of Mamie, whilst feeling inclined to wam Mamie, "Be careful, 
watch out. Someone's coming along the corridor" (altruism). 
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(a) A tertiary solution to the paradox of fiction (and the paradox of empathy) 
Before appealing to the role of emotional simulation in either the real world or the cinema, 
we should consider at least two questions: namely, to what extent does the multi-level 
model of the emotion system outlined thus far act as a 'constraint' on, and an 'alternative' 
to, emotional simulation (see Table 5.9)? 
(i) 'Constraints' on simulation 
The first question has been addressed by reconsidering the associative network route to 
(cinematic) emotion. A reconsideration of associative networks from both a 
neurobiological and a connectionist perspective has yielded the following two points. First, 
it is plausible that both 'direct' perception and 'indirect' simulation utilise the same nodes 
in the mindibrain, the external perceptual information presented by fiction films making 
the internal activity of perceptual imagining largely superfluous. More specifically, the 
direct activation of nodes may serve as an affective prompt for emotional imagery, whilst 
our capacity to respond emotionally to this imagery may be dependent on a 'critical 
number' of associated nodes being (directly) activated. 
It should be stressed that the same arguments could be made for the cognitive 
appraisal route to (cinematic) emotion. In a general sense, the results of emotional 
appraisal may play a crucial role in activating a corresponding emotion node in an 
associative network. More specifically, the negative arousal resulting from automatic 
appraisal may serve as a motivational prompt for reflective appraisal, whilst our capacity to 
respond emotionally to this appraisal may be dependent, once again, on independent 
instigation in the manner described. 
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(iO 'Alternatives' to simulation (and theory) 
The second question has been addressed by reconsidering the cognitive appraisal route to 
(cinematic) emotion. In light of this discussion, Currie's essentialist claim that imagination 
is simulation (key point 1) can be taken one step further with respect to emotional 
simulation. If the simulation of central states operates in a largely automatic, non-
conscious fashion (key point 2), begins with the film itself (key point 3), and successfully 
bridges the theory/experience gap (key point 4), then it can be spelt out in terms of 
automatic appraisal - which, in turn, can be partially understood in terms of parallel 
constraint satisfaction, and so forth. Similarly, if the simulation of central states operates in 
a deliberate, conscious fashion, then it can be spelt out in terms of reflective appraisal. This 
essentialist claim can be approached from the opposite direction by appealing to the notion 
of emergence: viz., we can say that/rom appraisal 'emerges' simulation. 
The same essentialist claim (1) can be made for the associative route to empathy. If 
the simulation of perceptual states operates in a largely automatic, non-conscious fashion 
(2), begins with the film itself (3), and successfully bridges if not the theory/experience gap 
exactly, then the gap between input nodes and emotion nodes (4), it can be spelt out in 
terms of automatic association - which, in turn, can be partially understood in terms of 
pattern association, and so forth. Similarly, if the simulation of perceptual states operates in 
a deliberate, conscious fashion, then it can be spelt out in tenns of reflective association. 
* * * 
The main challenge to the essentialist claim that (nonconscious) simulation can be spelt out 
in tenns of either (automatic) association or appraisal can be described as the argument 
from design. Although in retrospect it seems reasonable for us to refer to some of our 
emotional states as 'isomorphisms' of a target person's emotional states - operating in a 
largely 'offline' fashion, and so forth - the sceptic might argue that the term 'simulation' 
implies something altogether stronger: namely, that the emotional states in question have 
been brought about in order to replicate those of the target person. The question, then, is 
how do we extract the required element of design from the proceedings? 
Although evolution by natural selection is emphatically non-teleological - that is, 
entirely devoid of goals and purpose - evolutionary theory allows us to sever the link 
between the notion of 'design' and human intention. Whether or not we regard our 
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emotional states as 'simulations' of the target person's emotional states is ultimately 
dependent, perhaps, on whether we regard the capacity in question as a 'deliberate' design 
feature or an 'accidental' byproduct: viz., was the capacity selected primarily to give us an 
adaptive understanding (etc.) of other people's emotional lives (in which case our 
emotional states can be classified as 'simulations' proper), or is the capacity merely a by-
product of an emotion system whose automaticity was selected primarily to give us an 
adaptive headstart in a competitive environment (in which case the generation of 
'isomorphic' emotional states is merely an end-result of non-discriminatory processes)? It 
goes without saying that this is an open question. 
Given, then, that we cannot extract the required element of design from the 
evolutionary account with any degree of certainty, we may need to look in a different 
direction altogether; indeed, we may need to appeal to human intention - and the 
consciousness that goes with it - after all. The flip-side of Currie's proposal that most 
simulation is done 'unintentionally' and 'at a subconscious level' is that some simulation is 
done 'intentionally' and 'at a conscious level'. Perhaps, then, we should reserve the term 
'simulation' for those instances in which we intentionally and consciously attempt to 
'imaginatively entertain' perceptions, thoughts, and feelings which are more relevant to the 
target person's situation than our own; that is (conscious) simulation should be regarded as 
'simulation' proper.20 
20 What happens if we deliberately project ourselves into the place of the target person or character? Stotland 
(1969, pp.288-297) found that subjects who were instructed to imagine themselves in the place of a target 
person undergoing (apparently) painful heat treatment (the 'imagine-self' condition) generated greater palmar 
sweating responses and experienced greater anxiety (as measured by self-report) than control subjects who 
were simply instructed to watch the target person (the 'watch-other' condition). 
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Table 5.9: A tertiary solution: the relationship between automatic and reflective processing 
(1) automatic processing (2) reflective processing constraints imposed by 
(1) on (2) * 
(1) associative network automatic association reflective association affective prompting. 
route (emotional imagery) critical instigation 
(2) cognitive appraisal automatic appraisal reflective appraisal motivational prompting. 
route (primary appraisal) (reappraisal) critical instigation 
emergent result of (nonconscious) simulation (conscious) simulation 
(1) and/or (2) ** [= simulation proper?] 
N.B. This scheme does not make a distinction between central and acentral imagining: 
according to the argument outlined above, this distinction is primarily dependent on the 
information provided by the film-maker as opposed to the automatic and reflective 
processing undertaken by the viewer. 
(b) Further applications 
Although the scenes from Psycho and Mamie are brief instances which centre on the 
feeling of anxiety alone, the account of empathy and sympathy described above is intended 
to be applicable across the board; i.e., to different narratives from different films involving 
different emotions. One of the ways in which the account can be regarded is as an 
argument for the primacy of alignment; that is, an attempt to acknowledge the importance 
of the information presented by the film-maker. 
(i) The case of the unfaithful spouse 
Suppose that after the journey on the train described previously - during which we 
encounter the anxious stranger - we meet up with a friend at a restaurant. During dinner, 
our friend informs us that a mutual acquaintance is being betrayed by an unfaithful spouse. 
This type of case is described by Sober and Wilson (1998, p.234). They distinguish 
empathy from sympathy, by proposing a certain conception of sympathy: 'Suppose Walter 
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discovers that Wendy is being deceived by her sexually promiscuous husband. Walter may 
sympathize with Wendy, but this is not because Wendy feels hurt and betrayed.'21 
What would happen, though, if we watched a cinematic version of the case in 
question? In Adrian Lyne's Fatal Attraction (1987) - see Frame 5.11 - we are not aligned 
with the ' betrayed' wife Beth Gallagher (played by Anne Archer); rather, the first half of 
the film focuses on the affair between the ' sexually promiscuous' husband Dan (Michael 
Douglas) and the femme fatale Alex Forrest (Glenn Close). In this instance, it is plausible 
that our empathetic responses for the latter would interfere with the development and 
attribution of our sympathetic responses for the former. 
Frame 5.11: The case oftbe unfaitbful spouse: Fatal Attrac.1ion (1987) 
(ii) The case of the condemned murderer 
This point can be developed considering a less standard example. Suppose that we pick up 
a newspaper which someone has left on the adjacent table. Our interest is caught by an 
article about a man who is on death row for committing rape and murder. The question is : 
do we sympathise with the family of the victims or the perpetrator of the crimes? When 
reading a written account - which only provides us with ('degraded') symbolic information 
_ we are sufficiently removed from the two sides to eliminate 'parallel' (i.e., empathetic) 
responses from the equation. In light of this, classifying our response to the parents of the 
victims as, say, ' sympathetic', and our response to the murderer and as, say, ' antipathetic ' 
21 In reply, Nichols (2001 , pp.431-433) points out that 'a sophisticated empathy account can casily 
accommodate their case by claiming that we usc our imagination to empathize with what Wendy would feel 
if she were to discover his infidelity.' 
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may be relatively straightforward. (Notice, however, that this classification pivots on a 
conception of sympathy and antipathy as primarily cognitive states.) 
What would happen, though, if we watched a cinematic version of the case in 
question? A potential example is provided by Tim Robbins's controversial 1995 film Dead 
Man Walking (see Frame 5.12) - also discussed by Smith (1997, pp.424-425). Matthew 
Poncelet (Sean Penn) is on death row for the rape and murder of a young couple; he is 
befriended by Sister Helen Prejean (Susan Sarandon) who offers him spiritual guidance 
and support, whilst attempting to gain a stay of execution from the law courts. In a strict 
sense, what is unusual about our experience as viewers is not the fact that we may find 
ourselves empathising (and sympathising) with both the parents of the victims and 
Ponce let as the alleged perpetrator; according to the above account, this follows 
automatically from the processing of the information with which we are presented. Rather, 
what is unusual is the fact that we are presented with detailed information - perceptual as 
well as symbolic - from both of the sides in question. As one of the parents says bitterly to 
Sister Prejean, "I'm sure you've seen a side to Matt Poncelet that none of us has seen." 
From our perspective, one of the most interesting scenes comes towards the end of 
the film. Poncelet breaks down in tears as he confesses to Sister Prejean that he is guilty of 
the crimes of which he is accused. In terms of attention and duration, this scene conforms 
to Plantinga's (1999) criteria for a 'scene of empathy'. Our empathetic response to 
Poncelet need not be considered as an example of 'perverse allegiance': to use Smith's 
phrase, we empathise with Poncelet 'in spite of his acts. What is more, this 'in spite of 
can be spelt out in reasonably concrete terms: the associative and appraisive processes in 
operation may be 'encapsulated' with respect to our knowledge, and moral evaluation, of 
Poncelet's character (his racist tendencies, for example) and the horrific nature of his 
crimes. In addition, our empathetic response may also stem from a certain cognitive 
limitation - a 'failure of the imagination', as it were - for it is only at the film's conclusion 
that we are shown a flashback of Poncelet and his partner committing the aforementioned 
crimes. 
337 
Frame 5.12: Tbe case of tbe condemned murderer: Dead Man Walking (1995) 
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6.1 SOLVING THE PARADOXES OF FICTION, REPRESENTATION, AND EMPATHY 
(a) The associative network route to (cinematic) emotion 
(i) Automatic association 
(ii) Reflective association 
(b) The cognitive appraisal route 
(i) Automatic appraisal 
(ii) Reflective appraisal 
(c) The simulative route 
(i) Nonconscious simulation 
(ii) Conscious simulation 
6.2 ASKING FURTHER QUESTIONS 
(a) Different films (and different emotions) 
(i) PrimalY (basic) emotions 
(ii) Secondary (complex) emotions 
(b) Different viewers 
(i) Universal versus personal associations 
(ii) Universal versus personal appraisals 
(c) Different paradigms 
(i) A prophylaxis against theory 




The project has focused on the paradox of emotiona l re ponses to fiction : the conundrum 
of how and why we respond emotionally to fictional characters and events, when ware 
consciously aware of their fictional (i.e., non-existent) tatus. In addition the pr ~ e t has 
addressed a series of related paradoxes from both perceptual and emotional per pe tives: 
the paradox of representation is concerned with the conundrum of how and why we 
perceive characters and events which are not physically present, whil t the paradox f 
empathy is concerned with the conundrum of how and why we respond emotionally t the 
fate of people who exist separately - in physical , kindred, and platonic terms - from 
ourselves. 
The main strategy for solving all three paradoxes has been to reVI e th third 
proposition by removing existence beliefs - along with presence and relevan e b lief: -
from the perceptual and emotional equations. In the first part of this concluding chapter, I 
will outline the three main routes to (cinematic) emotion and the possible relations between 
them; for each route, my aim will be show how it operates independently of existen e 
beliefs. In the second part of the chapter, I will provide suggestions for future re earch by 
asking a number of further questions. 
6.1 SOLVING THE PARADOXES OF FICTION, REPRESENTATION, AND EMPATHY 
(a) The associative network route to (cinematic) emotion 
The first route to real world and cinematic emotion has been described a the as ociative 
network route (see Figure 6.1). The impact of emotional stimuli has been illustrated by 
considering film scenes in which a character is confronted by some sort of threat: 
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representative examples include Indiana Jones being confronted by a venomous rattlesnake 
in Raiders o/the Lost Ark, Ripley being confronted by the monster in Alien, and a young 
soldier lying wounded on Omaha Beach in Saving Private Ryan. The impact of emotion 
cues, on the other hand, has been illustrated by considering the opening scene from Jaws in 
which the Watkins girl is confronted by an unseen shark. 
The associative network route may operate in either a direct or an indirect fashion, 
corresponding to automatic and reflective processing respectively: from a neurobiological 
and a connectionist perspective, both perception and imagination involve the same regions 
of the mind/brain, or, to use Damasio's terms, they are both realised in the same 'image 
space'. 
(i) A utomatic association 
Starting with the direct version, association can be understood as an automatic process 
which begins with the external world of the film: the principal elicitors of emotion are 
individual stimuli and multiple cues. In this instance, the absence of existence beliefs is 
compensated by the presence of shallow inputs. From a neurobiological perspective, 
shallow inputs resulting from the perceptual processing of an emotional stimulus (the so-
called 'key') activate 'emotion induction sites' - in certain subcortical regions of the brain -
which are 'preset' to respond to that particular class of stimulus (the 'lock'): in other 
words, the emotional impact of a stimulus can be explained in terms of the associative 
matching of a perceptual pattern with some sort of 'template' in the emotion system. From 
a connectionist perspective, shallow inputs resulting from the perceptual processing of 
emotion cues result in the activation of input nodes (or perceptual memories) and event 
nodes (or episodic memories) in an associative network; both processes can be understood 
in terms of parallel constraint satisfaction. 
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Table 6.1: Automatic association 
induction stage reliance on existence beliefs? 
(site of activation) 
(1) associative connections subcortical regions no: partial encapsulation / 
(neurobiology) (emotion-induction sites) lock-and-key analogy 
(2) associative networks input nodes (perceptual memories) no: partial encapsulation / 
(connectionism) event nodes (episodic memories) parallel constraint satisfaction 
(ii) Reflective association 
Moving onto the indirect version, association can be understood as a reflective process 
which begins with the internal world of the viewer's mindlbrain: as 'intentional' and 
'conscious' beings, we are capable of imagining the situations depicted by a film from an 
impersonal (acentral) perspective or from the personal (central) perspective of a character. 
Given that such a reflective process is likely to be sensitive to the situation's fictional 
status, the sceptic might argue that we are guilty of 'inconsistency' and 'incoherence'. In 
reply, the imagination theorist might argue that imagination should be understood as the 
capacity to 'entertain a proposition non-assertively' - that is, without existential 
commitment. 
Either way, we still need to understand how such a capacity is constrained by the 
emotional content of the film on the one hand, and the emotional makeup of the viewer on 
the other. In this instance, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the presence 
of affective prompts. Following our initial emotional responses, somato-visceral feedback 
may activate appropriate 'memory structures' and 'thought patterns' in an associative 
network, thereby enabling us to generate emotional imagery in the manner described by 
Lang. Conversely, our capacity to respond emotionally to this imagery may be dependent 
on the instigation of a critical number of associated nodes; a factor which is largely 
determined by the automatic processing already described. 
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Figure 6.1: The associative (network) route to (cinematic) emotion 
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N.B. In the case of automatic association, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by 
(i) the presence of shallow inputs. In the case of reflective association, on the other hand, the 
absence of existence beliefs is compensated by (ii) the presence of affective prompts, which. 
in tum, can be 'traced back' to (i) the presence of shallow inputs. 
(b) The cognitive appraisal route 
The second route to real world and cinematic emotion has been described as the cognitive 
appraisal route (see Figure 6.2). The impact of situational meaning was firstly illustrated 
by considering the scene from The Beach in which the three main characters are confronted 
by a non-existent shark, and secondly illustrated by considering the cases of the protective 
son and the compulsive thief from Psycho and Mamie respectively. Once again, the 
cognitive appraisal route may operate in either a direct or an indirect fashion, 
corresponding to automatic and reflective types of processing respectively: the relationship 
between the two must be understood in primarily cognitive and intentional terms. 
(i) Automatic appraisal 
Starting with the direct version, appraisal can be understood as an automatic process which 
begins with the external world of the film: namely, the primary appraisal of the emotional 
meaning of the depicted situation. In this instance, the absence of existence beliefs is 
compensated by the presence of shallow inputs. From a cognitive perspective, shallow 
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inputs resulting from the perceptual processing of the situation may be filtered to either 
auto-appraisers (as examples of Darwinian modules), or the schematic model level of the 
mind (as an aspect of a multi-level model of the emotion system), thereby 'interfacing' 
with appropriate goal structures. In the case of basic emotions - especially those 
fundamentally related to survival such as fear and disgust - it seems reasonable to say that 
the appropriate goal structures are already 'on standby', readily activated by realistic 
representations. With respect to more complex emotions, on the other hand, the appropriate 
goal structures may need to be activated during the course of the film by means of the 
factors of (close) perceptual access and (sustained) spatio-temporal attachment. 
(Alternatively, goal structures may be constructed as and when needed, by using related 
examples from memory.) 
Table 6.2: Automatic appraisal 
induction stage reliance on existence beliefs I 
(state of goal structures) adoption of goals? 
fear, disgust on standby no: partial encapsulation I 
diegetic effect 
otber emotions not on standby no: partial encapsulation / 
alignment 
N .B. This scheme does not make reference to the notion of' identification'. 
(ii) Reflective appraisal 
Moving onto the indirect version, appraisal can be understood as a reflective process which 
begins with the internal world of the viewer's mindlbrain: as 'intentional' and 'conscious' 
beings, we are capable of (re)appraising the emotional meaning of the depicted situation. 
Given that such a reflective process is likely to be sensitive to the situation's fictional 
status, the sceptic might level the viewer with accusations of irrationality once again. At 
first glance, moreover, it seems that the sceptic really does have a case this time round for 
(re)appraisal cannot be straightforwardly understood as the capacity to 'entertain a 
proposition non-assertively', and so forth. 
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In this instance, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by the presence of 
motivational prompts. Following our initial emotional responses, negative arousal may be 
fed back to the somatosensory regions of the mindlbrain, thereby contributing to an overall 
feeling of anxiety. Considering that we are likely to transfer this arousal/feeling to the 
characters and events on the screen - albeit through some sort of attribution error - the most 
natural way of reducing it is to keep our eyes rooted on the screen and devote our 
conscious (attentive) processing resources to appraising the pros and cons of the situation 
in question, whilst hoping that everything turns out for the best. Conversely, our capacity 
to respond emotionally to this appraisal may be dependent on the emotion system being at 
a critical level of activation; a factor which is largely determined, once again, by the 
automatic processing already described. 
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N.B. In the case of automatic appraisal, the absence of existence beliefs is compensated by 
(i) the presence of shallow inputs. In the case of reflective appraisal, on the other hand, the 
absence of existence beliefs is compensated by (ii) the presence of motivational prompts, 
which, in tum, can be 'traced back' to (i) the presence of shallow inputs. 
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(e) The simulative route 
The third and final route to real world and cinematic emotion has been described as the 
simulative route. Although this route may operate in either a direct or an indirect fashion, 
the key question is: how does it relate to the two routes already described? 
(i) Nonconscious simulation 
The direct versIOn can be understood by making an essentialist claim: if emotional 
simulation operates in an unintentional and nonconscious fashion, begins with the film, and 
successfully bridges the theory/experience gap, then it can be spelt out in terms of either 
automatic association or appraisal (see Table 6.3). Considering this claim, it is possible that 
when we use the term ' simulation', we are actually referring to associative and appraisive 
processes which have already been taken into account. In this type of case, then, perhaps 
the tenn is largely superfluous. 
Table 6.3: The simulative route to (cinematic) emotion: nonconscious simulation 
(1) automatic processing 
(1) associative network route automatic association 
(connections. networks) 
(2) cognitive appraisal route automatic appraisal 
(primary appraisal) 
emergent result of nonconscious simulation 
(1) and/or (2) 
N.B. Nonconscious simulation (highlighted by blue shading) can be thought of as the 
emergent result of automatic association and/or appraisal (dark grey shading) which, 
crucially, operate independently of existence beliefs. 
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(ii) Conscious simulation 
Understanding the indirect version IS more problematic. To begin with, a similar 
essentialist claim can be made: if emotional simulation operates in an intentional and 
conscious fashion, then it can be spelt out in terms of either reflective association or 
reflective appraisal (see Table 6.4). Despite this claim, the sceptic might argue that the 
tenn 'simulation' implies a certain element of design: for instance, a viewer could claim 
that they deliberately generated emotional imagery and/or deliberately (re)appraised the 
meaning of the depicted situation, in order to replicate the mental states of a character. In 
this type of case, then, perhaps the tenn can be used in a legitimate and meaningful sense. 
Table 6.4: The simulative route to (cinematic) emotion: conscious simulation 
(1) automatic processing (2) reflective processing constraints imposed by 
(I) on (2) 
(1) associative network automatic association re1lcdive association affective prompting, 
route (connections, networks) (emotional imagery) critical instigation 
(2) cognitive appraisal automatic appraisal re1lcdive appraisal motivational prompting, 
route (primary appraisal) (reapJnisal) critical instigation 
emergent result of nonconscious simulation conscious simulation 
(1) and/or (2) [= simulation proper?] 
N.B. Conscious simulation (highlighted by blue shading) can be thought of as the emergent 
result of reflective association and/or appraisal (dark grey shading). In turn, each instance of 
reflective processing can be traced back to the influence of automatic processing (light grey 
shading), which, to repeat, operates independently of existence beliefs. 
6.2 ASKING FURTHER QUESTIONS 
(a) Different films (and different emotions) 
In order to develop a multi-level model of the emotion system, the project has focused on 
the primary emotion of fear and the related emotion of anxiety. Similarly, in order to 
control the independent variables, the project has discussed relatively simple examples of 
fear sequences from action, horror, and war films by directors such as Spielberg, and 
relatively minimalist examples of suspense and surprise sequences from the pure cinema of 
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Hitchcock. Having deliberately narrowed the scope of enquiry and simplified the filmic 
examples whenever possible, a first avenue of further research lies in applying the multi-
level model of the emotion system to a wider - and more complex - variety of emotions 
and films. 
(i) Primary (basic) emotions 
Although I have suggested how the multi-level model of the emotion system might be 
applied to the primary emotions of anger, sadness, and happiness, a possible research 
project would be to ascertain whether or not the accounts in question could be developed to 
a higher level of specificity and detail: a possible case study would be the film genre of 
(melo )drama and the emotion of sadness. From a neurobiological perspective, such an 
emotion may be relatively intractable - for a number of reasons already described. From a 
connectionist and functional perspective, however, it is plausible that associative network 
models and appraisal theories of equal specificity and detail could be developed: specific 
research topics might include the types of emotion cues employed by film-makers and the 
role of episodic memories on the one hand, and the types of appraisals performed on the 
other. 
(ii) Secondary (complex) emotions 
As we have seen, primary (basic) emotions can give rise to secondary (complex) emotions 
in at least two ways. First, a primary emotion such as anger may be elaborated by the 
(cognitive) appraisal that, say, 'the object of the anger is a social inferior', thereby 
generating the secondary emotion of indignation. Second, two or more primary 'emotion 
modules' can be combined to produce a secondary emotion: for instance, the 'happiness' 
and 'sadness modules' may give rise to the emotion of nostalgia. In light of these 
principles, another research project would be to demonstrate how relatively simple 
cognitive and affective components - which, crucially, operate independently of existence 
beliefs - might be combined to form emotional states of ever increasing complexity. 
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(b) Different viewers 
Considering that a certain universality of emotional response between viewers has been 
assumed throughout the project, a second avenue of further research lies in accounting for 
personal differences (see Patrick Hogan, 2003, and Greg M. Smith, 2003). Significantly, 
every aspect of the multi-level model of the emotion system - and every stage of the 
emotional process - allows for a certain degree of flexibility. 
(i) Universal versus personal associations 
To what extent does one viewer's filmic associations resemble another's, and to what 
extent do they differ? Starting with universal similarities, some of the connections in the 
associative network have been 'biologically prepared' over the course of human evolution: 
examples include the connections between either the 'snake' or 'spider node' and the 'fear 
node'. In the extreme case of the ophidio- or arachnophobic, the connections between the 
respective nodes may be strongly weighted. (The process of desensitization may involve 
the weakening of these connections.) Moving on to personal differences, other connections 
in the associative network - probably the majority - are established during the individual's 
lifetime through socio-cultural experience: for instance, a film panned by the critics might 
nevertheless elicit a reasonably profound response in a viewer by using a partiCUlar 
location which uniquely related to an emotive event from their past. The impact of 
personal differences may be minimised, however, by a high level of emotional redundancy: 
if emotion cue I fails to activate a node in the associative network of viewer A, then 
emotion cue 2 may succeed, and if cue 2 fails with respect to viewer B, then cue I may 
succeed, and so forth. 
(iO Universal versus personal appraisals 
To what extent is one viewer's appraisal of a film's situational meaning similar to, and 
different from, another's? According to appraisal theory, each type of emotion corresponds 
to a particular 'person-environment relationship'; each type of situational (or relational) 
meaning corresponds to a core relational theme. With respect to film viewing, the 
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environmental variables are provided by the 'pseudoenvironment' of the film, whilst the 
personal variables are provided by the viewer themselves. This suggests the following 
possibility. The more a situation depicted by a film refers to a core relational theme from 
either human evolutionary history (phylogeny) or contemporary human experience 
(ontogeny) - and the more it relates to human survival - the greater the likelihood that a 
corresponding appraisal pattern already exists in the viewer (and exists universally). If this 
is the case, then the appraisal of situational meaning can be performed automatically and is 
likely to be similar from one viewer to another. Conversely, the more a depicted situation 
departs from a core relational theme, the lesser the likelihood that a corresponding 
appraisal pattern already exists. If this is the case, then the appraisal of situational meaning 
may require the flexibility and sophistication afforded by reflection, and with these 
properties comes the possibility that appraisal will be different from one viewer to the 
other. 
(c) Different paradigms 
Having focused on what could be described as 'subpersonal' (nonconscious) mechanisms 
and processes for the majority of the project, a third avenue for future research lies in 
recognizing the level of the person (and the role of consciousness). Rather than proposing a 
series of research questions, however, it seems fitting to address this issue - and conclude 
the overall project - by acknowledging what I regard as the most potentially significant 
opposition to the project as it stands: a way of thinking which began with Wittgenstein, 
which is implicit in Radford's original discussion of the paradox of fiction, and which has 
been recently revived in the field of art and film theory. 
(i) A prophylaxis against theory 
In their introduction to Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts, Richard Allen and Malcolm 
Turvey (2001) attempt to apply what they describe as 'a prophylaxis against theory'.' 
I The following discussion will take Allen and Turvey's interpretation of Wittgenstein - as opposed to 
Wittgenstein himself - as its starting point. 
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Following Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy, Allen and Turvey begin by making a 
distinction between - and thereby segregating - two paradigms (see Table 6.5). The first 
paradigm is the natural sciences. The main objective of the natural sciences is to explain 
'empirical phenomena', whilst the principal method of investigation is described as theory. 
The authors propose that theories possess two basic features: first, in order to uni fy 
'apparently diverse phenomena', they appeal to an 'underlying principle'; and second, this 
underlying principle is usually 'hidden from view'. (Alternatively, this method can be 
described as 'causal explanation'.) The second paradigm is philosophy. The main subject-
matter of philosophy is 'questions of sense and meaning', whilst the principal method of 
investigation is conceptual clarification. In contrast to theory, conceptual clarification is 
concerned with what is 'already in place' and 'open to view'. (This method leads to 
'justificatory explanation'.) 
In the second part of their introduction, Allen and Turvey describe a fundamental 
shift in Wittgenstein's thinking. Although Wittgenstein's early philosophy - notably, the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - acknowledged the distinction between the natural 
sciences and philosophy, it relied on theory in the following sense: in order to account for 
the nature of human language, it appealed to an underlying principle (or structure) which 
was hidden from view. In contrast, Wittgenstein's later philosophy - notably, the 
Philosophical Investigations - rejects theory altogether. In light of this, Allen and Turvey 
advance two main arguments. The first argument concerns the autonomy oj linguistic 
meaning. The meaning of psychological concepts cannot refer to neurobiological, 
connectionist, or cognitive processes; i.e., causal processes which are hidden from view 
(and not apparent to the language user). If they did refer to such processes, then 'language 
users would not be able to employ them in the fIrst place.' (p.13) Instead, the meaning of 
psychological concepts is determined by their use in everyday life; factors which are 
decidedly open to view (but which need to be drawn out in various ways). The second 
argument concerns the distinction between reasons and causes. The authors apply the 
lessons of human language to the domain of human psychology and intentional (rule-
governed) behaviour: 'Just as the meaning of a word cannot be unknown to the language 
user who uses it correctly ... the reason for an agent's action cannot be unknown to the 
agent in the way that a cause is.' (p.16) According to this argument, a reason is typically 
'authoritative and complete': it can be cited by an agent in order to justify acting in such 
and such a way. 
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Table 6.5: Segregating paradigms 
subject matter principal method of 
(hidden from I open to view) Investigation 
causes: 
paradigm 1: neurobiological, 'theory' 
natural sciences connectionist, (causal explanation) 
cognitive 
(i) meaning: 
paradigm 2: psychological concepts conceptual clarification 
philosophy (ii) reasons: (justificatory explanation) 
intentional (rule-governed) behaviour 
(ii) A theory against prophylaxis 
According to Allen and Turvey, the preceding project overplays the role of subpersonal 
mechanisms and processes: it offers an explanation of how we perceive and respond 
emotionally to fiction film. Conversely, the project underplays the role of the person: the 
project should be offering ajustification for why we respond in the way we do. (We cannot 
illuminate the nature of our perceptual and emotional relationship to film - and related 
forms of audiovisual media - by appealing to neurobiological, connectionist, and cognitive 
levels of explanation.) In reply, let us attempt to apply what could be described as 'a theory 
against prophylaxis' by addressing each of their key arguments in turn. 
Argument 1: the autonomy of linguistic meaning. For the sake of argument, let us 
assume that linguistic meaning is autonomous in the way described: that is, referring to 
psychological mechanisms and processes cannot clarify the meaning of a psychological 
concept such as the verb 'to see'; this meaning is constituted entirely by the way we use 
the concept in everyday life. In spite of this assumption, two points can be made. First, the 
autonomy of linguistic meaning - as a philosophical constraint on our understanding - need 
not be final (see Figure 6.3). As we have seen, it seems reasonable to suggest that referring 
to Fodorian modules improves our understanding of Wittgenstein's notion of 'regarding-
as' (in relation to our perception of the Jastrow duck-rabbit), whilst referring to central 
processing improves our understanding of his notion of 'seeing-as' (in relation to our 
perception of the Pole Star). In light of this Fodorian reading, moreover, it seems 
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reasonable to claim that a philosopher who applied the notion of 'seeing-as ' to our 
perception of the picture-face would be incorrect in some significant respect. (Similarly, 
with respect to the seeing theory, the research of LeDoux suggests that Turvey 's 
employment of the notion of 'regarding-as' conflates perception with emotion on the one 
hand, and should be counter-balanced by the notion of ' seeing-a ' - which brings in the 
role of central processing - on the otherl 
Figure 6.3: Challenging the autonomy of linguistic meaning 
conceptual 
clarification: theory: 
(I) regarding-as ---------. ~ .--------- Fodorian modularity 
seeing-as ---------. .--------- central processing 
(II) 
or .--------- Fodorian modularity 
f 
seeing-as? decisive factor 
Argument 2: the distinction between reasons and causes. For the sake of argument, 
let us assume that the 'reasons' we cite - at the personal level - in order to ju tify our 
actions and feelings must be based on factors which are readily available to us; they cannot 
refer to 'causes' - at the subpersonal level - which are unknown. In spite of thi 
assumption, it does not follow that the factors in question are the correct ones. This point 
could be illustrated by citing a multitude of psychological experiments; perhaps the most 
2 In addition, the autonomy of linguistic meaning - as an example of a humanistic phenomenon - may not be 
generalizable. It is plausible that the majority of humanistic practices - including the ritual of film viewing _ 
are constituted only in part by conventions, rules, and so forth. In a related fashion, the project has not been 
concerned with psychological concepts per se; rather, it is has been concerned with a psychological 
phenomenon - namely, our perceptual and emotional engagement with film - which, in a certnin sense, exists 
independently of the viewer and their use of language. 
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relevant and vivid examples come from Gazzaniga and LeDoux's research on split-brain 
subjects cited previously (see Figure 6.4). 
To recap, Gazzaniga and LeDoux presented either an emotional stimulus or an 
instruction to act to the subject's right hemisphere - the side ofthe brain usually associated 
with visuo-spatial capacities - but not to the left hemisphere - the side usually associated 
with language and thought. On the one hand, the non-conscious operations of the right 
hemisphere - assessing the emotional significance of the stimulus and responding to the 
instruction to act - are explicable in tenns of causes. On the other hand, the conscious 
operations of the left hemisphere - continually providing a narrative for why the subject 
feels and acts the way they do - are explicable in tenns of reasons. The significant point is 
that the findings of split-brain research can be extended to nonnal subjects, and the 
distinction between nonconscious and conscious processing: they suggest that on many 
occasions the reasons we offer for our feelings and actions are neither 'authoritative' nor 
'complete' - indeed, they are often entirely erroneous - whilst our appeals to reasons 
should be ultimately replaced by appeals to causes. Although Allen and Turvey might 
object that the notion of an 'incorrect' or 'unknown reason' is a contradiction in terms, this 
objection rests ultimately on an arbitrary definition. 
This challenge to the distinction between reasons and causes can be extended to the 
film viewer by considering two basic questions. The first question concerns actions: "Why 
did you go to see the film in question?" Given that Allen and Turvey would regard our 
decision to view, say, a horror film as a straightforward instance of an intentional (rule-
governed) behaviour, they might consider reasons along the lines of, "I am a fan of the 
horror genre, the director, the principal actor, and so forth." Although these reasons might 
be largely 'authoritative' and 'complete', it is plausible that our decision would be 
influenced by causal mechanisms and processes which are largely unknown: according to 
the organizational hypothesis, for instance, film viewing plays a significant role in the 
organization of our emotion system. 
The second, and decisive, question concerns the emotions: "Why did you respond 
to the film in such-and-such a way?" Our emotional engagement with film is clearly of 
interest to Allen and Turvey who both address the paradox of fiction in their work; with 
respect to the current discussion, they might consider reasons along the line of, "I found 
the film frightening and/or disgusting", or by pointing to the frightening and disgusting 
features of the proverbial monster. A less trivial and more complete answer, however, 
would not lead us to a straightforward instance of intentional (rule-governed) behaviour: 
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our capacity to respond emotionally to the film would be primarily dependent upon, and 
constrained by, the causal mechanisms and processes described above. This point can be 
made most concisely and forcefully by reiterating that the induction stage of the emotional 
process would be mediated by the subcortical regions of the central nervous system, whilst 
the response stage would be mediated by the involuntary branch of the peripheral nervous 
system; in other words, those parts of the nervous system which are 'below' and 'beyond' 
intentionality and consciousness. It should be reiterated, however, that our emotional 
responses might be shaped by social, cultural, and gender-specific display rules (which are 
readily available to us) and either reduced or increased by certain detachment and 
engagement strategies (which are initiated at the level of the person); topics for future 
research, then, include the clarification of the rules and strategies in question. 








Having challenged each of the main arguments, I should state that I do not expect a 
committed Wittgensteinian to be entirely, or even partially, convinced; I will conclude, 
therefore, by offering the basic intuition (see Table 6.6). Although Wittgenstein 
acknowledges the role of the brain and the nervous system, Radford acknowledges the role 
of 'brute facts' and 'biological reasons', and Allen and Turvey acknowledge the role of 
causal processes with respect to certain types of perception, it is possible that they quite 
simply underestimate the importance - and the pervasive influence - of the factors in 
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question; their habit of treating the person as a separate entity, therefore, amounts to a fonn 
of Cartesianism in all but name. Alternatively, the subpersonal (nonconscious) and the 
personal (conscious) - the respective domains of causal and justificatory explanations - are 
so interdependent that their segregation is untenable in a pragmatic, if not a strictly 
philosophical, sense. In light of this, the most viable line of enquiry is to engage in the type 
of enterprise which has characterised this entire project: only through integrating the 
paradigms of the natural sciences and philosophy, only through integrating 
neurobiological, connectionist, cognitive, and intentional levels of explanation, and only 
through integrating theory and conceptual clarification will we be able to reach a full 
understanding of our perceptual, cognitive, and emotional relationship to film and other 
forms of audiovisual media. 
Table 6.6: Integrating paradigms 
level of explanation conceptual integration 
(i) neurobiological 
(1) subpersonal (ii) connectionist 'theory' 
(nonconscious) (iii) cognitive (causal explanation) 
.. _--------------------------------
(iv) intentional (future research): 
(2) personal display rules, clarification of rules / strategies 
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